Concept
Improper Interference
Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations
Improper Interference
Section 766B imposes liability only for interference that is both intentional and improper, and the preceding sections have covered everything but the second adjective.1 A plaintiff who shows a probable relationship, a defendant who knew of it, and an intent to interfere has proved that the defendant meant to take business away. That is not yet a tort, because the same description fits a great deal of lawful commercial behavior. The word “improperly” sorts the deliberate diversions the law condemns from those it tolerates, and that sorting is the crux of the claim.
Markets explain why. Firms chase the same customers, employees, and contracts, and a firm that wins a customer with a better price has knowingly and purposefully diverted a prospect from a rival. Competition consists of exactly that conduct. If knowledge and intent were enough, the tort would punish the winner of every contested sale. Intentional interference with another's prospects is extremely common in ordinary business, property, and employment dealings, so liability must turn on something more: impropriety in the defendant's conduct, beyond the fact that the interference occurred and caused harm.2
Section 766B states the standard without defining it. The content of “improper” comes from the Restatement's companion section and from the case law, and this unit takes it in the order an exam problem raises it: who must prove impropriety (a question on which the older and newer approaches divide), how courts weigh the circumstances, the two classic markers of wrongfulness (improper means and improper motive), and the requirement, in a growing number of states, that the defendant's conduct be wrong independently of the interference itself.3
Burden to Show Impropriety
Section 766B makes impropriety part of the plaintiff's case.4 The first Restatement allocated the burden the other way. Its § 766 imposed liability on one who, “without a privilege to do so,” induced or otherwise purposely caused a third person not to enter into or continue a business relation with another.5 The section required neither improper motive nor improper means.6 The plaintiff's initial burden was therefore slender, amounting to no more than the defendant's conscious act and the plaintiff's economic injury, and the defendant had to establish a privilege to escape liability.7 Proof of intentional interference made a prima facie case, one that stood unless the defendant justified what it had done.8
Critics objected that this allocation made commonplace competition presumptively unlawful. A seller who wins a customer from a rival ordinarily knows of the rival's expectation and wants the sale, so every such victory satisfied the plaintiff's slender case and left the winner to defend it. The critics warned of time-consuming and expensive suits, with the threat of liability, over conduct the commercial world regards as both commonplace and appropriate. Some complained that a foreign lawyer reading the black-letter rules might conclude that the whole competitive order of American industry was prima facie illegal.9
The Second Restatement answered by discarding the prima facie approach. Section 766B requires that the defendant's conduct be “improper,” and § 767 directs the trier of fact to weigh seven factors in deciding whether it was.10 Some state courts went further and rebuilt the tort around the same idea. In Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., decided in 1978, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a claim for interference with economic relations “is made out when interference resulting in injury to another is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself,” whether through improper motives or improper means. Privilege, the court added, is no question at all unless the interference would be wrongful but for the privilege.11
The reform has two parts, and each has a reason. First, it puts wrongfulness in the plaintiff's case. A knowing diversion of business is the ordinary result of competing, so intent and a lost sale cannot distinguish a predator from a winner.12 The plaintiff, who alleges the wrongdoing, must say what was wrong with the defendant's conduct, and that requirement screens out claims resting on nothing more than a lost sale. A Utah decision quoted in the Massachusetts materials made the same point: a prima facie approach leaves the central issue, justification, to an affirmative defense and “requires too little of the plaintiff.”13 Second, the reform moves privilege to the back of the case. Once impropriety is an element, privilege and justification matter, if at all, only after the plaintiff has proved wrongful interference, so a defendant no longer has to justify conduct that was never wrongful.14
California shows how long the older allocation lingered. Some of its supreme court's earlier opinions treated privilege and improper motive as matters for the defendant's affirmative defense, even as lower courts and jury instructions had begun to require wrongfulness of the plaintiff.15 Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. brought those tensions to a head. John Della Penna, an automobile wholesaler doing business as Pacific Motors, sued Toyota and its Lexus division, alleging a violation of the state antitrust statute and intentional interference with his economic relations. Toyota had reminded its dealers of the policy against exporting Lexus automobiles, circulated a list of “offenders” believed to be heavily involved in foreign resale, and warned that doing business with those on the list might bring graduated sanctions. The trial court modified the standard jury instruction so that Della Penna had to show Toyota's interference was “wrongful,” and the jury returned a verdict for Toyota. The Court of Appeal reversed and ordered a new trial, reasoning that the plaintiff's burden did not include proof of a wrongful act. The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and directed that the trial court's judgment be affirmed. The plaintiff's burden, it held, includes proof that the defendant's conduct was wrongful by some measure other than the interference with the plaintiff's interest itself, and the court disapproved contrary language in its own earlier opinions.16
