Concept
Knowledge and Intent
Intentional interference with prospective contractual relations
Knowledge and Intent
A plaintiff suing under § 766B must prove two things about the defendant's state of mind before the question of wrongful conduct even arises: that the defendant knew of the plaintiff's relationship, and that the defendant acted to interfere with it. The section's wording shows where these requirements sit. It reaches one who “intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation,” so intent is the first of two adverbs and impropriety, which later sections take up, is the second.1 A lost relationship and a lost sale show only that the plaintiff was hurt. The plaintiff must also tie that loss to a defendant who knew what was at stake and acted with the interference in view.
The order matters because intent needs an object. No one can aim at a relationship whose existence is unknown, so knowledge supplies the object and intent rests on it. Both forms of interference in § 766B, inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the relation and preventing the plaintiff from acquiring or continuing it, describe conduct aimed at a relation.2
The requirement also fits how commerce works. Nearly every business decision, from a price cut to a new hire, changes dealings among people the decision-maker has never heard of. If liability attached whenever a decision happened to fall on a stranger's unseen expectations, every successful business would face suits over prospects it never saw. Requiring knowledge and purpose confines the tort to defendants who aimed at the plaintiff's prospect, which is where the plaintiff's complaint is strongest. The next subsection takes up what the defendant must know. The one after it asks what it means to intend the interference.
Knowledge of the Relationship
A defendant cannot intentionally interfere with a relation the defendant does not know exists, and the standard formulation says so directly: to be liable, the defendant must act “with knowledge of the prospective or existing contract and for the purpose of interfering with it.”3 The plaintiff carries the burden of proving that knowledge.4
The sharpest statement of what follows when knowledge is missing comes from Kasparian v. County of Los Angeles, which quoted Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier: “If the actor had no knowledge of the existence of the contract or his actions were not intended to induce a breach, he cannot be held liable though an actual breach results from his lawful and proper acts.”5 The sentence is disjunctive, so either gap defeats the claim. A defendant who did not know of the relation is not liable, and neither is one who knew but did not act to disrupt it, a point the next subsection develops. The phrase “lawful and proper acts” shows what the rule protects. A discounter who goes about ordinary business and unknowingly costs a stranger a sale commits no tort, however real the stranger's loss.
Imperial Ice involved inducing the breach of an existing contract, and so do most authorities on knowledge, so you need to see why the principle also governs prospective relations. Kasparian explains that the inducing-breach tort grew into the broader wrongs of interfering with contractual relations and with prospective economic advantage, and that this growth did not change the requirement that the defendant act with culpable intent.6 The court added that a plaintiff suing for interference with prospective economic advantage must plead and prove intentional acts by the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship.7 Acts cannot be designed to disrupt a relationship the actor has never heard of, so knowledge traveled with the tort. The usual formulation covers prospective and existing contracts in a single sentence for the same reason.8 In practice the requirement may matter most for prospects. A signed contract is a discrete fact that someone may disclose, while an expectancy lives in a course of dealing that an outsider may have no way to see.
The knowledge requirement does two jobs. The first is attribution. Where the defendant knew of the relationship, the plaintiff's loss traces to a choice the defendant made about that relationship. Where the defendant did not, the same loss is a byproduct of conduct chosen for the defendant's own commercial reasons, such as running a promotion or quoting a lower price. The second job is notice. The later sections on improper interference forbid certain conduct when it is used against a relation, and a duty of that kind can be obeyed only toward relations the defendant has some way of knowing about.
Because a state of mind is rarely admitted, a plaintiff usually proves knowledge from the surrounding circumstances. The decisions collected on this point include Continental Research, Inc. v. Cruttenden, Podesta & Miller, which accepted circumstantial evidence of knowledge, and Mid-Continent Telephone Corp. v. Home Telephone Co., which addressed reason to know and reasonable ignorance.9 The evidence that does this work is whatever shows the relation was in front of the defendant, such as a pending bid the defendant had seen, a customer's mention of the plaintiff's expected order during a call, or dealings carried on openly in the defendant's own market. General awareness that the plaintiff competes for customers is not knowledge of the particular relationship that was lost.
An exam stem will often describe a rival who won business the plaintiff was courting and then leave the rival's state of mind to be inferred from the facts, so the first question to put is what the rival knew.
