Concept
Means and Motive in Practice
Improper interference: § 767 factors and privileges
Means and Motive in Practice
Section 767 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts tells a court to give consideration to seven factors when it decides whether an intentional interference with a contract or prospective contractual relation is improper.1 Two of the seven look at the defendant's own behavior: the nature of the actor's conduct asks what the defendant did to bring the interference about, and the actor's motive asks why.2 In the decided cases, these two have become the major grounds for finding interference improper, as in Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co. and Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom.3
Intent alone screens out almost nothing, and that is why the two grounds matter. Knowing interference with another's prospects of income is extremely common in ordinary business, property, and employment transactions, and it does not result in liability unless the defendant's conduct was improper.4 The bar rises further for prospective relations. An existing contract receives greater protection than a speculative prospect, and liability for interfering with a prospect is imposed only on proof of more culpable conduct by the interferer.5 Means and motive are where that culpability appears: the defendant either did something the law condemns or acted for a purpose the law condemns.
Improper means and improper motive are alternative bases of liability, so a plaintiff needs only one. A court may also find the conduct improper from a combination of the two, as in Pleas v. City of Seattle.6 This section takes means first because it asks what the defendant did, then motive, including the dispute over how dominant a bad purpose must be, and finally the Third Restatement's narrower replacement for the word “improper.”
Improper Means
Courts use the label improper means for conduct that fails the first factor in § 767, the nature of the actor's conduct.7 The Oregon Supreme Court's formulation in Top Service is typical. A claim is made out when the interference is wrongful “by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself,” and the defendant's liability may arise from improper motives or improper means.8 The means may be wrongful “by reason of a statute or other regulation, or a recognized rule of common law, or perhaps an established standard of a trade or profession.”9 Each of those sources exists independently of the plaintiff's contract. The law condemns the conduct whether or not anyone's business relationship suffers, and the contract only identifies who can claim the loss.
Requiring a wrong beyond the interference keeps the tort from reaching every lost customer. The California Supreme Court made that point in Della Penna, reasoning that a wrongfulness requirement “sensibly redresses the balance between providing a remedy for predatory economic behavior and keeping legitimate business competition outside litigative bounds.”10 In California's formulation, the test is whether the defendant's action was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of interference itself, which ordinarily means that the defendant's conduct must have been independently tortious, even if not actionable.11
The usual list of improper means includes violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, and disparaging falsehood.12 Courts add duress, undue influence, misuse of confidential information, breach of a fiduciary relationship, and restraint of trade, and crimes and some violations of statute or regulation qualify as well.13
Decisions applying the list follow a pattern. A defamatory statement made to end a school bus driver's employment counted as improper means in Kraemer v. Harding, and false statements about a plaintiff's ability to perform a contract did the same in Fabricor, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. The reverse also holds: a Georgia appellate court in Vito v. Inman treated messages left for a podiatrist's patient as not improper because they were not actionable as defamation.14 Misuse of a former employer's confidential information has also been enough. In Reeves v. Hanlon, unlawful destruction of client files and misappropriation of confidential information supported a claim for interference with an at-will arrangement; and in the Adler Barish case, the court found that departing associates had improperly interfered with their firm's client contracts, stressing that they violated a professional-conduct rule against self-recommendation, took advantage of confidential information and the clients' trust, and “unduly suggested a course of action.”15 In each of these cases the wrong stood on its own, independent of any contract, which is why it can supply impropriety without help from the other factors.
The wrongful act need not be aimed at the plaintiff. The unlawful conduct can be a tort to, or directed at, a third party rather than the plaintiff.16 The plaintiff's loss usually arises because someone else decides not to deal, so the wrong that moves that decision often falls on the decision-maker.
