Concept
Damages for Defamation
Libel versus slander and when special harm is required
Damages for Defamation
The Restatement (Second) of Torts stacks defamation remedies in layers, from the thinnest award to the most concrete. A defendant who is liable for a libel, or for a slander actionable per se, owes at least nominal damages.1 A defendant liable for any defamatory communication owes the proved, actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation.2 And a defendant liable for a libel or a per se slander owes any special harm that the publication legally caused.3
Each layer answers a separate question. What does a plaintiff recover who has a valid claim but no provable loss? What does the plaintiff recover for injury to reputation? What does the plaintiff recover for money actually lost? A last question cuts across the others: how far does the First Amendment trim these awards?
Special harm has already appeared in this chapter as a gatekeeper, since slander outside the per se categories supports liability only if it legally causes pecuniary loss. Here the same loss appears later, as an item of recovery. For a libel plaintiff or a per se slander plaintiff, it is an add-on: proving it raises the award, and failing to prove it costs the plaintiff that item and nothing more. For a slander plaintiff outside the per se categories, it does double duty, opening the claim and then being compensated. Two further remedies sit outside the Restatement's three layers. Once liability is established, a plaintiff may also recover damages for emotional distress and resulting bodily harm, and punitive damages, which the Constitution limits.4 Punitive damages get only brief treatment here, because the rules that limit them come in the last subsection.
The layers fit together because of one idea. A libel and the four per se slanders injure standing in diffuse ways. The people who come to think less of the plaintiff rarely say so, and the plaintiff cannot trace each withdrawn invitation or lost opportunity to the publication. A rule that excused proof of loss when deciding liability but demanded an itemized figure before any recovery would give the plaintiff little, so at common law the jury could award general damages for harm to reputation whether or not the plaintiff proved actual harm.5 The First Amendment later cut back that latitude in some settings, because a jury free to presume damages can award sums that bear no relation to anything the plaintiff lost. The ladder starts at the bottom, with the award that follows directly from presumed injury.
Nominal Damages
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 620 sets the floor under every defamation recovery: a defendant liable for a slander actionable per se or for a libel owes at least nominal damages.6 A nominal award is a token sum that recognizes a wrong without measuring any loss, so a plaintiff who proves liability and cannot point to a dollar of harm still receives one. The floor reaches every libel, which is actionable without special harm, and every slander within the four per se categories. It does not reach slander outside those categories, and that boundary is the point to hold onto.
The floor rests on the presumption of injury. A libel and the per se slanders damage standing in ways that cannot be traced to particular listeners, so the law treats the injury to reputation as established by the publication itself. Nominal damages are what the law attaches to an invaded interest when no loss has been measured. Justice White, concurring in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., described the prevailing rule: the defendant could show that there was no reputational injury, but at the very least nominal damages were awarded for any defamatory publication actionable per se.7
The award is valuable for the judgment that comes with it. The same concurrence says the rule served a "vindicatory function," because it let the plaintiff publicly brand the publication as false, and a preventive one, because a defamed person could often expose a groundless rumor before harm to reputation resulted.8 Justice White made the same point in a separate opinion, saying that even a plaintiff who recovers no money should be able to prevail and have a judgment that the publication is false.9 These statements come from separate opinions, so they explain the purpose of the nominal award without stating a holding. The purpose is plain enough. A rumor circulates among people the plaintiff cannot identify, and silence leaves it uncontradicted; a judgment of falsity gives the plaintiff something public to point to.
The dinner-party result follows from § 575, under which slander that is not actionable per se supports liability only if it legally causes special harm.10 Because the law presumes no injury from such slander, nothing supports even a token award. Special harm is an element of the claim, and a plaintiff who cannot prove it loses at the threshold. A plaintiff who can prove it has a claim and recovers for the loss and for reputational harm, so the token sum never arises. The nominal floor therefore answers one problem: the plaintiff who has liability and no measurable loss.