The court explained that the requirement sensibly redresses the balance between providing a remedy for predatory economic behavior and keeping legitimate business competition outside litigative bounds. It went no further. Whether the plaintiff must also prove an independently tortious act, anticompetitive behavior proscribed by positive law, or unalloyed malice was left for another day, a question the independent-wrong subsection below takes up.17
A defendant may still assert a privilege such as competition once the plaintiff has shown the wrong, but the defense now comes second, and it becomes an issue only if the acts charged would be tortious on the part of an unprivileged defendant.18
Close to a majority of state high courts have approved a rule requiring the plaintiff to plead and prove that the interference was “wrongful,” “improper,” “illegal,” “independently tortious,” or some variant of those words,19 and most contemporary cases place the burden on the plaintiff for both existing contracts and economic opportunities.20 Massachusetts illustrates the movement. In United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, the Appeals Court had described the older state rule as a prima facie case, made out by evidence that the defendant intentionally interfered with an existing contract to the plaintiff's damage, with justification and privilege left for the defendant to plead and prove. The Supreme Judicial Court's own opinion quotes Oregon's rule that the plaintiff must prove an improper purpose or improper means, cites the Utah court's rejection of the prima facie approach, and notes that the § 767 factors can help decide whether conduct involved improper motive or means.21
The older rule has not vanished. Some courts may still make the defendant prove innocence before any bad purpose or means is shown, and others split the burden, placing it on the plaintiff when the claim is only for interference with economic relations and on the defendant when it concerns an actual existing contract.22 The split tracks the greater protection the law gives an existing contract than a mere prospect.23 California draws the same line: intentionally inducing a breach of an existing contract is a wrong in and of itself, while interference with prospective advantage requires an independently wrongful act.24 The controlling state's rule must therefore be checked, not assumed.
Where a problem supplies no controlling rule, the allocation most courts follow, which puts the burden of proving impropriety on the plaintiff, is the natural default.
Section 767 Factors
Section 766B makes interference actionable only when it is improper, and § 767 of the Second Restatement tells a court what to consider in deciding.26 When the American Law Institute abandoned the first Restatement's prima facie approach, it adopted a multifactor balancing test and directed the trier of fact to weigh seven factors.27 Section 767 lists them: “(a) the nature of the actor's conduct, (b) the actor's motive, (c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and (g) the relations between the parties.”28
A balance suits this tort because no single feature of a defendant's behavior settles the question. Soliciting a rival's customer is competition when the solicitor offers a lower price and a wrong when the solicitor lies about the rival's solvency, and withdrawing from a dealing may be a lawful exercise of freedom or a calculated blow. The same outward act can land on either side of the line. A court therefore asks three things: what the defendant did and why, whose interests collide and how much society values each, and how closely the conduct is tied to the loss. Those questions sort the seven factors into three clusters, which are the useful way to hold them.
The first cluster, factors (a) and (b), asks what the defendant did and why.29 The two work as a pair, and the comment to § 766B, which the Oregon court quoted in a footnote in Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., shows how they interact. The actor's motive and the interest the actor seeks to advance together make the actor's purpose of substantial significance, so a defendant who had no desire to bring about the interference, and knew it would be a mere incidental result of conduct pursued for another purpose, may be found not to have acted improperly.30 The same comment qualifies the point in both directions. If the means are innately wrongful and predatory, a purpose to produce the interference may not be necessary, and if the defendant's sole purpose is to vent ill will, the interference may be improper although the means are less blameworthy.31 Each factor can make up for weakness in the other, which is why courts so often find impropriety in a combination of improper motive and improper means, as in Pleas v. City of Seattle.32 Later subsections develop the recognized categories of improper means and the conditions under which motive can carry liability.
The second cluster, factors (c) through (e), is the weighing itself. It sets the interest of the plaintiff with which the conduct interferes against the interest the defendant seeks to advance, and then adds the social interest in protecting both the defendant's freedom to act and the plaintiff's contractual expectations.33 The defendant's side gains weight when the defendant is protecting something of its own. In Comini v. Union Oil Co., an oil company's legitimate interest in managing its outlets was said to give it a privilege to disapprove a proposed sale of a distributorship.34 The company was acting to protect its own business, and that interest answered the objection to a decision that blocked someone else's proposed transaction.
