Concept
Absolute Privileges
Defenses and privileges to defamation
Absolute Privileges
A privilege excuses a statement that would otherwise be defamatory because the speaker is serving an interest the law values, and the weight of that interest fixes the strength of the immunity. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf states the principle: when the interest is of paramount importance, “considerations of policy may require that the defendant's immunity for false statements be absolute, without regard to his purpose or motive, or the reasonableness of his conduct.”1 A lesser interest earns a conditional immunity, which turns on exactly those factors. Privilege therefore differs from the two defenses taught earlier in this chapter. Truth turns on the accuracy of the statement, and consent on the plaintiff's agreement; a privilege turns on the occasion, meaning who spoke, in what setting, and for what interest.
An absolute privilege protects the speaker from suit however wrongful the statement and even when an improper motive prompted it.2 The common law reserved that status for speech essential to representative government and the administration of justice.3 Motive drops out of the analysis because the privilege exists to spare speakers the fear of suit. If spite or carelessness could defeat the immunity, every speaker in a protected setting would face a trial over why the statement was made, and a speaker who must prove pure motives after the fact will hedge before speaking. The candor the setting depends on would suffer. The plaintiff pays for that candor, because a false and malicious statement within the privilege leaves the plaintiff with no remedy against the speaker.
Sindorf shows the contrast with a conditional privilege. The trial court there held a conversation by Fridkis conditionally privileged, found no malice, and directed a verdict for Jacron, so the case turned on malice.4 Where an absolute privilege applies, that inquiry never begins. The defendant must still prove, once the issue is properly raised, the circumstances that bring the statement within the privilege,5 but proof of those circumstances ends the plaintiff's case whatever the speaker's state of mind.
The recognized categories are few: statements in judicial proceedings, statements in legislative proceedings, certain executive communications, communications between spouses, and publications the law requires.6 A statute can add to the list, as the federal immunity of internet service providers shows. Each privilege below comes with its reason, because the reason marks its limits. Treatises file the common-law absolute and qualified privileges together and treat abuse or loss of a privilege, and the revision of privileges after the constitutional cases, as separate topics.7 The constitutional limits on defamation liability are sometimes called a constitutional privilege, but they are not privileges in the technical sense. They form part of the plaintiff's case and require the plaintiff to establish certain facts, instead of letting the defendant raise an affirmative defense.8
Judicial Proceedings
The Restatement gives an absolute privilege to everyone who carries on a lawsuit. Judges and other judicial officers, attorneys, parties, witnesses, and jurors may publish defamatory matter while performing their functions in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, provided the matter has some relation to it, and the privilege extends to agents of attorneys and parties, such as investigators, who help with proper litigation-related functions.9 Because the privilege is absolute, it survives ill will and knowing falsity, which separates it from the conditional privileges discussed later in this chapter. Kennedy v. Cannon quotes the attorney's version: counsel is absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory matter in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, in the institution of one, or during its course as counsel, if the matter has some relation to it.10
Each of these participants supplies information or judgment on which the decision depends, and the privilege covers what they say in that role. It reaches a defamatory statement in a pleading filed in the action, and it reaches a witness who testifies voluntarily as fully as one who testifies under subpoena.11 The judge's protection depends on capacity. A state supreme court judge who issued a press release explaining her recusal lost the privilege, and a judge who defamed an employee in an evaluation or discharge would likewise not be acting in a judicial capacity.12
The privilege also reaches back before the hearing. Attorneys and their agents who communicate with potential witnesses, consultants, clients, and opposing counsel act without a judge's supervision, yet the trend of modern decisions applies the absolute privilege to those statements because they connect to the proceeding.13 Courts divide on one version of the question: some give pretrial interviews of potential witnesses absolute immunity, and others give only qualified immunity.14
Protection extends only to matter with some reasonable bearing on the subject of the inquiry, and the test is generous. It is not evidentiary relevance. A witness who answers a question put to the witness, without objection, is privileged even if both question and answer are entirely irrelevant.15 The statements courts have found unconnected are mainly personal criticisms that could not reasonably be thought pertinent to the substance or conduct of the proceeding,16 and even a judge cannot seize the occasion to voice entirely unrelated defamation.17 A loose test serves the privilege's purpose. If protection depended on a later judge's view of whether a remark was needed, every participant would face a second trial over pertinence.
