Concept
Injunction Appropriateness Test
Remedies: damages and injunction
Injunction Appropriateness Test
A finding of nuisance settles liability and nothing more. Whether the court will also order the defendant to stop is a second question, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts answers it with a single test: an injunction against a committed or threatened tort is available according to how appropriate the remedy is, as determined by a comparative appraisal of the factors listed in § 936.1 Two words carry the test. Appropriateness makes the injunction a matter of judgment, because a court that has found a nuisance must still ask whether an order is the right response. Comparative tells the court how to judge: it weighs each consideration against the others, and no single one, not even clear proof of a nuisance, decides the matter alone.
The test replaced a rule that left little to weigh. Before Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. was decided in 1970, some courts had already adopted a balance-of-the-equities standard, but New York still treated an injunction as automatic when a nuisance caused substantial continuing harm. That view had begun to break down in the late nineteenth century, as courts grew concerned that it would disrupt industrial development. In Boomer the New York Court of Appeals adopted the emerging modern rule, and the decision greatly influenced nuisance law in other jurisdictions. In almost all jurisdictions today, the plaintiff no longer has an automatic right to an injunction.2
Because the relief is equitable, the court has discretion to grant full relief, to limit it, or to deny all equitable relief and leave the plaintiff to legal remedies. A nuisance finding can therefore end in any of those results.3 The first subsection below states the test and its method of comparison. The next three take up points that are easily mistaken for obstacles to an injunction: whether the plaintiff must first try other remedies, whether a jury trial on disputed facts rules an injunction out, and the date as of which appropriateness is measured. The individual factors come in the next section.
Comparative Appraisal
The Restatement states the method of the appraisal separately: a court determines the appropriateness of an injunction by comparing the probable consequences of granting it with the probable consequences of the alternative remedies if they are employed.4 The comparison has two sides because each remedy has benefits and costs of its own. An injunction gives the plaintiff the very thing the plaintiff is entitled to, a life free of the interference, but it may cost the defendant far more than the harm it prevents. Damages pay for the harm but leave the activity running. A court that weighed only the order's burdens would push plaintiffs toward damages even where only an order can stop the harm. A court that weighed only the plaintiff's injury would reach for an injunction where a payment would do. Setting the two sets of consequences side by side avoids both mistakes.
The comparison turns the other way when damages would pay for harm without stopping it. Equity will not enjoin a completed act, but it may enjoin a clearly continuous invasion of an important interest where a remedy at law is inadequate.5 A Washington court reasoned the same way about a continuing condition, there the planned location of a residence, that would cause frequent trespasses: damages were not a sufficient remedy, and an injunction was far superior to a remedy at law.6 Suppose instead that a plant dumps waste on a neighbor's land every week. A damages award pays for the weeks already past, leaves the dumping in place, and sends the neighbor back to court for the next week. Only an injunction ends the harm.
The alternative remedy need not be money. Courts usually refuse to enjoin a criminal prosecution once it has been instituted, because a person with a good defense can present it in the prosecution itself, perhaps winning dismissal at an early probable cause hearing. An injunction might be preferable for any number of reasons, but the normal rules of criminal procedure are quite protective, and the interest in orderly procedure may be thought to require that courts keep hands off the criminal process.7 The comparison therefore includes what the other remedies are, as well as what they pay.
