Concept
Consent as a Defense
Defenses and privileges to defamation
Consent as a Defense
A plaintiff who agrees to a defamatory publication cannot sue over it. Section 583 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts says so directly: except as § 584 provides, the consent of another to the publication of defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his action for defamation.1 A complete defense ends the claim; it does not merely reduce damages. Section 584 supplies the one exception. An honest inquiry or investigation by the person defamed to ascertain the existence, source, content, or meaning of a defamatory publication is not a defense to an action for its republication by the defamer.2
Both rules turn on one question: did the plaintiff ask that a statement be made, or ask only about a statement already made? A request for a statement is consent. A question about an existing publication is not. Consent also differs from truth. Truth tests whether the charge was accurate; consent tests what the plaintiff agreed to, so it can protect a speaker whose statement was false.
Consent Bars Recovery
The dismissal hearing in Lee v. Paulsen shows the rule at work. A teacher's attorney asked at a public hearing that the reasons for the teacher's dismissal be stated, and the teacher later sued over those reasons as false and defamatory.3 The Oregon Supreme Court held the defendants absolutely privileged, because the plaintiff had invited the very publication he complained of and his case fell outside the honest-inquiry exception taken up in the next subsection.4 The teacher's belief that the reasons were false did not matter. Consent asks what the plaintiff agreed to have published, not whether the publication was accurate.
Nelson v. Whitten shows how far an invitation reaches. A letter went to a third party, and the plaintiff, who had requested a statement, recovered, because the request did not invite anything false and defamatory.5 The teacher in Lee had invited a statement that he himself believed false and defamatory; the plaintiff in Nelson had invited only a statement. The scope of the request decided each case.
The Restatement classifies the protection that consent gives as an absolute privilege, and Smith v. Holley applied it that way. The Texas Court of Appeals relied on comment f to § 583, which declares that the privilege conferred by consent is absolute and is unaffected by the publisher's ill will or personal hostility or by any improper purpose behind the publication.6 Consent therefore bars the claim even against a speaker who acted with malice. The harm flows from a publication the plaintiff invited, and the speaker's feelings add nothing to what the plaintiff authorized. Courts that recognize an absolute privilege decline to inquire into motive or purpose, because the inquiry would expose honest speakers to harassing litigation.7 The same comment limits the privilege: when the plaintiff consents to publication for a particular purpose, publication for any other purpose falls outside the consent.8
The plaintiff in Smith also argued that a release exempting a party from liability for intentional or reckless harm is unenforceable as a matter of public policy, relying on a case that refused to let a race-track spectator's form release waive a claim for gross negligence. The court held that the principle does not carry over to defamation. In the right circumstances a person can consent to conduct that would otherwise be an intentional tort, and the court listed defamation, surgical procedures, trespass to land, and sporting events involving physical contact as examples.9
Ordinary rules of consent decide what counts as consent and when it fails.10 Consent need not be spoken or signed. A defendant is protected when the plaintiff's words or conduct reasonably manifest agreement, even if the plaintiff privately felt otherwise. In O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., a ship passenger who stood in a vaccination line and held up an arm for the shot could not rely on an unexpressed reluctance.11 Consent can also be implied. A person who accepts or applies for membership in an organization that contemplates investigating members and reporting to its governing boards agrees to that process, and a priest who accepts the canons of a church is treated as agreeing to the passing of parishioners' complaints to superiors.12
Fraud defeats consent. Consent is meaningful only when the plaintiff understands what is being agreed to, and a plaintiff deceived about the nature of the intended act has not accepted it.13 Consent to a defamatory publication obtained by fraud is therefore no bar to the claim.14
Advance authorization produces the hardest cases, because the plaintiff agrees before seeing what will be said. Letters of recommendation, employment references, credit reports, reports of test results, and reports of investigations all share this feature. Agreeing in advance to such a communication does not by itself establish consent to a defamatory statement in it. Consent is found when the plaintiff had reason to anticipate the type of defamatory statement that was made, or when the defendant could reasonably believe that the plaintiff consented to it, as comment d to § 583 indicates.15
Three decisions mark the range. In Gengler v. Phelps the plaintiff applied for new employment on a form that included consent to inquire of the present employer, which had already given the plaintiff notice of termination, and the court found consent.16 In Christiansen v. Marvin a teacher requested a statement of the reasons her contract was not renewed and had reason to know the statement would be defamatory, and the court again found consent. In Nelson, by contrast, a request for a reference letter was held not to be consent to defamation. The first two plaintiffs were positioned to expect an unfavorable statement, one by the notice of termination and the other by what the teacher already knew. The plaintiff in Nelson had asked for an ordinary reference and had no comparable reason to expect falsity.
