Concept
Truth as a Defense
Defenses and privileges to defamation
Truth as a Defense
The oldest answer to a defamation claim is that the statement was true. Section 581A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the rule in one sentence: one who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true.1 At common law a defamatory statement was presumed false, so truth gave the defendant a way to end the claim outright.2
Four questions decide how the defense works in practice. What must be true? How closely must the defendant’s words track the facts? What follows when the defendant repeated someone else’s charge, or published accurate words that imply something false? And who must prove truth or falsity? The subsections below take them in that order.
One idea runs through all four answers: the defense is measured against the defamatory charge the plaintiff complains of. Proof of something true that does not answer the charge helps the defendant not at all, and a harmless slip in wording costs the defendant nothing.
The Truth Rule
A defamatory statement of fact that is true is not actionable, whatever the publisher’s reason for speaking. Section 581A asks one question, whether the statement was true, so a defendant who published an accurate accusation out of spite stands where one who published it from a sense of duty stands.3
The rule follows from what defamation protects. The tort compensates damage to reputation, and an accurate statement lowers the plaintiff’s standing only to the level the facts warrant. The accuracy does the injuring, so the speaker’s feelings add nothing to what the plaintiff lost. A judicial account of the common-law history makes a related point: the old limit on civil recovery for true statements is better explained as reluctance to enrich an undeserving plaintiff than as protection the defendant earned by publishing the truth.4
The first scene shows that motive plays no part once the statement is true. The second shows where the defense runs out: the defendant must prove the charge actually made, so proof of something nearby, such as an inquiry, does not establish the crime itself.5 Two errors tempt students here. One lets the speaker’s ill will defeat the defense in the first scene. The other treats a strong suspicion that the plaintiff probably did it as enough in the second. Truth is judged against the facts, not against the speaker’s attitude or belief. How closely the wording must track those facts is the subject of the next subsection.
Criminal libel took a different course. At common law truth was not a complete defense to a criminal libel prosecution, though it was in civil actions,6 and the same truthful statement might support a criminal libel action.7 Colonial America’s best-known libel prosecution shows what that could mean for a critic of officials. New York’s governor used libel law against John Peter Zenger, editor of an independent newspaper, for reporting the governor’s misdemeanors. Zenger spent nine months in prison awaiting trial before Andrew Hamilton secured a jury acquittal in 1735.8 Civil law followed another path: at common law there was general agreement that a defamation action lies only if the statement is both defamatory and false.9
Some states attached a condition to the civil defense. Several jurisdictions required a showing that the publication was made for good motives or for justifiable ends.10 The Supreme Court restricted that kind of condition in Garrison v. Louisiana. When criticism targets public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation yields to the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in disseminating the truth.11 The guarantees of free expression require the same standard for the criminal remedy, and truth may not be the subject of civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned.12 A true criticism of an official’s public conduct therefore stays protected even when ill will inspired it.
Truth ends the defamation claim and nothing more. A true statement may still support a claim for invasion of privacy,13 a tort that by the early 1970s was recognized in all but a very few jurisdictions.14
Section 582 of the Restatement (Second) is an omitted section, and its note says the matter is now covered in § 581A.15 Nothing separate remains to learn there, because § 581A carries the truth rule.
Substantial Truth
A defendant need not prove that every word of a publication was accurate. A statement that is substantially true receives the same protection as one that is literally true, so the defense asks whether the gist or sting of the defamatory charge is true, not whether every detail is.17 The sting is the defamatory meaning that damages reputation. The inquiry therefore looks past the words to the accusation a reader takes from them.
The Supreme Court stated the test in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.: minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the gist, or the sting of the libelous charge is justified.18 What the sting is depends on how readers would take the words. In a dispute over a passage in a bestselling book, one court reasoned that the book had not become a bestseller by targeting only academics, so a word with a technical meaning, that scholars could not “replicate” an author’s results, could reasonably be read in more generic terms: scholars using different models, data, and assumptions tried to reach the author’s conclusion and could not.19
Reputation is the only interest at stake, and the plaintiff’s reputation already bears whatever damage the true facts warrant. A wrong detail that adds no further harm therefore injures nothing the tort protects. Judge Posner made the point in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.: falsehoods that do no incremental damage to reputation do not injure the only interest defamation law protects.20 Older decisions were less forgiving. In Sharpe v. Stevenson, an 1851 North Carolina decision, a defendant who charged the plaintiff with criminal intercourse with a named person at a particular time and place could not justify the charge by proving intercourse with that person at another time and place. A later critic ridiculed the result, because the location of the lapse does nothing to restore a reputation for chastity.21 A rule demanding literal precision would turn every slip about a date, an address, or an amount into liability for a speaker whose accusation was accurate where it counted.