The Restatement describes the appraisal as one of all the factors in the case, including the primary factors it lists.8 Among them are the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an injunction and of other remedies,9 the relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if an injunction is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied,10 and the interests of third persons and of the public.11 Later sections take each in turn. The public interest can be evidenced by who the litigants are and what rights they assert. In Kansas v. Nebraska (2015), the State of Kansas sought disgorgement and injunctive relief against Nebraska for alleged violations of an interstate water Compact and its Settlement agreement, and a special master recommended partial disgorgement of Nebraska's excess gains for knowingly exceeding its allowable water consumption.12
Because availability turns on that weighing, a finding of liability does not carry an injunction with it. Courts claim the power to deny equitable relief as a matter of discretion, and that power lets them leave the plaintiff to legal remedies.13 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., a dispute over Navy training, shows the alternatives side of the comparison. A court that concluded the Navy must prepare an environmental impact statement had many remedial tools, including declaratory relief or an injunction tailored to the preparation of the statement rather than to the training in the interim.14
The weighing is the trial court's job, and appellate review is deferential. Injunctive relief is granted or withheld at the trial court's discretion, and the decision stands unless it rests on untenable grounds or is manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary. In deciding whether to grant or deny a permanent injunction, the trial court must make a comparative appraisal of all the factors in the case.15 The standard cuts both ways. An appellate court does not ask whether it would have weighed the factors differently, so an order entered after a careful comparison is as secure as a denial entered after one. A trial court that treated the nuisance finding as the end of the inquiry has skipped the appraisal and exposed its order to reversal.
A related federal formulation takes a middle path. In eBay, a patent case, the Supreme Court reversed the automatic approach of the Court of Appeals but declined to adopt the district court's modern reality approach. It listed the traditional grounds for issuing an injunction and instructed the trial court to follow those benchmarks. How far eBay reaches is uncertain: its holding may be limited to business-method patents, or it may be affecting the standards for awarding any type of injunction.16 Whether its four-part test would serve in private nuisance cases is an open question, and Gergen et al. reject the test in both patent and nuisance law.17 A nuisance answer should therefore be built on the Restatement comparison, with eBay treated as an uncertain parallel.
No Prior Resort Required
An applicant for an injunction against a tort need not first resort to other remedies to demonstrate their inadequacy.19 The rule governs sequence. A nuisance plaintiff may ask for the injunction in the first suit, and the court may not tell the plaintiff to try damages first and return if they fall short.
No trial run is needed because the comparison is made in advance. The court compares the probable consequences of an injunction with the probable consequences of the alternative remedies if they were employed,20 and it does so from the nature of the harm and the evidence in the record. It can predict how damages would work without watching them fail.
A contrary rule would force the plaintiff to prove damages inadequate by living through the inadequacy. A plaintiff with a continuing nuisance would endure the dust or odor, win a money judgment, watch the interference go on, and sue again. That sequence produces the cost of a multiplicity of suits, which the adequacy inquiry itself counts against the damage remedy in the case of repeated or continuing torts.21 A prerequisite that demanded the cycle would force the very succession of suits that an injunction can spare the plaintiff.
The no-prior-resort rule is the practical side of a larger change in how adequacy is treated. The old adequacy rule began as an accommodation between separate law courts and equity courts, and with the merger of the two systems that history offers no basis for continued use of the rule. It survives mainly as a convenient but misleading and overstated expression for entirely different policies.22 The Restatement dropped the rule from its black letter and condemned it as misleading, replacing it with a long and unstructured list of factors. Yet many sophisticated lawyers believe the rule continues to reflect a serious preference for legal over equitable remedies.23 Adequacy now appears as one weighed item among several: the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an injunction and of other remedies.24 The measure is relative, so no preliminary showing has to be completed before the weighing starts.
The usual error is to read the rule as presuming that damages are inadequate. It speaks only to exhaustion. The plaintiff must still show, through the comparison of remedies, that an injunction is relatively more adequate to protect the plaintiff than the alternatives.25
Older opinions and bar questions often frame the issue as irreparable harm. Where the question is whether to leave the plaintiff to a noncoercive remedy, irreparable harm and inadequate remedy at law mean the same thing.26 The Restatement's relative-adequacy factor is the modern form of that question, and a later section takes up how a court judges it.
Jury Trial and Injunction
An injunction is not rendered inappropriate as a remedy for a tort by the necessity or advisability of trial by jury on the issues of fact presented.28 The rule answers an objection a defendant may raise once a jury has found a nuisance: that ordinary citizens have decided the facts, so no equitable decree can follow. The jury answers the factual questions. The judge still decides whether an order is appropriate under the § 936 appraisal.
