Concept
Tailoring the Decree
Remedies: damages and injunction
Tailoring the Decree
An injunction does not have to be all or nothing. The Restatement (Second) of Torts makes its availability depend on a comparative appraisal of all the factors in the case, including the primary factors listed in § 936, and it tells the court to compare the probable consequences of granting the injunction with those of the alternative remedies if they were used.1 A narrower order, or one that takes effect later, is one more remedy whose consequences can be set beside those of a full and immediate one. The earlier sections asked whether to enjoin. This one asks what the injunction should contain once a court decides to issue it: how much it should forbid, and when and on what terms it should take effect.
Without room to shape the decree, a court would sometimes sacrifice one party's real interest to protect the other's. A plaintiff whose harm a small change would cure could end up with damages alone because the only injunction on offer closed the whole operation. A defendant could face closure to stop a harm that a limit on operating hours would end. Equitable discretion supplies the room. A court may grant full relief, limit relief, or deny equitable relief and leave the plaintiff to legal remedies, and it exercises that discretion by balancing equities, hardships, and the interests of the public and of third persons.2
The factors that decide whether to enjoin keep working when the order is drafted. The relative hardship to the defendant if an injunction is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied changes with the breadth of the order, because a narrower command burdens the defendant less and may still remove much of the plaintiff's harm.3 The interests of third persons and of the public also depend on how far the order reaches.4 Public interest values may be evidenced by the status of the litigants and the nature of the rights asserted. In Kansas v. Nebraska, a dispute over an interstate water Compact, a special master recommended an equitable remedy of partial disgorgement of Nebraska's excess gains for knowingly exceeding its allowable water consumption.5 The practicability of framing and enforcing the order governs the terms themselves, since a decree must be specific enough for the defendant to follow and for the court to police.6
Two kinds of adjustment recur, and neither disturbs the finding of nuisance. Scope adjustments confine the order to the conduct that actually injures the plaintiff, so the activity goes on in reduced form. Timing and condition adjustments postpone the order, or attach terms to it, so the defendant can adapt before the full command bites. The next subsection takes up scope, and the one after it takes up timing and conditions. An exam stem that gives the plaintiff a real harm and the defendant a serious hardship therefore asks more than whether to enjoin. It also asks whether some intermediate order would serve both sides.
Narrowing the Order
Narrowing is the middle course between a full injunction and none. The court finds an injunction appropriate and then confines it to what the plaintiff's protection reasonably requires, so the defendant's activity continues in reduced form. Two Restatement factors act directly on the contents of the order. One is the relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if an injunction is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied (§ 941). The other is the practicability of drafting and enforcing the order (§ 943).7 A narrower command lowers the defendant's hardship while still removing the harm the plaintiff proved, and a command built from measurable terms is one a court can enforce.
The governing limit is that a decree should reach no further than the plaintiff's interest demands. The restraint an injunction imposes should not be more extensive than is reasonably required to protect the party in whose favor it is granted, and it should not be so broad as to keep the defendant from exercising its own rights.8 The cost of excess breadth explains the rule. Once an order has cured the harm the plaintiff proved, any further restriction adds nothing to the plaintiff's protection, yet the defendant pays for it in lost production, lost income, or lost use of what it may lawfully do.
The tools follow the ways an activity causes harm: how much of it occurs, with what equipment, at what hours, and at what volume. A court may order a defendant to minimize or eliminate a nuisance without closing down, for example by reducing the amount of dynamite in any one quarry explosion or by reducing nighttime activities, and it may order the defendant to experiment with alternative processes as ways of cutting the harm.9 Against a noisy factory, the possible orders run along a ladder. A court might forbid creating or continuing a nuisance, forbid operating certain specified engines, forbid any engine producing noise above a stated number of decibels at the property line, forbid operating after 5:00 p.m., or forbid any operation at all, and the list can be extended.10 The two ends of the ladder show the contrast. The first rung only restates the finding of nuisance and gives no one a line to observe, and the last closes the business. The rungs between them let the operation continue within a limit that protects the neighbor. A decibel reading at the property line or an hour of the day is a line the defendant can observe and a court can check, so the specificity that lowers the burden also makes the decree enforceable.
The limit has a second edge, which concerns proof. In Dobbs v. Wiggins, a trial court treated a dog kennel as a noise nuisance and enjoined the owner to reduce the number of dogs to six. The appellate court held that the trial evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the owner had to cut to six in order to abate the nuisance, so the six-dog order was an abuse of discretion. It offered no opinion on how many dogs the property could hold, and it remanded for further proceedings on the scope of injunctive relief needed to abate the noise nuisance.11 What failed was the number, which the record did not tie to the harm. The nuisance finding was not the defect, so the plaintiff did not lose on liability, and the case went back for the proof that would locate the line.
