Also known as: abolishes · abolished · abolishing · abolition · abolitions · abolishment
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A legislative or judicial act that eliminates a legal rule, institution, or remedy.
Andre Antoine defaulted on a mortgage held by Anchor Bank. After the foreclosure sale produced proceeds below the outstanding debt, the bank sought a deficiency judgment. A recently enacted state statute had abolished deficiency judgments in residential foreclosures, so the court denied the bank's request and left it with only the sale proceeds.
Aisha Ahmed sued Aaron Adams for breach of promise to marry after he ended their engagement. The state legislature had abolished heartbalm actions by statute years earlier. The court dismissed the complaint because the cause of action no longer existed.
Anita Ali executed a trust instrument that purported to create a remainder in her heirs. Because the Uniform Probate Code had abolished the doctrine of worthier title both as a rule of law and as a rule of construction, the court treated the language as creating a valid remainder rather than a reversion in Anita.
Adrian Aguilar and Angela Acosta formed a common law marriage in State A and later moved to State B. State B had abolished common law marriage by statute. The court recognized the marriage because a marriage valid where formed is generally recognized elsewhere even if the forum state has abolished common law marriage.
William Marbury sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to compel delivery of his judicial commission. The Court held that the statute granting original jurisdiction for such writs was unconstitutional. By declaring an act of Congress void, the decision confirmed judicial power to enforce constitutional limits on legislative enactments.
In December 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper petitioned the Supreme Court for a rule requiring Secretary of State James Madison to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding delivery of their commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. The applicants had been nominated by outgoing President John Adams. The Senate had advised and consented to the appointments. Commissions in due form were signed by the President with the seal of the United States affixed by the Secretary of State. During the proceedings the Court heard testimony from Department of State clerks Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who described the preparation and handling of the commissions. Wagner recalled that two commissions had been signed but could not confirm whether those of the applicants were recorded. Brent believed Marbury's and Hooe's commissions were made out. Ramsay's was omitted by mistake. None of the Adams-signed commissions for District justices were recorded. Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who had acted as Secretary of State, testified that he had seen signed and sealed commissions but did not know whether any for the applicants were ever sent out. James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he received and later returned several commissions from the Secretary of State's office, including those for Hooe and Harper. The applicants also submitted the affidavit of Hazen Kimball confirming that commissions for Marbury and Hooe were in the office on March 3, 1801. Madison did not appear or show cause after the rule was served. The motion for the writ itself was heard in the February 1803 term.
View caseHarry Tompkins was injured by an Erie Railroad train in Pennsylvania and sued in federal court. The railroad urged application of a federal general common law rule more favorable to it. The Supreme Court abolished the Swift v. Tyson regime, holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases.
Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that State. He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation or maintenance of the train. He asserted that he was rightfully on the premises as a licensee because he was on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks. He further alleged that he was struck by something which looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars. To enforce that claim he brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State. The Erie insisted that its duty to Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser. It contended, among other things, that its duty to Tompkins, and hence its liability, should be determined in accordance with the Pennsylvania law; that under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way are to be deemed trespassers; and that the railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful. Tompkins denied that any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts. He contended that, since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law. The trial judge refused to rule that the Pennsylvania law precluded recovery. The jury brought in a verdict of $30,000. The judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that it was unnecessary to consider whether the law of Pennsylvania was as contended, because the question was one not of local, but of general, law and that upon questions of general law the federal courts are free, in the absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law is. Because of the importance of the question whether the federal court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseRecovery is limited to actual damages such as expenditures made in preparation for marriage, loss to reputation, mental anguish, and injury to health. Expected benefits such as social or financial position are not recoverable. Punitive damages may be awarded upon a showing of malice.
No. A marriage valid where formed is generally recognized elsewhere even if the forum state has abolished common law marriage. Full faith and credit and choice-of-law principles require recognition of the status created under the law of the state where the marriage was formed.
Language in a governing instrument describing beneficiaries as the transferor's heirs or similar terms no longer creates or presumptively creates a reversionary interest in the transferor. The doctrine is eliminated both as a rule of law and as a rule of construction.
Yes. State law governs deficiency and surplus rules and may restrict or abolish deficiency judgments entirely. When a statute abolishes them, a mortgagee cannot obtain a personal judgment for the difference between the debt and the foreclosure sale price.
…if those limits may be passed by those intended to be restrained the distinction between limited and unlimited government is abolished. Either the Constitution is superior and paramount or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts. If the former, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law. It is…