Concept
Privileges and Justifications
Improper interference: § 767 factors and privileges
Privileges and Justifications
Section 767 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts gives a court seven factors for deciding whether an intentional interference with a contract or prospective contractual relation is improper, and it offers them as a general test for every setting.1 The commentary to § 767 then qualifies that generality. Sections 769 through 773 cover special situations in which the factors have produced more clearly identifiable decisional patterns, and their specific applications supplant the generalization in § 767. Comment j adds that once courts have weighed the conflicting factors and the decisions have marked the scope of a more or less crystallized rule or privilege, the task in a particular case is to apply the rule to the facts, with no need to balance afresh.2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court drew on this commentary in Walnut Street Associates, Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc. to hold that, when a truthfulness defense under § 772(a) is raised, analysis of the general § 767 factors is unnecessary.3
A privilege, then, is a balance that courts have already struck. A rule that records the usual outcome of a recurring pattern tells parties in advance what they may do, and it spares them a fresh weighing of seven factors in every dispute. The Pennsylvania court called this the ordinary course of the law: general principles are tested in practice, and more specific and accurate paradigms emerge.4 A rival bidding for a customer's prospective business, a party defending a stake of its own, and a person who answers a question truthfully each occupy a recurring setting of that kind, and each setting has a rule of its own.
Applying one of these rules begins with a question the general balance never asks: do the facts fall within the scope the decisions have marked? Each privilege carries its own conditions, and the subsections below take them up one at a time.5 A defendant inside the conditions skips the weighing, because the weighing was done when the rule took shape. A defendant outside them gains nothing from the rule and is judged under the § 767 factors, where its interests still count as one factor.
Courts label these rules inconsistently, so the burden of proof deserves attention. Where the plaintiff bears the burden of showing impropriety, a defendant's proof that it was competing in the ordinary way, or protecting a stake of its own, answers the claim that its conduct was improper, and the plaintiff must still point to wrongful means or an improper motive. Where justification is an affirmative defense, the defendant must prove the privilege once the plaintiff has established the interference. Opinions use the words privilege and justification in both kinds of jurisdiction, because the same considerations of motive, means, and interests are in play, so a reader should always ask who carried the burden.
The four privileges differ in what they protect and in what defeats them:
| Privilege | Protects | Defeated by |
|---|---|---|
| Competition (§ 768) | A rival pursuing prospective business or an at-will contract | An existing contract that cannot be ended at will; wrongful means; unlawful restraint of trade; acting solely from spite |
| Protecting one's own interests (including § 773) | A defendant with a genuine stake or a bona fide claim | No interest actually protected; improper means; in some courts, a bad motive |
| Truthful information and honest advice (§ 772) | Accurate statements; advice that was requested, within the scope of the request, and honest | A false statement; advice that was unrequested, beyond the request, or dishonest |
| Agents and advisers (§ 770) | Good-faith action for a principal or client | Acting outside the role; predominant malice or personal gain, depending on the formulation |
Competition comes first, because it is the commonest reason one business costs another a customer.
Competition
Section 768 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts settles the general § 767 balance for the commonest way one business costs another a customer, and it looks first at what the plaintiff holds. A competitor's status does not protect it from the consequences of interfering with an existing contract. Status may, however, excuse interference with prospective contractual relationships when the interference is intended at least in part to advance the competitor's own competing interest, no unlawful restraint of trade results, and the means are not wrongful.6
The distinction tracks the difference between the two interests. In Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Manufacturing Corp., the New York Court of Appeals explained that an existing contract receives greater protection because respect for individual contract rights outweighs the public benefit of unfettered competition. The less substantive, more speculative interest in a prospective relationship yields unless the interferer's conduct is more culpable.7 Fair competition for a prospective contract is therefore not a tort. As the California Supreme Court put it, the plaintiff must show conduct “wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of interference itself,” which ordinarily means independently tortious conduct.8
Competition cannot work without the privilege. A rival that wins a customer necessarily costs another seller a sale, and the rival knows it. Because knowing that interference is substantially certain to result satisfies the intent element, nearly every successful sales effort would meet that element.9 If that were enough for liability, each lost customer would invite a lawsuit, and the cost of defending would fall on the very conduct the law wants to encourage.