Kennedy explains why the privilege shelters even bad-faith speech. Whether counsel spoke maliciously or in good faith is always an open question on which opinion may differ, so counsel, however innocent, would face vexatious and expensive litigation if the privilege turned on motive. The court preferred a rule so broad that counsel acting in good faith are never troubled, even though bad-faith speakers fall within it too, and it noted that the privilege belongs to clients as well as to counsel.18 Witnesses receive the same protection at the same price: the plaintiff has no civil remedy even against a witness who gives perjured testimony as part of a conspiracy to injure the plaintiff.19 The process supplies its own checks, namely notice and hearing requirements, the trial judge's control, and actions for false swearing and perjury.20
A plaintiff gains nothing by renaming the claim. The privilege protects the litigation process and is not a rule peculiar to defamation, so it bars the claim whether the plaintiff pleads defamation, false light, or interference with business prospects.21 An exam answer that finds a judicial-proceedings setting should therefore dispose of the privacy-type and business-tort counts along with the defamation count.
The privilege protects what is said within the process, and statements to the press fall outside it. In Kennedy, a lawyer in a criminal case told a newspaper something the plaintiff claimed was defamatory. No one disputed that the statement was relevant to the criminal proceeding. The question was whether the lawyer published it in, meaning as part of, a judicial proceeding.22 The court withheld the privilege, observing that other steps consistent with the canons of professional ethics were open to the lawyer, such as seeking to have the accused moved to another jail, requesting a change of venue, or questioning prospective jurors about the article.23 Because relevance was conceded, the result shows that relevance alone does not bring a statement within the privilege. The statement must also be made as part of the proceeding.
Courts draw the press line in different places. In Norman v. Borison, the court extended the absolute privilege to out-of-court statements by lawyers who planned a class action. Distinguishing Kennedy, Judge Harrell noted that these lawyers were not trying to set up a slanderous defense in the press to a charge of rape or some other crime, and that press reports on the pleadings could help notify potential class members of the contemplated proceeding. The court rested the extension on the traditional aim of encouraging the free divulgence of information in pursuit of justice.24 Other courts apply the narrower line. A lawyer who faxed a copy of a complaint to a freelance reporter lost the privilege, and so did statements made to the media outside judicial proceedings.25 The privilege does not cover a lawyer's interview with a newspaper reporter even when the lawyer only describes the allegations or arguments in the litigation,26 and an employer that gives court documents about a terminated employee to people outside the judicial process before filing loses it too.27
A person who repeats the allegations to the public does not carry the participant's immunity along. The qualified privilege for fair reports of public proceedings, taken up below, may protect a news report of what was filed, but that protection is conditional.28
Legislative and Executive Officials
Members of Congress hold a constitutional privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause, and state legislators hold a common-law counterpart. Because the constitutional privilege is somewhat broader, constitutional law controls in most cases.30 The Restatement likewise gives an absolute privilege to a member of Congress or of a state or local legislative body who publishes defamatory matter in performing legislative functions.31 Hutchinson v. Proxmire marks the outer edge of that immunity. Senator Proxmire gave “Golden Fleece of the Month” awards to highlight what he considered wasteful federal spending, and Hutchinson, whose federal grants funded research on aggressive behavior in primates, received one.32 The senator demeaned the work in a Senate floor speech written by an aide, and the speech then appeared in a press release and in a summary sent to Wisconsin constituents.33 The Court held the floor speech wholly immune but denied immunity for the newsletters and the press release, because neither was “essential to the deliberations of the Senate” and neither was part of the deliberative process.34
The distinction follows from what the immunity protects. Gravel v. United States had already reached the same conclusion about a senator's private publication, which was “in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate” and whose examination did not threaten the Senate's integrity or independence by exposing its deliberations to executive influence.35 The Court found the same line in English practice, citing King v. Lord Abingdon, where a member of the House of Lords could not claim parliamentary privilege for publishing his own speech.36 Legislators deliberate by criticizing officials, programs, and private people. If every harsh remark on the floor could draw a damages suit, members would soften what they say and would spend their time defending legislative acts before judges and juries. A newsletter raises none of those concerns. No deliberation depends on it, and a court that examines it intrudes on nothing the legislature needs to protect. The same words therefore receive different treatment depending on the channel that carried them. An exam problem that follows a legislator's floor remarks with a mailing to voters tests this line: the remarks are immune whatever the motive, and the mailing carries no immunity.
The privilege covers more than a member's own words in the chamber. A legislator's assistant who acts on the legislator's behalf has the privilege the legislator would have,37 and Gravel extends the protection beyond pure speech and debate to matter that is “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which members of Congress participate in” proceedings.38 A witness in a legislative proceeding, or in communications preliminary to it, is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter that has some relation to the proceeding.39 A legislature gathers its information from people who would hedge or stay silent if their testimony could expose them to suit, so the witness is protected for the same reason the member is.