The nominal award rests on presumed injury, and the First Amendment limits that presumption. It prohibits presumed damages unless the plaintiff proves that the defendant knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded its truth; otherwise the plaintiff must prove actual harm, which includes injury to reputation and emotional distress and is not limited to pecuniary loss.11 The last subsection returns to what that limit means for a plaintiff who can show no actual injury. On an exam, state the common-law rule first and add this overlay when the publication touches a matter of public concern.
Reputational Harm and Presumed Damages
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 621 states the rule for the largest item in a defamation recovery: a defendant liable for a defamatory communication owes the proved, actual harm caused to the plaintiff's reputation.13 Reputation is the opinion other people hold of the plaintiff, so harm to it means a drop in that opinion, and that drop is the injury defamation law exists to redress. Harm to reputation is therefore the chief item of recovery, even though it is often impossible to put a number on it.14
The word "proved" describes the ordinary burden, and the common law added a presumption on top of it. Once liability was established, the jury could award general damages for harm to reputation whether or not the plaintiff proved any actual harm.15 General damages compensate the diffuse injury that a publication of this kind normally causes, in contrast to the itemized pecuniary losses of special harm. When the law lets the jury assume that injury, the award is called presumed damages. A nominal award is a token; presumed general damages can reach a substantial sum.
A dissent in Gertz explained why the law lets juries assume the injury. General damages for loss of reputation were granted without special proof because the content of the publication was itself so likely to cause injury, and because the effects of a defamatory statement are often so subtle and indirect that they cannot be traced to a loss.16 The mechanism runs through other people's minds. A neighbor who comes to believe the charge rarely announces it; she simply stops extending invitations or trust, and the plaintiff may never learn who withdrew or why. A plaintiff cannot call an unknown and silent audience to the witness stand, so a rule confined to proved harm would deny recovery to someone who was in fact injured. Torts commentary quoted in a footnote to one of these opinions says the same: harm from defamatory publication is frequently not susceptible of objective proof, because libel and slander work their evil in ways that are invidious and subtle.17 General damages rest on the premise that a rough estimate is a better approximation of the true state of affairs than a rule that denies recovery altogether.18 Presumed damages also work as an award unrelated to any actual harm, given to vindicate the right at issue, and they spare the plaintiff the task of tracing losses that cannot be linked to the defamation.19
The presumption follows the classification lines drawn earlier in this chapter. A libel plaintiff, and a plaintiff defamed by a slander within a per se category, may recover for harm to reputation without proving any such harm, unless constitutional rules say otherwise.20 A slander plaintiff outside those categories has no claim until special harm is proved, but once that gate is cleared, general damages for injury to reputation may be had without further proof.21
The presumption sets a baseline, and actual proof can move the award in either direction. The traditional rule never required the plaintiff to prove that anyone believed the publication, since it is enough that the publication is defamatory in nature.22 But evidence that people believed it and thought less of the plaintiff is relevant to show harm to reputation, and evidence that no one believed it tends to show that little harm was done.23 Reputation exists only in what other people think, so a statement that no listener credited leaves the plaintiff's standing where it was, however shocking the words. Courts reduce damages where the statement would not be believed, as in Bishop v. New York Times Co.24 A plaintiff who proves reputational harm and a plaintiff who relies on the presumption therefore seek the same item of damages, and they differ only in the evidence behind it.
The size of a reputational award depends on facts about the publication and the plaintiff, and the cases identify several that matter.25 Each stands in for a reason that a publication does more or less damage to standing:
- A specific accusation damages more than a vague one, because listeners can picture the conduct and act on it.
- A charge that touches highly emotional issues, or alleges a serious departure from important community standards, draws a sharper reaction from those who believe it.
- A publication likely to be permanent, and to have repeated effects, keeps working on the plaintiff's standing long after it first appears.
- A large audience, or one especially relevant to the plaintiff's reputation, such as customers or professional peers, multiplies the number of people whose opinion matters.
- A source with a poor reputation carries less weight with readers than a respected one.
