Concept
Remedial Framework
Remedies: damages and injunction
Nuisance Damages and Injunctions
Remedial Framework
A nuisance suit asks two questions in sequence. The first is liability: did the defendant substantially and unreasonably interfere with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of land? The second arises only if the plaintiff wins the first, and it asks what relief should follow. On that question the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes the availability of an injunction depend on how appropriate the remedy is, judged by a comparative appraisal of the factors listed in § 936.1 A finding of nuisance therefore does not carry an injunction with it. Remedy is a stage of its own, with its own weighing.
The stage exists because a nuisance is commonly still going on when the case is tried.2 Damages can compensate the plaintiff for smoke, noise, or odor already endured, but an award for yesterday's harm says nothing about tomorrow's. The court must therefore choose between stopping the activity and letting it continue while the defendant pays. The stakes can be large: the cement plant in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. cost more than $45 million and employed over 300 people.3 Liability alone cannot settle a choice with consequences like that, so the court compares the probable results of each remedy. The subsections below follow that comparison, first from liability to remedy and then through the four outcomes it can produce.
Liability Then Remedy
Damages and an injunction rest on different footing once a nuisance is found. Compensatory damages, measured by the character and extent of the injury to the plaintiff's property interest, are always recoverable.4 An injunction is different. Its availability depends on whether the remedy is appropriate under a comparative appraisal of the § 936 factors,5 and a second balancing test must follow whenever it is sought.6
At the liability stage, the question is whether the plaintiff must bear more of the defendant's activity than a neighbor should have to tolerate. A factory owner may behave quite reasonably and still cause an interference that is 'unreasonable' in that sense, because it exceeds what the plaintiffs should have to tolerate under the circumstances.7 The defendant's social value counts here in the defendant's favor, so a useful enterprise gets more leeway to impose costs on its neighbors. But value is not decisive, and the focus remains on the impact on the plaintiff.8 If value were decisive, any sufficiently productive use of land could burden the people next door without compensating them.
The remedy stage looks forward. Because a nuisance often continues through trial, the court may order damages for all past and future losses and let the activity go on, or order damages for past losses and enjoin the activity thereafter.9 At this stage the costs and benefits of the defendant's conduct, including what the activity is worth to the community, become a central consideration.10 Courts once issued injunctions as a matter of course when they found a nuisance. They do so less often today, because a short-term economic view may outweigh the interests of the injured owner, and the second balancing is what permits that departure.11
That balancing also makes the two remedies diverge. To get an injunction, the plaintiff must show that the harm to her actually outweighs the utility of the defendant's conduct; for damages, she probably need not make that showing so long as the conduct is unreasonable.12 A court that declines to enjoin can therefore still make the defendant pay for the harm it causes. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., which a later section takes up in full, the court found a nuisance and allowed damages but denied an injunction,13 unwilling to enjoin an operation of such immediate financial importance to the community.14 The same evidence of utility thus plays a supporting role at liability and a central one at remedy.
Many neighbor disputes never reach the remedy stage. Virtually any use of land affects the parcel next door, and if every such effect were a nuisance, compatible land ownership could never exist.15 That is why only a substantial and unreasonable interference is actionable, and why modestly incompatible uses must 'live and let live.'16
A claim that clears the threshold meets both stages. In Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co. the court looked past the harm already done. Taking the evidence in the plaintiffs' favor, it inferred that the refinery meant to keep operating as it had, casting noxious gases and odors onto the plaintiffs' nine acres with such frequency and density as to inflict irreparable injury on their use and enjoyment of their home and other land.17 That inference, together with proof of an abatable private nuisance, entitled the plaintiffs to the injunctive relief needed to stop the nuisance from continuing.18 The injunction rested on a showing about what would happen next, and not only on what had already happened. The barbecue dispute fails at the first stage and ends there, while the refinery's fumes pass it and open both remedial questions.
