Concept
Strict Liability for Public Misrepresentation
Negligent misrepresentation and strict liability misrepresentation
Strict Liability for Public Misrepresentation
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B can make a seller answer for a false statement that was neither deceitful nor careless. Under the section, one engaged in the business of selling chattels (movable goods) who, by advertising, labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.1 Two closing clauses then remove the defenses a seller would expect to raise. The rule applies even though the misrepresentation was not made fraudulently or negligently, and even though the consumer did not buy the chattel from, or enter into any contractual relation with, the seller.2
The first clause separates § 402B from the two older misrepresentation theories. Every state holds a product seller liable in tort for fraudulent (intentional) and negligent misrepresentation; the contested question is whether a seller should also answer in tort without fault.3 Section 402B says yes. A seller who escapes liability in deceit and in negligence may therefore still lose under § 402B in the few states that follow it.
Both closing clauses echo the better-known § 402A, which imposes strict liability for defective products. Section 402A(2) likewise applies although the seller exercised all possible care and although the user or consumer did not buy from, or contract with, the seller.4 The trigger differs, however. Under § 402A the question is whether the product was defective; under § 402B it is whether a public statement about the product was false. A § 402B plaintiff must therefore point to untrue words, and the section’s text asks for no proof of a defect or of fault.5
Few states have accepted the section. Courts in California, Texas, and Pennsylvania adopted § 402B, and so did Ohio’s legislature, but most states did not; they left strict seller responsibility for statements to contract law, chiefly express warranty under UCC § 2-313.6 The subsections below trace the rule from a 1932 windshield case, take up its elements in turn, and end by asking how far the rule has spread and what replaces it elsewhere.
Origins in Baxter
The rule grew out of an obstacle in warranty law. Courts imposed a privity requirement on warranty claims, in part because warranties were thought to be an integral part of the contract of sale, and privity meant that only a party in a direct contractual relationship could enforce the warranty.7 Express statements made to the public escaped that limit quickly. After Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., a 1932 decision of the Washington Supreme Court, courts abandoned privity for express warranties made to the public generally, such as a manufacturer’s statement in literature distributed with an automobile that the windshield was “shatterproof.”8
Ford had touted the new windshield on its Model A as shatterproof even “under the hardest impact.” The glass was immeasurably safer than the competition’s, yet it could still break in certain rare situations, and one of those situations injured the plaintiff: a pebble struck the windshield, and fragments of glass flew into his eye, which he lost.9
Neither established theory fit his case. An express warranty claim ran into the privity limit. Negligence had shed its own privity requirement in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., which held that lack of privity is no defense when it is foreseeable that a negligently made product will injure a class of persons that includes the plaintiff.10 But negligence demanded proof of carelessness, and Ford’s windshield was better than its rivals’.11 The plaintiff needed a theory that required neither a contract with Ford nor a showing that Ford had been careless.
The Washington court supplied one by allowing recovery in tort. It ruled that marketing a product by misrepresenting it is wrong.12 Liability, the court reasoned, did not rest on contractual obligations, and a manufacturer that created consumer demand through false statements in mass advertising could not hide behind the absence of privity when a consumer it had induced to buy was hurt.13
That reasoning accounts for both closing clauses of § 402B. Fault drops out because the wrong lies in the gap between the words and the product. A manufacturer that sincerely believed its claim and built glass better than its rivals’ left the same gap in front of the driver as one that knew better, and the buyer chose the car on a claim he could not test before driving. Privity drops out because the duty arises from the public statement, which the manufacturer addressed to everyone who might buy; the advertisement itself ties the manufacturer to the injured driver, and no separate contract is needed. Present-day authority follows the same logic: a few jurisdictions allow strict liability in tort for innocent public misrepresentations notwithstanding the seller’s belief that its statements are true, its good faith, and its exercise of all due care.14
Baxter therefore sits on a different branch from the defect-based rules that followed it. Once MacPherson opened negligence claims against manufacturers, products liability claims slowly spread, and truly modern products liability law began in the early 1960s with Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., which let a non-purchaser injured in an accident caused by a defective car sue the manufacturer in warranty despite two linchpin warranty defenses, privity and disclaimer.15 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. followed in 1963. It imposed strict liability on manufacturers of defective products as a matter of tort law, not implied warranty, so privity was not required.16 Those cases asked what was wrong with the product. Baxter asked what the seller said about it.
Public Statements of Material Fact
Section 402B turns on the seller’s words, and it reaches them only when three conditions align. The defendant must be engaged in the business of selling chattels; it must make to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel it sold; and a consumer must suffer physical harm caused by justifiable reliance on that misrepresentation.18 A manufacturer or retailer satisfies the first condition without difficulty, and reliance and harm have their own subsection below. This subsection takes up the middle: what counts as a public statement of material fact.
