54 N.E.3d 344 (Ind. 2016)
David Allen and Kimberly Allen divorced in 2002.1 The parties agreed to share custody of their two children, with Father paying child support to Mother.2 Their settlement agreement and dissolution decree did not provide for payment of college expenses.3
In 2010, the parties agreed to an order terminating basic child support for their daughter Hunter.4 Under the order Father became responsible for Hunter's undergraduate educational expenses and Mother became responsible for providing Hunter's health insurance.5 In 2013, shortly before Hunter's 21st birthday and while she was a senior at Indiana University, Father petitioned the court for modification of the agreed order and requested an order apportioning Hunter's dental school expenses between him and Mother.6
The trial court held two evidentiary hearings and entered an order in October 2014.7 It found that Hunter graduated from Indiana University with a degree in biology with highest distinction, scored in the 97th percentile on the Dental School Admission Test, was accepted into the Indiana University dental school where annual expenses are approximately $75,000, and had begun attending summer classes there.8
The trial court also found that Mother had assets of approximately $843,000 and weekly income of approximately $1,700, while Father had a net worth of over $2 million and was capable of generating approximately $4,600 per week.9 The court ordered that the 2010 agreement remain in effect, making Father responsible for the cost of dental school for Hunter less any contribution from Hunter through grants, scholarships, loans or other sources, and making Mother responsible for Hunter's health insurance.10
Father appealed, arguing among other things that the trial court erred in not determining each parent's presumptive share of educational expenses according to the Child Support Guidelines.11 Mother cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked statutory authority to enter an educational award for graduate school expenses.12 The Court of Appeals reversed on the apportionment issue but rejected Mother's cross-appeal argument, then remanded for an order apportioning dental school expenses between Father, Mother and Hunter. Mother petitioned for transfer, which the Supreme Court granted.13
Whether a trial court may order that divorced parents be obligated to pay the graduate or professional school expenses of their adult children pursuant to the Indiana child support statutes?14
The term "postsecondary," as used in Ind. Code § 31-16-6-2, does not include graduate or professional school expenses.15 This conclusion follows from the statutory definition in the higher education title limiting postsecondary education to programs creditable toward a baccalaureate degree.16 It also follows from legislative amendments that lowered the presumptive age for termination of child support and mirrored filing deadlines for educational expense petitions.17 Courts should not impose obligations on divorced parents that married parents do not bear absent clear legislative direction.18
No. The statute authorizes educational support orders only for elementary, secondary, and postsecondary institutions, and the definition of postsecondary education in Ind. Code § 21-7-13-6(a)(1)(A) covers only organized two-year or longer programs of collegiate grade directly creditable toward a baccalaureate degree.19 Hunter had already completed her undergraduate degree at Indiana University before the 2013 petition, placing her dental school expenses beyond the statute's reach.20 The 2010 agreed order addressed only undergraduate expenses, and Father's subsequent request to apportion dental school costs sought an extension the statute does not permit.21
The trial court's October 2014 order requiring Father to pay those graduate expenses therefore exceeded the authority granted by Ind. Code § 31-16-6-2.22 The 2012 amendment lowering the presumptive termination age of child support to nineteen further confirms the legislature's intent to limit parental obligations after children reach majority, and the filing windows in Ind. Code §§ 31-16-6-6(c) and (d) align with that temporal boundary rather than extending into graduate study.23
The trial court lacked statutory authority to order payment of graduate school expenses, and its order requiring Father to pay the costs of Hunter's dental school is reversed.24