The plaintiff's side of the scale depends on what kind of relation was disrupted. Greater protection goes to an interest in an existing contract, where respect for contract rights outweighs the public benefit of unfettered competition, than to the more speculative interest in a prospective relationship, where liability attaches only on proof of more culpable conduct by the interferer.35 The factors are where that difference does its work. A prospect weighs little on the plaintiff's side, while the defendant's freedom to compete and society's interest in competition stay heavy, so the balance tips toward liability only when the defendant's conduct is correspondingly worse. Massachusetts reached a similar place without insisting on two separate torts. Its highest court declined to distinguish them on the question of what conduct is actionable, yet observed that the existence of a contract, and not just a prospective relationship, might be a factor in determining whether particular intentional conduct was improper.36
The third cluster, factors (f) and (g), concerns the connection between the defendant and the loss.37 Proximity asks how directly the defendant produced the result. A defendant who speaks to the customer and wins the order stands at the point of interference, and the farther a defendant's conduct sits from the loss, the less it resembles an act aimed at the plaintiff's relation. The relations between the parties supply the setting in which everything else is read. Rivals who chase the same customers are expected to take business from each other, a point the Competition as Justification section develops, and conduct that is routine between competitors can look different between parties who stand in some other relationship.
Every cluster in that scene points toward impropriety. The means are threats and deceit, the motive is spite, the owner has no interest of its own to advance, and the conduct is aimed at the very people who decide where to buy. The yard's interest is a business expectation, not a contract, and so it weighs lightly, but conduct this culpable satisfies even the heightened demand a prospective relation imposes. A defendant at the opposite end of the scale, with a business reason of its own, lawful means, and no wish to hurt the plaintiff, is the one the comment to § 766B has in mind when it says an incidental interference may be found not improper. Most exam facts fall between those poles, which is why the factors are best run as questions.
Courts treat the factors as a way to organize the discussion, and many use them to decide whether the interference was culpable enough to warrant liability.38 The list is not closed: other considerations may include relevant business ethics and customs and the rules of a business or trade association that bind the parties.39 In the decided cases the major grounds for finding interference improper have become improper motive and improper means.40 The factors serve mainly to help decide whether either is present, as the Massachusetts high court noted when it said they may be helpful in determining whether an act of interference was committed with an improper motive or by improper means.41 The next two subsections take up means and motive one at a time, with the balancing described here as the frame within which those categories are applied.
The flexibility that makes the factors useful is also the source of the standard criticism. Different judges can emphasize different factors or weigh the same factors differently, and they can characterize the facts so that they fit within a factor or fall outside it, so the list is almost always capable of leading a court wherever its predisposition already points.42 A process of decision that cannot describe the wrongful acts it condemns risks being neither judicial nor fair, and the list gives little advance guidance to people in business, who must decide what to do before any court has weighed anything.43 Those objections help explain the movement toward requiring the plaintiff to show wrongfulness by some measure beyond the interference itself, such as a statute, a regulation, a recognized rule of common law, or an established standard of a trade or profession.44 An essay should therefore use the factors to organize the argument and then identify the concrete wrong, such as an improper means or an improper motive, that justifies the result.
Improper Means
Improper means is, with improper motive, one of the two grounds on which courts most often find the impropriety requirement met.46 The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co. supplies the usual catalog in a footnote: violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, and disparaging falsehood are commonly included among improper means.47 The footnote presents these as common examples, so the list illustrates the category without exhausting it.
The items share one feature: each wins the third person's choice, or burdens the plaintiff, by something other than the merit of an offer. A seller who lowers a price or improves a product persuades the customer that dealing with the seller is the better bargain. A seller who threatens the customer, lies about the rival, pays off the customer's purchasing agent, or sues the rival on a claim with no basis changes the outcome by frightening, deceiving, or corrupting the person who makes the choice, or by loading the rival with costs unrelated to the quality of what either one sells. The law condemns each of those methods whether or not any rivalry is involved, so no one has a right to use them against anyone. That is why liability for improper means leaves legitimate competition alone: the defendant is told to stop doing what was already forbidden, and a business can know in advance which methods are off limits.