- The plaintiff's existing reputation sets the baseline, because the injury is the drop from the standing the plaintiff already had.
Courts also police the amount of a presumed award. In Republic Tobacco Co. v. North Atlantic Trading Co., a competitor's defamatory letters to dealers produced an $8.4 million verdict in presumed damages, and on appeal the award was cut to $1 million because, without general publication or evidence of some economic loss, no more could fairly be presumed.26 Bongiovi v. Sullivan sits at the other end of the range. One plastic surgeon sued another for slander per se over a false statement that the plaintiff had negligently caused a patient's death, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a $250,000 award as a reasonable range of presumed damages, given the emotional harm to the plaintiff and perhaps the seriousness of the defamation.27 What separates the two is what the presumption had to rest on. The letters had limited publication and no shown loss, so the facts supported only a modest inference of injury, while the surgeon faced a charge of the gravest kind aimed squarely at his profession.
Both plaintiffs establish liability in the same way, since each was the subject of a false and defamatory libel. The difference lies in the amount of reputational harm the facts support. That amount depends on the reach, specificity, and permanence of the flyer and the identity of its readers, set against a single unbelieving recipient. An exam answer on reputational damages should therefore state the presumption, run the facts through the factors above, and say which way the audience and its belief push the figure.
The feature that makes the presumption useful also makes it hazardous. A plaintiff who need not prove the amount of harm leaves the jury to choose a figure without evidence, and a judge reviewing that figure has nothing to measure it against, so the common-law scheme gave courts little control over the sum.28 Converting lowered standing in the community into dollars has no objective yardstick. For that reason the presumption has been attacked, and some states have abandoned it even where the Constitution does not require them to; it has been described as a rule that may be headed for extinction.29 It is not dead everywhere, however. In W.J.A. v. D.A., New Jersey retained presumed damages for a private person defamed on a matter of only private concern, which allowed the plaintiff to recover nominal damages and thereby vindicate his good name.30
The Constitution supplies the most important limit. Under Gertz, a private person defamed on a matter of public concern who shows less than a knowing or reckless falsehood cannot recover presumed damages and is confined to actual damages, a category that includes proved harm to reputation and emotional harm without any pecuniary loss.31 Dun & Bradstreet left states free to presume damages where a private figure is defamed on a matter that is not of public concern.32 The common-law rule is therefore the start of an answer, never the whole of it. Special harm as a separate item of damages comes next, and the constitutional limits follow.
Special Harm as Damages
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 622 provides that a defendant liable for either a slander actionable per se or a libel also owes any special harm legally caused by the publication.34 Special harm keeps the meaning developed earlier in this chapter: pecuniary loss resulting from the damage to the plaintiff's reputation. What changes is the job the loss performs. Economic loss from a defamation may always be recovered as damages, and in the settings where the common law demands it as a condition of suing, slander not actionable per se and libel per quod in the jurisdictions that follow that minority rule, it is also a prerequisite to liability.35 This subsection takes up the later use, the recovery of proved pecuniary loss as an item of damages, which sits on the ladder just above the token award and the award for injury to reputation.
The same lost paycheck can play two roles, depending on how the statement is classified. For slander outside the four per se categories, special harm gets the plaintiff in the door: without it there is no liability and no award of any size.36 For a libel or a per se slander, liability is complete on the publication, and special harm is one more item the plaintiff may add by proving it. A plaintiff with no pecuniary loss still wins the claim and the nominal and reputational awards; a plaintiff with such a loss recovers more.37 Even in the first group the requirement sets no ceiling. Special harm is a condition of liability for that slander,38 and once liability exists the plaintiff may also recover for injury to reputation generally and for emotional distress.39
The reason for allowing the recovery follows from why the presumption of harm exists. A libel or a per se slander injures standing in ways that usually cannot be traced to particular listeners, so the law presumes the injury and lets the jury estimate general damages without evidence. That presumption keeps plaintiffs from being left without a remedy, and it supplies no reason to cap the recovery of a plaintiff who can show exactly what the publication cost. Once liability is established, nothing is gained by refusing compensation for losses that can be proved, so proof of special damages is allowed in addition to proof of general damages.40 The price of the extra recovery is evidence. Presumed damages rest on an inference the law draws for the plaintiff, while special harm rests on proof, so the plaintiff must show the loss itself and show that the publication legally caused it.
