Concept
Slander Per Se
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
Slander Per Se
A defamation plaintiff must satisfy a fourth requirement after falsity, publication, and fault: the statement must be actionable irrespective of special harm, or the plaintiff must prove special harm caused by the publication.1 Libel meets the first alternative automatically, because written statements are more permanent and the law presumes the harm.2 Slander usually does not. A plaintiff suing over spoken words must plead and prove special damage unless the words fit one of four categories,3 and that damage must be pecuniary and the natural, immediate, and legal consequence of the words.4 The plaintiff must also show that the harm resulted from the publication.5
Slander per se is the exception to that burden. Spoken words that impute criminal activity, a loathsome disease, serious sexual misconduct, or misconduct involving the plaintiff's business, trade, profession, or office are actionable without proof of special harm.6 The plaintiff then recovers without documenting a lost job, customer, or contract.
Why these four and no others? The categories may be viewed as types of slander especially likely to harm reputation, but that likelihood is not the reason they exist.7 They are a common-law inheritance, and courts have shaped each with its own limits: how serious the crime, how present the disease, how closely the words touch the plaintiff's work, how grave the misconduct. A problem therefore rarely asks whether the plaintiff can name a category. It asks whether these words, about this plaintiff, fit the category as the cases have drawn it.
The categories answer only the fourth requirement. The statement must still be false and defamatory, refer to the plaintiff, reach a third person without privilege, and be published with the fault the plaintiff's status requires. Within the fourth requirement, ask first whether the words fit a per se category, and turn to proof of pecuniary loss only if they do not. The subsections below take the categories in turn, beginning with crime.
Imputation of Crime
A spoken accusation of crime is slander per se when the offense is serious enough, and the doctrine's difficulty lies in how courts measure seriousness. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 571, an imputation of crime qualifies if the offense imputed would, if committed in the place of publication, be punished by imprisonment or be regarded by public opinion as involving moral turpitude.8 The speaker need not identify the crime in precise or legally correct terms. The words must charge conduct that amounts to a qualifying offense.9
The category's history explains both its existence and the effort to confine it. The original basis seems to have been that an accusation of crime exposed the plaintiff to prosecution, and the emphasis later shifted to the social ostracism the accusation produces and the likelihood of financial loss that could not be proved.10 That shift explains a rule that would otherwise look odd: the action lay even when the words showed that the plaintiff had already been punished or pardoned, or that the statute of limitations barred prosecution.11 The danger of prosecution had dropped out in those cases, yet the stigma remained. The shift also created a problem of scope, because a rule that excused proof for every charge of wrongdoing would reach trivial offenses, and courts struggled to separate major crimes from minor ones.12 They now limit the category to imputations of more serious crimes or imputations likely to injure reputation. The operative limit varies by state as the level of the crime in the criminal code, the punishment attached to it, or whether it involves moral turpitude.13
The Restatement's two alternatives measure seriousness in different ways. The punishment prong borrows the legislature's own grading: an offense punishable by imprisonment in the place of publication has already been treated as grave, so no court needs to guess how listeners will react. The moral turpitude prong looks to listeners instead, and it reaches conduct whose sentence understates how people would regard the person who did it. Most courts now follow the moral turpitude formula, which defines the term as “an inherent baseness or vileness of principle in the human heart,” and under it the character of the act charged controls rather than the label in the criminal code.14 A trivial assault or battery does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, so an accusation of a minor scuffle falls short of the line.15 States word the limit in their own terms, such as an indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude in Alabama and a serious crime in Alaska.16
Statements that sound criminal but charge no act are the harder cases. In Privitera v. Town of Phelps the imputation was that the plaintiff had been involved in organized crime, and the decision is cited for the rule that a general imputation of criminality is not slander per se.17 Listeners take away an association but cannot point to anything the plaintiff did, so the statement lacks the specific charge of a criminal act on which the rule rests. Comment c to § 571, quoted in Biondi v. Nassimos, applies the same logic to dispositions: accusing a person of being capable of a crime or of having criminal intent is insufficient unless a criminal act is charged.18 Context can also cut against a plaintiff even when a loaded word is used. One Mississippi court held “thief and liar” not slander per se in the circumstances before it.19
The seriousness limit also screens out offenses whose stigma is too light to presume. One court held that adultery, a class B misdemeanor, is not a serious crime and so falls outside the crime category.20 The limit applies only to spoken words. In Gosden v. Louis the court observed that voyeurism might not count as a crime of moral turpitude, yet a written charge of any crime would be libel and actionable, because libel needs no special harm.21 A minor offense therefore prompts two questions in order: was the statement spoken, and if so, does the offense clear the seriousness line? An imputation of adultery may still fit the serious sexual misconduct category discussed at the end of this section.