The audience matters more than the vehicle. A false statement may appear in an advertisement, an operating manual, a label, a plaque, or an oral statement to a buyer,19 and the statement may concern quality and safety in advertising, on labels, in brochures, or in other literature that accompanies the product.20 The misrepresentation must be made “by public advertising in newspapers or television, by literature distributed to the public through dealers, by labels on the product sold, or leaflets accompanying it,” or by another public means of communication.21 The Restatement takes no position on private misrepresentations, and the rule is formulated, and has been applied, in terms of public ones.22 A private assurance to a single customer therefore falls outside the settled core of the doctrine, and the fault-based theories discussed earlier in this chapter are the natural route for it.
Because the claim rests on communicated words, the first task is to isolate exactly what the seller said and to read it as the public would. A crane maker’s manual says the crane is “rated to 20,000 lbs.” The boom collapses under an 18,000-pound load and injures a worker beneath it. The worker’s claim points to the words and the collapse, not to proof of how the crane was designed or built.23 The rating works as an actionable statement for three reasons: it states a number, it concerns what the product can do, and it can be checked against what happened.
A statement that does not say what the plaintiff needs it to say fails at this first step. In General Motors Corp. v. Howard, a truck driver was struck from the side by another truck and thrown against his steering wheel, and he claimed that the steering column, advertised as telescopic, had not telescoped adequately. The column had telescoped somewhat even though the blow came at an angle, and it would have telescoped further in a head-on collision. The court found no misrepresentation, because the advertisement never asserted that the column would telescope in every circumstance.24 The two examples differ in what the words promise. Any collapse below the rated load proves the crane rating untrue, but a description of a feature promises only the feature.
Words must also be read together with the warnings that accompany them. One decision applying New Jersey law reasoned that “safe and effective” on a drug label could not be read as an unqualified guarantee for all consumers, because the same label listed contraindications, risk factors, and possible side effects.25
A different question arises when a seller’s words express enthusiasm instead of fact. Section 402B speaks of a “misrepresentation of a material fact,” and its text does not use the word puffery. Warranty law supplies a useful parallel: under UCC § 2-313(2), statements of opinion, affirmations of the value of the goods, and statements of commendation do not create express warranties.26 The parallel works because a statement can be false only if it says something that can be tested against the product. A specific promise sits on the fact side of the line. In Klages v. General Ordnance Equipment Co., an advertisement promised that a mace weapon would “instantly stop and subdue entire groups,” the weapon failed to stop an intruder who then shot the buyer, and the Pennsylvania court rejected the manufacturer’s argument that the advertisement was mere puffery.27
Even a concrete and false statement supports recovery only if it concerns the characteristic that caused the injury. The plaintiff must identify an inaccurate representation about the particular feature that led to the harm; if no relevant representation was made, there is no claim.28 Warranty law draws the same limit: a seller’s statement that a vehicle has excellent brakes supports suit when the brakes fail, but not when some other defect causes the injury.29
No Fault Required
The first of § 402B’s two closing clauses removes the seller’s state of mind from the case. The seller is liable for physical harm caused by a consumer’s justifiable reliance on its public misrepresentation even though the misrepresentation was not made fraudulently or negligently.31 A seller that honestly believed its statement, and that could not have discovered the falsity with any amount of care, is therefore still liable. The doctrine permits recovery notwithstanding the seller’s belief that its representations are true, its good faith, and its exercise of all due care.32
Set beside the older theories, the clause shows how the three misrepresentation claims differ in the fault the plaintiff must prove:
- Fraud requires an intentional misrepresentation.33
- Negligent misrepresentation requires a careless one.34
- Public misrepresentation under § 402B requires neither.35
Two considerations support dropping fault. First, a seller who advertises or labels a product chooses the claim, controls its wording, and earns the sales it produces, while the consumer who acts on the claim cannot test it first; when the claim proves false, the seller is the party better placed either to verify it or to leave it out. Second, deceit and negligence require the plaintiff to prove what the seller knew and how carefully it checked, and that information sits in the seller’s own files and laboratories.
Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories applies the clause to facts that favored the seller as strongly as facts could. The maker marketed the painkiller Talwin as non-addictive. None of the research before FDA approval had shown any potential for addiction, and the jury found that the maker could not reasonably have foreseen the plaintiff’s addiction given medical knowledge when the drug was marketed; yet unusually susceptible patients do become addicted.36 The trial court dismissed the suit for that reason. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and, citing § 402B, held the maker liable for affirmatively and falsely representing that the drug was not addictive.37 Baxter v. Ford had reached the same result for Ford’s shatterproof windshield, which was far safer than competing glass and still breakable in certain rare situations, because the court treated marketing a product by misrepresenting it as the wrong.38 In both decisions the seller’s good faith was beside the point.
Crocker is a misrepresentation case, not a failure-to-warn case, and the court emphasized the difference. A failure-to-warn claim asks what the seller knew or should have known about a danger, and this maker could not have known of the risk when it marketed the drug, so liability could not rest on its silence.39 A claim built on a false statement asks what the seller said, and the assertion that the drug was non-addictive was untrue of susceptible patients whether or not anyone could have known it. A maker that stays quiet about a risk it cannot foresee has said nothing false; a maker that announces that no such risk exists has.
Dropping fault does not drop falsity. In Howard, the court found no misrepresentation because the advertisement never asserted that the steering column would telescope under every circumstance.40 The other elements of § 402B also remain: a public representation of a material fact about the character or quality of the chattel, justifiable reliance, and physical harm.41 The clause matters only where a court has adopted the section; elsewhere an innocent seller answers for a false statement, if at all, through express warranty.42
Consumers Without Privity
The second closing clause finishes what the first began. Subsection (a) removes the seller’s state of mind; subsection (b) removes the contract, by making the seller liable although the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.44 Privity is the legal term for the direct contractual relationship that the clause dispenses with. Without the clause, a manufacturer could answer that its contract, if any, was with a dealer, and that a consumer has no claim on a bargain struck by someone else. With it, that answer is gone, and the case moves to the questions the section actually asks: whether a public statement of material fact was false, and whether the consumer justifiably relied on it and suffered physical harm.45
The defense has a history that explains why the clause exists. Warranty law imposed a privity limit, in part because warranties were thought to be an integral part of the contract of sale.46 Baxter’s windshield claim reached the driver through Ford’s advertising, so letting a contract between Ford and someone else shield Ford would have made little sense, and after Baxter the privity requirement was quickly abandoned for express statements made to the public.47 Subsection (b) writes that answer into the Restatement: the duty arises from the public statement, so the consumer’s link to the seller is made by the statement and needs no contract. Intermediaries do not break the link. In a fraud case, one court treated lot purchasers as the persons the seller intended and expected to act on its representations, even though building contractors first took title as conduits for the purchasers who would eventually build their homes.48
Express warranty is the contract-law counterpart of § 402B, and comparing the two shows what the tort theory adds. Most cases have talked of “express warranty,” while the Tennessee Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon returned to the theory of misrepresentation and relied on § 402B, which addresses strict liability without using the word “warranty.”49 A warranty plaintiff who did not buy the goods depends on the state’s version of UCC § 2-318. One alternative limits protection to members of the buyer’s family or household and guests in the home,50 while Alternative C extends it to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured by the breach.51 A warranty plaintiff may also face a rule requiring timely notice of the breach to the seller.52 The text of § 402B states none of those conditions; its elements are a public misrepresentation, justifiable reliance, and physical harm.53
Warranty decisions confirm that the injured person need not be the purchaser. In Hauter v. Zogarts, a father bought a golf-practice device whose packaging promised that it was “completely safe” and that the “ball will not hit player”; the ball struck his son, and the manufacturer was held liable in warranty.54 Section 402B differs from warranty in one respect that the privity clause leaves untouched. The Uniform Commercial Code does not require reliance, though many courts require that the express warranty form part of “the basis of the bargain,”55 but the text of § 402B conditions recovery on justifiable reliance. The next subsection takes up that condition.
The clause also leaves intact the plaintiff’s status as a consumer of the chattel. The section speaks of physical harm to a consumer, not to a buyer, and subsection (b) itself contemplates a consumer who has not bought the chattel, so the category takes in someone who uses goods that another person bought.56
A harder case is the injured person who never bought the goods, never saw the label, and was simply standing nearby, like a pedestrian hit by a car whose brakes failed. The Institute expressly takes no position on whether § 402B applies when physical harm is caused to someone who is not a consumer of the chattel.57 Two features of the theory make the question hard. A misrepresentation plaintiff must establish that she was actually aware of the seller’s representation and relied on it, which a bystander cannot do, and the remedy may not support recovery by third parties such as bystanders.58 Warranty law under the broadest version of § 2-318 is the more natural route for such a plaintiff, because it reaches any person reasonably expected to be affected by the goods.59 A fact pattern stressing that the plaintiff dealt only with a dealer therefore tests subsection (b) and resolves in the plaintiff’s favor on that point, while one stressing that the plaintiff never saw the statement tests reliance and the consumer concept.