The same reasoning marks the limit of the defense. When a published charge differs in kind from what actually happened, it injures reputation in a way the true facts do not, and the defense fails.
Errors of detail fall on the protected side of that line. In Harnish v. Herald-Mail Co. a statement that the plaintiff evicted a wounded Marine was substantially true because the plaintiff had evicted the Marine’s family, with whom the Marine lived. A reader thinks the same of the landlord whichever household was put out.22 Other examples follow the pattern. A layperson’s charge of theft is substantially true if the plaintiff in fact embezzled, since ordinary usage treats theft as any wrongful taking. A statement that the plaintiff has been disbarred remains substantially true while a motion for rehearing is pending. A statement that the plaintiff was identified by his own children is substantially true if the identifying children were his former wife’s. In each case the gap lies in a detail, and the kind of conduct charged matches the kind proved.23
The cases that fail the test change the kind of charge. In St. Surin v. Virgin Islands Daily News a headline and article implied that the plaintiff was under criminal investigation by a prosecutor, and the true fact that the Environmental Protection Agency was investigating him did not match that sting.24 In Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Schenck a specific charge of crime was not justified by proof of a different and more serious crime.25 Courts look for a gap that would affect the plaintiff’s reputation differently. In Nanji v. National Geographic Society a magazine reported that the plaintiff was sentenced for raping a girl. He had not been convicted of rape or sexual assault, although evidence of the rape was a basis for conviction on other charges.26 The question in such a case is whether the true facts and the published charge carry the same sting.
The most tempting error is to argue that worse conduct proves a lesser charge. Benedict Arnold’s treason was more shameful than shoplifting, but it does not follow that he was a shoplifter. Treason is too different from shoplifting to show the truth of that charge.27 Some judicial language says a statement is true if it produces no more disgust in readers than the truth would. That formulation works only when the published statement and the truth are factually similar, because the test compares the sting of the charge made with the sting of what happened, and the relative gravity of two unrelated wrongs is beside the point.28
Quotations raise the same question in a different form. In Price v. Stossel the Ninth Circuit refused to uphold the truth defense on summary judgment where a televised segment played a clip of a preacher saying that he lived in a mansion and owned a yacht, a jet, and a helicopter. The proper comparison is between the meaning of the quotation as published and the meaning of the words as uttered, and the clip changed the meaning materially, because in the sermon the preacher was telling a story about someone else.29 A misquotation that leaves the meaning intact is different, since even an intentional misquotation does not necessarily depart from substantial truth.30
When a publication contains several defamatory items, the substantial truth of each is judged separately, although each is read in the context of the whole.31 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts the jury was told that truth had to be substantially portrayed in the parts of the article that libeled the plaintiff, and the sting was identified as the charge that the plaintiff rigged the Georgia-Alabama game by giving the Alabama coach information that could have affected the outcome.32 Accurate detail about the game and the players would not have answered that charge. For the same reason, proof that one accusation in an article is true does not carry the others.
Proof follows the charge. When a publication charges specific conduct, the defendant must prove that conduct or substantially similar conduct carrying the equivalent sting. Evidence of general bad reputation does not tend to prove a specific act, so a plaintiff’s reputation as a heavy drinker does not show that he was intoxicated at a school event last Saturday.33 Where the charge instead attributes an ongoing course of behavior or a character trait, evidence of particular occasions or of reputation on that trait becomes admissible.34
Repetition and Embedded Defamation
Truth under § 581A must reach the defamatory sting, meaning the charge that actually injures the plaintiff’s reputation, and not some accurate fact that sits beside it.36 A statement can be assembled so that the part a defendant can prove is harmless while the part that does the damage stays unproved. Courts respond by testing truth against the meaning the audience takes away. That test governs three recurring situations: repeating what someone else said, publishing accurate words that imply something false, and reporting that a person is under investigation.