The stamping shop and the kennel both involve a proved nuisance and a business that keeps running under a limit. What separates them is whether the record shows where the line falls. The shop's cap came from measurement, and the kennel's cap came from nowhere. A stem in which a court closes an entire operation to stop a harm confined to certain hours, or fixes a number of animals, machines, or decibels with no testimony behind it, describes an order broader than the plaintiff's protection requires. Narrowing is also not denial. The plaintiff keeps an enforceable order against the conduct that actually injures, and bears whatever harm remains inside the limit. Narrowing changes what the order forbids, and the next subsection turns to when the order takes effect and on what terms.
Delay and Conditions
Timing is the second lever a court can use to adjust an injunction. The relative hardship to the defendant if an injunction is granted, and to the plaintiff if it is denied, is a primary factor in deciding whether an injunction is appropriate,13 and the defendant's share of that hardship depends on when the order takes effect and what compliance will demand. A court that has found an injunction appropriate can therefore reduce that hardship by controlling the order's timing and terms. The power comes from the same equitable discretion: a court facing a pollution nuisance may grant the injunction only to take effect at a certain time in the future.14 The previous subsection dealt with how much the decree forbids. This one deals with when it bites and on what conditions.
A delay helps because of what a defendant can do with the interval. An operation that must end its emissions or relocate usually needs equipment ordered and installed, or a new site found and prepared, and neither can happen on the day of the decree. An order effective immediately leaves a willing defendant a single way to obey, which is to stop operating. A fixed interval gives the defendant a way to comply that keeps the business alive, while the plaintiff still holds an order that ends the interference on a known date. The plaintiff pays for that arrangement by tolerating the interference until the date arrives, so the length of the delay is itself weighed against the plaintiff's hardship.
Courts have used time in just this way. In Pendoley v. Ferreira, a Massachusetts decision involving a piggery, the court granted the injunction but provided time for the defendant to make new arrangements.15 The nuisance still had to end, and only the date for compliance moved. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. adds a second term to the same device. The court affirmed the injunction against the feedlot but modified it to give Spur a reasonable time to move its operation or to take whatever steps were necessary to eliminate the nuisance, and it required the developer to pay Spur the reasonable cost of moving or such other amount as would compensate Spur for the damages the injunction would cause.16 The two decisions differ in what they attach to the interval. Pendoley spreads the defendant's burden over time and leaves it on the defendant. Spur also shifts the cost of moving to the developer, the compensated injunction treated in the preceding section. A court may even order a polluting factory to move to a location that causes less interference while ordering the plaintiff to pay the cost of the move.17 In each of these decrees, what the defendant had to do lay within its own power.
Time can also be used to find out whether a cure exists. A court may order a defendant to experiment with alternative processes or procedures as potential means of minimizing the harm, and it can do so without closing the operation in the meantime.18 The same discretion lets the court order experiments for controlling the nuisance or give the defendant time to carry them out.19 An injunction that does issue can be made temporary and conditional where the defendant can reduce or abate the interference by reasonable changes in the conduct of its activities.20 The logic of a conditional decree is that compliance ends the command. The defendant holds the key to its own release, so the order presses toward the change the court wants without forcing a shutdown in the interim.
The same device fails where the defendant cannot deliver the cure. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., the court rejected an injunction that would give the defendant time for research on controls. The technology was unlikely to be developed in the short run, and Atlantic had no ability to control the rate of research.21 Such an injunction, the court reasoned, would give the plaintiffs immense and unfair economic leverage, because if the research failed Atlantic might have to pay a price far in excess of their actual damages to settle the case and eliminate the injunction.22 Where a known cure exists, a deadline gives the defendant a reason to finish it. Where none is in sight, the deadline is a countdown, and the plaintiffs who hold the order can name the price of dissolving it.
Boomer did not abandon conditions altogether. The court directed the trial court to grant an injunction to be vacated when Atlantic paid permanent damages, which is itself a conditional decree and in effect awarded compensatory damages in lieu of an injunction.23 The difference lies in what satisfies the condition. Payment of a sum the court has fixed lies within the defendant's power, while completion of industry research depends on events that neither the defendant nor the court controls. That is the variable separating the foundry from the cement plant: whether the defendant can realistically cure the problem in the time allowed.
A stem that stresses the defendant's payroll and investment does not by itself call for a delay, because a delay serves the defendant only if the time can be used. A fact pattern that gives the defendant a known fix and a realistic schedule points toward a postponed or conditional decree. One that offers only the hope of future technology points away from it.