Also known as: adequate representation · adequately represented · effective assistance of counsel
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A prerequisite for class certification and derivative litigation requiring that named representatives and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of absent class members or the corporation. The inquiry focuses on the absence of conflicts between the representatives and the group they seek to represent as well as the competence and resources of counsel.
A prerequisite for class certification and derivative litigation requiring that named representatives and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of absent class members or the corporation. The inquiry focuses on the absence of conflicts between the representatives and the group they seek to represent as well as the competence and resources of counsel.
Adrian Aguilar filed a class action challenging a state residency requirement for divorce. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court Aguilar had satisfied the residency rule, yet the Court examined whether the named plaintiff could still adequately represent the class of similarly situated persons. The analysis turned on whether the interests of absent class members remained aligned with those of the representative.
The constitutional guarantee under the Sixth Amendment that defense counsel's performance will not so undermine the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon to have produced a just result. Counsel must provide reasonably effective assistance and may not assist the client in committing perjury.
Albert Allen was convicted after his lawyer declined to object to plainly inadmissible hearsay emails and waived closing argument because the lawyer believed the judge had already decided the case. Allen later sought postconviction relief claiming the omissions deprived him of adequate representation. The court measured whether the lawyer's conduct so undermined the adversarial process that the trial could not be trusted to have produced a just result.
The constitutional guarantee under the Sixth Amendment that defense counsel's performance will not so undermine the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon to have produced a just result. Counsel must provide reasonably effective assistance and may not assist the client in committing perjury.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.
View caseArthur Abrams sought to intervene in an employment discrimination suit brought by a class of workers. The existing class representatives had reached a settlement that would bind all class members. Abrams argued that the representatives' interests conflicted with his own because the settlement released claims he wished to pursue separately. The court evaluated whether the existing parties provided adequate representation before denying intervention.
In 1974 and 1975, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board. They alleged racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in public service jobs including the fire department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal law. After a bench trial in 1976 on some issues and a second trial in 1979 focused on promotion practices but before judgment, the parties negotiated two consent decrees. One was between the black individuals and the City, and the other was between them and the Board. These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters and goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department. The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings. Notice of the hearings with a reference to the general nature of the decrees was published in two local newspapers. At that hearing the Birmingham Firefighters Association appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing but before final approval the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights. The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees in August 1981. Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees. The District Court denied relief. Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal in 1983. A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board. They alleged that because of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law. The Board and the City admitted making race-conscious employment decisions but argued that the decisions were required by the consent decrees. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss after trial, concluding that the promotions of the black individuals were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the Wilks respondents were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988.
View caseAlan Ackerman and other policyholders sued an insurer alleging a uniform practice of denying certain claims. They moved for class certification on behalf of thousands of similarly situated insureds. The court first determined whether the proposed representatives and their counsel could fairly and adequately protect the interests of absent class members before addressing predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3).
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A., provided medical care to Sonia E. Galvez for injuries she suffered in an automobile accident. As partial payment for that care, Galvez assigned to Shady Grove her rights to insurance benefits under a policy issued in New York by Allstate Insurance Co. Shady Grove tendered a claim for the assigned benefits to Allstate, which under New York law had 30 days to pay the claim or deny it. Allstate apparently paid, but not on time, and it refused to pay the statutory interest that accrued on the overdue benefits at two percent per month. Shady Grove filed this diversity suit in the Eastern District of New York to recover the unpaid statutory interest. Alleging that Allstate routinely refuses to pay interest on overdue benefits, Shady Grove sought relief on behalf of itself and a class of all others to whom Allstate owes interest. The individual claim was worth roughly $500, which fell far short of the amount-in-controversy requirement for individual suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The District Court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 901(b), which precludes a suit to recover a penalty from proceeding as a class action, applies in diversity suits in federal court despite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Concluding that statutory interest is a penalty under New York law, it held that § 901(b) prohibited the proposed class action.
View case2 common questions
The court must determine that the named representatives and class counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. This requires the absence of conflicts between the representatives and absent members and that counsel possesses the competence and resources to prosecute the action vigorously.
Typicality focuses on whether the representatives' claims arise from the same course of conduct and legal theory as the class claims. Adequacy examines whether the representatives and counsel will vigorously protect absent members without conflicts and with sufficient competence and resources.
Anika Anand insisted her lawyer present false testimony at trial. The lawyer first attempted to dissuade her, then informed the court when she persisted. Anand claimed the lawyer's refusal and threat to disclose violated her right to adequate representation. The court held that the duty of loyalty does not extend to assisting perjury and that the lawyer's actions preserved rather than undermined the integrity of the proceeding.
Anthony Arnold, an indigent defendant charged with a felony, was forced to proceed without counsel after the trial court refused to appoint one. Arnold was convicted and later challenged the conviction on the ground that the absence of counsel denied him adequate representation. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires states to provide counsel to indigent defendants in felony cases.
Petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, Gideon asked the court to appoint counsel for him. The court denied the request, stating that under the laws of the State of Florida the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition. The petition attacked his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government. Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, upon consideration thereof but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review here, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments whether this Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady should be reconsidered.
View case2 common questions
Counsel's performance is presumed adequate unless the defendant shows that counsel's conduct so undermined the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon to have produced a just result. Strategic choices receive deference and isolated errors rarely suffice.
Yes. Counsel has an ethical duty to refuse to assist perjury. The lawyer must first attempt to dissuade the client, consider withdrawal, and if necessary disclose the perjury. Such conduct does not violate the client's right to adequate representation.
…denied the motion to intervene as of right on the basis that the intervenors failed to show that their interests would not be adequately represented by the University. The district court also denied the proposed intervenors' alternative motion for permissive intervention. Discussion The proposed intervenors in each of these cases…