Pressure on the applicant complicates the picture. Job applicants often cannot refuse to sign an authorization without losing the opportunity, so the usual premise that consent is a free choice weakens, and consent to publish may be better read as not reaching a knowing or reckless falsehood. A practice of warning the plaintiff about the nature of the evaluation before consent is given might also represent sound policy.17 Local law can reach further than the common-law rule: in McQuirk v. Donnelley the Ninth Circuit held that a California statute invalidating advance releases of intentional torts included defamation.18 That decision contrasts with the treatment of releases in Smith v. Holley and shows that the enforceability of advance consent can turn on a state's statutes.
Courts label this defense differently. The Restatement calls consent an absolute privilege, while Texas decisions typically say that a publication made in response to consent is not actionable; the Smith court observed that the result was the same under either terminology because no question of burden of proof or production arose.19 In the employment-reference setting some decisions go further and treat consent as creating only a qualified privilege, one that malice can destroy.20 A problem that uses the “not actionable” or “qualified privilege” vocabulary still asks first whether the plaintiff consented to this publication for this purpose. Where the plaintiff never consented to a reference at all, former employers are often protected by a qualified privilege instead, a subject taken up with the other qualified privileges later in this chapter.21
Honest Inquiry Exception
Section 584 marks where consent ends. An honest inquiry or investigation by the person defamed to ascertain the existence, source, content, or meaning of a defamatory publication does not defend the defamer who republishes it.23 Republication means repeating a defamatory statement that has already been published. Three features define the exception. The inquiry must come from the person defamed, though in the oldest decision discussed below an inquiry through the plaintiff's agent sufficed. Its object must be an existing publication: the plaintiff wants to learn whether one exists, who made it, what it says, or what it means. And its effect is narrow, because the speaker loses only the argument that the question amounted to consent. All four things the rule lists are facts about a publication already in circulation, so the exception looks backward, while the consent that § 583 recognizes looks forward to a statement the plaintiff wants made.24
The line falls there because of what each plaintiff asked for. A person who hears that a damaging charge is circulating cannot answer it, correct it, or sue over it without first learning what was said and by whom, and the only way to learn is to ask. If asking counted as consent, a defamer could repeat the whole charge to the person it concerns and point to the question as permission. A speaker in that position was asked about something already said and chose to say it again, so the repetition is the speaker's own act. A plaintiff who requests that a statement be made stands differently, because the request brings the publication into being, and the plaintiff cannot complain of the thing requested. Information about an existing publication falls inside the exception; a new statement falls outside it.
An 1845 New York decision, Thorn v. Moser, shows the exception in its simplest form. The plaintiff's agent had heard that the defendant had charged the plaintiff with a crime, went to the defendant to inquire, and heard the defendant repeat the charge.25 In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court said that an attempt by a person who thinks himself injured to learn what slanderous imputations had already been cast upon him could hardly be allowed to justify their renewal.26 The Oregon Supreme Court later read the case as one in which the agent's inquiry was meant to verify the existence of a defamatory publication and to learn its content, which are the very aims § 584 lists.27 The charge existed before the agent asked, and the question did nothing to create the defendant's reason to speak. The defendant's answer renewed an old accusation and did not reply to an invitation.
Lee v. Paulsen falls on the other side of the line. At a public hearing the teacher's attorney asked that the reasons for the teacher's dismissal be stated, and the stated reasons were later attacked as false and defamatory. The court held the defendants absolutely privileged by consent unless the publication fell within an exception, because the plaintiff had invited the defendant to make public a statement that the plaintiff himself believed false and defamatory.28 The court then tested the case against § 584. The version it quoted spoke only of an honest effort to ascertain the source of the original publication, and the drafters of the Second Restatement had recommended broadening it to the four-part form quoted above. The court assumed the broader language correctly stated the law and still found that the plaintiff's case did not come within it.29 Comparison with Thorn explains why. In Thorn a charge was already in circulation and the agent's question looked back at it. In Lee the request itself prompted the statement, and the teacher's attorney was not investigating a publication already made.
Two misreadings of the exception recur, and each treats the plaintiff's question as the only relevant fact. The first assumes that a plaintiff who asked anything has consented, which ignores that § 584 withdraws consent when the question was an honest effort to learn about an existing publication. The second assumes that any request framed as a question qualifies for the exception, which ignores that a request that the speaker state reasons or give an account asks for a new publication, as in Lee. The test is what the plaintiff actually requested, whatever the request is called. The exception also removes only the consent defense. The plaintiff must still establish the claim for the republication, and the speaker keeps whatever other defenses the facts support.30