Concept
Fault
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
Fault
Fault is the third requirement of a defamation claim. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558(c) asks for fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher,1 and § 613(1)(g) puts the burden on the plaintiff: when the issue is properly raised, the plaintiff must prove the defendant's negligence, reckless disregard, or knowledge regarding the truth or falsity and the defamatory character of the communication.2 The earlier elements describe the statement and its audience. This one examines the defendant and asks what the defendant knew, believed, or should have checked before publishing. A statement can satisfy every earlier element and still fail to support liability, because the publisher took the care the law expects.
Every fault rule allocates the cost of a false report between the person described and the person who printed it. A rule that makes each error costly turns publishers into guarantors of accuracy, and guarantors are cautious: they hold back reports they believe true but doubt they could prove in court. The Supreme Court made this point about critics of public officials, who, if forced to guarantee every factual assertion, may stay silent even when their criticism is true.3 A fault requirement sorts speakers by what they did. It protects the careful publisher whom a source misled, and it leaves the careless publisher, or the one who knew better, with the loss.
The governing standard depends on who the plaintiff is and what the statement concerns. The first subsection traces the strict liability of the common law and the constitutional decisions that displaced it. The next two take up public officials and public figures, who carry the heaviest burden, and the definition of reckless disregard that decides most of their cases. The last covers private plaintiffs, for whom negligence is the floor. On any fault problem, identify the plaintiff and the subject of the speech first, because that identification selects the standard against which the defendant's conduct is measured.
Common-Law Liability Without Fault
The common law of defamation asked almost nothing about the defendant's state of mind. Liability was strict. The defendant did not have to know that the statement was false or defamatory, did not have to be negligent in finding out, and did not have to intend or foresee any harm or expect that anyone would read the statement as referring to the plaintiff.4 Liability depended on the meaning the statement had for those who saw or heard it, so a defendant could be liable without intending to defame, without intending the meaning the audience took, without intending a false meaning, and even without intending to refer to the plaintiff. Negligence on any of these points was equally irrelevant to the plaintiff's cause of action.5
E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, which the section on identifying the plaintiff discussed, applies the rule on two fronts. A publisher may act in good faith, may believe the statement true, and may even believe it reasonably, yet have no defence if the statement proves false, “however excellent his intention.”6 The same reasoning governs reference to the plaintiff. A defendant cannot excuse himself from malice by showing a benevolent spirit, and for the same reason he cannot show that the libel was not of and concerning the plaintiff by proving that he never heard of the plaintiff, because his intention “in both respects equally is inferred from what he did.”7
The old form of the action did speak of malice, but the word protected few defendants. In the seventeenth century, courts reluctant to encourage defamation suits developed a rule that the plaintiff must prove not only that the defendant intended to defame but that malice, in the sense of spite, ill will, or a desire to do harm, inspired the publication.8 The requirement lost its force once the law inferred the defendant's malice and intention from what the defendant did.9
The common law did demand fault at one point: publication. The defendant is not liable unless the defendant intended to communicate with someone other than the plaintiff or had reason to anticipate that someone other than the plaintiff would see or hear the statement.10 That anticipation test explains the odd case of a defendant who hands a written defamation to a plaintiff who cannot see. The defendant can expect the plaintiff to have others read it, and so counts as a publisher.11 The Restatement adds that the defendant is a publisher here because the plaintiff was unaware of the defamatory character of what she passed on to third persons.12 Courts divide over whether a defendant can also foresee publication by a plaintiff acting under compelling circumstances, such as a discharged employee seeking work elsewhere: a few cases impose liability, and the large majority reject the idea.13 These rules ask whether the statement reached an audience. They say nothing about whether the defendant took care over its truth, and the fault that § 558(c) now requires is a separate inquiry. An answer that runs the two together misses the change.
