Also known as: abuse of discretion review · abuse of discretion · abuse of discretion standard
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An appellate standard under which a reviewing court upholds a lower court's ruling unless the decision is arbitrary, irrational, or rests on an incorrect legal premise. The standard applies to discretionary calls such as evidentiary rulings on expert testimony and certain procedural determinations. It requires deference to the trial court's judgment when the ruling falls within a range of reasonable choices.
Apex Pharma faced hundreds of suits claiming its drug caused nerve damage. Plaintiffs offered Dr. Lopez, who relied on case reports and animal studies. The district court found too great a gap between the data and her causation opinion, excluded the testimony, and granted summary judgment. On appeal the court affirmed because the gatekeeping decision was not arbitrary.
Center for Humanities lost a copyright trial and moved for a new trial or remittitur after a large verdict. The district court applied state law to reduce the award. The court of appeals reviewed that reduction under abuse-of-discretion review and affirmed the adjusted amount.
William Gasperini, a journalist and photographer who had taken over 5,000 slide transparencies while reporting in Central America, agreed in 1990 to supply 300 of his original color transparencies to The Center for Humanities, Inc., for use in an educational videotape titled Conflict in Central America. After the project concluded, the Center could not locate or return the transparencies, prompting Gasperini to pursue legal remedies for their loss. Gasperini, a California citizen, sued the Center, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. He invoked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and alleged state-law claims for breach of contract, conversion, and negligence. The Center conceded liability, so the case proceeded to trial solely on damages. At the three-day jury trial, Gasperini's expert testified that the industry standard valued each lost transparency at $1,500 as the average license fee over the photographer's copyright term. Gasperini testified that his photography earnings from 1984 through 1993 totaled just over $10,000 and that he planned to publish a book of his best Central American photographs. The jury returned a verdict of $450,000, or $1,500 for each of the 300 slides. The Center moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, invoking both the federal standard and New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5501(c). The District Court denied the motion without comment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment after applying the New York deviates-materially standard itself. The Second Circuit surveyed Appellate Division decisions on similar awards and concluded that the verdict materially deviated from reasonable compensation because many slides were generic and Gasperini had limited earnings. It ordered a new trial unless Gasperini accepted a reduction to $100,000. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict over the proper standard.
View caseMassachusetts and other states petitioned EPA to regulate greenhouse gases from vehicles. EPA declined, citing policy reasons. The Supreme Court reviewed the denial under abuse-of-discretion review and held the agency had failed to exercise its statutory authority properly.
In October 1999, nineteen private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA requesting regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202 of the Clean Air Act. The petition asserted that carbon dioxide and other gases were heat-trapping greenhouse gases that had accelerated climate change, with carbon dioxide as the most important contributor according to the IPCC's 1995 report. The EPA received more than fifty thousand comments after requesting public input in 2001. A National Research Council report from 2001, prepared at the White House's request, stated that greenhouse gases from human activities were causing surface air temperatures to rise. On September 8, 2003, the EPA denied the petition on two grounds: the Clean Air Act did not authorize regulation of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, and even assuming authority, the agency would not regulate due to scientific uncertainty about causation and concerns that regulation would conflict with the President's comprehensive approach involving voluntary programs and international negotiations. The denial order referenced Congress's decision in 1990 not to enact binding emissions limitations and the political history of climate change issues. Petitioners including the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other states and private organizations then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review in 2005. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006 to address the issues raised by the denial. Massachusetts submitted affidavits showing that global sea levels rose 10 to 20 centimeters over the 20th century, already causing loss of coastal land owned by the Commonwealth, with projections of further inundation by 2100. The United States transportation sector alone emitted more than 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1999, accounting for over 6 percent of worldwide emissions.
View caseStewart Organization sued Ricoh in Alabama despite a New York forum clause. The district court refused to transfer the case. The court of appeals reviewed the refusal for abuse of discretion and reversed because the clause should have controlled the venue analysis.