Workplace disputes supply many reported examples, because an employer who explains a discharge often accuses the employee of wrongdoing. An accusation of theft has been held slander per se in that setting, and such a charge can fit both the crime category and the business-or-profession category taken up below.22 Exam answers tend to err in two directions. Some treat any crime-sounding word as per se and overlook that the statement must charge a specific act of a serious or morally base crime. Others treat the speaker's failure to name the offense correctly as fatal, although the charge need only convey conduct that amounts to the crime.
Loathsome Disease
The second per se category covers a spoken imputation that the plaintiff has a loathsome, communicable disease, and it is far narrower than the crime category. Courts cite Restatement (Second) of Torts § 572 for it.24 Its limits, like those of the crime category, follow from how it began.
The exception began with venereal disease and leprosy, both regarded at the time as permanent, lingering, and incurable, and its original basis appears to have been the exclusion from society that an accusation of such a disease would bring.25 The law did not extend it to equally repugnant disorders such as smallpox, from which a victim either recovered or died within a short time.26 Permanent avoidance supported the presumption of loss, and a short illness did not.
The exception then stayed within its original limits. Accusations of insanity, tuberculosis, or other communicable diseases are not included, and the exception has had slight importance, with very few modern cases applying it.27 Two questions should be kept apart here. An imputation of a serious and contagious disease can be defamatory because it tends to deter others from associating with the plaintiff, even though it implies no deficiency in the plaintiff's morality or integrity.28 That answers whether the words are defamatory. Whether they are slander per se is a separate question, and for most disease accusations the answer is no.
The category has not stayed closed to every modern illness. In McCune v. Neitzel the imputation was that the plaintiff had AIDS, and the decision is cited for treating that imputation as within the loathsome disease category.29 A serious, stigmatized, long-term condition fits where tuberculosis does not, because the original diseases drew lasting exclusion from society and a court asked about a newer disease compares its seriousness and the avoidance it produces with that pair. Time frame matters as much as the disease. In Bruce v. Soule the court settled that an imputation that the plaintiff has had even a venereal disease in the past is not actionable without proof of special damage, because a person who has recovered would not meet the same social avoidance.30 A speaker who says the plaintiff has AIDS describes a present condition that listeners will avoid. A speaker who says the plaintiff once had a venereal disease and is cured describes a closed chapter that gives listeners no reason to keep away.
The category also applies only to spoken words. A written accusation of the same disease is libel, actionable without special harm in any event, so the per se analysis matters only when the plaintiff was defamed orally.31 The usual error is to treat any disease accusation as slander per se. The statement must charge a present loathsome, communicable disease of the kind the exception was built around, and an accusation of tuberculosis, mental illness, or a past illness sends the plaintiff back to proving special harm.
Business or Profession
The third category covers spoken words likely to affect the plaintiff in a business, trade, profession, or office, and it is the category that matters most in employment law.33 The older decisions reason that words attacking a person's standing in an occupation make pecuniary loss probable enough to presume.34 The presumption has a boundary, though: the words must reflect on the plaintiff's fitness for the work. Nearly every adult has some occupation, so a rule that presumed harm from any unflattering remark about a working person would swallow the special-harm requirement that slander otherwise imposes.
The category is broad as to who is protected. Any legitimate calling is included, “be it ever so base,” and the old decisions applied the rule to a lime-burner and a blacksmith.35 Even offices that pay nothing count when they are offices of confidence or trust. In Dietrich v. Hauser a statement that a club president was a cheat and a fraud was held slander per se.36 The unpaid office stretches the economic rationale, since a volunteer has no salary to lose, but the category tracks the standing a person holds in a role that depends on other people's confidence. Breadth about the plaintiff's occupation does not loosen the requirement about the statement, and the statement is where the limit operates.
The cases locate the limit by comparing the trait the statement imputes with what the plaintiff's work requires. In Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC the statement was that a former basketball star had filed for personal bankruptcy, and the Seventh Circuit held that it did not imply a lack of competence or integrity for the roles at issue: goodwill ambassador for a professional team, basketball analyst, and celebrity product endorser.37 A bankruptcy filing says something about a person's finances and nothing about the judgment, skill, or honesty those roles call for. The Texas Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Hancock v. Variyam, holding that an assertion that a physician was “lacking veracity” did not affect fitness for the proper conduct of a physician's work.38 That statement sounds like an attack on a trait that matters in many jobs, so the result shows that the label on an accusation does not decide the category. The question is whether this imputation, aimed at this plaintiff's occupation, bears on the work.