Constitutional decisions have since added a fault requirement the common law never had. Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny, one who publishes a false and defamatory communication about a public official or public figure, concerning that person's conduct, fitness, or role in that capacity, is liable only if the publisher knows the statement is false and that it defames, or acts in reckless disregard of those matters.14 The standard is called “actual malice,” but the term does not mean spite. It means knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard, and ill will need not be proved.15 A publisher held to guarantee the accuracy of every statement about public affairs would publish less of it, so the standard leaves room for honest error and reaches the publisher who knew better.16
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. then reached plaintiffs who are neither officials nor public figures. The Court held that the Constitution does not permit strict liability for defamation in cases involving matters of public interest, and that the states may adopt any other standard so long as the plaintiff must show at least negligence on the defendant's part.17 A state may therefore create what amounts to a conditional privilege that the plaintiff defeats by showing negligence or, if the state prefers, only by showing actual malice.18 Negligence is the constitutional floor, and any more demanding standard protects speakers further. Gertz thus bars liability without fault in most, though perhaps not all, defamation cases.19
The qualification comes from Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., which permits the states to keep imposing strict liability, and apparently presumed damages, when the speech involves no matter of public interest. The rule clearly covers a private plaintiff who sues a non-media defendant.20 States therefore remain free to apply the old strict liability rule where no public official, public figure, or matter of public interest is involved, although many now require negligence even there.21 Some states have also adopted fault requirements as common-law rules where the Constitution does not demand them.22
The object of clause (g) shows what changed. The common law ignored the defendant's state of mind about falsity and defamatory character, and the Restatement makes that state of mind the subject of the inquiry: negligence, reckless disregard, or knowledge regarding the truth or falsity and the defamatory character of the communication.23 The three states of mind line up with the constitutional standards. Negligence is the floor for private plaintiffs after Gertz; knowledge or reckless disregard is the actual malice standard for public officials and public figures. Negligence here means failing to use the care a reasonable publisher would use to learn whether the statement was false and defamatory, so a fact pattern that describes how a story was gathered is asking this question.
The modern rule gives a careful publisher a defense the common law withheld.
The dentist hypothetical shows why a complete answer names the baseline before analyzing fault. Treating falsity as enough for liability gives the common-law answer, and that answer is correct only where a state still applies strict liability to a purely private matter involving a private plaintiff. Elsewhere the answer depends on who the plaintiff is and what the speech concerns, which the next three subsections take up in turn.
Actual Malice Plaintiffs
The Constitution restricts strict liability most severely when the plaintiff is a public official, and the restriction begins with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. There the Court recognized “a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice,’” which it defined as knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.25
The rule answered the way Alabama had treated the claim. Sullivan, a Montgomery city commissioner, sued over a political advertisement in the New York Times that made accusations, some of them false, about the city's conduct toward civil rights demonstrators.26 The trial judge told the jury that, because the statements were libelous per se, “the law . . . implies legal injury from the bare fact of publication itself,” “falsity and malice are presumed,” and “general damages need not be alleged or proved but are presumed.”27 The Supreme Court reversed, holding the Alabama rule “constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press” that the First and Fourteenth Amendments require when a public official sues critics of his official conduct.28
The Alabama rule failed because of what it demanded of the critic. Once a publication was held libelous per se, the defendant had no defense as to the stated facts unless he could persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars.29 A rule that compels the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of every factual assertion, on pain of judgments virtually unlimited in amount, leads to self-censorship. Would-be critics may stay silent even when they believe their criticism true, and even when it is true, because they doubt they can prove it in court or fear the expense of trying.30 Official conduct is what citizens most need to discuss, so the old rule chilled speech where debate matters most.
The standard tolerates honest error and withholds protection only from the knowing or reckless falsehood. Neither kind of falsehood contributes to a good-faith willingness to take part in public discourse, so each lacks First Amendment value, and the actual malice standard was designed so that, in public debate, only that unprotected speech remains subject to defamation law.31 Two further reasons explain why the standard attaches to officials and figures. Such plaintiffs usually have significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication, and so a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals have.32 Private figures, by contrast, have not voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye.33 The last subsection returns to private plaintiffs.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580A states the rule in the form to use on an exam. One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a public official or public figure, with regard to his conduct, fitness, or role in that capacity, is liable only if the publisher knows the statement is false and that it defames the plaintiff, or acts in reckless disregard of those matters.34 The standard adds a scienter element, a requirement about the defendant's state of mind, to the plaintiff's prima facie case.35 The burden of persuasion is heavy: the showing must be made with convincing clarity, which later decisions phrase as clear and convincing proof.36 Because the standard is constitutional, trial judges also have a duty to determine independently whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity, so a jury's finding is not the last word.37 In structure, the rule works as a constitutional conditional privilege for statements about public officials, which the official defeats only by proving actual malice with convincing clarity.38 The official must also establish falsity, as the earlier section on falsity explained, so the case rests on two showings.
