447 U.S. 74 (1980)
PruneYard Shopping Center is a privately owned shopping center in Campbell, California.1 It covers approximately 21 acres with 5 acres devoted to parking and 16 acres occupied by walkways, plazas, sidewalks, and buildings.2 These buildings contain more than 65 specialty shops, 10 restaurants, and a movie theater.3 The center is open to the public for the purpose of encouraging the patronizing of its commercial establishments.4
The center maintains a policy of not permitting any visitor or tenant to engage in any publicly expressive activity.5 This includes the circulation of petitions that is not directly related to its commercial purposes.6 The policy has been strictly enforced in a nondiscriminatory fashion by a security force.7 The center is owned by appellant Fred Sahadi.8
In December 1975, appellees who are high school students sought to solicit support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism.9 On a Saturday afternoon they set up a card table in a corner of PruneYard's central courtyard.10 They distributed pamphlets and asked passersby to sign petitions that were to be sent to the President and Members of Congress.11 Their activity was peaceful and orderly and so far as the record indicates it was not objected to by PruneYard's patrons.12
Soon after the students had begun soliciting signatures a security guard informed them that they would have to leave because their activity violated PruneYard regulations.13 The guard suggested that they move to the public sidewalk at the PruneYard's perimeter.14 The students immediately left the premises and later filed this lawsuit in the California Superior Court of Santa Clara County.15 They sought to enjoin the shopping center owners from denying them access to the PruneYard for the purpose of circulating their petitions.16
The Superior Court held that the students were not entitled under either the Federal or California Constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center property.17 It concluded that there were adequate effective channels of communication available to them other than soliciting on the private property.18 The California Court of Appeal affirmed.19 The California Supreme Court reversed.20 It held that the California Constitution protects speech and petitioning reasonably exercised in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned.21 It concluded that the students were entitled to conduct their activity on PruneYard property.22 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.23
Whether a state may require a privately owned shopping center to allow individuals to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on the property of the shopping center?24
Our reasoning in Lloyd does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power.25 Nor does it limit the State's sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.26 In Lloyd there was no state constitutional or statutory provision at issue.27
Yes. The California Supreme Court concluded that the state constitution provides for the right of individuals to exercise free speech and petition in shopping centers.28 The facts establish that PruneYard is a large commercial complex open to the public.29 The students' activity was peaceful, orderly, and limited to a corner of the central courtyard without interference with normal commercial operations.30
A state may require a privately owned shopping center to allow individuals to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on the property of the shopping center.31
Related opinions on this issue
Marshall concurs in the judgment and writes separately to emphasize that the California Supreme Court recognized the state constitution protects the exercise of free speech and petition rights in shopping centers.32 This recognition represents a significant expansion consistent with the federal system.33 States may provide greater protection for individual liberties than the Federal Constitution.34
He applauds the decision as part of a healthy trend of state courts affording state constitutional provisions a more expansive interpretation than the Federal Constitution.35 Marshall notes that the state may abrogate common-law trespass rights in this limited context without violating due process because shopping centers are already open to the public and reasonable restrictions may be imposed.36
Stevens joins the judgment and Powell's concurrence but adds that the Federal Constitution does not require a shopping center to permit distributions or solicitations on its property.37 He notes that on the record before the Court there was not an unconstitutional infringement of property rights.38 The California Supreme Court recognized that reasonable time and place limitations could be imposed.39
The court was dealing only with the public or common areas in a large shopping center rather than an individual retail establishment or a homeowner's property.40
Whether a state constitutional requirement that a private shopping center owner allow the exercise of free speech and petition on his property constitutes an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?41
Not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a taking in the constitutional sense.42 The determination whether a state law unlawfully infringes a landowner's property requires an examination of the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.43
No. The requirement does not deprive the owner of all use of the property.44 The PruneYard may continue to operate the shopping center for its intended commercial purposes.45 It may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions that minimize interference with commercial functions.46 The facts show the center is a large commercial complex covering several city blocks with numerous business establishments.47 The students limited their activity to the common areas in an orderly manner.48
The state constitutional requirement does not constitute an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.49
Related opinions on this issue
White concurs in the judgment and joins the opinion of the Court.50 He agrees that Lloyd does not control this case because it held only that the First Amendment does not require a privately owned shopping center to allow the distribution of handbills.51 The state constitutional requirement is a reasonable regulation of the use of private property.52
It does not deprive the owner of the use of the property for its intended commercial purposes.53 The owner may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of the exercise of the rights to prevent interference with the normal commercial activities of the center.54
Whether a state constitutional requirement that a private shopping center owner allow the exercise of free speech and petition on his property violates the First Amendment by compelling the owner to allow the exercise of rights with which it disagrees?55
No. The owner remains free to post signs disclaiming any sponsorship of the views expressed by others.59 Because the shopping center is a business establishment open to the public to come and go as they please, the views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition will not likely be identified with those of the owner.60 The facts show that the students were expressing their own opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism.61 The center can expressly dissociate itself from the message by posting appropriate signs.62
The state constitutional requirement does not violate the First Amendment by compelling the owner to allow the exercise of rights with which it disagrees.63
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger
Powell concurs in the judgment but writes separately to emphasize that the decision is limited to the type of shopping center involved in this case.64 Significantly different questions would be presented if a state authorized strangers to picket or distribute leaflets in privately owned freestanding stores.65 He notes that state action forcing a property owner to admit third-party speakers can raise serious First Amendment questions if listeners are likely to identify the opinions with the owner.66
On this record customers of the vast center would not reasonably believe the limited speech activity expressed the views of the PruneYard or its owner.67