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ACLU Letter to Potential Client
Ava Adebayo received a letter from the ACLU explaining her rights after a workplace discrimination incident and offering free representation. The ACLU pursued her case in federal court, asserting First Amendment protections for its outreach. The court upheld the letter as protected expressive activity rather than prohibited solicitation.
ACLU Challenge to Internet Regulation
Anita Ali joined the ACLU as a plaintiff challenging a federal statute that criminalized certain online speech. The ACLU argued the law lacked feasible age-verification tools and therefore burdened adult access. The Supreme Court agreed and struck down the provisions as unconstitutional.
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union521 U.S. 844 (1997)
In 1996 Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act as Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Immediately after the President signed the bill, twenty plaintiffs including the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Attorney General challenging the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)(1)(B) and 223(d). A week later a second suit was filed by twenty-seven additional plaintiffs; the cases were consolidated and a three-judge district court was convened.
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing based on a detailed stipulation of 356 paragraphs plus live testimony and made 410 findings of fact. Those findings described the Internet as an international network of interconnected computers that had grown from roughly 300 host computers in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of trial, with about 40 million users expected to reach 200 million by 1999. The findings detailed communication methods including e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, chat rooms, and the World Wide Web, noting that any person or organization with Internet access could publish information and that the content available was as diverse as human thought.
The district court further found that sexually explicit material on the Internet included text, pictures, and chat extending from the modestly titillating to the hardest-core, that such material was widely available but users seldom encountered it accidentally because a series of affirmative steps was required to access specific content, and that almost all sexually explicit images were preceded by warnings. The court determined there was no effective way to determine the identity or age of a user accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms and that credit-card or adult-password verification systems were not economically feasible for most noncommercial providers and would impose significant burdens including the exclusion of adults without credit cards.
The district court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the two challenged provisions. The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the CDA's special review provisions, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Abigail Alvarez worked with the ACLU to contest provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. The ACLU claimed the restrictions violated its members' rights to engage in political speech and association. The Court addressed the ACLU's arguments in its review of the statute's constitutionality.
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission540 U.S. 93, 226–27 (2003)
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Communications Act of 1934, and other statutes to address the role of soft money and issue advocacy in federal elections.
Plaintiffs included a diverse group of entities and individuals such as the National Rifle Association and the American Civil Liberties Union who alleged that BCRA was unconstitutional. Defendants included the Federal Election Commission and the Attorney General of the United States.
The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge panel pursuant to special procedures in BCRA Section 403. The District Court received a voluminous record from the parties and issued a judgment on May 1, 2003, that upheld some provisions of BCRA and invalidated others.
All losing parties filed direct appeals to the Supreme Court within ten days, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 5, 2003, ordering expedited briefing and argument on September 8, 2003.
More than a century of federal legislation preceded BCRA, beginning with the Tillman Act of 1907 that banned corporate contributions in connection with federal elections. Congress later extended prohibitions to unions, required disclosure of contributions and expenditures, and enacted FECA in 1971 with further amendments in 1974 that imposed contribution limits, expenditure ceilings, and created the FEC.
The Supreme Court addressed constitutional challenges to the 1974 amendments in Buckley v. Valeo. After Buckley, the FEC permitted political parties to fund mixed-purpose activities such as voter registration and generic advertising in part with soft money not subject to FECA's source and amount limits.
Soft-money fundraising by the national parties grew from $21.6 million in 1984 to $498 million in 2000, with large corporate and union donations often motivated by a desire for access to federal candidates. National parties transferred substantial soft money to state parties, which could use higher percentages for mixed activities under FEC allocation rules.
The use of soft money also supported so-called issue ads that avoided express advocacy of a candidate's election or defeat and therefore fell outside FECA's disclosure and source restrictions. These ads frequently aired in the 60 days before federal elections, referred to clearly identified candidates, and were funded by corporations, unions, and tax-exempt organizations using misleading names.
A Senate investigation into 1996 federal election practices documented both parties' use of soft money to obtain special access for large donors and the coordination of issue ads with candidates. The District Court compiled extensive evidence from declarations, expert reports, and internal party documents showing that federal officeholders solicited soft-money donations, that parties maintained tallies crediting donors to particular candidates, and that large soft-money contributions were often made to secure influence rather than for ideological reasons.
Anthony Arnold litigated a gestational surrogacy case in which the ACLU filed an amicus brief addressing substantive due process and privacy claims. The ACLU argued that the genetic parents' rights should prevail under existing constitutional doctrine. The court considered the ACLU's submission while resolving the parentage issues.