Justifiable Reliance and Harm
Two requirements on the plaintiff’s side of the case limit a rule that would otherwise reach broadly. The consumer’s reliance must have been justifiable, and the harm must have been physical.61 The first keeps the seller from answering for injuries its words did not cause, or that no sensible consumer would have risked on those words. The second keeps a rule built for bodily safety from absorbing the law of contract and warranty.
Reliance comes first because it connects the seller’s words to the injury. Justifiable reliance is a central element of every form of tortious misrepresentation, so the plaintiff must plead and prove it; its absence is a gap in the plaintiff’s own case, not an affirmative defense for the seller to raise.62 The first thing to prove is actual reliance: the plaintiff must have been aware of the seller’s representation and have acted on it in deciding to buy the product or to use it.63 Most courts require reliance, though some do not.64 The requirement carries special weight in a no-fault tort. A seller whose only wrong is a false sentence causes injury through that sentence only if someone acted on it, so a consumer who never saw the label, or who would have used the product the same way whatever it said, has no causal path from the words to the harm.
Reliance must also be justifiable, and whether it is depends on the nature of the representation and all the circumstances of the transaction.65 Decisions on strict liability for misrepresentation are sparse, but most courts would probably ask whether a “reasonable consumer” would rely on the particular representation in dispute.66 An objective test fits because an innocent seller has no culpable state of mind for the plaintiff’s imprudence to offset. The requirement also serves a causal purpose. It does not exist to shield a deceiver from the plaintiff’s gullibility; it supplies objective assurance that the plaintiff probably did rely on the particular representation, and it keeps a buyer from shifting to the seller an injury caused principally by the buyer’s own careless decision to buy or use the product.67
The decisions show where the line falls. A court or jury may conclude that a person reasonably believed explicit assurances that a golf-practice device is “completely safe” and that its “ball will not hit player,” or that a mace weapon sold for self-defense “disables as effectively as a gun” and will “subdue” an attacker “instantly.”68 In Klages, the court rejected the manufacturer’s argument that the buyer had not justifiably relied on its claim that the weapon would “instantly stop and subdue entire groups.”69 A person who ignores widespread publicity about the evils of drinking and smoking, by contrast, may not justifiably base consumption decisions on advertisements glorifying drinking or smoking, even if the advertisements somehow suggest that prolonged and excessive consumption is not harmful or addictive.70 In Smith v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., a plaintiff seriously injured while driving intoxicated could not show reasonable reliance on any representation in a beer maker’s advertising that drunk driving is safe or acceptable, and the court upheld dismissal.71 What separates the two groups is the content of the statement and what the consumer could do about it. The mace and golf claims were specific promises about the very function the product was bought to perform, which the buyer could not test short of the emergency or the swing. The beer advertising made no specific promise about driving, and what it implied ran against what everyone already knows.
Knowledge or suspicion that a statement is untrue is where reliance stops being justified, because a consumer who already knows the truth is acting on his own judgment and not on the seller’s words. Justifiability therefore overlaps the other limits on the claim: the statement must be one of fact rather than opinion, it must be material rather than trivial, the plaintiff must have been ignorant of its falsity, and the plaintiff must in fact have relied on it.72
The second limit concerns the kind of injury. The section speaks of physical harm to a consumer, and a consumer who loses only money has other remedies.73 Tennessee adopted the misrepresentation theory in Lonon and later confined it to personal injury or property damage, leaving plaintiffs with only economic loss to contract theories in First National Bank of Louisville v. Brooks Farms.74 The Third Restatement’s counterpart, § 9, likewise speaks of liability for harm to persons or property caused by a misrepresentation of material fact.75 The limit has a structural reason. A buyer who pays for a product that falls short of its advertising, and loses only money, has made a bargain; contract and warranty law already allocate that risk and supply the measure of damages. If a no-fault tort reached the same loss, every disappointing advertisement would support a tort suit that required no proof of fault and no bargain, and the conditions that warranty law attaches to such claims would fall away. Physical injury differs because a consumer cannot bargain around a danger to the body that she cannot see.
Express warranty asks a different question about the same words. The Uniform Commercial Code does not require the buyer to prove reliance, but many courts require that the statement form part of “the basis of the bargain.”76 A § 402B plaintiff may never have dealt with the seller, so there is no bargain to examine; the link between the words and the plaintiff is the plaintiff’s own reliance, and it must be justifiable.