A fact pattern that stresses the defendant's economic importance usually points to the remedy stage, where that importance can defeat or reshape an injunction without defeating the plaintiff's damages.
Remedial Outcomes
The Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies the method for choosing among remedies: the court compares the probable consequences of granting an injunction with the probable consequences of the alternative remedies if they were employed instead.20 A nuisance suit offers four outcomes to compare. Because the nuisance is often still continuing at trial, the choice carries unusual weight, since the court decides what the defendant owes for past harm and also whether the activity continues tomorrow, and on whose terms.21 Each outcome can be described by asking who ends up limiting whom and who pays whom:
- If the court finds no nuisance, it denies all relief and the defendant's activity continues, so the defendant has in practical effect enjoined the plaintiff: almost every activity interferes a little with its neighbors, and the plaintiff must live with that interference.22
- If the court finds a nuisance and enjoins it, the defendant pays for past losses and must stop, so the plaintiff in effect enjoins the defendant.23
- If the court finds a nuisance but awards damages in lieu of an injunction, the activity goes on and the defendant compensates the plaintiff.24
- If the court enjoins the activity but makes the plaintiff pay the defendant's cost of stopping, the plaintiff compensates the defendant.25
The first two outcomes protect the entitlement with a property rule. The court fixes an absolute entitlement in one party, either the defendant's right to carry on the activity or the plaintiff's right to be free from the harm, and the parties remain free to bargain to give up their rights.26 Private bargaining therefore sets the price. Under an injunction the plaintiff holds the entitlement, so the plaintiff decides whether the nuisance continues and at what price.
The last two outcomes protect the entitlement with a liability rule. One party may interfere with the other's interest so long as it pays an amount determined by a court rather than by private bargaining.27 Under outcome three the defendant decides: the activity goes on only if its benefit to the defendant exceeds the damages awarded, and otherwise the defendant stops rather than pay.28 Outcome four reverses the roles. The plaintiffs decide whether ending the nuisance is worth the defendant's cost of stopping, and if it is not, they live with it.29 In both, the court names the price and the party who must pay makes the choice.
Which outcome a court prefers depends heavily on whether the parties can realistically bargain. Transaction costs are the expense and difficulty of reaching and enforcing a deal. Where they are low, an injunction works well, because the parties can bargain to a price that reflects what each side values.30 Where they are high, court-set damages are a second-best solution that still makes the defendant bear the cost of its conduct.31
Two decisions mark the contrast. In Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz the court enjoined the defendants' air conditioning unit as a nuisance, which protected the neighbors with a property rule. With only a few parties on each side, the injunction still left room to negotiate over whether it would be enforced. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. the neighbors of a cement plant established a nuisance, but the plant represented an investment of close to $45 million and had caused permanent damage to the plaintiffs' property of only $185,000, a figure disputed in later academic work. An injunction would have required the plant to pay potentially vast sums, because each neighbor could demand holdout value, and strategic holdouts and the resulting transaction costs might even have kept the plant from obtaining consent from every neighbor.32 A holdout is an owner who demands far more than the harm suffered because the deal fails without his signature. The court therefore priced the harm itself and protected the neighbors with a liability rule.
Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co. illustrates outcome four. A residential developer built near a cattle feedlot that was already operating, and the feedlot's smells and flies troubled owners of the developed properties. The court enjoined the feedlot but required the developer to indemnify the operator for the reasonable cost of moving or shutting down. That adjustment of the equities is a new approach, the reverse of Boomer, and it adds to the court's repertoire of remedies.33 Before Spur, courts had recognized the other three outcomes.34 Later sections develop damages in lieu of an injunction through Boomer and the compensated injunction through Spur, including the effect of the plaintiff's arrival after the nuisance began.
A stem in which the defendant keeps operating after a nuisance finding and pays its neighbors describes outcome three, and one in which the newcomer pays the established operator describes outcome four. In either case, ask who holds the decision and who sets the price.