The recognized items are the ones a defamation of a working person would be expected to produce. A plaintiff may recover pecuniary losses proximately caused by the publication, such as loss of employment or harm to a career, along with the cost of corrective advertising and other expenses of defending a reputation.41 Where the loss is lost earnings, earnings before the publication are an important measure, and potential earnings may also be counted when the evidence lets a jury assess them.42 Courts scrutinize such projections for speculation. In one case, experts put a performer's potential earnings at $100,000 to $250,000 a year, based on what comparable performers received, although he had never earned more than about $35,000. They never explained why his own earnings were so low, and the court said their testimony left plenty of room for speculation.43
Causation by the false statement limits the item. In Schoen v. Washington Post, a libel claim in which the plaintiff sought to recover for lost customers, the plaintiff would have been required to segregate the losses due to the true portion of the publication from those due to the false portion.44 The rule is stated generally: a plaintiff who claims loss of business may be required to show how much of the loss came from the true parts of a defamatory publication and how much from the untrue and defamatory part.45 Only a false defamatory statement is a wrong the law redresses. A true statement may have lowered the plaintiff's standing, but it did so lawfully, and a loss it caused was not produced by the defendant's wrong. A plaintiff who points to a drop in customers after a partly true article, and cannot say how much of the drop followed from the false part, may therefore find the recovery for lost business limited until the two are separated.
Courts have traditionally been strict about the burden of proof, and an action may fail when the plaintiff has not identified specific economic losses and shown how the falsehood caused them.46 The strictness relaxes where specificity is practically impossible. In Tex Smith, The Harmonica Man, Inc. v. Godfrey, a New York court held that for a seller to the general public, allegation and proof of a general loss of sales suffices, leaving the trier of fact to decide whether the loss is attributable to the slander.47 A retailer can rarely name the customers who stayed away, so a rule demanding names would leave the plaintiff without a remedy for the very loss the defamation caused. A tradesperson with identifiable customers, by contrast, should be ready to name them.
Established liability also opens recovery for harms that could not count as special harm. Damages for emotional distress and resulting bodily harm are recoverable once the defendant's liability is established, as Restatement § 623 provides.48 A plaintiff whose cause of action is made out as a libel, as a slander per se, or by proof of pecuniary loss may likewise recover for mental distress, wounded feelings, and humiliation.49 This explains how the illness in Terwilliger v. Wands fits the structure. Sickness from worry over a lost reputation could not serve as the special harm that would have opened the claim, yet sickness of that kind is compensable as distress and bodily injury once another route has opened the claim.50
The constitutional limits taught next do not reach this item in the same way. A proved pecuniary loss is actual injury. The First Amendment limits cut back presumed and punitive damages when the matter is one of public concern and the plaintiff proves no knowing or reckless falsehood, and they leave damages for actual injury available.51
Constitutional Limits on Damages
Every damages rule taught so far is a common-law rule, and the First Amendment overlays it. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, so a plaintiff in that position is restricted to compensation for actual injury.53 The plaintiff was a private individual who sued over a magazine article. Illinois law treated statements in the article as libel per se, so the trial court withdrew every issue except damages from the jury, which awarded $50,000.54 He is the libel plaintiff described in the earlier sections, one who needed no proof of pecuniary loss, and the case shows that the constitutional limit reaches exactly such a plaintiff. This subsection gives only the damages overlay and its two anchor cases, because the full constitutional framework for defamation is taught elsewhere.
