458 U.S. 886 (1982)
In March 1966 black citizens of Claiborne County, Mississippi, presented local officials and white merchants with a list of demands that included desegregation of public facilities, hiring of black policemen, and employment of black clerks in white-owned stores.1 When no satisfactory response was received, several hundred black persons voted unanimously at a meeting of the Claiborne County NAACP branch held at the First Baptist Church in Port Gibson to place a boycott on the white merchants; the boycott began on April 1, 1966, and continued until the end of 1972.2
Charles Evers, the NAACP Field Secretary in Mississippi, played a leading role in organizing and directing the boycott, which also involved regular Tuesday-night NAACP meetings, speeches, marches, picketing by children and teenagers, and the stationing of store watchers and members of a group called the Black Hats or Deacons outside boycotted stores.3 A few incidents of violence occurred, mostly in 1966, including shots fired into homes, bricks thrown through windshields, and one instance in which an elderly man was spanked; Evers delivered speeches in April 1969 that referred to discipline and broken necks for boycott violators, though no violence was found after 1966.4
On October 31, 1969, seventeen white merchants filed suit in the Chancery Court of Hinds County against the NAACP, Mississippi Action for Progress, Evers, and 144 individuals, seeking damages for lost business earnings and goodwill plus a permanent injunction.5 After an eight-month trial in 1973 that heard testimony from 144 witnesses, the chancellor found 130 defendants jointly and severally liable on three conspiracy theories, awarded damages exceeding $1.25 million including antitrust penalties and attorney's fees, and entered a broad permanent injunction prohibiting store watching, picketing, and persuasion not to patronize the stores.6
The Mississippi Supreme Court in December 1980 reversed the secondary-boycott and antitrust holdings but affirmed liability on the common-law tort theory, reduced the damages award, dismissed thirty-eight defendants for lack of proof, and left the injunction in place.7 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1981.8
Whether the nonviolent elements of the petitioners' boycott activities were entitled to the protection of the First Amendment?9
The First Amendment protects speech, assembly, association, and petition even when they coerce others through economic pressure, provided the activity remains nonviolent and is aimed at political or governmental change rather than purely private economic ends.10
Yes. The established facts show that in March 1966 black citizens presented demands for desegregation, black policemen, and black clerks.11 They then voted unanimously at the First Baptist Church NAACP meeting to begin the boycott on April 1, 1966. The boycott continued until the end of 1972.12 The boycott took the forms of speeches by Charles Evers, regular Tuesday-night NAACP meetings, marches, picketing by children and teenagers, and store watchers from the Black Hats group.13 These activities constituted speech and assembly protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.14 They sought to change governmental and economic structures through collective expression rather than violence.15 Although the state may regulate economic activity with incidental effects on speech, no comparable power exists to prohibit peaceful political boycotts intended to vindicate constitutional rights.16 The Mississippi Supreme Court's failure to separate these protected elements from any unprotected conduct therefore violated the First Amendment.17
The rule requires that liability rest only on unprotected conduct.18 Any damages must be limited to losses proximately caused by that conduct.19 Here the established facts demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of business losses arose from voluntary decisions by black citizens who supported the demands for racial justice.20 The losses did not arise from the few 1966 incidents of shots fired into homes or bricks thrown through windshields.21 Because the nonviolent elements receive full constitutional protection, the judgment imposing liability for the entire seven-year period cannot stand.22
The nonviolent elements of the petitioners' boycott activities were entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.23
Whether the Mississippi Supreme Court's theory of liability based on a secondary boycott and the presence of violence could constitutionally support damages for the entire seven-year boycott without distinguishing protected from unprotected conduct?24
A state may not impose liability for protected speech, assembly, or association.25 Any damages award must rest on precise findings that specific defendants authorized, ratified, or participated in particular acts of violence with intent to further unlawful aims.26 Only losses proximately caused by those acts may be recovered.27
No. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld liability on a secondary-boycott theory and on the presence of violence.28 It did so without identifying which defendants engaged in violence or which losses were caused by it.29 The established facts reveal that the chancellor found joint and several liability on all 130 defendants for more than $1.25 million in damages after an eight-month trial.30 Yet the Mississippi Supreme Court itself dismissed thirty-eight defendants for lack of proof.31
The court acknowledged that coercion and threats formed only part of the boycott's success.32 The court's theory swept in the protected speech, marches, and voluntary withholding of patronage that occurred throughout the seven years. Because the record shows no violence after 1966 and most losses resulted from voluntary participation, the undifferentiated award violates the requirement of precision in regulating conduct that mixes protected and unprotected elements.33
The Mississippi Supreme Court's theory of liability based on a secondary boycott and the presence of violence could not constitutionally support damages for the entire seven-year boycott without distinguishing protected from unprotected conduct.34
Whether liability for business losses could be imposed on individual defendants solely on the basis of their association with the boycott or attendance at NAACP meetings?35
No. The established facts show that the chancellor imposed liability on 130 defendants.38 This included those who merely attended Tuesday-night NAACP meetings at the First Baptist Church.39 There was no finding that illegal conduct was authorized or discussed at those meetings.40 The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed liability on a group-liability theory even though it dismissed thirty-eight defendants for insufficient proof of participation.41
Under the rule, mere presence at meetings or membership in the NAACP branch supplies no basis for damages.42 This is true when the group itself pursued lawful political goals and the record contains no evidence that any meeting endorsed violence.43 The sheriff's testimony that he was kept informed of meeting proceedings further confirms the absence of any discussion of unlawful activity.44 Therefore liability cannot rest on association alone.45
Liability for business losses could not be imposed on individual defendants solely on the basis of their association with the boycott or attendance at NAACP meetings.46
Whether liability for damages could be imposed on Charles Evers or the national NAACP based on his speeches or leadership role without findings that he authorized, ratified, or participated in specific acts of violence?47
Liability for the unlawful conduct of others may be imposed on a leader only upon findings that the leader authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious acts.48 Alternatively, the leader's speech must have been directed to and likely to incite imminent lawless action that in fact followed.
No. The established facts show that Charles Evers delivered speeches in April 1969 containing references to discipline and broken necks.49 Yet the chancellor made no finding of any violence after 1966.50 No evidence linked the speeches to subsequent unlawful acts.51 The national NAACP's liability was derived solely from Evers's actions.52
But the record contains no finding that the national organization authorized or ratified any violent conduct.53 To the contrary, the Mississippi State Conference president testified that the NAACP did not approve of the manner in which the boycott was conducted.54 Because the speeches remained within the bounds of protected advocacy and no specific authorization of violence was shown, neither Evers nor the national NAACP may be held liable for the damages awarded.55
Liability for damages could not be imposed on Charles Evers or the national NAACP based on his speeches or leadership role without findings that he authorized, ratified, or participated in specific acts of violence.56
Whether the award of damages for all business losses over seven years and the broad permanent injunction could stand when only isolated acts of violence occurred in 1966 and most losses resulted from voluntary participation?57
No. The established facts establish that the boycott ran from April 1966 through December 1972.60 The few violent incidents occurred in 1966.61 The Mississippi Supreme Court itself recognized that intimidation formed only part of the boycott's success while most participants acted voluntarily.62 The chancellor awarded more than $1.25 million plus interest for all lost earnings and goodwill over seven years.63
The chancellor entered a permanent injunction against store watching, picketing, and persuasion.64 Because the record demonstrates that the great majority of losses stemmed from constitutionally protected voluntary conduct rather than the isolated 1966 violence, and because the injunction was not tailored to prohibit only unprotected activity, neither the damages award nor the injunction can stand.65
The award of damages for all business losses over seven years and the broad permanent injunction could not stand when only isolated acts of violence occurred in 1966 and most losses resulted from voluntary participation.66