The rule rests on how the two kinds of relief are allocated. Claims that basically involve money damages are almost always legal, and an action whose principal relief is an injunction is almost always equitable.29 A nuisance plaintiff usually wants both, damages for harm already suffered and an order against its continuation. If the jury right on the damages claim could defeat the injunction, the plaintiff would have to choose between a jury on the money claim and an effective order against a continuing wrong. Dividing the work avoids that choice. The jury can decide whether a nuisance exists and what the plaintiff has lost, and the judge can then weigh the equities and shape the decree. An early opinion on public nuisance explained why equity is suited to the second task: a court of equity can give a more speedy, effectual, and permanent remedy than the law. It can prevent threatened nuisances, arrest or abate those in progress, and protect against them in the future by perpetual injunction, while courts of law can reach only existing nuisances and leave future acts to new proceedings.30
Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz shows the division at work. The plaintiffs sued over noise from air-conditioning equipment next door, a jury returned affirmative answers on their nuisance claim, and the trial judge entered a permanent injunction. The judgment never mentioned balancing the equities. But the pleadings raised the question and evidence was heard, so the appellate court implied a finding that the trial court had balanced the equities in the plaintiffs' favor, and it found no abuse of discretion.31 The jury supplied the facts, and the judge supplied the remedy.
The case also settles a point about sequence. The plaintiffs were not required to recover damages for the temporary nuisance, the period from the start of the noise to the trial, before obtaining a permanent injunction, and the jury's affirmative answers entitled them to the order.32 The two remedies cover different periods. Damages to the date of trial answer for the past, and an injunction addresses conduct that has not yet occurred, so neither depends on the other.
A verdict for the plaintiff does not guarantee the injunction, and the same division of labor explains why.
A bar question that mentions a jury verdict on nuisance is therefore pointing to the facts, and the remedy stays open. A defendant who argues that the jury's role forecloses an injunction misstates the rule. A plaintiff who assumes the verdict compels one skips the § 936 appraisal.
Time of the Order
The appropriateness of an injunction against a tort is determined as of the time of the order or judgment, unless special circumstances otherwise require.34 The date that counts is the day the court speaks, not the day the plaintiff filed. The comparison of remedies and the appraisal of the § 936 factors run on the facts as they stand when the decree would take effect. A plaintiff who proved a nuisance at the start of the case must still show that an order is appropriate against the situation that exists at the end.
An injunction speaks only to the future, so its value depends on whether harm will occur if the court enters no order. The court is making a prediction, and the legal consequence of a prediction is easily applied only at the extremes: equity will not enjoin a completed act, but it may enjoin clearly continuous invasions of an important interest where a remedy at law is inadequate.35 Wrongs already completed are answered by damages. Litigation also takes time, and the facts move while it runs: a defendant repairs equipment, a use ends, the source of the trouble disappears. A court that measured appropriateness at filing could enter a decree against conduct that has already stopped, and the decree would restrain nothing.
The same reasoning reaches a nuisance that stops before the case is decided, since no injunction issues if the nuisance has abated at the time of trial.36 Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs, LLC v. Franklin County is an example: the private nuisance action sought to enjoin a gun range, and any nuisance the range had created had abated in 2008.37 The prediction can also fail in the other direction. A court may be reluctant to enjoin an anticipated nuisance if there is evidence that, with care, the defendant's conduct or facility might not constitute a nuisance.38
The orchard and the gravel plant differ in what is happening when the court rules, and how old the grievance is does not enter into it. A plaintiff whose harm has ended gets damages for the past. A plaintiff whose harm is still arriving can also seek an order against the future. A bar question that says the nuisance was real when suit was filed but had ended by trial is therefore pointing to a denied injunction with damages intact.
The order date yields when special circumstances otherwise require, so it is a default and not an absolute.39 The provision does not list those circumstances. An answer should depart from the order date only when the facts supply a reason to do so.