action in concert

In March 1966 black citizens of Claiborne County, Mississippi, presented local officials and white merchants with a list of demands that included desegregation of public facilities, hiring of black policemen, and employment of black clerks in white-owned stores. When no satisfactory response was received, several hundred black persons voted unanimously at a meeting of the Claiborne County NAACP branch held at the First Baptist Church in Port Gibson to place a boycott on the white merchants; the boycott began on April 1, 1966, and continued until the end of 1972. Charles Evers, the NAACP Field Secretary in Mississippi, played a leading role in organizing and directing the boycott, which also involved regular Tuesday-night NAACP meetings, speeches, marches, picketing by children and teenagers, and the stationing of store watchers and members of a group called the Black Hats or Deacons outside boycotted stores. A few incidents of violence occurred, mostly in 1966, including shots fired into homes, bricks thrown through windshields, and one instance in which an elderly man was spanked; Evers delivered speeches in April 1969 that referred to discipline and broken necks for boycott violators, though no violence was found after 1966. On October 31, 1969, seventeen white merchants filed suit in the Chancery Court of Hinds County against the NAACP, Mississippi Action for Progress, Evers, and 144 individuals, seeking damages for lost business earnings and goodwill plus a permanent injunction. After an eight-month trial in 1973 that heard testimony from 144 witnesses, the chancellor found 130 defendants jointly and severally liable on three conspiracy theories, awarded damages exceeding $1.25 million including antitrust penalties and attorney's fees, and entered a broad permanent injunction prohibiting store watching, picketing, and persuasion not to patronize the stores. The Mississippi Supreme Court in December 1980 reversed the secondary-boycott and antitrust holdings but affirmed liability on the common-law tort theory, reduced the damages award, dismissed thirty-eight defendants for lack of proof, and left the injunction in place. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1981.

Judith Sindell and Maureen Rogers filed separate lawsuits in California against several pharmaceutical companies that manufactured diethylstilbestrol, commonly known as DES. The complaints stated that the plaintiffs' mothers had taken DES during pregnancy to prevent miscarriage, and that the plaintiffs later developed cancerous and precancerous conditions as a result. Sindell alleged exposure led to a malignant bladder tumor requiring surgery and ongoing adenosis necessitating frequent monitoring. Rogers' allegations were substantially similar. DES was first developed in 1938 and received FDA approval in 1941 for use in preventing miscarriages. Manufacturers produced the drug in multiple forms and strengths under many trade names, but all followed an identical formula set forth in the United States Pharmacopoeia. In 1971 the FDA ordered companies to stop marketing DES for miscarriage prevention after studies linked it to adenocarcinoma in the daughters of women who had used the drug. Hundreds of companies had manufactured DES between 1941 and 1971. Because of the long latency period between ingestion and the appearance of injuries, and because pharmacists often filled prescriptions with whatever brand was in stock, the plaintiffs could not determine which company had produced the particular DES their mothers received. The trial court sustained demurrers filed by the defendants, including Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company, E.R. Squibb & Sons, the Upjohn Company, and Rexall Drug Company, on the basis that the plaintiffs had not identified the manufacturer of the injurious product. The actions were consolidated for appeal to the Supreme Court of California. Sindell sought compensatory damages of one million dollars and punitive damages of ten million dollars on her own behalf, along with class-wide equitable relief requiring the defendants to warn physicians and establish free clinics for screening. The complaints further alleged that the defendants had continued to market DES without adequate testing or warnings even after they knew or should have known of its carcinogenic properties.

On April 22, 1974, Glen Gregos, a teenage boy, was injured while participating in a cross-country motorcycle race for novices sponsored by the American Motorcycle Association and the Viking Motorcycle Club. Glen's second amended complaint alleged that the American Motorcycle Association and Viking negligently designed, managed, supervised, and administered the race and negligently solicited entrants. Such negligence was a direct and proximate cause of his injuries, including a crushed spine resulting in permanent loss of the use of his legs. Glen's parents, acting as guardians ad litem, filed the underlying action against the American Motorcycle Association, the Viking Motorcycle Club, and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission. The American Motorcycle Association answered the complaint, denying the charging allegations and asserting affirmative defenses that included a claim that Glen's own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. Thereafter the American Motorcycle Association sought leave of court to file a cross-complaint against Glen's parents. The first cause of action alleged that the parents knew motorcycle racing is dangerous, were knowledgeable about Glen's training, directly participated in his decision to enter the race by signing a parental consent form, and negligently failed to exercise their power of supervision over their minor child. The second cause of action sought declaratory relief. It asked for a declaration of the allocable negligence of Glen's parents so that any damages awarded against the American Motorcycle Association could be reduced by the percentage allocable to the parents' negligence. The trial court denied the American Motorcycle Association's motion for leave to file the cross-complaint. The American Motorcycle Association petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant the motion. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ. Ultimately the court granted a peremptory writ of mandate. Because of the statewide importance of the questions presented, the Supreme Court ordered a hearing in the case on its own motion.