The boundary appears when the plaintiff holds an existing contract that the other party cannot end at will. Economic competition does not justify improper interference with a valid existing contract.10 Comment h to § 768 says expressly that the rule protecting competition for prospective relations does not apply to inducing breach of contract.11 A rival in that position asks someone to abandon a commitment already made, and the law treats the commitment as an established interest that competition alone cannot override. The defendant's status as a competitor therefore settles nothing once an existing contract is involved. Nor is a defendant who cannot invoke the privilege automatically liable, because the claim returns to the general § 767 balance, where the strength of the plaintiff's interest and the directness of an appeal aimed at a known contract weigh toward impropriety.
Contracts terminable at will are treated like prospects. The other party may walk away at any moment for any reason, so the plaintiff holds no legal assurance that the relationship will continue, only an interest in future dealing. Comment g to § 766 treats that interest as closely analogous to a prospective contractual relation and adds that interference with it may not be improper when the defendant competes for the business the contract covers.12 Section 768(2) matches that treatment by withholding the privilege only from existing contracts that are not terminable at will, so the privilege reaches prospective relations and at-will contracts alike.13 Jurisdictions differ on how much protection an at-will arrangement deserves, so a problem involving one should be read against the governing rule.
Speakers of Sports, Inc. v. ProServ, Inc. shows the privilege at work on an at-will contract. Ivan Rodriguez, a catcher for the Texas Rangers, had signed a series of one-year contracts, each terminable at will, with the sports agency Speakers of Sports. In 1995 a rival agency, ProServ, invited him to its offices and promised to get him between $2 million and $4 million in endorsements if he signed with it. He signed, ProServ failed to get him any significant endorsements, and Speakers sued, charging that the promise was fraudulent and had induced Rodriguez to leave.14 Judge Posner started from the premise that nothing is wrong with one agent trying to take a client from another when it can be done without precipitating a breach of contract. That process is competition, which is not a tort and instead supplies a defense, the competitor's privilege, to the tort of improper interference.15
Fraud would have forfeited the privilege, because fraud or misrepresentation counts as a wrongful means.16 But the promise of endorsements was puffing: a sales pitch that a reasonable person in Rodriguez's position would understand as aspirational rather than enforceable, an expression of hope rather than a commitment. ProServ did not offer to pay Rodriguez $2 million a year. It offered to find endorsements that other companies, not ProServ, would pay, and it had no power to force those companies to pay.17 The case marks both edges of the privilege. Aggressive solicitation of an at-will client is protected, and a knowingly false statement of fact would not have been, which is why classifying the promise as puffing decided the result.
Each check has a reason. Persuasion alone stays off the list of wrongful means even when the defendant knows it will end the plaintiff's relationship, because persuading customers is the activity the privilege protects.19 Some courts go further and require a plaintiff suing a competitor to prove legally wrongful means, while keeping the broader improper-means inquiry for suits against non-competitors.20 The restraint-of-trade check follows from the privilege's purpose. Society tolerates the harm competition does to a rival because rivalry benefits buyers, so an arrangement that suppresses rivalry, such as an agreement among competitors to divide customers, cannot borrow the protection of the thing it destroys.
