20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182
On April 22, 1974, Glen Gregos, a teenage boy, was injured while participating in a cross-country motorcycle race for novices sponsored by the American Motorcycle Association and the Viking Motorcycle Club.1 Glen's second amended complaint alleged that the American Motorcycle Association and Viking negligently designed, managed, supervised, and administered the race and negligently solicited entrants.2 Such negligence was a direct and proximate cause of his injuries, including a crushed spine resulting in permanent loss of the use of his legs.3
Glen's parents, acting as guardians ad litem, filed the underlying action against the American Motorcycle Association, the Viking Motorcycle Club, and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission.4 The American Motorcycle Association answered the complaint, denying the charging allegations and asserting affirmative defenses that included a claim that Glen's own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries.5
Thereafter the American Motorcycle Association sought leave of court to file a cross-complaint against Glen's parents.6 The first cause of action alleged that the parents knew motorcycle racing is dangerous, were knowledgeable about Glen's training, directly participated in his decision to enter the race by signing a parental consent form, and negligently failed to exercise their power of supervision over their minor child.7 The second cause of action sought declaratory relief.8 It asked for a declaration of the allocable negligence of Glen's parents so that any damages awarded against the American Motorcycle Association could be reduced by the percentage allocable to the parents' negligence.9
The trial court denied the American Motorcycle Association's motion for leave to file the cross-complaint.10 The American Motorcycle Association petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant the motion.11 The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ.12 Ultimately the court granted a peremptory writ of mandate.13 Because of the statewide importance of the questions presented, the Supreme Court ordered a hearing in the case on its own motion.14
Whether the adoption of comparative negligence requires the abolition of joint and several liability among concurrent tortfeasors?15
The adoption of comparative negligence does not require the abolition of joint and several liability; each concurrent tortfeasor whose negligence is a proximate cause of an indivisible injury remains individually liable for all compensable damages.16
No. The rule from Li v. Yellow Cab Co. preserves joint and several liability because the feasibility of apportioning fault does not render an indivisible injury divisible.17 A plaintiff's partial fault does not equate to a defendant's tortious conduct.18 Applied to the established facts, Glen Gregos suffered a crushed spine in the novice motorcycle race sponsored by the American Motorcycle Association and Viking Motorcycle Club.19 The American Motorcycle Association answered the complaint while asserting Glen's own negligence.20
The American Motorcycle Association later sought to cross-complain against the parents.21 Yet the court retained joint and several liability to ensure the injured plaintiff could obtain full recovery from any responsible defendant.22
The adoption of comparative negligence does not require the abolition of joint and several liability among concurrent tortfeasors.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clark dissented on the ground that retention of joint and several liability directly contradicts the Li principle that the extent of liability must be governed by the extent of fault.24 He argued that under a true comparative system no defendant should pay more than its proportionate share.25 The majority's approach would allow a 1 percent defendant to bear 100 percent of the loss when others are insolvent.26
This produces unfairness and discourages settlements.27 Clark would have held liability several only, in direct proportion to fault.28
Whether the common law equitable indemnity doctrine should be modified to permit partial indemnity among concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis?29
The common law equitable indemnity doctrine should be modified to permit partial indemnity among concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis so that liability is apportioned in direct proportion to each party's respective fault.30
Yes. The all-or-nothing character of traditional indemnity conflicts with Li's goal of apportioning loss according to fault.31 The equitable considerations that once supported complete shifting now support proportionate sharing.32 Applied to the established facts, Glen Gregos's parents were alleged in the proposed cross-complaint to have known the dangers of motorcycle racing, signed the consent form, and negligently supervised their minor son.33
The American Motorcycle Association claimed its own negligence was merely passive.34 The court therefore authorized the cross-complaint for partial indemnity measured by comparative fault.35
The common law equitable indemnity doctrine should be modified to permit partial indemnity among concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis.36
Whether California's statutory contribution provisions preclude judicial recognition of a common law right of comparative partial indemnity?37
California's contribution statutes do not preclude judicial recognition of a common law right of comparative partial indemnity. The statutes expressly subordinate contribution to indemnity.38 They were intended only to ameliorate the harsh no-contribution rule, not to freeze common-law development.39
No. The 1957 legislation preserved existing indemnity rights.40 It directed that contribution be administered according to equitable principles, leaving room for judicial evolution of comparative indemnity.41 Applied to the established facts, the American Motorcycle Association's proposed cross-complaint against Glen's parents sought partial indemnity on a comparative basis.42 The trial court had denied leave to file.43 The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme did not bar the court from recognizing the new common-law right.44
California's statutory contribution provisions do not preclude judicial recognition of a common law right of comparative partial indemnity.45
Whether a named defendant may file a cross-complaint against previously unjoined alleged concurrent tortfeasors seeking partial indemnity on a comparative fault basis?46
Yes. The cross-complaint statutes expressly authorize a defendant to bring in any person from whom total or partial indemnity is sought, whether or not that person is already a party.49 Applied to the established facts, the American Motorcycle Association moved for leave to file a cross-complaint against Glen Gregos's parents.50 The cross-complaint alleged their negligent supervision and sought both indemnity and declaratory relief allocating negligence.51
The trial court denied the motion.52 The Supreme Court directed that leave be granted so the comparative indemnity claim could proceed.53
A named defendant may file a cross-complaint against previously unjoined alleged concurrent tortfeasors seeking partial indemnity on a comparative fault basis.