Alcoa was incorporated in Pennsylvania on September 18, 1888, as the Pittsburgh Reduction Company and later changed its name in 1907. Through assignment of the Hall patent in 1889 and the Bradley patent in 1892, Alcoa secured a legal monopoly on virgin ingot manufacture that lasted until the patents expired in 1906 and 1909 respectively. Beginning in 1895, Alcoa obtained water power through contracts that restricted the power companies from supplying others for aluminum manufacture. It also participated in successive cartels with foreign aluminum producers that limited imports into the United States. In 1912 the United States brought suit against Alcoa, resulting in a consent decree that enjoined several restrictive covenants. From 1909 onward Alcoa remained the only domestic producer of virgin ingot. Its share of virgin ingot available for sale in the United States exceeded 90 percent for most years after 1912 and averaged over 90 percent from 1934 to 1938. Alcoa expanded its production capacity from two plants producing less than 42 million pounds in 1912 to five plants producing approximately 327 million pounds by 1934. In 1928 Alcoa transferred its foreign properties to a newly formed Canadian corporation, Aluminum Limited, whose shares were distributed to Alcoa's shareholders. Limited later joined with foreign producers in the Alliance cartel agreements of 1931 and 1936 that established production quotas and royalties for aluminum. Alcoa also engaged in a price squeeze on aluminum sheet from 1925 to 1932 by maintaining high ingot prices and low sheet prices that left little margin for independent sheet rollers. The complaint in this action was filed on April 23, 1937. Trial took place from June 1, 1938, to August 14, 1940, producing over 40,000 pages of testimony. The district court delivered its opinion in 1941, filed findings in 1942, and entered judgment dismissing the complaint on July 23, 1942. The Supreme Court referred the appeal to the Second Circuit on June 12, 1944, because a quorum of qualified justices was lacking.

Respondents operate a medical clinic in Melbourne, Florida, that offers abortions among other services. The clinic is located on Dixie Highway, a major traffic artery in the city. The clinic property occupies less than one acre and is bounded on the north and south by other commercial property, on the west by a two-lane road, and on the east by a parking lot and an intersecting street. In September 1992, a group of antiabortion protesters began picketing the clinic. The protesters, whose number varied from 10 to 40 on any given day, engaged in a variety of activities near the clinic. They sang, chanted, and carried signs and banners. They also distributed literature to, and engaged in conversations with, people approaching the clinic. Although the protesters were generally nonviolent, they occasionally trespassed onto clinic property and blocked access to the clinic. They also picketed the nearby residences of some of the clinic's employees. In response to these activities, the clinic obtained an injunction from the Florida Circuit Court. The initial injunction prohibited trespassing on or entering clinic property, blocking or interfering with access to or egress from the clinic, physically or verbally abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic, making loud or raucous noise within earshot of the clinic during specified hours, physically approaching any person seeking clinic services within 300 feet unless the person indicates a desire to communicate, using any images observable by patients inside the clinic, and picketing or demonstrating within 300 feet of clinic employees' residences. After the initial injunction proved insufficient, protesters continued to impede access to the clinic by congregating on the paved portion of Dixie Way and marching in front of the clinic's driveways. Sidewalk counselors approached vehicles heading toward the clinic. The number of people congregating varied from a handful to 400, and the noise varied from singing and chanting to the use of loudspeakers and bullhorns. The trial court issued a broader amended injunction that established a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway, noise restrictions during surgical procedures and recovery periods, a 300-foot no-approach zone around the clinic, a 300-foot buffer zone around employees' residences, and an in concert provision. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the amended injunction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Florida Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.