That result applies the limit Kasparian drew. The contractor's loss is real, but a defendant that did not know of the relationship and acted lawfully and properly is not answerable for it.
Knowledge opens the door to liability and does not carry the plaintiff through it. A state supreme court has approved requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant's conduct was wrongful by some measure other than interference with the plaintiff's interest itself.10 Some courts also say a third party is privileged if it acts in a bona fide exercise of its own rights or holds a right in the subject matter equal or superior to the plaintiff's, although the privilege is lost if the interferor goes beyond what is necessary to protect its legitimate interests or uses improper means.11 A knowing competitor who wins a buyer with a better price has satisfied this element and still faces those later requirements.
Purpose or Substantial Certainty
Section 766B reaches only interference that is intentional, and its comment fills in the word by borrowing the general definition in Restatement § 8A. Interference is intentional if the actor desires to bring it about, or if the actor knows it is certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of the action.13 The first branch covers a defendant whose aim is the diversion itself. The second covers a defendant who wants something else but knows the interference will follow. That knowledge counts as intent because a defendant who knows the result is coming has accepted it as the price of getting what the defendant is really after. A defendant who is aware only that interference is possible has not met a standard that asks for certainty or something close to it.
The plaintiff does not have to show spite. The tort requires only an intention to interfere with the plaintiff's prospective or existing contractual relationship, and malevolent ill will is unnecessary.14 A rival who coolly calculates that taking over the plaintiff's accounts will raise its own profits intends the interference as fully as one acting out of rage. Intent measures what the defendant was trying to bring about and says nothing of how the defendant felt toward the plaintiff.
What the defendant must intend is the interference itself. Kasparian states the consequence directly: it is not enough that the actor intended to perform the acts that caused the result, because the actor “must have intended to cause the result itself.”15 Every deliberate act is intended in the sense that the actor meant to do it, so if that were enough, the intent element would screen out nothing. A business that deliberately signs an exclusive lease on a prime storefront has intended the lease. It has intended the loss of a rival's prospective tenancy only if it desired that loss or knew it was substantially certain to follow.
Intent must also attach to the relationship the plaintiff lost. The formulation asks for an intention to interfere with the claimant's prospective or existing contractual relationship,16 and Kasparian speaks of acts designed to disrupt the relationship.17 The rival who calls the plaintiff's customers by name is aiming at those relations. A business that merely sets out to win customers in general has not aimed at any one plaintiff's prospect. Courts also do not always treat awareness of an effect as the end of the intent inquiry. In Kreuzer v. George Washington University, the court found no intent to interfere on facts where the defendant knew its activity affected the plaintiff's economic prospects, which shows that the defendant's purpose often decides the case.
Intent and impropriety are separate elements, and the history shows why the separation matters. Under the First Restatement, proof of intentional interference made a prima facie case, and the plaintiff needed neither improper motive nor improper means.18 The text of § 766B adds the word “improperly,” so proof of intent no longer completes the plaintiff's case.19 The defendant's purpose still bears on both elements. According to the comment, if the actor had no desire to effect the interference but knew it would be a mere incidental result of conduct pursued for another purpose, the interference may be found not improper. The comment also marks the limits of that reasoning. If the means used are innately wrongful and predatory, a purpose to produce the interference may not be necessary, and if the sole purpose is to vent ill will, the interference may be improper although the means are less blameworthy.20 The developer in the hypothetical shows the first point. The interference is intentional, yet the plaintiff must still prove impropriety, and a court may find an incidental effect of that kind not improper. A developer who closed the road in order to drive the plaintiff's customers away would stand differently, because the purpose would then count against the developer. The full balancing test belongs to the later discussion of improper interference.
Intentional interference is the actionable wrong, and negligent interference typically is not.21 One authority makes the point with a bus driver who sleeps late one morning. On a loose reading of the intent definition, the driver might be said to interfere intentionally with the passengers' performance of their employment contracts, yet no court would hold the driver liable, which shows that liability cannot well be based on the logic of the companion § 766A alone.22 The example also shows why intent is only the first filter. A definition built on substantial certainty reaches widely, and the tort relies on the further requirement of impropriety, together with the plaintiff's burden to show wrongfulness beyond the interference itself, to keep ordinary conduct outside its scope.23