Courts divide on how far the sources of wrongfulness extend. The Second Restatement took a wide view in its comment on the nature of the conduct. That comment included not only conduct unlawful under legislation or common law but also threats of unlawful action, violation of ethical codes and established business customs, and economic pressure applied to someone who would otherwise deal with the plaintiff.17 Some courts accept that breadth: the Oregon Court of Appeals held in Volt Services Group v. Adecco Employment Services, Inc. that violating an industry association's code of ethics was a basis for finding the defendant's conduct improper.18 An accelerating trend runs the other way, requiring an independent legal wrong, meaning conduct unlawful under legislation or rules of common law. That is the position of the Third Restatement.19 The Missouri Supreme Court stated the narrower view in Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College: improper means are those that are “independently wrongful, such as threats, violence, trespass, defamation, misrepresentation of fact, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act recognized by statute or the common law.”20 Della Penna itself approved a wrongfulness requirement but left for another day whether to refine it into an independently tortious act, a violation of positive law, or unalloyed malice.21
Even among courts that count professional standards, some demand that the violation expose the defendant to liability or some sanction, and the idea has drawn criticism.22 The Second Restatement's privilege for competitors turns on a related phrase. Section 768 says that a competitor's interference with prospective contractual relations is not improper if the competitor does not employ “wrongful means,” and the section on competition takes up that phrase.23
Even under the independent-wrong approach, not every unlawful act counts. Conduct that violates a statute does not support interference liability when the statute was not meant to protect an interest like the plaintiff's.24 In Klinger v. Morrow County Grain Growers, Inc., the operator of a retail gasoline station sued a competitor that allegedly took its business by violating the state's prohibition of self-service pumping. The claim failed because the law aimed to protect safety, not business interests or competition.25 Participants in an illegal strike by public employees likewise usually have not been liable to the businesses predictably harmed by the strike.26 The interference tort borrows its wrong from another body of law, and the borrowed wrong has to be a wrong to someone in the plaintiff's position.
Legislation aimed at competition itself stands differently. Much of the conduct at issue in the older cases is now regulated or prohibited by antitrust, trade practices, and labor legislation, and the relevant legislation typically allows a party harmed by prohibited conduct to obtain damages or an injunction.27 An action for interference with prospective advantage may lie as well when the conduct is unlawful as well as intentional. A common mistake is to find improper means in any statutory violation, but not every violation conclusively shows improper means.28 The better question asks what the violated rule was meant to protect and whether the plaintiff stands within that protection.
Improper Motive
The second factor in § 767 is the actor's motive, and together with improper means it has become one of the two major grounds for finding interference improper.30 An improper motive is a purpose to injure the plaintiff or to vent ill will on the plaintiff, as distinct from a purpose to win business or protect an interest of the defendant's own. Comment d, as the Maryland court quoted it in K & K Management, Inc. v. Lee, treats a sole motive of that kind as almost certainly making the interference improper, because a motive to injure another or to vent one's ill will serves no socially useful purpose. A primary motive may carry substantial weight in the balancing process, and even a casual motive may be significant in some circumstances.31 Earlier in this chapter, motive appeared as one weight among seven. The harder question is whether a bad motive can carry the claim by itself when the defendant used no improper means.
The question exists because of how the tort developed. Early decisions treated the defendant's bare intent to interfere as malicious in itself, so a defendant was prima facie liable without any improper purpose or improper means, and some authority on interference with contract still follows that approach.32 The Restatement and most courts later recognized that not all intended interference is culpable, and they required that the interference be improper, either because the defendant acted for a bad purpose or because the defendant used tortious or improper means.33 That second stage put the defendant's purpose at the center of the claim, and with it came the problem of what to do when purpose is the only thing wrong.
