424 U.S. 409 (1976)
In January 1961, two men attempted to rob a Los Angeles market run by Morris Hasson.1 One shot and fatally wounded Hasson, and the two fled in different directions.2 Ten days later Leonard Lingo was killed while attempting a robbery in Pomona, California, but his two accomplices escaped.3 Paul Imbler turned himself in the next day as one of those accomplices.4 Subsequent investigation led the Los Angeles District Attorney to believe that Imbler and Lingo had perpetrated the first crime as well, and that Imbler had killed Hasson.5 Imbler was charged with first-degree felony murder for Hasson's death.6
The State's case at trial consisted of eyewitness testimony from Hasson's wife and identification testimony from three men who had seen Hasson's assailants fleeing after the shooting.7 Mrs. Hasson was unable to identify the gunman because a hat had obscured his face, but from police photographs she identified the killer's companion as Leonard Lingo.8 The primary identification witness was Alfred Costello, a passerby on the night of the crime.9 He testified that he had a clear view both as the gunman emerged from the market, and again a few moments later when the fleeing gunman turned to fire a shot at Costello and to shed his coat before continuing on.10 Costello positively identified Imbler as the gunman.11 Imbler's defense was an alibi.12 He claimed to have spent the night of the Hasson killing bar-hopping with several persons, and to have met Lingo for the first time the morning before the attempted robbery in Pomona.13 This testimony was corroborated by Mayes, the other accomplice in the Pomona robbery.14 The jury found Imbler guilty and fixed punishment at death.15 On appeal the Supreme Court of California affirmed unanimously.16
Shortly thereafter Deputy District Attorney Richard Pachtman, who had been the prosecutor at Imbler's trial, wrote to the Governor of California describing evidence turned up after trial by himself and an investigator for the state correctional authority.17 In substance, the evidence consisted of newly discovered corroborating witnesses for Imbler's alibi, as well as new revelations about prime witness Costello's background which indicated that he was less trustworthy than he had represented originally to Pachtman and in his testimony.18 Imbler filed a state habeas corpus petition shortly after Pachtman's letter.19 The Supreme Court of California appointed one of its retired justices as referee to hold a hearing, at which Costello was the main attraction.20 He recanted his trial identification of Imbler, and it also was established that on cross-examination and re-direct he had painted a picture of his own background that was more flattering than true.21 Imbler's corroborating witnesses, uncovered by prosecutor Pachtman's investigations, also testified.22 In a thorough opinion by then Justice Traynor, the Supreme Court of California unanimously rejected these contentions and denied the writ.23
In 1964, the year after denial of his state habeas petition, Imbler succeeded in having his death sentence overturned on grounds unrelated to this case.24 Rather than resentence him, the State stipulated to life imprisonment.25 There the matter lay for several years.26 In late 1967 or early 1968, Imbler filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court based on the same contentions previously urged upon and rejected by the Supreme Court of California.27 The District Court held no hearing.28 Instead, it decided the petition upon the record, including Pachtman's letter to the Governor and the transcript of the referee's hearing ordered by the Supreme Court of California.29 Reading that record quite differently than had the seven justices of the State Supreme Court, the District Court found eight instances of state misconduct at Imbler's trial, the cumulative effect of which required issuance of the writ.30 The District Court ordered that the writ of habeas corpus issue unless California retried Imbler within 60 days.31 The State appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.32 The Court of Appeals affirmed, and certiorari was denied.33 California chose not to retry Imbler, and he was released.34
At this point, after a decade of litigation and with Imbler now free, the stage was set for the present suit.35 In April 1972, Imbler filed a civil rights action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related statutes, against respondent Pachtman, the police fingerprint expert, and several other officers of the Los Angeles police force.36 He alleged that a conspiracy among them unlawfully to charge and convict him had caused him loss of liberty and other grievous injury.37 He demanded $2.7 million in actual and exemplary damages from each defendant, plus $15,000 attorney's fees.38 Pachtman moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to have the complaint dismissed as to him.39 The District Court granted his motion.40 Following the entry of final judgment as to Pachtman under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Imbler appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.41 That court affirmed the District Court.42 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the important and recurring issue of prosecutorial liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.43
Whether a state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of the defendant's constitutional rights?44
A state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of the defendant's constitutional rights.45 Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from such suits, grounded in common-law tradition and public policy considerations that protect the judicial process from harassment and deflection of prosecutorial energies.46
No. Pachtman's actions fell within the core of his prosecutorial duties as advocate for the State.47 He initiated the prosecution by charging Imbler with first-degree felony murder following the investigation of the January 1961 market robbery and shooting of Morris Hasson, and he pursued the case by presenting the State's evidence, including the identification testimony of Alfred Costello.48 These functions are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, so the absolute immunity recognized at common law and under § 1983 applies to bar the damages action.49
The policy considerations supporting this immunity, including the need to avoid deflection of prosecutorial energies and the risk of biased post-conviction decisions, are fully implicated here, where the suit followed years of litigation including state and federal habeas proceedings that ultimately resulted in Imbler's release without retrial.50
A state prosecuting attorney is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions taken within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.51
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice White concurs in the judgment because the gravamen of the complaint is that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony for which absolute immunity is appropriate.52 He agrees that absolute immunity protects the judicial process from suits based on the decision to prosecute or the presentation of testimony.53 However he disagrees with any implication that absolute immunity extends to suits based on claims of unconstitutional suppression of evidence because such a rule would threaten to injure the judicial process by discouraging disclosure of exculpatory information.54
He notes that the complaint's allegations of suppression are insufficient to state a claim in any event and thus concurs in the result.55