The footnote adds a point about proof. When an interference claim rests on conduct that would also be another tort, the plaintiff need not establish every element of that tort so long as the elements that concern the defendant's conduct are present. A fraudulent misrepresentation to a third party therefore counts as an improper means whether or not the third party can show injurious reliance.48 The reason follows from what the claim compensates. The plaintiff is suing for the loss of its own relation, and the reliance element exists to protect the third party who was deceived, so it has no part in measuring the wrong done to the plaintiff.
Top Service also gave the practice a general formulation. A claim is made out when the interference is “wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself,” and the wrongfulness may rest on a statute or other regulation, a recognized rule of common law, or perhaps an established standard of a trade or profession.49 Each source supplies a standard that exists apart from the lawsuit, so the court is not asked to invent a norm for the occasion. Statutes and regulations matter a great deal because much of the conduct at issue in the older cases is now governed by antitrust, trade-practices, and labor legislation.50 Recognized rules of common law bring in fraud, defamation, trespass, and the other tort doctrines, and the wrong may be one directed at a third party rather than at the plaintiff.51 The trade-standard source carries the word “perhaps” because courts are less settled about it, though in Volt Services Group v. Adecco Employment Services, Inc. the court treated a violation of an industry association's code of ethics as a basis for finding the defendant's conduct improper.52
Testing Systems, Inc. v. Magnaflux Corp. illustrates the false-statement category. The plaintiff and defendant were competing manufacturers of equipment for testing industrial and commercial materials. The complaint alleged that the defendant circulated to the plaintiff's current and prospective customers a false report that the United States Government had tested the plaintiff's product and found it only about 40 percent as effective as the defendant's, and that at a manufacturers' convention the defendant's agent told an audience of the plaintiff's customers, in a loud voice, that the plaintiff's product was no good and that the government was throwing it out.53 The case was a trade libel action decided on a motion to dismiss, so it supplies facts and no holding on interference. The facts still show what a false statement looks like when used as a means: a sale diverted this way is diverted by an invented government finding, not by a better offer. The same facts could support a defamation or injurious-falsehood claim, which is why plaintiffs commonly plead more than one theory, and those claims have elements of their own.
Other courts have treated false statements the same way. False statements about a plaintiff's ability to carry out a contract counted as improper interference in Fabricor, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., and a defamatory statement counted as an improper means of interfering with a plaintiff's employment as a school bus driver in Kraemer v. Harding.54 One federal court identified false statements calculated to diminish the market for the plaintiff's product as improper means without asking whether they met the definition of disparagement, defamation, or misrepresentation.55 The borrowing has a limit, though. In Vito v. Inman, a defendant left messages for a podiatrist's patient that caused the patient to leave the practice. Because the messages were not actionable as defamation, they were not improper means for the interference claim either, and many cases hold that a statement the rules of its own tort protect cannot be the basis of interference liability.56 A plaintiff can rely on the wrongfulness of a false statement but not on a statement that the law of defamation or falsehood has already placed beyond liability.
How wide the category extends depends on the jurisdiction. The Second Restatement takes a wide view, because its comment to § 767 counts not only conduct unlawful under legislation or common-law rules but also threats of unlawful action, violation of ethical codes and established business customs, and economic pressure applied to someone who would otherwise transact business with the plaintiff.57 Some courts accept that breadth, as in Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., and Virginia's court in Duggin v. Adams, an at-will contract case, described improper interference to include sharp dealing, overreaching, and unfair competition.58 A countertrend has gathered speed, however, toward requiring that the defendant's conduct be unlawful under legislation or common-law rules, an independent legal wrong, and the Third Restatement takes that position.59 Where the wide view governs, a threat of unlawful action or a breach of a trade code can supply the means. Where the independent-wrong rule governs, the question is whether the conduct was itself unlawful, a requirement the last subsection of this unit examines.
