Concept
Trespassing Livestock
Strict liability for harm done by animals
Trespassing Livestock
The animal rules in the preceding sections ask what kind of animal did the harm and what its keeper knew about it. Trespass sets both questions aside. The Restatement (Second) opens its rule for an ordinary domestic animal, one the keeper has no reason to know is abnormally dangerous, with the words “Except for animal trespass,” and then makes the keeper liable only if he intentionally causes the harm or is negligent in failing to prevent it.1 Livestock that invade a neighbor’s land are the excepted case, and a rule of their own governs them.
The exception follows from where the harm comes from. A cow that eats a neighbor’s crop is doing what cows do; the wrong is the entry onto land that belongs to someone else. Whether this particular cow was gentle, and whether its keeper suspected otherwise, drops out of the analysis. The question becomes who was responsible for keeping the animal where it belonged.
The subsections below follow the claim in three steps: the common law rule and its exceptions, the fencing statutes that reversed that rule in many states, and the public highway, where no land is invaded and fault rules return. Whether the plaintiff’s own carelessness affects recovery is a separate question for the next section, though it helps to know that most states have adopted comparative negligence, which reduces damages by the plaintiff’s percentage of fault.2 On an exam, the first screen is whether the animal intruded onto land. If it did, this rule applies. If the harm happened elsewhere, the analysis returns to the wild, abnormally dangerous, and ordinary domestic categories.
The Common Law Rule
In most jurisdictions, the keeper of any animal, domesticated or not, is strictly liable for physical harm the animal does by trespassing on another’s land.3 Statements of the older common law make the same point from the other direction: the owner of any animal, wild or domestic but not a household pet, answered for reasonably foreseeable damage done while the animal trespassed.4 Strictness has two consequences here. The keeper’s care is no defense, and neither the animal’s temperament nor the keeper’s knowledge of it matters. In Lee v. Riley, the defendant’s mare strayed through a gap in his fence onto the plaintiff’s land and kicked the plaintiff’s horse. The defendant was held liable for cattle-trespass, and the court called the long argument over whether he knew the mare was ferocious beside the mark, however relevant it would have been in an action on scienter.5
The strictness is a legacy of the old forms of action. The writ of trespass carried liability without fault.6 From the early thirteenth century it reached a keeper who intentionally put cattle on another’s land, and in 1353 it was extended to beasts that had merely escaped.7 The extension filled a gap in the law, and because it came before the action on the case had developed, courts filed it under trespass even though the invasion was indirect.8 Strictness came with the label and survived after the action on the case became available.9
The rule also allocates a cost. It puts the economic burden on cattle owners to protect crop-growers, perhaps by building fences to keep the cattle in.10
The rule reaches barnyard animals generally, but not household pets.11 Owners of dogs and cats are not liable for their trespasses absent negligence, unless a statute or ordinance imposes strict liability.12 One explanation is that dogs and cats are very hard to confine, and community custom has long let them roam, so the keeping of household pets is sanctioned by general usage.13 The exception removes only the strictness. A keeper may still be liable for negligently or intentionally causing a dog or cat to enter the land,14 so a neighbor’s terrier that digs up a flower bed leaves the gardener to prove fault. The master who sends a pack of hounds across the plaintiff’s farm on a chase has caused the entry intentionally (see Pegg v. Gray). One court went further and applied the trespass rule itself to a pack of dogs engaged in fox hunting, in Baker v. Howard County Hunt.15
A second exception covers animals that stray from a public highway on which they were lawfully being driven. Their keeper is not strictly liable for trespasses on property adjoining the road.16 Tillett v. Ward is the early authority for this well-established exception.17 Courts explained it as a servitude borne by the owners of land adjoining the highway, and it did not apply to other lands. In Wood v. Snider, cattle strayed from the highway across A’s land and onto B’s, and B could invoke strict liability even though A could not.18 The motorist hurt by livestock on the road is a different problem, taken up below.
The harm the rule reaches has widened. The Second Restatement imposed strict liability for the trespass but not for personal injuries the trespassing animals cause.19 The Third Restatement extends liability, for animals other than dogs and cats, to physical injury that is characteristic of the intrusion, which may include personal injury.20 It also prefers the word “intrusion” to “trespass,” because an animal cannot form the intent that trespass suggests.21 Accounts of the older common law differ, with some including personal injury and some limiting strict liability to property harm.22 An answer should therefore present the Second Restatement’s property-focused approach first and the Third’s broader rule as the modern development.
