Concept
Reasons for the Limit
Negligent interference with contract or prospective relations
Reasons for the Limit
Section 766C produces a result that looks wrong on first reading: a careless defendant causes a real and often foreseeable financial loss, and the injured plaintiff recovers nothing. By its terms, one is not liable to another for pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm to the other if that harm results from the actor's negligently causing a third person not to perform a contract with the other, interfering with the other's performance or making it more expensive or burdensome, or interfering with the other's acquiring a contractual relation with a third person.1 Each clause names a different route to the same purely financial injury.2 Earlier sections taught what the rule covers and how it differs from intentional interference. This section asks why a legal system that usually compensates foreseeable harm refuses to do so here.
Two reasons answer that question, and they work together. The first is reach: economic loss travels along contracts, so one careless act can disturb a chain of agreements the defendant never saw. The second is allocation: negligence law imposes duties only in particular relationships, and the parties who made the contracts were better placed than a stranger to decide who would bear the risk of their disruption. Together the reasons explain why the two arguments students expect to win these problems, that the plaintiff was innocent and that the loss was foreseeable, do not.
Boundless Liability Concerns
Economic loss has no natural stopping point, and that is the first reason for the bar. In Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, a steamship charterer sought lost profits attributable to delay after the defendant negligently broke a vessel's propeller. The charterer had a contract with the ship's owners but no property interest in the ship itself, and the Court denied recovery, reasoning that "[t]he law does not spread its protection so far."3 The phrase describes a problem of reach. Every liability rule must say where the defendant's responsibility ends. For physical injury the accident usually supplies the answer, but for purely financial injury it does not, so courts that follow Robins draw the line by category.
A careless act that causes physical harm is limited by the physical world. A falling beam injures the people beneath it and damages the property it lands on, and anyone can count those victims by walking the site. Economic loss moves differently. One disabled ship or one closed street reaches the charterers, suppliers, customers, employees, and lenders of everyone it touches, and then the people who deal with each of them in turn. The physical victims form a small group with a visible edge, while the economic victims form a group whose edge the defendant cannot see in advance. That difference is why courts describe the physical-harm requirement as a convenient clamp on otherwise boundless liability: it ties the number of plaintiffs to the reach of the physical injury.4
Courts have applied the same reasoning to city-scale disruption. In 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., businesses lost money when collapsing buildings closed the streets around them, and the New York Court of Appeals refused recovery. A defendant owes a duty of care to those with whom it has an undertaking or special relationship,5 but every shop, restaurant, and office on those streets could claim a loss, and each had suppliers and employees who could claim the same through it.
The shoe store recovers its lost profits because they accompany physical harm to its own property, and economic losses are recoverable in tort only in connection with physical harm to person or property.6 The bakery stands where the Manhattan merchants stood. Its claim has no natural limit, because the dry cleaner beside it can say the same thing, as can the courier who could not reach either, and a court that allows one claim has no principled place to stop. The physical victims can be listed by walking the block, and the list ends.
Courts that defend the bar add three specific dangers to the general fear of boundless liability: fraudulent claims, mass litigation, and liability out of proportion to the defendant's fault.7 All three are easy to see in a closed-street case. A broken propeller or a collapsed wall can be inspected, but a claim that sales would have been higher is a counterfactual resting on the plaintiff's own books, and a week of closed streets is hard to tell apart from an ordinary slow week. One event can produce a very large number of claimants, each needing proof of its own contracts and losses. And the exposure would depend on facts the defendant neither knew nor controlled, so the same moment of inattention could cost one defendant a modest judgment and another a ruinous one, depending on how many contracts happened to rest on what was damaged.
Each danger argues for a line fixed before the accident rather than drawn claim by claim afterward, which is why the economic loss rule is described as a bright-line limit.8 The categorical shape also explains why foreseeability does not rescue a plaintiff. Economic harm to nearby businesses is often entirely foreseeable, since anyone who drops a beam across a street can guess that shops depend on it. If foreseeability decided liability, the boundary would be redrawn after every accident and the rule would lose the predictability that justifies it. A court applying the bar therefore does not ask whether the loss was foreseeable. It asks whether the law protects this kind of interest against negligence, and for stand-alone economic loss it ordinarily does not.9
Critics accept that the concerns are real but deny that a categorical rule is needed to meet them. The court in People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp. observed that the fear of unchecked liability has been raised and answered in other settings, including strict liability for defective products and for ultrahazardous activities. It concluded that the answer is not judicial obstruction of a fairly grounded claim but a more careful application of traditional concepts of duty and proximate causation to the facts of each case.10 In re Kinsman Transit Co. took a similar path: after rejecting an inflexible rule of nonrecovery, the court applied traditional proximate-cause analysis to a claim for purely economic losses.11 The majority approach accepts the cost the critics point to, because some innocent plaintiffs with foreseeable losses go uncompensated. In exchange it gets a line that defendants, insurers, and courts can apply without trying each plaintiff's remoteness.