Tuttle v. Buck is the classic case in which motive does all the work. The complaint alleged that a wealthy banker with influence in the community set up a barber shop, hired a barber to run it, and used personal influence to draw customers from the plaintiff's shop. The banker allegedly had no legitimate purpose of his own and aimed solely to ruin the plaintiff, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the ruling that the complaint stated a claim.34 The court reasoned that a person who opens a rival business not for profit but only to drive a competitor out, planning to retire once that is done, is not exercising a legal right, and that such conduct cannot be judged apart from the motive behind it.35 Opening a barber shop is lawful, so the banker's purpose supplied the entire wrong. A purpose to injure puts nothing on the actor's side of the balance, since no profit, competing interest, or legitimate claim sits against the harm. The Fifth Circuit reached a similar point between rival mall developers in Deauville Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., where the defendant lured a retailer away from the plaintiff's mall even though the retailer had a right to withdraw. The court held that a jury could find the defendant's motive was solely to harm the plaintiff, in which event the defendant would be liable.36
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom shows a bad motive and bad means appearing together. Leigh sold a furniture business to Isom, then grew unhappy with the contract and with being unable to sell the building because of Isom's long-term lease and purchase option. Leigh attacked Isom verbally in front of customers, wrote letters criticizing the business, and filed two groundless lawsuits, which demoralized Isom and the employees and impaired their dealings with the public.37 The jury found for Isom, and the Utah Supreme Court sustained the award as interference with Isom's prospective contracts with customers, under an elements test that asked whether the defendant acted for an improper purpose or by improper means.38 The court required that an improper purpose be predominant before motive alone could support liability.39 The decision must be read with its later history. In Eldridge v. Johndrow, the Utah Supreme Court overruled Leigh Furniture to the extent that it allowed liability based on improper purpose, and plaintiffs there must now prove improper means.40 Leigh Furniture therefore illustrates both the predominant-purpose rule and the retreat from it, and its facts would still seem to support liability under a means-based test, since unfounded litigation is among the recognized improper means.41
How much of the defendant's purpose must be bad is where jurisdictions part company, and the answer decides most mixed-motive cases. The positions run from the most generous to plaintiffs to the least generous:
- The bad motive need only be present. The traditional rule imposed liability when any or a predominant part of the defendant's motive was improper, and the Restatement's comment treats even a casual bad motive as potentially significant.42
- The bad motive must be predominant, the requirement Leigh Furniture stated.43
- The bad motive must be the sole motive, a rule that is hard to meet and restricts liability far more than the traditional one.44
- A bad motive alone never suffices, as in Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, which require independently unlawful acts and reject liability based on improper purpose or motive alone.45
The chain differs from the banker in Tuttle in the one respect that matters: the banker sought no profit and planned to close the shop once the rival left, so the purpose to injure was the only purpose in the case. The Restatement's own comment on purpose draws the same line. An actor who knew the interference would be a mere incidental result of conduct undertaken for another purpose may be found to have acted without impropriety, while a sole purpose to vent ill will may make the interference improper even though the means are less blameworthy.46 The broader principle is that interference carried out by proper means for the purpose of protecting the defendant's own interests is not wrongful.47
The movement away from motive-based liability rests on three separate worries. The first concerns accuracy. A motive is a mental state that the plaintiff proves by inference from words and conduct, and findings about motive may not be accurate.48 The inquiry can also run in unexpected directions. In Smith v. Ford Motor Co., Ford induced a dealership to fire a manager whose membership in a dealer alliance Ford considered harmful to its interests, and the North Carolina court decided for itself that the firing did not in fact protect those interests and held the motive improper.49 The second worry is that the public can benefit from competition begun with a bad motive, because customers still get the lower prices and better service whatever the competitor happened to feel.50 The third is cost. Allowing motive to count invites claims based on alleged improper motives, and the cost of defending claims that appear unjustified falls on defendants and the courts, even though liability by reason of motive alone appears to be rare.51 A means requirement shifts the inquiry from what the defendant felt to what the defendant did.
Motive keeps a role even where courts limit motive-only liability. A defendant's conduct may be found improper because of a combination of improper motives and improper means, as in Pleas v. City of Seattle.52 The two also trade off against each other. When the means are independently wrongful, the desire to interfere becomes less essential, and when the means are innocent or less blameworthy, the desire to interfere becomes more essential.53 A common mistake is to treat evidence that the defendant disliked the plaintiff as the end of the analysis, when in many jurisdictions it is only the beginning of a question about what the defendant did and how much of the purpose was bad.
The Third Restatement Approach
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm answers the question “improper?” for interference with an existing contract by naming the kinds of conduct that count, where Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 directs a court to give consideration to seven factors.55 Section 17(2) makes a defendant liable for intentionally causing a breach of the plaintiff's contract when the defendant's conduct was wrongful in one of three ways:56
- The defendant acted for the purpose of appropriating the benefits of the plaintiff's contract.
- The defendant's conduct was an independent and intentional legal wrong.
- The defendant acted for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff.
