ABA Model Rules

On August 4, 1980, respondents, a class of children suffering from emotional and mental handicaps, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho against petitioners, the Governor and other officials of the State of Idaho responsible for their education and treatment. The complaint alleged deficiencies in both educational programs and health care services that violated the Education of the Handicapped Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and provisions of the Idaho Constitution and statutes. It sought injunctive relief along with costs and attorney’s fees. Charles Johnson of the Idaho Legal Aid Society served as next friend for the class. The organization made no fee agreements with class members because it was prohibited from representing clients able to pay. Shortly after petitioners filed their answer, the parties reached a partial settlement on the educational services claims in October 1981 under which each side would bear its own attorney’s fees and costs. Negotiations on the treatment claims broke down. This led to cross-motions for summary judgment, class certification, discovery, and preparation for a spring 1983 trial. In March 1983, one week before trial, petitioners presented respondents with a new settlement proposal. As respondents themselves characterize it, the proposal offered virtually all of the injunctive relief they had sought in their complaint. Petitioners' offer included a provision for a waiver by respondents of any claim to fees or costs. Respondents’ counsel had been instructed by the Idaho Legal Aid Society to reject any settlement offer conditioned upon a waiver of fees. Johnson ultimately determined that his ethical obligation to his clients mandated acceptance of the proposal. The parties conditioned the waiver on approval by the District Court. Johnson then filed a written motion requesting the District Court to approve the settlement except for the provision on costs and attorney's fees. He also asked to allow respondents to present a bill of costs and fees for consideration by the court. The District Court evaluated the waiver in the context of the entire settlement and rejected the ethical underpinnings of Johnson's argument. Accordingly, the District Court approved the settlement and denied the motion to submit a costs bill. When respondents appealed from the order denying attorney's fees and costs, petitioners filed a motion requesting the District Court to suspend or stay their obligation to comply with the substantive terms of the settlement. The Court of Appeals granted two emergency motions for stays requiring enforcement of the substantive terms of the consent decree pending the appeal. After ordering preliminary relief, it invalidated the fee waiver and left standing the remainder of the settlement. It then instructed the District Court to make its own determination of the fees that are reasonable and remanded for that limited purpose. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits.

In late spring of 1975, the District Court of Durham County, North Carolina, adjudicated William Everett Lassiter, born in 1975 to petitioner Abby Gail Lassiter, a neglected child after evidence that she had not provided proper medical care, and transferred custody to the respondent Durham County Department of Social Services. A year later, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second-degree murder and began serving a sentence of 25 to 40 years. In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights, alleging she had not had contact with the child since December 1975 and had willfully left the child in foster care for more than two years without substantial progress. Ms. Lassiter was served with the petition and notice of the August 31, 1978 hearing. Although her mother had retained counsel for her in connection with challenging the murder conviction, Ms. Lassiter did not mention the termination hearing to him. At the hearing, the court discussed whether she should have more time to find counsel but concluded she had ample opportunity and proceeded without appointing counsel or inquiring about indigency. A social worker testified about the child's medical issues in 1975, lack of contact since then, and that the grandmother was not able to care for the child. Ms. Lassiter cross-examined the witness, testified herself, and her mother also testified. The court found that Ms. Lassiter had not contacted the Department since December 1975, had not expressed concern for the child's welfare, and had willfully failed to maintain responsibility, and terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that appointment of counsel for indigent parents was not constitutionally mandated, and the North Carolina Supreme Court summarily denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In 2007, two teenage sisters were sexually assaulted in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing facility. The girls identified the assailant as a racetrack employee, and police arrested Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez. Each girl separately identified him as the man who assaulted her. State prosecutors charged Peña-Rodriguez with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault on a child. Before the jury was empaneled, members of the venire received a written questionnaire asking if anything would make it difficult to be a fair juror. The court and defense counsel repeatedly asked prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial. None of the empaneled jurors expressed reservations based on racial bias. After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Peña-Rodriguez of unlawful sexual contact and harassment but failed to reach a verdict on the attempted sexual assault charge. When the jury was discharged, the court gave the mandated instruction that whether jurors discussed the case was their own decision. Following discharge, two jurors remained in the jury room to speak privately with defense counsel. They reported that during deliberations another juror, identified as H.C., had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness. With the trial court's supervision, counsel obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors. The affidavits stated that H.C. said Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women. The affidavits further stated that nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls. H.C. believed Peña-Rodriguez was guilty because he is Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want. H.C. did not find the alibi witness credible because the witness was an illegal. The trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias. It denied Peña-Rodriguez's motion for a new trial on the ground that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying about statements made during deliberations in a proceeding inquiring into the validity of the verdict. A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the statements did not fall within an exception to the rule. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed by a 4-3 vote. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether there is a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for instances of racial bias.