Even the broad statements that unlawful means can support liability have a limit, because not every violation of a statute or common-law rule qualifies. Conduct that breaks a statute may not count as a basis of interference liability when the statute did not have the purpose of protecting the interest of a party such as the plaintiff.60 In Klinger v. Morrow County Grain Growers, Inc. the operator of a retail gasoline station sued a competitor that allegedly took away business by violating the state's prohibition of self-service pumping. The case is the standard example of a statutory violation that does not qualify, because the prohibition had a purpose of protecting safety, not business interests or competition.61 A station that lets customers pump their own fuel offends the safety interest the statute guards, and the state can enforce it. The plaintiff's lost sales are not the harm the legislature addressed, and if they were enough, every regulatory violation by a rival would make the plaintiff a private enforcer entitled to damages for each diverted customer. Participants in an illegal strike by public employees show the same limit, since they usually are not liable to businesses predictably harmed by the strike, as in Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner.62 Antitrust and trade-practices legislation sits at the other end of the scale, because it governs conduct that injures competitors and customers and carries its own damages or injunction remedies, and conduct that is unlawful as well as intentional may also support an interference action.63 An exam stem that says only that the defendant broke the law invites a shortcut, and the question to put before accepting it is whom the violated rule was written to protect.
Improper Motive
Impropriety can come from the defendant's purpose as well as from its methods. The comment to § 766B says so directly: if the sole purpose of the actor is to vent ill will, the interference may be improper although the means are less blameworthy.65 The same comment treats the actor's motive and the interest the actor seeks to advance as making the actor's purpose of substantial significance, so a defendant whose interference is a mere incidental result of conduct pursued for another purpose may be found not to have acted improperly.66 Means and motive can also compensate for each other: if the means are innately wrongful and predatory, a purpose to produce the interference may not be necessary.67 The preceding subsection dealt with such means. Here every act the defendant performs may be lawful, and what remains to condemn is the aim behind the acts. One formulation puts the point bluntly: there is liability when the defendant acts for a spite motive, out of a desire to do harm for its own sake.68
A bare purpose to injure can make lawful conduct actionable because of how the weighing works. A court judging impropriety sets the plaintiff's loss against the interest the defendant is pursuing and against the social value of leaving the defendant free to act. A defendant who is trying to win customers or protect a business has something real on its side of that scale, and the freedom to compete, which excuses so much knowing interference elsewhere, has an object. A defendant whose only aim is the plaintiff's ruin has nothing on its side, because no sale is being made, no customer is being won, and no interest of the defendant's own is being protected. The plaintiff's loss is then weighed against nothing the law values, and the purpose becomes the single feature that separates the conduct from the ordinary dealing it resembles.
Tuttle v. Buck is the leading illustration. The complaint alleged that the defendant, a wealthy banker with influence in the community, set up a barber shop, hired a barber to run it, and used his personal influence to draw customers away from the plaintiff's shop, serving no legitimate purpose of his own and acting for the sole purpose of maliciously injuring the plaintiff, whose business was ruined as a result.69 The trial court overruled a demurrer, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. A man who starts a rival business “not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss to himself, and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business,” the court reasoned, is guilty of “a wanton wrong and an actionable tort.”70 Opening a barber shop is something anyone may do, which is why the court added that such a defendant is not exercising a legal right or doing an act that can be judged separately from the motive behind it, and that calling the conduct competition perverts the term.71 Conduct that makes sense only as a way of harming a rival, such as running a business at a loss while planning to leave once the rival has failed, is the kind of circumstance from which a purpose of that single kind can be inferred.
Those facts were extreme, and the limits on the doctrine begin as soon as the defendant has any aim other than harm. The Restatement's rule on competition explains that the competitor's freedom developed to advance the actor's competitive interest and the social benefits that flow from it. If the defendant's conduct is directed at least in part to that end, the fact that the defendant is also moved by hatred or a desire for revenge does not alone make the interference improper.72 Only conduct directed solely to the satisfaction of spite, and not at all to advancing the defendant's competitive position, falls outside that protection.73 Competition between the parties therefore does not end the inquiry, and Deauville Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. shows why. Federated, which was developing a large shopping mall, induced a retailer named Ward to sign on as a tenant, knowing that Ward had earlier signed with the plaintiff's competing mall and also knowing that Ward had the right to withdraw from that commitment, and Ward did withdraw.74 The Fifth Circuit treated the two developers as competitors for Ward's tenancy and Ward as not contractually bound to stay, and it still held that a jury could find Federated's motive was “only to harm Deauville,” in which event Federated would be liable.75
Courts that accept motive-based liability often turn the Restatement's sole-purpose language into a question about which purpose was in charge. Utah's decision in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom required that an improper purpose be predominant to support liability on motive, and it counted a purpose to inflict injury among the improper motives.76 The Iowa decision in Lake Panorama Servicing Corp. v. Central Iowa Energy Cooperative states the idea from the defendant's side: conduct is improper only if undertaken with the sole or predominant purpose to injure or financially destroy another, while an interference that is a necessary consequence of actions taken for a different purpose may be intentional without being improper.77 Another line of authority asks a counterfactual question and rejects liability when the defendant's justifiable motive would have produced the same conduct anyway.78 The mechanism is the same in each version. Most defendants have more than one reason for what they do, so a rule that asked only whether some bad motive was present would reach nearly every competitor who dislikes a rival, and the predominance and same-conduct tests confine liability to the defendant whose legitimate reasons were not what drove the conduct.