A defendant who introduces a charge with words of attribution, such as “he told me,” “it is rumored,” or “X accused Y of,” cannot justify the charge by proving that the statement, rumor, report, or accusation was made. The substance of what was reported must itself be shown true, as comment e to § 581A says.37 The reason runs through the listener. Someone who hears that a named source calls Pat a thief thinks less of Pat nearly as if the speaker had made the charge directly, and the repeater supplies a wider audience. If proof that the accusation was made were enough, defamatory gossip could spread with no remedy for the person harmed, so long as the speaker never vouched for it.38 The rule puts the risk of an untrue charge on the person who chooses to spread it. It fits the general principle that a repeater is ordinarily not relieved of liability by naming the source, repeating the charge accurately, or even saying the charge is disbelieved.39 A truth defense satisfied by the fact of the earlier statement would erase that principle, because every accurate repeater could invoke it.40
Other forms of embedded defamation follow the same pattern. A speaker who says that in her opinion Linda is an embezzler states something true about her own opinion. A speaker who says “either I added incorrectly or the cashier stole ten dollars” states something true about two possibilities. In each case the sting is the unproved part, that Linda embezzled or that the cashier stole, and the accurate frame gives the speaker no help if Linda is honest and the cashier took nothing.41 Whether an opinion can support liability at all is a separate question. Statements of opinion can be defamatory, but liability may fail when the opinion neither contains nor implies a false assertion of fact.42 For the truth defense the point is narrower: sincerely holding an opinion does not make its factual sting true.
Accurate words can still convey a false defamatory meaning, and the truth defense follows the meaning, not the words.43 The reason matches the repeater rule. The injury comes from what listeners conclude, so the defense must establish the conclusion. Decisions show five ways in which accurate words mislead:
- An ambiguous phrase can carry a false charge. A statement that the plaintiff had worked in a house of prostitution may be literally accurate and still convey a false charge of prostitution, as in Crellin v. Thomas.44
- An omission can create an implication. An accurate statement about the plaintiff and another person can suggest an extramarital affair when the facts that would explain the association are left out, as in Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols.45
- Juxtaposition can imply a link that neither statement makes. Two correct statements placed side by side might be defamatory, as alleged in Church of Scientology v. Flynn. A speaker who told an audience that his airplane was forced to land because of water in the fuel tanks shortly after he rejected the plaintiff’s settlement offer created the suspicion that the plaintiff was responsible.46
- A statement true of one person can wrongly refer to another. A defamatory statement that is true about the person it was intended to describe can convey a false defamatory meaning when it is reasonably understood to refer to someone else, as when both share a name.47
- A question can assert by implication. Asking whether Phil attempted to bribe the juror conveys that the speaker believes he may have, so a defendant who invokes truth must show that Phil did.48
The plaintiff must still show that the audience would take the defamatory implication, and not every question about wrongdoing carries one. In Schupmann v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co., a question whether the plaintiff was pregnant was held not to imply unchastity.49 Characterization raises the issue from the other direction. A defendant who says that the plaintiff used county building materials on the plaintiff’s own driveway may be able to justify that statement even if the plaintiff was in fact authorized to do so. A defendant who goes on to describe the plaintiff as the perpetrator of a crime must prove the crime, as in Ratcliff v. Barnes.50 Employment disputes show the same thing. An employer could say truthfully that it discharged an employee for stealing, because that was its reason whether or not the employee stole. Courts have looked to the implication, not the literal words, and one court called it the better view that truth as a defense should go to the underlying implication of the statement.51
The usual exam error is to treat a truthful attribution as if it satisfied § 581A. It does not, because truth and privilege are different defenses. A publisher who accurately attributes a defamatory statement to someone else has shown that it was said, not that it is true, although in some circumstances the publisher may be privileged to pass along information gathered from others.52 The fair-report privilege and fair comment, covered in later sections, are the usual vehicles for that protection. The neutral reportage doctrine would protect accurate reports of newsworthy accusations even when the reporter doubts them, so long as the report does not endorse the accusation. It began in Edwards v. National Audubon Society, the Supreme Court has not addressed it, and a number of courts have rejected it, in part because it appears to conflict with the Court’s allowance of liability to public officials and public figures when the defendant entertained serious doubts about the truth of what it published.53 Whichever route a defendant takes, a privilege is the defendant’s to establish. The Restatement puts on the defendant the burden of proving the circumstances necessary for a privilege when the issue is properly raised.54
A narrow line of cases treats a report that a person is under investigation, or is a suspect, as true when the investigation or the suspect status existed, even if the person was innocent.55 In Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. New York Times Co. the defendants reported that the plaintiff was being investigated for financial support of terrorist activities, and the court treated the report as true because it was accurate about the investigation.56 These decisions apply the sting rule rather than depart from it. They ask what the statement actually asserts, and a report confined to an investigation asserts only the investigation.