The Third Restatement is more precise and narrow than § 767, and comment a to § 17 says that it is not intended to change substantially the results courts reach.57 Its three categories turn a case-by-case weighing into three questions a defendant can ask before acting: is it trying to take the contract's benefits, is it committing a recognized wrong, or is its only aim to hurt the plaintiff? Each category rests on its own reasoning, so they are taken in turn.
Appropriation describes a defendant who steps into the plaintiff's place and takes what the plaintiff bargained for. Many of the defendants who would have been liable under the older rule of inducing breach without justification fall into this category, since a person who procures a breach in order to capture the contract's benefits is the paradigm interferer.58 The category cannot reach every competitor who ends up with the plaintiff's customers, however, and the dispute between Knight and a fuel supplier called M&L shows why. M&L sold fuel to stations it knew were bound to buy from Knight, the stations bought from M&L, and Knight presumably lost profits. M&L presumably wanted to take over Knight's customers, which looks like appropriation, yet it merely answered the stations' inquiries with a better price and solicited no one to breach.59 Under the Second Restatement that result follows from the requirement that the defendant induce or otherwise cause the breach. The Third Restatement's text says nothing about solicitation, so the sensible reading is that active solicitation or encouragement of the breach is part of what makes appropriation wrongful, since it is hard to believe the drafters meant a different result on these facts.60
The second category is the one many courts were already moving toward on their own. Conduct that is itself a tort or a crime, such as fraud, defamation, or bribery, is condemned whether or not any contract is disturbed, so the plaintiff's contract only identifies who suffered the loss, and the wrong can be a tort to a third party rather than to the plaintiff.61 The Third Restatement's rule for interference with prospective economic expectations, § 18, takes the same position by requiring an independent legal wrong, and it reflects an accelerating trend in the cases.62 This is the improper-means analysis from earlier in this section, without the Second Restatement's broader willingness to count breaches of ethical codes and business customs.63
The third category is the narrowest rule on motive. A purpose to injure qualifies only when it is the sole purpose, so a defendant who also hoped to earn a profit or protect an interest falls outside it, and ill will sitting beside a lawful business aim is not enough.64 The category corresponds to the third of the four positions on mixed motive listed above. It follows the concerns that drove the retreat from motive-based liability: findings about a defendant's motive may be inaccurate, and competition begun with a bad motive can still benefit the public.65
Because a plaintiff must fit the facts into one of these three categories, conduct that needed a privilege under the Second Restatement often never becomes wrongful at all. Comment g to § 17 explains that a defendant with a stake in another party's business may object, by lawful means, to a contract that party has made with the plaintiff. If the objection does not secure the contract's benefits for the defendant and is not meant to injure the plaintiff, it is not a wrongful act and requires no defense or privilege.66 The La Rancherita dispute illustrates this. La Rancherita objected to a sale of Breg stock to Bomze and appeared to be pursuing its own financial interests, so it committed no independent and intentional legal wrong and did not act solely to harm Breg or its shareholders. Only appropriation remained, and it would depend on characterizing the objection as an attempt to divert part of the sale proceeds to La Rancherita in exchange for its consent. Whether the plaintiffs could satisfy § 17 on that characterization is unclear, and if they cannot, La Rancherita never has to rely on a privilege.67 The same reasoning protects a lawyer or another party who gives disinterested advice that leads the recipient to breach, because that person is neither trying to appropriate the contract's benefits nor motivated by a desire to injure the plaintiff.68 The privileges for competition, for protecting one's own interests, and for honest advice are taken up later in this chapter with that relationship in mind.
The Third Restatement is best treated as orientation, because most courts have not adopted its approach. The Second Restatement's rules of liability for tortious interference have been adopted or quoted in many cases.69 The Third Restatement's tighter requirements have support in some but not most of the case law, and the Third Restatement also separates interference with existing contracts from interference with economic expectations and applies the expectations rules to the termination of an at-will contract.70 A common mistake is to assume that the narrower test changes the answer to a problem that § 767 would resolve. Because the two tests are meant to reach about the same results, the facts that carry a § 767 analysis (independently wrongful means, a purpose to take over the contract, or a bare purpose to hurt) are the facts that satisfy one of the three categories. Unless a problem says otherwise, answer under § 767 and use the three categories as a cross-check on whether the defendant did anything wrongful.