Beyond those limits, a growing group of jurisdictions refuses to impose liability for motive alone, and the criticism behind that refusal has two parts. The first concerns accuracy, because findings about a defendant's motive may not be correct.79 Motive is a state of mind that a fact-finder reconstructs from circumstances, and a business decision usually has several reasons behind it, so the outcome depends heavily on which of them the jury chooses to emphasize. The second is that the public can benefit from competition begun with a bad motive.80 A customer who pays a lower price gets the same bargain whatever the seller feels about the rival. Pratt v. Prodata, Inc. voices the same worry in Utah: a purpose test with no standards lets a jury's moral judgment recast legitimate practices, such as enforcing a valid noncompete provision, as spite.81 Actual liability on motive alone appears to be rare, yet the possibility of it invites claims built on alleged bad motives.82
Several major courts have concluded that motive cannot carry a claim. Utah's own course shows the trend, because Eldridge v. Johndrow overruled Leigh Furniture to the extent it allowed liability to rest on improper purpose, so plaintiffs there must prove improper means.83 In Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. the California Supreme Court observed that intentionally interfering with an existing contract is a wrong in itself, while interfering with prospective economic advantage is not, so a plaintiff in the second situation must plead an independently wrongful act, and “[a]n act is not independently wrongful merely because defendant acted with an improper motive.”84 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges reaches the same result in Texas by requiring independently unlawful acts and rejecting liability on improper purpose alone.85 Federal courts applying Indiana law have likewise said that motive alone is insufficient and that something illegal must be shown.86 A defendant who acts out of spite but uses only lawful means therefore wins in those jurisdictions at the threshold, however vivid the evidence of ill will.
The law is divided, and an answer has to say which rule governs. Motive remains available in jurisdictions that keep the Restatement's open-textured standard. Hawaii's supreme court, for one, requires a plaintiff in an economic-opportunity case to prove that the defendant either pursued an improper objective of harming the plaintiff or used wrongful means that caused injury in fact.87 Where the independent-wrong requirement governs, as it does under the Third Restatement, evidence of ill will may color a claim but cannot carry it.88 The next subsection takes up that requirement directly.
The banker in Tuttle stands at the opposite pole. His shop earned him nothing and was meant to close when the rival's did, so there was no competitive aim for the spite to mix with. A purpose with nothing else in it is what the sole-purpose language and the predominance tests are built to find.
Independent Wrong Requirement
The Second Restatement makes interference actionable when it is intentional and improper, and it leaves “improper” open-textured, to be filled in by weighing the considerations in § 767.90 A growing body of authority asks a narrower question: did the defendant commit a wrong that exists apart from the interference itself? The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm takes that position for interference with economic expectation and makes an independent legal wrong part of the plaintiff's case.91 The movement toward the requirement has been accelerating, which is why the tort now reads differently from one state to the next.92
Each word in the formulation has its own reason. The word independent keeps the diversion from doing double duty. Every successful competitor knowingly takes business from a rival, so if the diversion itself could supply the wrongfulness, the element would screen out nothing, and a court would have to decide case by case whether the defendant's conduct felt culpable enough. That open-ended judgment is the source of the standard objections to the § 767 balance, since a business must choose its course before any court has weighed anything and the weighing can follow the judge's predisposition. A wrong defined by a statute, a regulation, or a recognized rule of common law replaces that judgment with a standard drawn from outside the case, so a business can learn in advance what it must not do.93 Motive-based liability fits poorly with that aim, because findings about a defendant's motive may be inaccurate and the public can benefit from competition begun with a bad motive.94 The word intentional does separate work, as a later paragraph shows.
