Also known as: aliens · alienage · alienigena · alienus · foreigner · noncitizen
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person who resides within the borders of a country but is not a citizen or subject of that country. The person was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States, is subject to some foreign government, and has not been naturalized under U.S. law.
Anthony Arnold, a foreign national captured abroad and designated an enemy combatant, was held indefinitely at a U.S. military facility. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to contest the factual basis for his detention and to introduce newly discovered exculpatory evidence. The court permitted the petition because no adequate substitute review process existed that allowed him to challenge the President's detention authority and seek release.
Arthur Abrams, a citizen of Mexico lawfully admitted for permanent residence, was domiciled in the Eastern District of Texas. He was sued there by a foreign corporation for breach of a supply contract exceeding $75,000. Venue was proper in that district because the statute treats him as residing where he is domiciled for all venue purposes.
Alice Atkins, a citizen of Canada, filed a contract suit in federal court against a U.S. citizen. At the moment of filing she remained a Canadian domiciliary, satisfying alienage diversity. Three months later she obtained a green card and moved to the same state as the defendant. The court retained jurisdiction because citizenship is fixed at the time the action is instituted.
Aaron Adams, a lawful permanent resident from India, applied for Medicare benefits after only four years of residence. Federal regulations denied coverage because he lacked the required five years of permanent residence. The classification survived review because Congress holds plenary power over immigration and the rule was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
Andrew Avery, a three-year resident alien, was denied a state teaching license under a citizenship requirement. The court applied rational-basis review to the state classification and upheld the rule because the state possesses authority to condition certain positions on citizenship status.
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
View caseAudrey Ashton, charged with unlawful possession of land, asserted that she was a U.S. citizen as a defense. The prosecution introduced evidence that she was born abroad and subject to a foreign government. The court placed the burden on her to prove citizenship once the government showed facts placing her in a class ineligible for citizenship.
On December 27, 1970, Gordon Patterson shot and killed John Northrup in Glens Falls, New York. After a brief and unstable marriage, Patterson had become estranged from his wife Roberta. Roberta had resumed an association with Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged before her marriage to Patterson. Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in Northrup's presence. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head. Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. At his jury trial in Warren County Court, Patterson raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and presented psychiatric evidence tending to show that he had been extremely emotionally disturbed when he killed Northrup. The jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime of murder. The defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicted Patterson of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur. The New York Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed, distinguishing the Maine statute at issue in Mullaney and holding that New York's allocation of the burden of proof on the affirmative defense was consistent with due process. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the burden of proof placed on the defendant by New York law is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseA lawful permanent resident alien is treated as a citizen of the state in which the alien is domiciled when suing or being sued by a citizen of that same state. This statutory exception prevents use of alienage jurisdiction for essentially local disputes. Domicile requires both physical presence and intent to remain indefinitely, shown by objective acts such as home purchase, voter registration, and driver's license issuance.
No. Diversity or alienage jurisdiction is measured at the time the complaint is filed. Later naturalization, change of domicile, or merger does not divest jurisdiction that attached when the suit was instituted.
Federal alienage classifications receive rational-basis review because Congress holds plenary power over immigration. A five-year residency requirement for benefits is valid if not arbitrary or unreasonable.
Congress may not categorically deny review without providing a meaningful substitute. Any substitute must permit the detainee to challenge the President's authority to detain, contest fact-finding, introduce newly discovered exculpatory evidence, and seek release.
…and Nationality Act of 1952 authorized the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend deportation of certain deportable aliens. It required that the Attorney General’s decision be reported to Congress, and provided that either House of Congress, by resolution, could veto the Attorney General’s decision to allow the…