The standard governs only plaintiffs who fit one of two categories, and the first is broader than its title suggests. A public official is a governmental employee who has, or appears to have, responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs, and the category can include relatively low-ranking personnel such as police officers.39 The test asks about the responsibility the person holds in government, so neither high rank nor election is required. The public's interest in scrutinizing how government is run reaches the officer on patrol as well as the commissioner who supervises the department.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts supplied the second category by carrying the Sullivan reasoning to public figures. Chief Justice Warren's concurrence explained that the citizenry has “a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons,” and that uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as debate about public officials.40 The New York Times standards now apply not only when a public official sues a newspaper but also when a public figure sues a magazine or news service.41 A public figure is one who has achieved a degree of fame or notoriety, either generally or as to a particular public issue or controversy, and the voluntary nature of the plaintiff's participation is a factor to consider.42 Courts have treated a well-known college football coach, a retired Army general who took a prominent controversial position on racial segregation, and candidates for public office as public figures, but not a socially prominent woman who did no more than sue her very wealthy husband for divorce.43 The first group took a public role or a public position, while the divorce plaintiff's social prominence, standing alone, did not make her a participant in a public controversy.
Even a plaintiff who is plainly an official or a figure meets the standard only for statements about the public side of life. The statement must concern the official's fitness for or performance in the office, and for a public figure it must affect the plaintiff in a public capacity.44 The limit follows from the reasons for the rule. Society's interest in scrutinizing a public role, and the plaintiff's voluntary acceptance of that scrutiny, attach to the role the plaintiff holds, so a statement about something outside it gets no help from the plaintiff's office. Courts analyze that kind of statement like a private-plaintiff case, the framework the last subsection takes up.
The label “actual malice” misleads students, because the term has nothing to do with malice in its everyday sense. The standard requires only that the defendant published a defamatory falsehood with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.45 Reckless disregard means publishing despite a high degree of awareness of probable falsity or with serious doubts about the truth, and actual ill will need not be proved.46 Because the inquiry looks only at what the defendant knew or doubted about the truth, the publisher's feelings toward the plaintiff do not decide it. A publisher who detests an official but honestly believes the story lacks actual malice, while a publisher with no grudge who prints a story known to be false has it. The next subsection explains how a plaintiff proves what a publisher actually believed and how courts measure serious doubt.
Sullivan itself shows that the standard does real work on the evidence and not only in the jury instructions. The Court held that, under the proper safeguards, the evidence presented was constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment for the official.47
Carelessness falls short because the actual malice standard sits above negligence. Negligence is the constitutional floor for private plaintiffs suing over matters of public interest, and actual malice is a separate and higher minimum for public officials and public figures.48 A publisher can therefore fail to investigate, and even fail unreasonably, without crossing the line the standard draws.
Reckless Disregard Defined
The preceding subsection established that a public official or public figure must prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, and Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton supplies the working definition of the second alternative.54 Reckless disregard requires more than a departure from reasonably prudent conduct; the plaintiff needs “sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”55 The Court called the standard subjective, because the evidence must permit the conclusion that the defendant actually had a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.56 The inquiry therefore looks at the publisher's own state of mind when it published, and every other rule in this subsection follows from that one feature.
The reason for measuring belief rather than prudence appears when you ask what an objective test would do. A test built on what a careful publisher would have done would measure negligence, so proof of negligence would also prove reckless disregard. The heightened standard for officials and figures would collapse into the lower standard for private plaintiffs, and publishers would again answer for honest mistakes, the exposure the actual malice rule exists to remove.57 The subjective test also matches the line the First Amendment draws. A knowing or reckless falsehood adds nothing to good-faith public debate and gets no protection, while a statement the publisher honestly believed, even if wrong, is the kind of error that open debate must tolerate.58
Because the test concerns belief about the truth, the publisher's feelings toward the plaintiff are a poor guide to the answer. Actual malice has nothing to do with malice as that word is commonly understood, and actual ill will need not be proved.59 Hostility may suggest that a writer hoped the story was true, but hope leaves open whether the writer believed it, and belief is what the constitutional question asks. A reporter who despises an official, checks the story, and believes it has not published with serious doubts. A reporter with no grudge who prints a charge while privately doubting it has.
Plaintiffs most often offer a failure to investigate, and the Court has held that it does not suffice, even when a reasonably prudent person would have investigated before publishing.60 The rule follows from the subjective test. A skipped phone call shows carelessness about learning the truth, but carelessness is consistent with complete confidence that the story is accurate, and only doubt turns a skipped check into recklessness.