The purpose check keeps the privilege tied to its reason. The privilege exists to advance the actor's competitive interest and the social benefits believed to follow from competition. A defendant whose conduct aims at least in part at that end keeps the privilege even when hatred or a desire for revenge also moves it, but a defendant who acts only from spite or ill will, and not at all to improve its competitive position, loses it.21 Tuttle v. Buck marks the far end. The complaint alleged that a wealthy banker opened a barber shop and used his influence to draw customers from the plaintiff's shop, seeking no profit and planning to retire once the plaintiff was ruined. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that this stated an actionable wrong and called the label “competition” a “perversion of terms.”22 The banker had no competing interest to advance, and that fact separates him from a rival that undercuts a disliked competitor to win the account. Where a jurisdiction rejects motive-based liability and demands wrongful means, the sole-spite limit shrinks accordingly.23
Opinions describe the privilege in whatever vocabulary their jurisdiction uses. A court that makes the defendant justify its interference will say the defendant is privileged to compete. A court that puts the burden of impropriety on the plaintiff may say competition is not wrongful at all, or may keep the older word privilege anyway.24 The difference lies in who must produce proof, because competition is protected either way. It is also one instance of a wider rule that a defendant may pursue its own interests so long as its means are not wrongful, even against someone who is not a competitor, and the next subsection develops that rule.25
Protecting One's Own Interests
A defendant who interferes to protect a legitimate stake of its own is privileged if its means are proper. One court quoted Prosser's statement of the rule: a defendant with a present, existing economic interest to protect, such as the ownership or condition of property, may prevent performance of another's contract that threatens it, and for reasons of policy may likewise assert an honest claim, bring or threaten a suit in good faith, petition public authorities, or settle its own case out of court.27
The Colorado Supreme Court applied the privilege to the filing of a notice of lis pendens, a public notice that a lawsuit affecting title to real property is pending. In Westfield Development Co. v. Rifle Investment Associates, the court held that a litigant asserting a bona fide claim has a privilege to interfere in that way, a rule it rooted in § 773 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.28 The holding also allocates the proof. After the plaintiff shows that the interference was intentional, caused the termination of the contract, and caused damage, the interferer may still escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that it was asserting a bona fide claim.29 The plaintiff must also show impropriety under the § 767 factors, which the trial court in that case had never weighed, so the privilege operates as a defense on top of the plaintiff's own burden.30
This privilege differs from the actor's-interests factor discussed earlier. Under § 767(d), the interests the actor seeks to advance are one input into a judgment about the whole situation.31 The privilege records a balance already struck, so a defendant who fits within it avoids the weighing, while a defendant outside it is judged under the general factors, where the interest still counts as one input. The questions here are what a defendant must show to enter the privilege and what takes the defendant out of it.
The privilege exists because a person with a stake in property can lose it by staying quiet. A claimant who knows that another is offering land for sale as the other's own, and who passes up a readily available chance to tell likely buyers about the claim, may lose the ability to assert it against the purchaser afterward.32 The only effective warning comes before the sale closes, and a warning that clouds the title necessarily disturbs the sale. If every warning that cost the owner a buyer produced liability, the claimant would have to choose between forfeiting the claim and facing a lawsuit, so the claimant must be free to assert the claim before the purchase is made.33
Courts have applied the same reasoning to other stakes. In Wilkin Elevator v. Bennett State Bank, a bank that took ownership of the security for its loan acted on a legitimate self-interest that reflected a legal right. The Iowa Supreme Court said in Green v. Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa that a party “does not improperly interfere with another's contract by exercising its own legal rights in protection of its own financial interests.”34 Interference undertaken to protect a reputational interest, or the actor's own contractual rights, has been treated the same way.35 Nor does the privilege depend on rivalry. The New York Court of Appeals reasoned in Carvel Corp. v. Noonan that when the defendant is motivated by legitimate economic self-interest, it should not matter whether the parties compete in the same marketplace.36 That reasoning links this privilege to the one for competition, which is one instance of the wider principle that a defendant may pursue its own interests so long as its means are not wrongful.37
Three limits keep the privilege tied to its reason. The first is that the defendant must actually be protecting an interest, because naming one is not enough. In Smith v. Ford Motor Co., a dealership manager worked for a dealership that had the contractual right to terminate him, and Ford, believing his membership in a dealer alliance was inimical to its interests, induced the dealership to fire him. Ford's motive was to protect its own business as it saw it. The court nevertheless determined for itself that the firing did not in fact protect Ford's business interests, held the motive improper, and imposed liability even though the dealership acted within its rights.38 By contrast, a litigant who claims an interest in land, records a notice of lis pendens, and thereby causes a buyer to withdraw from a contract with the owner stands on the protected side of the line if the claim is bona fide.39
The two situations differ in what the court found about the interest. The privilege rests on a stake that justifies the harm to the plaintiff's contract, so where the interference protects nothing, the justification disappears and only the harm remains. The formulations in the title cases ask a narrower question than Smith did. One court found the privilege satisfied where the claimants asserted an honest claim to land that they had reason to believe was part of their property, a standard keyed to the claimants' reason to believe in the claim.40 The approach in Smith asks a court to review a business judgment, which is a larger inquiry than whether a claim was honestly asserted.
