475 U.S. 157 (1986)
On February 8, 1977, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Emmanuel Charles Whiteside stabbed Calvin Love to death during an argument over marijuana at Love's apartment late at night. Whiteside and two companions had gone to the apartment seeking marijuana.1 Love was in bed when they arrived.2
Whiteside gave his appointed counsel Gary L. Robinson a statement that he had stabbed Love as the latter was pulling a pistol from underneath the pillow on the bed.3 Upon questioning he indicated he had not actually seen a gun but was convinced Love had one.4
Robinson investigated and learned that no pistol was found on the premises after the police search.5 The victim's family had removed all possessions from the apartment shortly afterward.6 Whiteside's companions present during the incident had not seen a gun.7
Until shortly before trial Whiteside consistently told Robinson he had not seen a gun but believed Love had one.8 About a week before trial, during preparation for direct examination, Whiteside told Robinson and associate Donna Paulsen for the first time that he had seen something metallic in Love's hand.9 He referenced another case where a gun was involved.10
Robinson advised Whiteside that testimony claiming he saw a gun or something metallic would be perjury given his prior statements.11 It was not necessary to prove an actual gun for self-defense.12 If Whiteside insisted on testifying falsely, Robinson would advise the court, seek to withdraw, and possibly attempt to impeach the testimony.13
At trial Whiteside testified that he knew Love had a gun and believed Love was reaching for one.14 On cross-examination he admitted he had not actually seen a gun in Love's hand.15 Robinson presented evidence that Love had been seen with a sawed-off shotgun on other occasions.16 The police search may have been careless.17
The jury returned a verdict of second-degree murder.18 Whiteside moved for a new trial claiming he had been deprived of a fair trial by Robinson's admonitions.19 After a hearing at which both Whiteside and Robinson testified, the trial court denied the motion.20 The trial court made specific findings that the facts were as related by Robinson.21
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.22
Whiteside petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa alleging denial of effective assistance of counsel and the right to present a defense.23 The district court denied the writ.24 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and directed that the writ be granted.25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.26
Whether the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to assistance of counsel is violated when an attorney refuses to cooperate with a defendant in presenting perjured testimony at his trial?27
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.28 This requires showing both deficient performance measured against prevailing professional norms and resulting prejudice that undermines confidence in the trial outcome.29 Prevailing norms, as reflected in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted in Iowa, prohibit an attorney from knowingly using perjured testimony or assisting a client in conduct the lawyer knows to be criminal or fraudulent.30 An attorney's duty of loyalty to the client is limited by an overarching duty to the court and the law.31 The right to counsel does not extend to assistance in presenting false evidence.32
No. The established facts show that Robinson's conduct satisfied the Strickland performance standard.33 He investigated Whiteside's shifting account.34 He determined that testimony claiming to have seen a gun or something metallic would contradict prior consistent statements to Robinson and others.35 He warned Whiteside that such testimony would constitute perjury.36 Robinson advised Whiteside that an actual gun was unnecessary to establish self-defense.37 He attempted to dissuade the false testimony.38 He stated he would inform the court and seek to withdraw or impeach only if Whiteside insisted on testifying falsely.39 These steps fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.40 They prevented subornation of perjury while still allowing Whiteside to testify to his belief that Love had a gun.41 They permitted presentation of supporting evidence of Love's prior gun possession and the possibility of a careless police search.42
The facts further demonstrate that Robinson's actions did not compromise Whiteside's right to testify truthfully.43 They did not create the type of actual conflict of interest that would presume prejudice under Cuyler v. Sullivan.44 Whiteside did testify at trial.45 He admitted on cross-examination that he had not seen a gun.46 He received zealous representation on the self-defense theory through other witnesses and stipulations.47 The only limitation imposed was the refusal to present perjured testimony.48 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that this is not a protected right under the Sixth Amendment or otherwise.49
Application of the prejudice prong confirms no constitutional violation occurred.50 The trial court credited Robinson's account after a hearing.51 The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.52 The record shows Whiteside's proposed perjured testimony would have been contradicted by his own prior statements, the absence of any gun, and other eyewitness accounts.53 There is no reasonable probability that the second-degree murder verdict would have changed.54 The jury rejected self-defense even on the version presented.55
The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was not violated when the attorney refused to cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured testimony.56
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.57 He agreed that a lawyer's duty to the client does not include assisting in perjury.58 The lawyer must advise against it and withdraw if possible.59 He stressed that the Court's holding is strictly limited to the narrow issue presented and does not address what a lawyer should do when withdrawal is not feasible.60
Brennan emphasized that the Court has no constitutional authority to establish rules of ethical conduct for lawyers practicing in the state courts.61 Nor does the Court enjoy any statutory grant of jurisdiction over legal ethics.62 The Court's essay regarding the correct response to a criminal client's suggestion of perjury is pure discourse without force of law.63 Lawyers and bar associations should understand that the problem has not now been decided.64 He joined Justice Blackmun's concurrence because respondent failed to prove the prejudice necessary under Strickland v. Washington.65
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment and joined Justice Brennan's opinion.66 He stressed that the record amply supports the conclusion that Whiteside's proposed testimony would have been perjurious.67 It contradicted his own earlier statements to Robinson and others that he had not seen a gun.68
Blackmun focused on the absence of any cognizable prejudice under Strickland.69 The only effect of counsel's conduct was to prevent false testimony.70 A defendant has no right to benefit from perjury that would undermine the reliability of the trial result.71 All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth.72
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on different grounds from the majority.73 He agreed that the lawyer's threat to withdraw and inform the court was not only ethical but required by the duty to the court.74 The lawyer did not coerce the client into silence but properly advised him of the consequences.75
Stevens concluded there was no prejudice under Strickland.76 Whiteside was able to present his version of events to the jury.77 That version was rejected.78 There was no reasonable probability the outcome would have differed if the lawyer had acted differently.79