560 U.S. 631 (2010)
Albert Holland was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Florida state court in 1997.1 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.2 On October 1, 2001, the United States Supreme Court denied Holland's petition for certiorari, starting the one-year AEDPA limitations period under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1).3 Florida appointed Bradley Collins to represent Holland in postconviction proceedings on November 7, 2001.4
On September 19, 2002, Collins filed a motion for state postconviction relief, which tolled the limitations period with twelve days remaining.5 The state trial court denied relief, and after appeals, the Florida Supreme Court denied rehearing on December 15, 2005.6 Collins failed to inform Holland of these developments despite Holland's repeated letters requesting updates and emphasizing the need to file a timely federal habeas petition.7
Holland wrote multiple letters to Collins between March 2005 and January 2006 seeking information and directing him to file the federal petition on time.8 Holland also wrote to the Florida Supreme Court and filed a complaint with the Florida Bar Association seeking to remove Collins.9 On January 18, 2006, Holland learned from the Florida Supreme Court that his state proceedings had concluded.10
Holland filed a pro se federal habeas petition on February 27, 2006, which was approximately five weeks after the limitations period had expired.11 The District Court dismissed the petition as untimely, finding that Holland had not demonstrated due diligence and that Collins's conduct did not constitute extraordinary circumstances.12 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that attorney negligence, even if gross, could never warrant equitable tolling absent bad faith or similar misconduct.13 Holland petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.14
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases?15
A nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling.16 That presumption applies to AEDPA because the statute is not jurisdictional, its text and legislative history do not rebut the presumption, and habeas corpus is an area where equity traditionally applies.17
Yes. Because the AEDPA limitations period in 28 U.S.C. §2244(d) is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar, the Irwin presumption applies to it. The District Court and Eleventh Circuit dismissed Holland's petition on timeliness grounds after his state conviction became final on October 1, 2001.18 The fact that Congress provided statutory tolling under §2244(d)(2) for state postconviction proceedings but remained silent on equitable tolling does not rebut the presumption.19
The two forms of tolling address different circumstances.20 The legislative history shows no intent to preclude equitable tolling.21
Section 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia dissented on this issue.23 He contended that the detailed scheme in §2244(d) specifies particular tolling events and exceptions without mentioning equitable tolling.24 This demonstrates that Congress displaced the default rule.25
Courts have no room to add equitable exceptions beyond those enumerated in the statute.26 The absence of any language authorizing equitable tolling is telling given the statute's structure and legislative history.27 Scalia argued that when Congress has codified specific exceptions, courts should not imply additional equitable ones, as this would undermine the legislative design aimed at reducing delays in habeas cases.
Whether the facts alleged by Holland, if true, could entitle him to equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period?28
Equitable tolling requires a petitioner to show that he has been pursuing his rights diligently.29 It also requires that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.30 Attorney misconduct that amounts to abandonment of the client can constitute such an extraordinary circumstance.31
Yes. Holland alleged that Collins failed to inform him of the Florida Supreme Court's December 15, 2005 denial of rehearing despite repeated letters requesting updates.32 Collins failed to file the federal petition despite Holland's explicit directions to do so before the deadline.33 Collins failed to communicate with Holland for years.34
These facts, if true, go well beyond garden-variety negligence.35 They amount to abandonment that severed the attorney-client relationship.36 Holland learned of the mandate on January 18, 2006.37 He filed his pro se petition on February 27, 2006.38
These circumstances satisfy the diligence prong.39 They could establish extraordinary circumstances warranting tolling of the roughly five-week delay.40
The facts alleged by Holland, if true, could entitle him to equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period.41
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment on this issue.42 He agreed that the facts alleged go well beyond routine attorney negligence.43 They could amount to abandonment of the client sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.44
He emphasized that only rare cases of egregious attorney conduct will qualify.45 The decision does not open the door to tolling for ordinary mistakes by counsel.46 The lower courts must apply the correct standard on remand.47
Alito stressed that the ruling preserves the high bar for equitable tolling while recognizing that true abandonment by counsel creates circumstances beyond the petitioner's control.48
Whether an attorney's gross negligence or failure to communicate can constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling?49
While a garden-variety claim of excusable neglect or simple miscalculation does not warrant equitable tolling, attorney conduct that is so egregious as to amount to abandonment of the attorney-client relationship can constitute an extraordinary circumstance.50 Courts must apply equitable principles on a case-by-case basis rather than through rigid per se rules.51
Yes. Collins's alleged conduct included ignoring Holland's multiple letters from March 2005 through January 2006.52 Those letters emphasized the need to file a timely federal petition and requested status updates.53 Collins failed to notify Holland of the Florida Supreme Court's decisions until after the limitations period had expired.54
This conduct went far beyond ordinary negligence.55 It could amount to abandonment that severed the agency relationship.56 The Eleventh Circuit's per se rule that attorney negligence can never constitute an extraordinary circumstance is therefore incorrect.57 The facts alleged by Holland could satisfy the extraordinary-circumstance prong.58
An attorney's gross negligence or failure to communicate can constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling when the conduct amounts to abandonment of the client.59
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia dissented on this issue as well.60 He argued that even if equitable tolling were available, Holland could not qualify.61 An attorney's acts and failures within the scope of representation are attributable to the client.62
The alleged misconduct here amounted at most to garden-variety negligence.63 It was the same type of miscalculation already rejected in prior precedent such as Lawrence v. Florida.64 Scalia maintained that no constitutional right to counsel exists in postconviction proceedings, so the client bears the risk of attorney error without exception for gross negligence.