The same protection covers a publisher whose error is one of interpretation. In Time, Inc. v. Pape, the Court refused to let the malice issue go to the jury because Time magazine omitted a word like “alleged,” reasoning that doing so would impose a much stricter standard of liability on errors of interpretation or judgment than on errors of historic fact.61 The Court added that nothing in its opinion makes “alleged” a superfluity in published reports of information damaging to reputation.62
A publisher cannot, however, rest on a claimed belief that the surrounding circumstances contradict. Where a publisher reports a third party's allegations, “recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.”63 A publisher who holds such reasons can hardly claim to have felt confident in the story, so the reasons are themselves evidence of doubt. The time and opportunity the publisher had to check the statement may also bear on the inference, since a publisher with ample time who chose not to verify looks different from one racing a deadline.64
Harte-Hanks shows obvious reasons to doubt joined to silence about the sources that would have settled them. The newspaper published a story that rested on a third party's allegations. Its informant, Thompson, answered leading questions in a hesitant, inaudible, and sometimes unresponsive and improbable manner, which raised obvious doubts about her veracity. The paper's taped interview with the plaintiff, Connaughton, showed that he unambiguously denied each allegation of wrongful conduct, so the Court found it extraordinarily unlikely that the reporters missed his denials simply because he confirmed certain aspects of her story.65
Two omissions completed the record. The newspaper never contacted Stephens, and Blount, who testified for the newspaper, did not listen to the tapes. Taken alone, those choices resemble the investigative lapses the Court holds insufficient. But the jury had rejected the newspaper's innocent explanations: that Stephens went uncontacted only because Connaughton failed to put her in touch with the paper, that Blount skipped the tapes only because he expected nothing new, and that the newspaper's employees believed Thompson's allegations substantially true. With those explanations gone and the undisputed evidence in view, the Court concluded that actual malice “inexorably follows,” and it rested the decision on that narrower ground rather than on the eleven subsidiary facts the court of appeals had said a jury could have found.66 The contrast with the fund-manager reporter lies in what each publisher had in hand and why it looked away. That reporter had a reliable source and no warning sign, so the missing calls were oversights. The newspaper had denials, an informant whose tone invited doubt, and unexplained gaps at the very steps that would have tested the story, which lets a factfinder infer that it avoided the truth and did not merely overlook it.
A jury's finding of actual malice does not end the matter. Credibility determinations stay under clearly erroneous review because the trier of fact watched the witnesses, but the reviewing court must consider the factual record in full and examine for itself the statements and the circumstances in which they were made, to see whether the First Amendment protects them.67 Trial judges carry a parallel constitutional duty to determine independently whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity, and the plaintiff's proof must be clear and convincing to begin with.68 The duty follows from the function of the standard, which marks the boundary of protected speech, and a boundary should not rest on a jury's reaction to one defendant alone.
The same evidentiary standard shapes pretrial motions. Where the clear and convincing requirement applies, the judge deciding whether a genuine factual dispute requires a jury asks whether the evidence is such that a jury applying that standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant, as Anderson v. Liberty Lobby held.69 A public-figure plaintiff who can show only carelessness therefore risks summary judgment, because carelessness does not let a reasonable jury find actual malice clearly and convincingly. A defendant's sworn statement that it believed the story does not settle the matter in the other direction, since Harte-Hanks shows that a jury may reject such testimony when the surrounding evidence points the other way.70
The fourth step does the real work in most exam problems. A fact pattern that says only that the publisher failed to check its sources describes negligence, whereas one that adds warning signs the publisher possessed, and sources it chose not to consult, describes the kind of record from which a factfinder can infer doubt.