The concerns fit § 766C especially well because plaintiff and defendant are usually strangers. Nothing the defendant agreed to defines how far its responsibility to the plaintiff runs, so the limit has to come from the law itself. That is why negligent interference with contract is not ordinarily actionable, even though a duty can arise from an undertaking or special relationship.12
Duty and Contract Allocation
Section 766C states its rule as an absence of liability, and a court can say so flatly because of duty, the legal obligation to use reasonable care toward a particular plaintiff.14 The duty issue arises in many contexts and is influenced by a variety of factors, which is why these cases are hard to fit into a single framework.15 Pure economic harm is one setting in which negligence is often an insufficient basis for liability, and negligent interference with contract is the standard example.16 The contrast with intent is sharp: it is a tort to interfere intentionally with a contract between two other parties, but negligent interference ordinarily is not actionable.17
Because the duty question depends on a variety of factors, courts weigh considerations such as foreseeability, the closeness of the connection between the conduct and the harm, the burden a duty would impose, and who can insure against the loss.18 In a § 766C case these do not line up evenly. Foreseeability usually favors the plaintiff, since a careless defendant can often guess that someone depends on whatever is being damaged. The others weigh against a duty. The harm reaches the plaintiff only through its contract with someone else, and a duty to protect contract partners would run to everyone tied by agreement to everything the defendant's act might disable. Insurance is contested. The majority in State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank asserted that victims are better able to obtain insurance, but the dissent answered that although denial of recovery may spread the loss over the victims, it is not certain that victims are generally better insurers against losses from tortious acts with widespread consequences.19 Because foreseeability is only one factor, treating a foreseeable loss as proof of a duty gets the analysis backward. The no-duty rule amounts to a decision to do this weighing once for the whole category rather than plaintiff by plaintiff.
Contract supplies a further reason, clearest where the plaintiff and the defendant have a contract with each other. There the economic loss rule bars tort recovery of purely economic losses such as lost profits and limits the plaintiff to her remedies under the contract.20 A buyer whose new truck fails, and who therefore cannot deliver to its own customer, must pursue its lost profits on that sale as a contract claim.21 The reasoning is that the parties' contract is where they decided who bears the risk, and a tort claim would let the buyer collect what the bargain withheld.
The § 766C plaintiff has no contract with the defendant, so this rule does not govern it directly, but the same logic reaches it by a longer path. Its loss exists only because it contracted with a third person, and that contract was its chance to decide who bears the risk of the third person's failure to perform. Price, delivery terms, excuse clauses, termination rights, a second supplier, and insurance are all tools for that purpose. A negligence claim against the stranger who disabled the third person would let the plaintiff recover from someone who never joined the bargain, and that recovery could undo the allocation the plaintiff accepted. Some courts go further and refuse to entertain tort claims when the plaintiff could have contracted about a matter but did not.22 Throughout, the plaintiff keeps whatever rights it has against its own promisor.
A professional who undertakes a task for the plaintiff stands differently. A defendant who owes the plaintiff a duty of care because of an undertaking or special relationship may be sued in negligence for purely economic harm, and legal malpractice claims are the standard example.23 A client's lost deal after a lawyer carelessly botches a closing may equal Aldous's lost week in dollars, yet the client's claim goes forward while Aldous's fails, because only the lawyer had taken on a task directed at the client's interests. What separates the two is whether an undertaking or special relationship ties the defendant to the plaintiff, and the size or foreseeability of the loss does not answer that question.
The settings of stranger and contracting party call for different explanations, and keeping them apart prevents a common blur. Among strangers the concern is unpredictable, limitless liability, while between parties to a contract the policy is to honor the contract.24 A § 766C claim sits closer to the stranger pattern, since plaintiff and defendant have no contract with each other. The contract that matters is the plaintiff's contract with the third person, which is why contract allocation supports the stranger rationale without replacing it. Special relationships and undertakings are the principal exceptions, and they are taken up next.25