Local legislative bodies sit outside the federal clause, and courts disagree about their members. The Restatement endorses an absolute privilege, and the majority view agrees, but one court has given only a conditional privilege to those testifying at city council meetings.40 Remarks made during a meeting that have nothing to do with its official business may fall outside the privilege altogether.41
Executive officials receive absolute protection on a more varied footing, and the Restatement states the rule in two tiers. Executive and administrative officers of the United States, and governors or other high-level executive officers of a state, are absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter in communications within the scope of their official duties and their discretion, while lower-level state executives may or may not hold the privilege, depending on the jurisdiction.43 For federal officials, Barr v. Matteo extended the absolute privilege down into the lower ranks of the bureaucracy and applied it whenever the action taken was within the outer perimeter of the official's line of duty.44 In Sullivan, the Court repeated the reason for the official privilege: without it, the threat of damage suits would “inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government” and “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.”45
That reason explains both the scope of the federal rule and the narrower state approach. An official who must decide whether to issue a report, discipline an employee, or explain a policy would choose the safest course if every such act could lead to a lawsuit, and the cautious would end up setting the government's course while the resolute stood aside. The privilege exists to prevent that distortion, so it follows the function and covers communications connected with official duties. State law also tends to demand a closer connection between the communication and the official's duties than the federal outer-perimeter test requires.46 The same passage in Sullivan adds that “analogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-critic of government,” which matters because officials have not always dealt gently with critics.47 In 1735, New York's British-appointed Governor Cosby used libel law to prosecute John Peter Zenger, the editor of an independent newspaper, for reporting the governor's misdemeanors, and Zenger spent nine months in prison awaiting trial before a jury acquitted him.48
The executive privilege repeats the Hutchinson pattern when an official goes beyond the official channel. Decisions point in different directions on press statements. A Michigan court in Schlinkert v. Henderson protected a member of a state liquor control commission who released to the press a letter to the civil service commission about a proposed reorganization. A Minnesota court in Carradine v. State gave a state trooper absolute protection for statements in an arrest report but none for statements to the press about the arrest.49 Courts commonly require a tighter link between the communication and official duties than the federal rule does, so a press statement is the part of an official's speech most likely to fall outside the privilege.
Federal employees have one further layer of protection by statute. Under the Westfall Act, the United States is substituted as defendant for many acts within the scope of a federal employee's official duties, and because the federal government is immune from defamation liability, the plaintiff has no remedy in those cases.50 Statutory immunities that protect government employees from tort liability generally, for acts within the scope of their employment, may also apply.51
Spousal and Required Publications
Two further privileges complete the Restatement's list. A spouse is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter to the other spouse, and a person required by law to publish defamatory matter is absolutely privileged to publish it.53 Both prevail over the speaker's malice. They differ in what triggers them: the spousal rule turns on who is speaking to whom, and the required-publication rule turns on a legal command. The second rule raises the harder questions.
The spousal privilege covers publication to the other spouse and to no one else. A remark made to the spouse is protected; the same remark repeated to a neighbor is a separate publication, outside the privilege.
The required-publication privilege rests on compulsion. The Restatement's standard example is a newspaper required to publish an official notice.54 A person whom the law commands to publish has no real choice about the act. Damages liability would catch that person between a legal duty and a lawsuit, and a merely conditional privilege would force the person to defend the motive and care behind an act the law demanded. The duty would also lose its value if those bound by it had to soften or omit statements to avoid suit.
Weber v. Cueto applied the same reasoning to a private professional. Attorney disciplinary rules required a lawyer to report suspected misconduct by another lawyer, and the report was held absolutely privileged.55 The rules had already decided that speaking served a worthwhile interest, so the lawyer's motive no longer mattered. A disciplinary system that depends on lawyers to report one another also depends on prompt and complete reports, and a lawyer who feared that a later finding of ill will or error would turn the report into a lawsuit would have reason to delay or to say less.
A report that serves the public but that no law compels falls on the other side of the line. A report to the proper authorities that the speaker believes someone is about to commit a crime against another appears among the standard examples of conditionally privileged communications.56 A conditional privilege, unlike an absolute one, depends on the speaker's purpose, motive, and reasonableness, and abuse of the occasion can destroy it.57
A statute can also create an absolute protection of its own. The leading modern example is the federal Communications Decency Act, which immunizes internet service providers who facilitate the communication of messages by others from liability for those messages, even when the provider hosts the posting or its servers carry a defamatory email.58 The provider has no duty to remove the material even after notice that it is defamatory, because courts read the statute's protection of publishers to include distributors. The immunity also serves free expression, since a provider under a duty to remove offensive speech would tend to remove nondefamatory speech along with the defamatory. The protection belongs to the provider. The person who writes and posts the defamatory message is not immunized, although anonymity often shields such a poster in practice unless a court compels the provider to reveal the poster's identity.59