Negligence for Private Plaintiffs
For a plaintiff with no public role, the constitutional source of the negligence minimum is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. The Court held there that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.76 The Restatement states the resulting floor in § 558(c): fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher.77 The Court called this approach a more equitable boundary between competing concerns. It recognizes the strength of the state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, and it shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability.78 The floor therefore sits below the actual malice test of the last two subsections and above the strict liability of the common law. Every state must require at least negligence, meaning a failure to use reasonable care to learn whether the statement was false and defamatory, and a state may require more.79
The Court demanded less of a private plaintiff than of an official because of two facts, and each does separate work. Private figures have lesser access to the media channels that could counteract a false statement, and they have not voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye.80 An official falsely accused can call a press conference and be heard, but a private person usually cannot reach the audience that read the accusation, so damages may be the only repair available. An official or public figure also accepted scrutiny as part of the role, while a private person did nothing to invite it and has less reason to absorb the risk of someone else's honest error. The Court acknowledged that the concerns behind the actual malice rule do not vanish for private plaintiffs, and it rested the difference on the strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation.81
The Constitution still demands some fault, for the reason that drove the actual malice rule. A publisher that answers for every false statement, however careful its work, becomes a guarantor of everything it prints, and it will hold back reports it believes true but doubts it can prove in court. A negligence requirement relieves the publisher who checked its facts and was misled anyway, and it leaves liable the publisher who took no care. The middle position protects the careful press and still gives the private person a remedy against the careless one.
A dissent in Gertz attacked that tradeoff. Under the Court's new rules, it said, the plaintiff must prove not only the defamatory statement but also some degree of fault, so a publication may be wholly false and unjustified and the case will still be dismissed for failure to prove negligence or other fault.82 The dissent found it unacceptable to force the wholly innocent victim to bear the injury, because as between the two the defamer is the only culpable party, the one who circulated a falsehood he was not required to publish.83 It added that a plaintiff who loses on fault may lose any chance of securing a judicial determination that the publication was false.84 The majority chose the other allocation, accepting that cost to shield the press from strict liability.85
Most states have chosen the floor as their standard. The majority of states that have decided the question follow Gertz and require a private plaintiff to prove only that the defendant was negligent in ascertaining the falsity and defamatory character of the statement.86 A minority require even private plaintiffs to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard when the defamation concerns a matter of general or public interest, the standard that governs officials and public figures.87 New Jersey, in Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., extended actual malice beyond what the Supreme Court demands to press statements about businesses that affect the public's health and safety or are subject to substantial government regulation, and Indiana applies it to matters of general or public concern in Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido's, Inc.88 Each state's choice operates like a conditional privilege for statements on matters of public interest, which the private plaintiff defeats by showing negligence or, in the minority states, only by showing actual malice.89
The plaintiff's status matters as much as the state's choice. A careless story that accused a city councilmember of steering a catering contract to a relative would draw the actual malice standard, and carelessness alone would end the claim, as the preceding two subsections explained. A public official or public figure sued over a matter that does not touch the public role stands where a private plaintiff stands. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B, one who publishes a false and defamatory communication about a private person, or about an official or public figure on a purely private matter, is liable if the publisher knows the statement is false and defames the plaintiff, acts in reckless disregard of those matters, or acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.90 The reason follows from the justifications for the stricter rule, which are scrutiny of a public role and voluntary exposure through that role. A hardware store the road commissioner happens to own has no connection to the office, so neither justification applies to a story about it.
The negligence inquiry has a defined object. It asks whether the defendant failed to use reasonable care to learn that the statement was false and that it was defamatory.91 Gertz tied its holding to a statement whose substance “makes substantial danger to reputation apparent,” so that a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster would be warned of its defamatory potential, and the Court intimated no view about a factual misstatement whose content gave no such warning.92 The constitutional fault standard probably also applies to the question whether the statement refers to the plaintiff, though the scope of the requirement leaves other questions open.93
The floor has an outer edge. Under Dun & Bradstreet, the states may keep strict liability, and apparently presumed damages, when the speech does not involve a matter of public interest, a rule that plainly covers a private plaintiff who sues a non-media defendant, though many states now require negligence there too.94 A complete answer therefore asks first whether the matter is one of public interest, because that question decides whether the constitutional minimum applies at all.
Negligence also limits what the plaintiff may recover. The state interest in compensating private plaintiffs extends only to actual injury, so a plaintiff who proves no knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard is restricted to compensation for it, and presumed or punitive damages stay out of reach.95 Actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. It includes impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish, though awards must rest on competent evidence of the injury even when no evidence assigns a dollar value to it.96 That category is broader than the special damages slander requires, because special damages demand pecuniary loss.97 A private plaintiff who proves actual malice may recover presumed or punitive damages, so the heavier fault showing unlocks the larger remedy.98 The later sections on harm work out these damages rules in detail.
The showing the plaintiff must make is also lighter. Officials and public figures must establish actual malice with convincing clarity, while the Constitution allows the States to impose liability on the publisher of a defamatory falsehood about a private person on a less demanding showing than New York Times requires.99