The second limit concerns means. Interference is not wrongful when it is carried out by proper means and the motive is to protect the defendant's own interests, so a genuine stake does not shelter a defendant who pursues it by improper means.41 Asserting the claim through the channels the legal system provides is proper. Bringing or threatening a bona fide suit to protect one's own interests is ordinarily not improper interference, at least absent other factors that warrant liability, and some courts count a bad motive among those factors.42 The purpose of the privilege explains the limit: it lets people defend what is theirs, and defending a claim requires no fraud and no other conduct that the law condemns apart from the contract.
Motive is the third limit and the least settled. Where a claim was asserted by statements about title, one court described the privilege as qualified, meaning that malice forfeits it, whether the malice takes the form of a knowing falsehood, reckless disregard of truth or falsity, or spite and ill will.43 The same court divided the questions: whether the privilege exists is a matter of law for the judge, and whether it was abused through malice is a question of fact for the trier of fact.44 Some courts likewise hold that a bad motive overrides the protection a financial interest would otherwise give.45 The reasoning is that the privilege rests on a protective purpose, so a defendant who acts from spite is using the interest as cover. Courts that have moved away from motive-based liability and insist on wrongful means are likely to give a bad motive little room to defeat the privilege when the means were proper. That leaves the mixed-motive defendant, one with a real claim and also a grudge, in a jurisdiction-dependent position.46
Falling outside the privilege does not make the defendant liable. It means only that the settled rule is unavailable and the claim returns to the § 767 balance, where the defendant's legitimate interest still counts on one side while wrongful means or a bad purpose count on the other.47 The usual exam error is to stop at the observation that the defendant had a financial stake and declare the interference privileged, when the privilege also requires that the stake be actually protected, the claim honest, and the means proper.
Truthful Information and Advice
Section 772 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts takes two ordinary ways of changing another person's mind out of the interference torts. One who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract, or not to enter a prospective contractual relation, “does not interfere improperly” by giving that person “truthful information” or “honest advice within the scope of a request for the advice.”49 Subsection (a) covers information and subsection (b) covers advice. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained in Walnut Street Associates, Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc. that § 772 now sits beside §§ 766 and 767 and further defines what counts as improper interference.50
The setting in Walnut Street was ordinary. Walnut Street Associates, an insurance broker, had recommended that its client, Procacci, retain Brokerage Concepts, Inc. (BCI) as administrator of Procacci's employee benefit plans, and BCI paid the broker commissions based on the premiums Procacci paid. When Procacci asked BCI to lower its costs and BCI refused, Procacci announced that it would move to another administrator. A BCI employee then wrote to ask Procacci to reconsider and disclosed how much the broker had been earning, and because the figure was higher than Procacci had believed, Procacci terminated the broker.51 The broker sued BCI and the employee for interference with contract, and the jury, charged under the general standards of §§ 766 and 767, found for the broker. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that a truthfulness defense under § 772(a) supplants the general § 767 analysis, so the employee's statement, being true, “was not an improper interference, and cannot, on its own, support a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations.”52
The route to that result runs through the comments to § 767. The commentary says that §§ 769 through 773 cover situations in which the factors have produced clearly identifiable decisional patterns, and that these specific applications supplant the general statement in § 767. Comment j adds that when courts have already weighed the competing factors and settled the scope of a rule, the task is to apply the rule to the facts without balancing afresh.53 Section 772(a) is such a rule, so a court that finds the defendant's statement truthful does not proceed to the seven factors. The consequence on the Walnut Street facts is concrete. The BCI employee wrote in order to keep a client, a self-interested purpose that the motive factor would have put on the scale, yet under the specific rule the question that decides the case is whether the statement was true.
The rule rests on the value of free exchange of information. The Pennsylvania court began from the premise that citizens in a free society may freely interact and exchange information, and it treated interference liability as a way to reach improper conduct without burdening such exchanges.54 The mechanism is easy to trace. A truthful statement affects the plaintiff's contract only by giving the third party an accurate fact that bears on its own decision, so the loss comes from the third party's reaction to the truth about the plaintiff's own dealings, with no deceit or pressure from the speaker in the chain. If that loss were actionable, a contract holder could suppress unwelcome facts by suing whoever disclosed them, and the candid communication on which commerce and professional relationships depend would carry a litigation risk for the speaker.
