Also known as: advisory juries
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A jury empaneled to hear a case when the parties have no right to a jury trial. The judge may accept or reject the advisory jury's verdict.
Abigail Alvarez sued Atlas Ventures in federal court for breach of an investment agreement seeking only equitable relief. The judge empaneled an advisory jury to hear the evidence. After the verdict the court entered its own findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record and entered judgment under Rule 58.
Anthony Arnold brought unseaworthiness and Jones Act claims against Apex Dynamics. The court allowed the jury to decide the Jones Act claim while treating its answers on the unseaworthiness claim as advisory only. The judge then independently weighed the evidence on the admiralty count before entering judgment.
In October 1953 Francisco Romero, a Spanish subject, signed on as a crew member of the S.S. Guadalupe, a vessel of Spanish registry owned by the Spanish corporation Compania Trasatlantica. Romero continued to serve on the Guadalupe after the initial voyage, so that under Spanish law the original contract of hire remained in force. The ship sailed from Bilbao, touched other Spanish ports, proceeded to New York and Hoboken, made a brief trip to Vera Cruz and Havana, and returned to Hoboken. On May 12, 1954, while the vessel lay in Hoboken, Romero was struck by a cable on deck and seriously injured. Romero filed suit on the law side of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against four corporate defendants. He asserted Jones Act and general maritime claims for unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and maritime tort against Compania Trasatlantica and its New York husbanding agent Garcia & Diaz, Inc. He asserted maritime-tort claims against stevedore International Terminal Operating Co. and carpenter Quin Lumber Co., both of which were performing work aboard the Guadalupe under oral contracts with Garcia & Diaz. Jurisdiction was invoked under the Jones Act and under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. After a pre-trial hearing the district court dismissed the entire complaint. It held that the Jones Act supplied no right of action against the foreign shipowner, that § 1331 did not confer jurisdiction over general maritime claims, that Garcia & Diaz was not Romero's employer, and that complete diversity was lacking under Strawbridge v. Curtiss. The court also declined to exercise discretionary admiralty jurisdiction after examining Spanish law, which provided Romero a lifetime pension of 35 to 55 percent of his wages plus maintenance and cure enforceable through the Spanish consul. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of conflicts among the circuits concerning the construction of § 1331 and the applicability of Lauritzen v. Larsen to the facts presented.
View caseAnika Anand sought an injunction against Apollo Energy for securities violations. Because the action was equitable the court denied a jury demand but seated an advisory jury to assist with factual questions. The judge accepted some findings and rejected others before issuing the injunction.
Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., and eleven of its officers and directors issued a proxy statement in connection with a merger between Parklane and another corporation. Leo Shore, a stockholder of Parklane, filed a class action on behalf of stockholders in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against Parklane and the individual defendants. The complaint alleged that the proxy statement was false and misleading in violation of sections 14(a), 10(b), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and related SEC rules. The complaint sought damages for the class, rescission of the merger, and recovery of costs. Before Shore’s action came to trial, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a separate suit against the same defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The SEC complaint alleged that the proxy statement that had been issued by Parklane was materially false and misleading in essentially the same respects as those that had been alleged in the respondent's complaint. After a four-day trial, the District Court found that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading in the respects alleged, and entered a declaratory judgment to that effect. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from further violations of the securities laws and ordered them to offer rescission to shareholders who had tendered shares. The defendants did not appeal this judgment. Shore then moved for partial summary judgment in the Eastern District of New York action, asserting that the defendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues resolved against them in the SEC action. The District Court denied the motion on the ground that application of collateral estoppel would deny the defendants their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a party who has had issues of fact determined against him after a full and fair opportunity to litigate in a nonjury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a subsequent jury trial of these same issues of fact. Because of an intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rachal v. Hill, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseAva Andrews sued Apex Partners for an accounting and constructive trust over disputed partnership assets. The court denied a jury demand because the claim was equitable but empaneled an advisory jury to resolve factual disputes about asset tracing. The judge adopted some answers and rejected others before entering judgment.
In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history. The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.
View caseAvalon Pharmaceuticals sued Spur Industries for creating a nuisance that threatened its development plans. The court tried the equitable claim to the bench and used an advisory jury to resolve disputed facts about the scope of the harm. The judge adopted some of the jury's answers and rejected others before granting injunctive relief.
In 1956, Spur’s predecessors in interest developed feedlots about ½ mile south of Olive Avenue in an area between the confluence of the usually dry Agua Fria and New Rivers, some 14 to 15 miles west of the urban area of Phoenix. By April and May of 1959, the Northside Hay Mill was feeding between 6,000 and 7,000 head of cattle and Welborn approximately 1,500 head on a combined area of 35 acres. In 1960, Spur purchased the property and expanded the feedlot operation from approximately thirty-five acres to one hundred fourteen acres by 1962, eventually maintaining between twenty thousand and thirty thousand head of cattle at the time of trial. Del E. Webb Development Co. began planning Sun City, a retirement community, in May 1959 after purchasing twenty thousand acres of farmland for fifteen million dollars. Construction of a golf course started that September. Homes were first offered in January 1960. The first residents moved in during 1960. By the time of trial, Sun City had a population of approximately fourteen thousand people, and the development had extended south to within five hundred feet of Spur's feedlot north of Olive Avenue. Residents of Sun City began complaining about odors and flies from the feedlot, which produced over a million pounds of wet manure per day, and Webb encountered sales resistance starting around 1963 in the southwestern portion of the development. Webb attempted to buy the feedlot from Spur but the parties could not agree on a price. Webb then filed suit alleging that the feedlot was a public nuisance because flies and odors drifted over the southern portion of Sun City, rendering in excess of one thousand three hundred lots unfit for residential development. The trial court, after proceedings that included an advisory jury later discharged and special actions in the Arizona Supreme Court, found the feedlot to be a nuisance, permanently enjoined its operation, and awarded damages to Webb. Spur appealed from the injunction and the damages award, while Webb cross-appealed from the trial court's refusal to award attorneys' fees. During the appeal process, Spur agreed to and did shut down its operation without prejudice to the final determination.
View caseA federal court may empanel an advisory jury when no constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial exists or has been waived. The device is commonly invoked in equity proceedings and certain hybrid admiralty cases.
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No. The judge remains free to accept or reject the advisory jury's verdict in whole or in part and must independently find the facts and state conclusions of law under Rule 52(a)(1).
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Yes. The rule expressly requires the court to find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately in any action tried without a jury or with an advisory jury.
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A binding jury decides facts in actions at law where the Seventh Amendment right applies and its verdict controls subject only to limited post-trial review. An advisory jury supplies recommendations that the judge may disregard entirely.
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…at all about his likely sentencing decision. Id., at 62. Counsel advised respondent to invoke his right under Florida law to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing. Respondent rejected the advice and waived the right. He chose instead to be sentenced by the trial judge without a jury recommendation. In preparing for…