California's decisions show the shift in two stages. In Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., the supreme court held that the plaintiff must prove conduct “wrongful by some measure” other than the interference with the plaintiff's own interest, and it went no further than approving that showing.95 The court expressly left for another day whether to require that the conduct be an independently tortious act, a species of anticompetitive behavior proscribed by positive law, or conduct motivated by unalloyed malice.96 Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. later supplied much of the answer. It observed that intentionally interfering with an existing contract is a wrong in itself while interfering with prospective economic advantage is not, so a plaintiff in the second situation must plead that the defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act. It added that an act does not become independently wrongful merely because the defendant acted with an improper motive.97
Other courts reached the same place by their own routes. Texas, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, requires independently unlawful acts and rejects liability based on improper purpose alone, and Utah's Supreme Court in Eldridge v. Johndrow overruled Leigh Furniture to the extent it had allowed liability to rest on improper purpose, so Utah plaintiffs must prove improper means.98 A federal court applying Indiana law has said that motive alone is insufficient and that something illegal must be shown. In Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, the Missouri Supreme Court described improper means as those that are “independently wrongful, such as threats, violence, trespass, defamation, misrepresentation of fact, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act recognized by statute or the common law.”99 The Missouri formulation shows what the requirement looks like in practice: a list of wrongs that every business already has a duty to avoid, whether or not any competitor is harmed by them.
Broken into parts, the Third Restatement's rule for economic expectation requires the plaintiff to show that:100
- the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of an economic benefit from a relationship with a third party;
- the defendant committed an independent and intentional legal wrong;
- the defendant intended to interfere with the plaintiff's expectation; and
- the defendant's wrongful conduct caused the expectation to fail.
The second element replaces § 766B's requirement of impropriety. The first and third correspond to the probable-relationship and intent requirements taught earlier, and the fourth corresponds to the causation requirement a later section takes up. The fourth also carries a refinement: it asks whether the wrongful conduct itself caused the expectation to fail. A defendant who won the business by lawful means and committed some unrelated wrong elsewhere has not caused the plaintiff's loss by that wrong.
The Third Restatement belatedly follows the lead of the English courts, which, soon after allowing a cause of action for interference with prospective contractual relations, confined it.101 In Allen v. Flood, Lord Herschell described a “chasm” between inducing a breach of contract and inducing a person not to enter a contract, and Canadian, British, and Australian decisions hold the same line today.102 The reason for treating the two sides differently appears from what each defendant takes. A defendant who induces a breach takes performance the plaintiff already holds a right to, and the breach is itself a legal wrong that the defendant has procured. A defendant who deters a third person from entering a contract takes only an expectation, because the third person was free to refuse and owes the plaintiff nothing. Persuasion of that second kind, standing alone, is something the law lets anyone do, which is why an independent wrong has to supply what the persuasion cannot.
The wrong need not be directed at the plaintiff. The unlawful conduct can be a tort against a third party, and it can also be a violation of a statute or regulation, so long as the wrong exists apart from the interference.103 That follows from what the claim protects. The plaintiff sues for the loss of its own relation, and the defendant's wrong against the third person is the means by which the relation was lost.
The distributor's claim in that scene needs no balancing of interests, because the forged certificate is condemned by fraud law whether or not any rival is hurt. The limit discussed under improper means still applies to statutory wrongs: a violated statute counts only when it was meant to protect interests like the plaintiff's.
Two kinds of conduct that sound wrongful do not qualify. The Third Restatement's comment states that an independent legal wrong does not include an act of negligence or breach of contract.104 Negligence is excluded for a reason that already runs through this tort: the wrong must be intentional, and carelessness is not. A breach of contract is a wrong against the other contracting party, and the law answers it with the remedies of contract law between the parties to the promise. Letting every broken promise serve as the predicate would allow a plaintiff to convert any lost deal into a tort claim by finding some promise the defendant had broken to somebody.
The same line governs claims built on motive. Under the Second Restatement approach, improper motive and improper means are alternative bases of liability, so a banker like the one in Tuttle v. Buck could answer for a lawful barber shop opened to ruin a rival.105 A jurisdiction that follows Korea Supply would dismiss the same complaint at the threshold, since a lawful act is not independently wrongful merely because the defendant acted with an improper motive.106
Because the states have not converged, the first move in a problem is to identify the formulation the controlling jurisdiction uses. A state that keeps the Second Restatement's wide view lets impropriety rest on threats of unlawful action, violation of ethical codes and established business customs, or economic pressure on someone who would otherwise deal with the plaintiff. A state that demands an independent wrong asks whether the conduct was unlawful under legislation or common-law rules, and the Third Restatement takes that position.107