Johnson v. Calvert851 P.2d 776, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874, and cert. dismissed sub nom. Baby Boy J. v. Johnson, 510 U.S. 938 (1993)
In 1984 Crispina Calvert underwent a hysterectomy that left her ovaries capable of producing eggs. She and her husband Mark desired a child genetically related to both of them. In 1989 Anna Johnson, a licensed vocational nurse who had previously given birth to a daughter, learned of Crispina's situation from a coworker and offered to serve as a surrogate.
On January 15, 1990, Mark, Crispina, and Anna signed a written contract providing that an embryo created from Mark's sperm and Crispina's egg would be implanted in Anna, who would carry the child to term and relinquish all parental rights to the Calverts upon birth. In exchange the Calverts agreed to pay Anna $10,000 in installments, with the final payment due six weeks after birth, and to purchase a $200,000 life insurance policy on Anna's life. The zygote was implanted on January 19, 1990, and an ultrasound confirmed Anna's pregnancy less than a month later.
During the pregnancy relations between the parties deteriorated. Anna felt the Calverts were not providing sufficient attention or obtaining the required insurance policy in a timely manner. In July 1990 Anna demanded the balance of the payments or she would refuse to relinquish the child. The following month the Calverts filed suit in superior court seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of the unborn child. Anna filed her own action to be declared the mother, the cases were consolidated, and the parties agreed to the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child.
The child was born on September 19, 1990. Blood samples taken from Anna and the child excluded Anna as the genetic mother. The parties stipulated that Mark and Crispina were the genetic parents. After a trial in October 1990 the superior court ruled that the Calverts were the child's genetic, biological, and natural parents, that Anna had no parental rights, that the surrogacy contract was enforceable, and that Anna was not entitled to visitation. Anna appealed. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division Three, affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court of California granted review.
Albert Allen contacted the ACLU after facing prosecution under a state sodomy law. The ACLU provided representation and argued that the statute violated substantive due process protections for private consensual conduct. The Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the law.
Lawrence v. Texas539 U.S. 558 (2003)
In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance.
They entered an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided. The officers observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody overnight, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace.
The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man)." Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003) provides that a person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex. The statute defines deviate sexual intercourse as any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person, or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.
The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25.
The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion indicates that the Court of Appeals considered our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider three questions. The petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged offense. Their conduct was in private and consensual.
Adam Anderson collaborated with the ACLU to challenge a city's refusal to display a private group's monument in a public park. The ACLU contended that the city's selective acceptance of monuments constituted viewpoint discrimination. The Supreme Court ruled that the city's choices amounted to government speech.
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum555 U.S. 460 (2009)
Pioneer Park is a 2.5 acre public park located in the Historic District of Pleasant Grove City, Utah. The park currently contains 15 permanent displays, at least 11 of which were donated by private groups or individuals. These include an historic granary, a wishing well, the City’s first fire station, a September 11 monument, and a Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1971.
Respondent Summum is a religious organization founded in 1975 and headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah. On two separate occasions in 2003, Summum’s president wrote a letter to the City’s mayor requesting permission to erect a stone monument containing the Seven Aphorisms of Summum. The monument was to be similar in size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument. The City denied the requests. It explained that its practice was to limit monuments in the Park to those that either directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove or were donated by groups with longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove community.
The following year the City passed a resolution putting this policy into writing. The resolution also mentioned other criteria such as safety and esthetics. In May 2005 Summum’s president again wrote to the mayor asking to erect a monument. The letter did not describe the monument, its historical significance, or Summum’s connection to the community. The city council rejected this request.
In 2005 Summum filed this action against the City and local officials. It asserted that they had violated the Free Speech Clause by accepting the Ten Commandments monument but rejecting the proposed Seven Aphorisms monument. Summum sought a preliminary injunction directing the City to permit it to erect its monument in Pioneer Park. After the District Court denied Summum’s preliminary injunction request, a panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed.
The Tenth Circuit denied the City’s petition for rehearing en banc by an equally divided vote. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reviews the case.
What does the ACLU primarily do in constitutional litigation?
The ACLU litigates cases and files amicus briefs to protect civil liberties and First Amendment rights. It often represents individuals or challenges government regulations that burden protected speech or association.
How has the ACLU been involved in internet speech cases?
The ACLU has challenged statutes that effectively ban adults from accessing protected online material by requiring unavailable age-verification technology. Courts have relied on these challenges to invalidate overbroad restrictions under the First Amendment.
Can the ACLU be regulated differently from commercial solicitors?
Letters and outreach from the ACLU receive greater First Amendment protection than in-person commercial solicitation because they advance political and civil rights objectives. Outright bans are generally impermissible absent actual deception or overreaching.
American Civil Liberties Union
, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter , 492 U. S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("We cannot avoid the obligation to draw lines, often close and…