The investigation cases do not create a general repeater defense. The line holds only while the publication stays within the fact of the investigation. A publisher who goes on to characterize the person as guilty must prove the guilt, just as in the driveway example. Only some cases follow the line, so present it as a limited exception grounded in the content of the statement, not as a rule that attribution to an official source establishes truth.
Who Proves Truth or Falsity
Section 581A states what follows when a defamatory statement of fact is true. It does not say which party must establish truth or falsity, and that is a separate question with its own answer.58 A burden of proof allocates the risk of a failed proof: the party who carries it loses when the evidence is missing or evenly balanced. Courts sometimes cite the Restatement for the proposition that truth is a defense the defendant must prove, yet the section speaks only to when liability ends.59 The answer comes from the common law and from the constitutional cases that modified it.
The common law supplied the first answer. A defamatory statement was presumed false, so truth was an affirmative defense that the defendant had to raise and prove.60 Falsity was not something the plaintiff had to prove, and truth entered the case only if the defendant chose to plead and prove it.61
The Supreme Court identified the weakness in that allocation before it changed it. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan the Court observed that allowing a truth defense, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred, because even courts that accept the defense recognize the difficulty of producing legal proof that a charge was true in all its factual particulars.62 The reasoning is short. A burden decides who pays for uncertainty. A critic who believes a charge is accurate but cannot be sure that witnesses and documents will surface must expect to lose any contest on the point, and may stay silent, so that true speech is deterred along with false.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps carried that reasoning into the allocation itself. The Court held that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern.63 In that setting the plaintiff must show falsity as well as fault. The Court recognized that this allocation may shield some speech that is false but unprovably so, and it accepted that cost rather than deter true speech by placing the burden of proving truth on media defendants.64
Two facts decide which allocation applies: who spoke and what the speech was about. A private-figure plaintiff who sues a newspaper over a story on a matter of public concern must prove the story false, and if the evidence on falsity is evenly balanced the plaintiff loses.65
The Hepps rule reaches no further than its facts require. The holding concerned media defendants speaking on matters of public concern, and the Court has not decided the remaining cases.66 States fill the gap in different ways. Some place the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff even when the statement was not on a matter of public concern, though Hepps did not require it.67 Others treat falsity as an element of the claim that the plaintiff must plead and prove.68 Still others keep the traditional rules, since states remain free to apply the older standards where no public official, public figure, or matter of public interest is involved.69 The usual exam error is to assume that Hepps abolished the presumption of falsity everywhere. It did so only for media defendants on matters of public concern, and in other cases the answer comes from the jurisdiction’s own law.
Because the allocation varies, a court’s reference to a “truth defense” says little about who carries the burden. Casual statements that truth is a defense in defamation cases are not to be taken literally,70 and the habit of speaking that way probably reflects accustomed language more than a rejection of the constitutional rule.71 The rules from the earlier subsections stay constant under every allocation. Whichever party carries the burden, the question is whether the gist or sting of the charge is true, not whether every detail is.72
A neighboring tort places the burden in the same spot. A plaintiff whose products are disparaged faces a higher burden than a defamation plaintiff and must prove, among other things, that the disparaging statements are false.73
The allocation also decides whether a foreign judgment can be enforced here. The SPEECH Act, passed unanimously by both houses of Congress in 2010, makes foreign libel judgments unenforceable in U.S. courts unless the law applied offered at least as much protection as the First Amendment or the defendant would have been found liable under U.S. law.74 In Trout Point Lodge v. Handshoe the Fifth Circuit held the first condition unmet for a Canadian default judgment. A Canadian plaintiff need not prove falsity as an element of a prima facie claim, and truth in Canada is a defense the defendant must raise and prove, whereas a Mississippi plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity.75 The Canadian arrangement is the common-law allocation described at the start of this subsection, which is why a judgment resting on it can fall short of the protection American speakers receive.