Stewart Organization, Inc., an Alabama corporation, entered into a dealership agreement with Ricoh Corporation, a nationwide manufacturer whose principal place of business is in New Jersey, obligating Stewart to market Ricoh copier products. The agreement contained a forum-selection clause stating that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under or in connection with the agreement. Business relations between the parties soured, and in September 1984 Stewart filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama alleging breach of the dealership agreement together with claims for breach of warranty, fraud, and antitrust violations. Relying on the forum-selection clause, Ricoh moved the district court to transfer the case to the Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406; the district court denied the motion after concluding that Alabama law governed and disfavored enforcement of such clauses, then certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A divided Eleventh Circuit panel reversed, holding that federal law governs venue questions in diversity actions and that the clause is enforceable; after rehearing en banc the full court adopted the panel result and reasoning, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseAmchem Products faced thousands of asbestos claims and proposed a global settlement class. The district court certified the class. The court of appeals reviewed the certification decision for abuse of discretion and reversed because common issues did not predominate.
In the early 1990s, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all pending federal asbestos cases to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for pretrial proceedings before Judge Weiner. Attorneys from the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee and the Center for Claims Resolution, a consortium of twenty former asbestos manufacturers, began settlement negotiations that initially addressed pending inventory claims but soon expanded to cover future claims. After CCR settled thousands of inventory plaintiffs' claims for more than $200 million through separate agreements, the parties on January 15, 1993, filed a single-day package. This package consisted of a complaint, answer, proposed settlement stipulation exceeding one hundred pages, and joint motion for conditional class certification in a new action not part of the MDL transfer. The complaint defined the class as all persons in the United States or its territories who had been exposed occupationally or through a spouse or household member to asbestos products attributable to CCR defendants and who had not filed suit as of January 15, 1993. This class encompassed both individuals with manifest diseases such as mesothelioma, lung cancer, and asbestosis and exposure-only individuals with no current symptoms. The group potentially numbered in the hundreds of thousands or millions. The accompanying stipulation created a no-fault administrative compensation matrix with fixed, non-inflation-adjusted award ranges for four disease categories. It imposed numerical caps on extraordinary claims and excluded compensation for medical monitoring, fear of future injury, and loss-of-consortium claims. A three-month opt-out period applied. The District Court conditionally certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3) for settlement purposes only, appointed class counsel, approved an extensive notice plan that reached millions of individuals, conducted fairness hearings, and entered orders finding the settlement fair while enjoining class members from pursuing separate asbestos suits. Objectors appealed, the Third Circuit vacated the certification, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseFemale employees sued Wal-Mart alleging gender discrimination in pay and promotion. The district court certified a nationwide class. The court of appeals reviewed the certification order for abuse of discretion and reversed because the plaintiffs failed to show a common policy.
In 2001, three current or former female employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith Arana—filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging that the company had discriminated against them and other women in pay and promotions. Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest private employer with approximately 3,400 stores across the country and more than one million employees, delegated pay and promotion decisions to local store managers who exercised broad discretion in a largely subjective manner. The plaintiffs claimed that this discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men, resulting in lower pay and fewer promotions for female employees. They sought to represent a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees who had worked at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store since December 26, 1998. To support their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs presented statistical evidence from experts Dr. Richard Drogin and Dr. Marc Bendick showing pay and promotion disparities between men and women, anecdotal evidence consisting of about 120 affidavits from female employees describing discriminatory experiences at only 235 of the company's 3,400 stores, and the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby who analyzed Wal-Mart’s corporate culture. Betty Dukes began working at a Pittsburg, California store in 1994 as a cashier and was later promoted to customer service manager before being demoted; she alleged retaliation and that male greeters were paid more. Christine Kwapnoski worked at Sam’s Club stores and claimed a male manager yelled at female employees and told her to “doll up.” Edith Arana worked at a Duarte, California store from 1995 to 2001. She was denied opportunities for management training despite repeated requests. The District Court certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs had presented significant evidence of a company-wide pattern of discrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, substantially affirmed the certification order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the class certification was consistent with Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).
View caseAppellate courts review the exclusion for abuse of discretion. The trial judge acts as gatekeeper and must assess both reliability and relevance. Deference applies even when the ruling leads to summary judgment.
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No. The abuse-of-discretion standard still governs the evidentiary decision itself. The grant of summary judgment receives separate de novo review, but the underlying ruling on expert testimony remains deferential.
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Unless the appointing order sets a different standard, a court may set aside a master's procedural ruling only for abuse of discretion.
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