The privilege ends where the truth does. A knowingly false statement of fact made to a third party to shrink the plaintiff's market is not truthful information, and falsehoods of that kind can be improper means. The Eleventh Circuit in Manufacturing Research Corp. v. Greenlee Tool Co., for example, identified false statements “calculated to diminish the market” for the plaintiff's product as improper means.55 The BCI employee gave Procacci an accurate figure and left the decision to Procacci. A speaker who gives a third party false facts hands it a false premise, so the decision to walk away reflects the deception and not the third party's own weighing of real facts. The plaintiff's loss is the same in both settings, which is why the truth of the statement marks the boundary and the size of the injury does not.
Truth also does not shelter every inducement to breach. Suppose Gye induced Wagner to breach her contract with Lumley by telling her truthfully, “I will pay you twice what Lumley is paying you.” Read literally, § 772(a) would seem to excuse Gye, since the statement is true, yet the Second Restatement suggests that an offer of better terms, even a truthful one, is impermissible when it is made against an existing contract. The question is a puzzling one, and it fits the competition rule above: an existing contract draws protection that truthful words alone may not defeat.56
Advice differs from information because it carries the adviser's own judgment about what the recipient should do, and § 772(b) therefore attaches conditions that subsection (a) does not. The text of the rule speaks of a request only in connection with advice, so truthful information is protected whether or not anyone asked for it, as courts applying the rule have recognized, for example in Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc.57 For advice, comment c to § 772 states three requirements: the advice must be requested, it must stay within the scope of the request, and it must be honest.58
Each condition has its own reason. The request shows that the recipient chose to seek the adviser's judgment, so the recipient's initiative, and not the adviser's solicitation, set the process in motion. The scope limit keeps an invitation to give an opinion on one question from becoming a platform for steering the recipient toward some other end. The honesty condition does the heaviest work, because advice is valuable to the recipient only when it reflects what the adviser really thinks, and a recommendation the adviser does not believe is a tool for the adviser's own purposes under the name of advice. An adviser or professional who procures a breach in the good-faith belief that it serves the contracting party's best interests is therefore not liable, while one who acts primarily for personal benefit rather than for the client is not protected.59
Honesty is measured against the recommendation and not against every feeling the adviser holds. Where an adviser gives advice partly because the adviser thinks it good for the client and partly because the adviser wants to harm the third party who will suffer from it, the privilege remains available.60 A wish to earn fees likewise does not take a consultant or professional outside the privilege.61 In J.D. Edwards Co. v. Podany, a consultant denied any ulterior motive, but his credibility was impeached, the jury was free to disbelieve him, and that disbelief combined with circumstantial evidence to support a finding of bad faith.62 The case shows where such disputes are fought in practice. The adviser's side motives rarely decide the result, and the contest is over whether the recommendation was sincerely believed to serve the recipient.
The Third Restatement reaches a similar destination by a different route. It has no counterpart to § 772(b) and no honest-advice privilege among its privileges, because comment g to § 17 explains that prima facie liability is drawn more narrowly, so the plaintiff must establish wrongful conduct before any privilege becomes relevant.63 Disinterested advice, which comes from someone who is neither trying to appropriate the benefits of the contract nor motivated by a desire to injure the plaintiff, falls outside § 17(2), and a lawyer or other party who gives it faces no liability.64 A claim against such an adviser fails at the plaintiff's prima facie case, and no defense needs to be raised. The usual exam error is to run the seven factors on facts where the defendant only told the truth, or to deny the privilege because the speaker also wanted to keep a client or earn a fee, when the specific rule asks only whether the statement was true and whether the advice was honest.
Agents and Advisers
Section 770 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts protects a defendant who is “charged with responsibility for the welfare of a third person.” Its comment b explains that the rule frequently applies to those who stand in a fiduciary relation toward another, as in the case of agents acting for the protection of their principals.66 If the agent uses no wrongful means and acts to protect the principal's welfare, the conduct is not improper, and the third illustration to § 770 applies that rule to an employee who urges the principal's management to terminate another employee for the protection of the company.67 Section 770 belongs to the group of provisions in §§ 769 through 773 that record balances courts have already struck, so a defendant within it is spared the seven-factor weighing that § 767 would otherwise require.68 A claim against an agent therefore turns on whether the agent stayed within the role that § 770 protects.