Because § 402B removes the seller’s state of mind from the inquiry, the plaintiff’s conduct is the only conduct left to examine, and the reasonableness of the reliance does the work that the seller’s fault would do in a fraud or negligence claim. Step 2 therefore carries most of a fact pattern. A consumer who relied on nothing, or on a claim no sensible person would credit, has no case against a seller whose only act was to speak.
Limited Adoption and Alternatives
Section 402B states a rule that comparatively few jurisdictions have made law. A Restatement binds no court until judges or legislators adopt it, and adoption here has been thin. Courts in California, Texas, and Pennsylvania adopted § 402B, as did Ohio’s legislature, but most states did not.78
Texas shows what adoption produces. In Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, the Texas Supreme Court, citing § 402B, held a drug maker liable for falsely and affirmatively representing that Talwin was non-addictive, although the jury found that the maker could not have foreseen the plaintiff’s addiction.79 Tennessee’s courts adopted the tort too, and then confined it to personal injury and property damage.80 In both states the tort exists because courts chose to recognize it, and a court that chooses otherwise leaves the consumer to contract law.
Most states have left no-fault responsibility for a seller’s statements to contract, and in particular to express warranty under UCC § 2-313.81 Overlap is the likely reason. All states hold sellers liable in contract, without regard to fault, for damage caused by a misrepresentation that amounts to an express warranty, so a court that regards that remedy as adequate has little reason to build a parallel tort.82 The split reflects a real disagreement about whether responsibility without fault for statements belongs to contract or to tort.
The two routes differ in what ties the statement to the plaintiff. An express warranty claim requires, in many courts, that the statement form part of the basis of the bargain, while a § 402B claim requires justifiable reliance.83 The sales code also withholds warranty status from statements of opinion, affirmations of value, and puffing, a line that parallels the question under § 402B whether the words assert a checkable fact.84 Warranty claims, finally, face defenses that a tort claim avoids: lack of privity and contractual disclaimers, which Henningsen confronted,85 and, in some states, the requirement of timely notice of breach.86 Those differences make the choice of theory matter to an injured consumer. In Hauter v. Zogarts, a golf-practice device was sold with the assurance that the ball would not strike the player; it did, and the manufacturer was held liable in warranty.87 A consumer in a state that has not adopted § 402B, hurt by an honestly mistaken label, must travel that route and accept its conditions, including whatever reach the state’s version of § 2-318 gives a plaintiff who did not buy the goods.88
The Third Restatement endorses the Second Restatement’s approach. Section 9 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability subjects one engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who, in connection with a sale, “makes a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of material fact concerning the product” to liability for “harm to persons or property caused by the misrepresentation.”89 Because the text expressly reaches innocent misrepresentation, it carries the idea of § 402B forward and explicitly endorses it.90 The endorsement is bolder than most states’ law, however, so a court applying § 9 must decide anew whether responsibility for misrepresentation without fault belongs exclusively to contract or also to tort.91
Section 552C of the Second Restatement supplies a related rule for pecuniary loss. It provides a tort claim for innocent misrepresentation “in a sale, rental or exchange transaction.” The misrepresentation must be “of a material fact” and made “for the purpose of inducing [a person] to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon it,” and liability runs “for pecuniary loss caused to [the person] by [the person’s] justifiable reliance.”92 Compare a fraud decision that treated lot purchasers as the persons the seller intended and expected to act, though builders first took title as conduits.93 Because the claim is strict, consequential and benefit-of-the-bargain damages are unavailable; recovery is limited to “the difference between the value of what [the person] has parted with and the value of what [the person] has received in the transaction.”94
Expectations about speech help explain why these rules stay unsettled. In virtually every setting, one party expects another not to lie, but business people probably do not expect each other to exercise reasonable care that statements made in transacting business are true; that expectation commonly arises only where information is sold as a service, such as legal or accounting advice.95 If even a duty of care is not firmly expected, a rule that holds a blameless speaker responsible has less natural support. Alaska shows how unstable a tort rule can be. Its supreme court in Bevins v. Ballard held real estate brokers liable for innocently repeating sellers’ statements to buyers, and a later statute reversed that result.96
A fact pattern about a blameless seller whose label proved false therefore calls for a choice of theory before any element is analyzed. Fraud and negligent misrepresentation both require wrongful conduct by the speaker, intentional in the first case and careless in the second, so neither fits a seller who checked carefully and believed the statement.97 When the facts place the case in a state that follows § 402B, the section’s elements govern. When they name no such state, the no-fault route is express warranty, and a claim for purely economic loss from an innocent statement in a sale depends on whether the jurisdiction follows § 552C.