Concept
Strict or Negligence?
Claims against manufacturers and other defendants arising out of the manufacture and distribution of products, and defenses to such claims
Strict or Negligence?
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes a seller liable for a defective, unreasonably dangerous product although the seller has exercised all possible care in preparing and selling it.1 Read at face value, that clause promises liability without fault for every defective product. The promise holds in full for only one kind of defect. In most states today, only manufacturing defect cases meet the definition of liability without fault, and design and warning claims are judged by standards that look much like negligence.2 Which standard applies also varies by state, so the first move in any products problem is to identify the defect alleged and the version of the law that governs it.
Manufacturing defects are the strict core of the field. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(a) deems a product defective in manufacture "when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product."3 The test works because the manufacturer supplies its own benchmark. A court compares the unit that injured the plaintiff with the design the manufacturer meant to build, and the comparison never asks what the manufacturer should have done differently.4 Care therefore gives no defense: even the most careful supplier is liable under § 402A for a stone in a can of peas, an air bubble in a tire, or a crossed wire in the electrical system of a punch press.5
The strict rule fits this category because of what the user expects. One commentary reports that the Third Restatement's explicitly strict manufacturing-defect standard drew no controversy in the American Law Institute debates or in nearly two decades of congressional debate over products bills. It calls strict liability here both logical and fair, given the special significance of the user's expectation interests in manufacturing flaw cases.6 The Third Restatement frames the rule in the strict liability manner of contract law, while an older formulation grounds it in tort. That older rule "does not rest upon contractual obligations,"7 but on the principle that delivering an article is wrong when it lacks the qualities the manufacturer represented, the lack cannot readily be detected by the consumer, and the article is therefore not safe for the purposes for which consumers ordinarily use it.8 The two framings differ in ancestry, but each looks to the article delivered rather than to the manufacturer's conduct.
Design and warning claims have no such benchmark. Every unit in a defectively designed line matches its blueprint, so the plaintiff's own standard "obviously is not appropriate, because it is never breached," and the court must find its standard elsewhere. Because no design is risk-free, an injury alone cannot show a defect.9 Under the risk-utility test, the jury decides whether the manufacturer made a reasonable trade-off between risk and the expense of preventing it, a Hand-formula assessment very close to the reasonable-person standard of negligence law.10 Only under the consumer contemplation test, which looks at the nature of the product sold and not at the defendant's design conduct, can design liability arguably remain strict.11 For years it was an open secret that most courts, while calling design and warning claims strict, applied principles that looked remarkably like negligence and based defect findings on balance, reasonableness, and foreseeability.12
Four overlapping developments moved the field back toward fault between the 1970s and the 1990s:13
- The duty to warn of unknowable dangers declined, which revived foreseeability of risk as a requirement.
- The two strict liability tests, the Wade-Keeton test and the consumer expectations test, declined.
- A state-of-the-art defense rose.
- The Third Restatement of Torts on products liability was promulgated.
Each development rested on the conviction that actors, manufacturers included, should not be held accountable for risks they cannot control, which is the principle of fault that underlies negligence law.14 The shift from consumer expectations to risk-utility balancing hastened the decline of "strict" liability under § 402A, because cost-benefit analysis simply circled back to negligence.15 The unknowable-risk question returns in the later section on the state-of-the-art defense.
The Third Restatement turns that drift into black-letter law. Its basic liability standards sit in Topic 1 of its first chapter, §§ 1–4.16 It keeps liability for manufacturing defects truly strict but abandons any pretense of strict responsibility for design and warning defects, which it grounds explicitly in negligence.17 Section 2 sorts claims into three categories, each with its own test.18 A product has a manufacturing defect when it departs from its intended design. It is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm could have been reduced or avoided by a reasonable alternative design whose omission leaves the product not reasonably safe.19 It is defective for want of instructions or warnings when reasonable ones could have avoided the foreseeable risks.20 The comments confirm the substance. The design comparison is made from the viewpoint of a reasonable person, the standard used in negligence, and comment i adopts a reasonableness test for warnings that parallels it.21 The alternative-design requirement gives a design claim something to measure the product against besides the injury itself, much as the blueprint does for a manufacturing flaw.
Two further choices follow from that structure. Consumer expectations still deserve respect in design and warning claims, but they lose their status as the test of liability under § 402A and become one factor in the balancing calculus.22 The Third Restatement also takes the position that a single claim for injury from a product defect should replace the separate negligence, warranty, and strict liability claims that courts have recognized, so that liability exists only if § 2's standard is met, whatever theory the plaintiff pleads.23 One standard casebook sequence runs from the early cases of Winterbottom v. Wright, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., and Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, through the Restatements, to the categories of product defect.24
States have not followed the Third Restatement uniformly, so a student cannot assume it states the local rule. Most states adopted strict products liability by judicially "adopting" § 402A, and many have since altered their approaches.25 Because modern doctrine in most states was built squarely on § 402A, courts in most states have so far declined to adopt the Third Restatement's formulations, a result one leading treatise attributes to precedent rather than to any compelling substantive reason.26 South Carolina accepted the Third Restatement in Branham v. Ford Motor Co. and held that the exclusive test in a design case is risk-utility with a feasible alternative design, while Pennsylvania in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc. kept its preference for the Second Restatement.27 Many other courts continue to use consumer expectations in place of risk-utility or alongside it, and § 402A remains the law in a fair number of states, often embellished with local variations.28
The regime can decide a case on identical facts. Suppose a rider is hurt when a dirt bike's shock absorber fails in certain circumstances and no redesign could remove the risk. Where consumer expectations governs, the bike may be defective because riders expect it to be safer than it proved, even though no feasible safer design exists.29 Under the Third Restatement the same rider loses, because a design plaintiff must establish that a reasonable alternative design was available.30
Statutes can settle the question before any Restatement is consulted. Indiana's statute restates the § 402A rule, including its application although the seller used all reasonable care and although the user bought from no one in privity. In 1996 Indiana added a proviso requiring a plaintiff who alleges a design defect or a failure to warn to establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care in designing the product or in providing the warnings.31 The statute still defines a defective condition in consumer-contemplation terms, as one "not contemplated by reasonable persons among those considered expected users or consumers." The result is a hybrid, with a care showing layered over the older vocabulary.32 Washington's reform statute makes a manufacturer liable when its negligence caused harm because the product was not reasonably safe as designed or for want of adequate warnings. North Carolina's statute rejects strict products liability in tort and imposes design liability only on a manufacturer that acted unreasonably in designing or formulating the product.33 Several statutes define design defectiveness in classic risk-utility language, which is simply Judge Learned Hand's negligence formula from Carroll Towing applied to product design.34 Some states go further and make a products statute the exclusive remedy, so that a plaintiff sues under the statute and cannot assert common law claims of negligence, breach of implied warranty, or other product liability theories.35
The strict label still matters in two places, even where the standards converge. The first is the downstream seller. In one treatise example, a defective computer mouse injures its user, and neither the manufacturer nor the retailer did anything negligent. Both are nonetheless liable, because it is enough under § 402A that the seller sold a defective product, and the plaintiff need not show that the defect resulted from negligence.36 The second is the number of claims. Many courts will continue to let plaintiffs try negligence, warranty, and strict liability theories at once, even though the Third Restatement would collapse them into a single claim.37 Strict products liability should not be confused with strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, a separate doctrine that the Second Restatement frames as a set of factors, such as the high risk the activity creates, rather than as fixed elements.38
The second and third steps do the most work, because they fix the regime before any test is applied. A problem that names no regime calls for stating the assumption you are making and then showing how the result would change under the other major approach.