The inquiry can produce the opposite answer. In Smith v. IMG Worldwide, Inc. a sports agent told a potential recruit that a competing agent had played the race card in negotiating with the NFL on behalf of players, and the court held the statement slander per se because it was peculiarly harmful to an agent whose ability to represent players is tied directly to relationships with the general managers of NFL clubs.39 What separates Smith from Pippen is the connection between the imputation and the way the plaintiff earns a living. The accusation in Smith attacked how the plaintiff dealt with the people on whom the work depended, while the bankruptcy report in Pippen said nothing about how the plaintiff performed any role.
A remark that sounds like opinion can still qualify. In Finck v. City of Tea a statement that a police chief was incompetent, delivered with a crude insult, was held opinion only and not actionable. In Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. v. Sadow, by contrast, a hospital's senior executive told a new doctor that the plaintiff doctor was not competent to operate on a dog, and an opinion from someone who seems to have special knowledge of the facts may imply unstated facts and be treated as slander per se.40 The difference applies the rule that an opinion is actionable when it implies undisclosed defamatory facts as its basis.41 A listener who hears a hospital executive pronounce a colleague incompetent will assume the executive knows of specific failures, and a listener who hears a crude insult from a stranger will assume nothing of the kind.
Employment disputes supply the most common application, because an employer who explains a discharge, or a supervisor who warns coworkers, tends to accuse the employee of exactly the faults that bear on the job.42 Courts have held it slander per se to say that an employee was fired for drunkenness, to accuse an employee of theft, and to make allegations of excessive absenteeism and misrepresentation of salary.43 Each imputation goes to reliability or trustworthiness at work. A theft accusation about an employee can therefore satisfy both the crime category and this one, and the plaintiff may rely on either.
The fourth step does the sorting. The usual exam error is to treat any unflattering remark about a person who has a job as slander per se, when the question is whether the imputed trait bears on the work that person does.
Serious Sexual Misconduct
The fourth per se category covers a spoken imputation of serious sexual misconduct, and it has shifted more than the others. It began as a rule about unchastity in a woman. Courts now generally describe it as serious sexual misconduct, a formulation that likely reaches men as well as women, because a presumption of harm tied to the plaintiff's sex would invite an equal protection challenge.49
The category depends on the attitudes of the community at the time of publication. The rules on defamatory meaning already say as much: current community standards control, and a classification that once supported a presumption of harm can lose it as those standards change.50 Two features of the modern wording follow from that dependence. The first is the word serious. Only conduct grave enough that listeners would withdraw from the plaintiff supports a presumption of lost standing, the same logic that confines the crime category to offenses punishable by imprisonment or involving moral turpitude. The second is the move away from the plaintiff's sex. A rule that grants a presumption of harm to one sex and withholds it from the other is hard to defend, so the better reading treats an accusation of serious sexual misconduct against a man as slander per se on the same footing.51
Current standards have also taken some accusations out of the category altogether. At one time a false accusation that someone was other than heterosexual could be found slander per se, but that is no longer so.52 The change is the one the reasoning predicts. Once a substantial and respectable part of the community stops thinking less of a person on that account, the accusation no longer produces the shunning on which the presumption relied. Whether such a statement is defamatory at all then becomes a question for the general test applied to the present community, and a plaintiff who cannot show defamatory meaning, or who cannot prove pecuniary loss where the statement falls outside every per se category, cannot recover for slander.
The category interacts with the crime category in a way that trips students. In Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa per Azioni, a federal district court in New York held that adultery, a class B misdemeanor, is not a serious crime and so falls outside the crime category.53 That holding closes one door and leaves another open. The crime category asks how grave the offense charged is, while the sexual misconduct category asks whether the conduct charged is serious sexual misconduct. Alaska decisions cited for the latter category include French v. Jadon, Inc. and City of Fairbanks v. Rice, the second involving allegations of marital infidelity.54 An accusation of adultery should therefore be run through both categories, with a negative answer under the first and an answer under the second that depends on the jurisdiction and on present community standards. On an exam, the usual error is to recite the category as unchastity in a woman and to treat every sexual or orientation-related accusation as slander per se.