Gertz objected to presumed damages for reasons that follow from how they work. A jury may award a substantial sum for supposed damage to reputation without proof that any harm occurred, and that largely uncontrolled discretion adds to the chilling effect that liability for defamatory falsehood already has on vigorous speech. The same discretion invites juries to punish unpopular opinion instead of compensating injury from a false fact. The state interest at stake is compensating private individuals for injury to reputation, and it extends no further than compensation for actual injury, so the States have no substantial interest in gratuitous awards far in excess of it.55
Punitive damages fail the same test for a separate reason. They are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence, not compensation for injury, so they serve none of the state interest that justifies letting private plaintiffs win on a standard less demanding than actual malice. A private plaintiff who establishes liability on such a standard may therefore recover only the damages that compensate him for actual injury.56 Jury discretion over the size of punitive awards is limited only by a rule against excess, so the sums come out unpredictable and unrelated to the harm done, and juries remain free to aim them at disfavored views.57
The resulting limits sort cases by the subject of the publication and by the fault the plaintiff proves, and they are easiest to apply as three tiers:
- A private plaintiff defamed on a matter of public concern who proves only negligence, or the other minimal fault the State requires, may recover only actual injury, and presumed and punitive damages are unavailable.58
- If that plaintiff proves knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, the constitutional bar lifts, and presumed and punitive damages may be awarded where state law still permits them.59
- A private plaintiff defamed on a matter that is not of public concern may recover presumed and punitive damages without showing actual malice.60
The first two tiers are two sides of one limit. States may let a private plaintiff win on a showing less demanding than actual malice, because they have a strong interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation. That interest stops at compensation for actual injury, so the extra remedies are reserved for a plaintiff who proves a knowing or reckless falsehood.61 The limit applies only when liability rests on the lesser showing. A plaintiff who proves the stronger fault is outside it, although a State remains free to refuse to presume damages anyway.62
The third tier comes from Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., where a credit reporting agency sent five subscribers a false report that a private company was bankrupt. The Court held that presumed and punitive damages may be awarded without actual malice when the statement involves no matter of public concern.63 Speech on private matters carries reduced constitutional value, so the state interest in these remedies is substantial when weighed against their incidental effect on such speech. The common-law rationale also still applies: proof of actual damage will be impossible in many cases where serious harm is all but certain, and letting the jury presume damage keeps the remedy effective.64
Whether speech involves public concern turns on its content, form, and context as shown by the whole record. The credit report served only the interest of the agency and its business audience, it reached five subscribers who could not pass it on, and it was driven by profit, a force less likely to be deterred by liability.65 Both plaintiffs were private, so status did not separate the two cases; the subject did. Gertz involved speech at the core of First Amendment concern, where the state interest in presumed and punitive damages was found not substantial, while the credit report was speech of significantly less constitutional interest.66
Actual injury is a broader idea than the special harm taught earlier. The Court declined to define it, but said that it is not limited to out-of-pocket loss and that its customary forms include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Awards must rest on competent evidence of the injury, although no evidence need assign a dollar value to it.67 A first-tier plaintiff with no pecuniary loss can therefore still recover if competent evidence shows real reputational or emotional injury, and that burden is lighter than the proof of pecuniary loss required for slander that is not actionable per se.68 A plaintiff who shows no actual injury at all may be left with nothing, so the nominal-damages floor described earlier cannot be assumed in this tier.
Public officials and public figures face a separate and stricter requirement: they must prove a knowing or reckless falsehood to establish liability at all, and who qualifies is a question taught elsewhere. Once they make that showing, the damages limit does not bite, and States remain free to permit presumed damages if they choose.69
On an exam, state the common-law rule first: a libel plaintiff, or a plaintiff defamed by a slander within a per se category, may recover presumed damages.70 Then run the overlay. Is the matter one of public concern? Did the plaintiff prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth? Does state law add limits of its own? The overlay is the chief exception to everything taught in this part, because a plaintiff can establish liability for libel or slander per se and still lose the presumption of damages.