a cancellis curiae explodi

Junius Scales was indicted on November 18, 1954, in the Middle District of North Carolina for violating the membership clause of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385, by holding knowing membership in the Communist Party of the United States from January 1946 through the date of the indictment, with knowledge of the Party's purpose to advocate the overthrow of the United States government by force and violence and with the specific intent to accomplish that overthrow as speedily as circumstances would permit. The indictment followed Scales' service as chairman of the Party's Carolina District, during which he recruited members, arranged attendance at Party schools, and directed instruction on Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The first trial ended in conviction in 1955; the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed on the authority of Jencks v. United States and remanded for a new trial. After Congress enacted the Jencks statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, Scales was retried in 1958, again convicted by a jury, and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the second conviction in 260 F.2d 21. At the second trial the government introduced testimony from former Party members and an FBI informant who had infiltrated the organization under Scales' direction. Witnesses described instruction at national and regional Party schools in 1945, 1947, 1950, 1951, and 1952 that taught the inevitability of violent proletarian revolution, the necessity of smashing the bourgeois state apparatus, the formation of coalitions between the working class and the Negro population in the South to prepare for that revolution, and techniques such as underground organization and readiness for action when objective conditions ripened. Scales personally instructed the informant on the Party's strategy of combining the proletariat and the Negro nation to achieve forcible overthrow, arranged his attendance at the Jefferson School of Social Science, and directed him to infiltrate labor and defense-related organizations while remaining undercover. The three-year limitations period narrowed the government's proof to events between November 1951 and November 1954, although earlier events were admitted to establish the continuing character of the Party's advocacy. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the statutory, constitutional, evidentiary, and procedural claims.

These cases present questions as to procedures required at prison disciplinary hearings and as to the reach of our recent decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974). The two cases consolidated here arose from prison disciplinary proceedings in California and Rhode Island. In the California case, respondents were inmates at San Quentin State Prison. They filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The suit alleged that the procedures used in disciplinary proceedings at San Quentin violated their rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted substantial relief. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment with one judge dissenting. The court first ruled in 1974. It ruled again after rehearing in light of an intervening Supreme Court decision. The opinion was modified to require minimum notice and a right to respond even for temporary suspension of privileges. It also required written reasons for any denial of confrontation or cross-examination. In the Rhode Island case, respondent Palmigiano was an inmate serving a life sentence for murder at the Adult Correctional Institution. He was charged by correctional officers with inciting a disturbance and disruption of prison operations that might have resulted in a riot. He was summoned before the prison Disciplinary Board and informed that he might be prosecuted for a violation of state law, that he should consult his attorney although the attorney was not permitted to be present during the hearing, that he had a right to remain silent during the hearing but that if he remained silent his silence would be held against him. Palmigiano availed himself of the counsel-substitute provided by prison rules and remained silent during the hearing. The Disciplinary Board placed him in punitive segregation for thirty days and downgraded his classification status thereafter. Palmigiano filed a separate action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages and injunctive relief. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed with one judge dissenting. After the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Wolff v. McDonnell, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its prior decision with modifications in 1974. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and set them for argument together.

Since Minnesota's admission to the Union in 1858, the State's Constitution has provided for the selection of all state judges by popular election. Since 1912, those elections have been nonpartisan. Since 1974, they have been subject to a legal restriction which states that a candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge, shall not announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. The Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct containing this announce clause is based on the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct. In 1996, petitioner Gregory Wersal ran for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. During his campaign, he distributed literature criticizing several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions on issues such as crime, welfare, and abortion. A complaint was filed against him with the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility challenging the propriety of this literature under the announce clause. The Lawyers Board dismissed the complaint, expressing doubt whether the clause could constitutionally be enforced, but Wersal withdrew from the election out of concern for his law practice. In 1998, Wersal ran again for the same office. Early in that race, he sought an advisory opinion from the Lawyers Board on enforcement of the announce clause but received an equivocal response because he had not submitted specific announcements. Shortly thereafter, Wersal and other plaintiffs including the Minnesota Republican Party filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. They sought a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court found in favor of respondents, holding that the announce clause did not violate the First Amendment. Over a dissent, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, first arrived in the United States in 1965 as a visitor. In 1967 she married a United States citizen and established residency in Connecticut. After completing law school, Griffiths applied in 1970 for permission to take the Connecticut bar examination. The County Bar Association determined that she met all qualifications except the citizenship requirement imposed by Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963). On that basis alone, the association denied her the opportunity to sit for the examination. Griffiths then pursued judicial relief, claiming that the citizenship rule violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Superior Court rejected her challenge. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and ultimately reversed the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.