The first question is who is really acting. A party cannot interfere with its own contract, so when a corporation's officer or agent, performing company duties, terminates or causes the termination of an employee, the act is the corporation's own. The employee's dispute is then with the employer for breach of contract, and not with the agent individually in tort.69 Two consequences of the opposite rule explain why courts hold that line. Exposing officers to personal liability for each discipline or termination decision would chill corporate personnel from doing their jobs, and it would cut against the limited liability that incorporation provides.70 Section 766 points the same way for a structural reason. It contemplates a three-party relationship, while agency law often treats the agent's actions as inseparable from the principal's, so even without § 770 there would be a question whether a claim against an agent can be brought under § 766 at all.71
Because the justification is that the agent is acting as the principal, it ends when the agent steps outside that role. A corporate officer or agent may be liable for interference when acting outside the scope of the agent's duties.72 Finding that edge is difficult when the agent's job includes evaluating or supervising the plaintiff, or taking part in the decision to discipline or terminate, because the conduct then supports conflicting inferences and the agent's motive can become the deciding fact.73 The court in Holloway resolved the problem with a good-faith rule. A company officer, agent, or employee is privileged to cause a breach of another employee's employment contract if the person “acts in good faith, whether competently or not,” believing that the actions further the company's business, but the privilege may be lost if the actions are “predominantly motivated by malice and bad faith,” meaning personal ill will, spite, hostility, or a deliberate intent to harm the plaintiff employee.74 The facts there suggested that the agent acted at least in part to save company funds for other corporate obligations, which would seem to suffice as an act to protect the corporation's welfare under § 770.75 The rule's tolerance for incompetence matters in applying it. The agent must have acted honestly in the company's interest, and need not have decided wisely, because a rule that penalized misjudgment would turn every unsuccessful personnel decision into a personal tort claim.
The first director fails both conditions of the privilege: she neither acted in good faith for the company nor acted within the role of an agent. An agent who acts exclusively in the agent's own interests and outside the scope of employment cannot rely on this justification.76 The second director keeps the protection because the business belief survives the grudge.
Jurisdictions differ on how much personal motive forfeits the privilege, and three formulations appear:
- The privilege is lost when the agent's actions are predominantly motivated by malice and bad faith, that is, by personal ill will, spite, hostility, or a deliberate intent to harm the plaintiff.77
- The privilege survives allegations of malice or career advancement unless the evidence shows that personal gain was the sole or predominant motivation, as in Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis.78
- The Third Restatement requires the employee to have been entirely motivated by personal interest at the expense of the corporation's interests, and it applies the same rule to any agent sued for interfering with the relationship between the plaintiff and the agent's principal.79
The third formulation is the hardest for a plaintiff to meet, but all three tolerate some mixture of motives, because mixed motives are the ordinary condition of workplace decisions. A supervisor who recommends discharging a weak performer may also dislike that person, and a test that reached every such case would remove the privilege exactly where it is needed. The Third Restatement says so directly: employees act on the corporation's behalf so long as they act within the scope of their employment, so showing that an employee misjudged the corporation's interests or had personal as well as professional motives does not establish liability.80 Section 770 itself leaves the question open, because it does not make clear whether a motive to protect the corporation's welfare suffices when mixed with others or must itself be predominant.81 A common mistake on an exam is to treat evidence that the agent disliked the plaintiff as the end of the analysis. Under every formulation the question is whether the agent kept to the role or used it as cover for a personal end at the principal's expense, so an answer should identify the standard the jurisdiction applies and then locate the facts on that scale.
Two related privileges follow the same logic and need only brief mention here. An adviser or professional responsible for a contracting party's interests, such as a consultant or an attorney, is not liable for procuring a breach in the good-faith belief that it serves the party's best interests, and a motive to earn fees does not take the adviser outside the privilege, although acting primarily for personal benefit does.82 A spouse or parent who persuades the contracting party not to perform may hold an absolute privilege regardless of motive, as Joel v. Weber suggests, so the motive inquiry that governs agents does not arise at all.83