Proximate cause draws the line for personal injury. In Troth v. Wills, a cow trespassing in a garden attacked the plaintiff who was trying to drive it out, and the keeper was held liable, because a cow disturbed while feeding is disposed to react that way and the reaction was directly tied to the original trespass. Nixon v. Harris reached the same result. In Hollenbeck v. Johnson, a cow wandered into the plaintiff’s barn and broke through a rotten spot in the floor, and the plaintiff, entering the barn later in the dark, fell into the hole. The court found no proximate cause. The cases differ in whose conduct produced the injury: the Troth cow did the harm itself in the course of the intrusion, while the Hollenbeck cow only supplied the occasion for a hazard created by the rotten floor and the dark.
Step three is the one most easily missed, because a stem that mentions a road invites the conclusion that strict liability is gone. The exception turns on the lawful drive and on which land was invaded, and strays that reach land beyond the roadside parcels restore the strict rule.
Fencing Statutes
At common law the livestock owner had to keep the animals on his own land, and one whose animals left it answered in trespass.24 Statutes reallocated that job, and their labels name the direction the fence faces. A fencing-out statute puts the duty on the landowner who wants animals excluded, and once he builds the required fence, the animals’ owner is strictly liable for later trespasses. A fencing-in statute puts the duty on the animals’ owner, and if he built the required fence, he is relieved of strict liability.25 Each statute rewards whichever party built the fence it demands, so every problem reduces to asking who had to build a fence and whether that party did.
The first departures from the common law came where grazing dominated. Early courts in the western states, where cattle customarily grazed at large on open range, rejected the common law rule as unsuited to local conditions and custom. Delaney v. Errickson and Beinhorn v. Griswold are leading authority that, under state reception statutes, English common law applies only when it suits the local context.26 Many states, especially in the west, then substantially reversed the common law rule by statute,27 and the rule has changed in some states where ranching is prevalent.28
Fencing-out statutes allow a landowner to recover for harm done by trespassing cattle only if he first erected a fence that met the statutory standards.29 The required act belongs to the landowner, and it is a precondition to the claim. Once a lawful fence exists and livestock trespass within it, the animals’ owner is strictly liable for the damage.30 In Hart v. Meredith, a fencing-out statute made the owner of a bull strictly liable when the bull broke through the plaintiff’s fence and bred the plaintiff’s cows.
What remains for an unfenced landowner is narrow. One account leaves the rancher liable for intentionally driving cattle onto the land of others, but not strictly liable and not liable for ordinary negligence.31 A good answer states that the strict claim fails for want of the fence and then asks what the local statute leaves open.
Fencing-in statutes arrived as areas became more settled and fencing more practical. Legislatures partly returned to the common law rule by making ranchers liable for livestock trespasses unless they could show they had built an adequate fence to contain the animals.32 The fence now protects the keeper. If livestock escape through the owner’s faulty fence, the owner is liable for the resulting damage, but if the fence is in good shape, the owner is generally not liable absent negligence.33 A keeper whose rotted fence lets heifers into a neighbor’s garden is therefore strictly liable, while a keeper whose sound fence was somehow breached answers only if the plaintiff can point to facts showing fault. Evidence of negligence includes the following:34
- a gate left open;
- a fence improperly constructed or maintained;
- knowledge that the animals were in heat, which called for a stronger enclosure or a closer watch;
- knowledge that the animals were outside their enclosure, followed by no attempt to return them.
The two statutes are mirror images that give the same fencing job to opposite parties. Fencing out gives the landowner the strict rule in exchange for building a fence, and fencing in gives the keeper relief from the strict rule in exchange for building one. That symmetry is why the labels are easy to reverse, and why each should be defined by the act it demands.
Because land use differs from place to place, the rule often differs within a state. Current statutes frequently provide for open range and free grazing, without liability, where cattle ranching is dominant, but adopt a different rule for other localities or permit a kind of local option.35 Contracts or easements assigning grazing rights, and informal local custom, also shape the result.36 Federal grazing land falls outside the state pattern: much public land managed by the federal government is leased or allotted for grazing, and the government’s rights against trespassing graziers do not depend on the state rules.37 How these rules bear on a motorist who strikes livestock on a public road is taken up next.
The first step does the most work, because reversing the labels at the second or third step flips the result and hands strict liability to the wrong party.
Livestock on Highways
A motorist who collides with a cow on a public highway has no claim for trespass to land, because no land was invaded, and so the strict liability that attaches to trespassing livestock is unavailable.39 In most instances the person responsible for an animal that strays onto the highway is liable for negligence and only for negligence.40 The Third Restatement says the same of owners and possessors whose livestock stray onto a public highway and contribute to an accident.41 The baseline is the rule for an ordinary domestic animal. The keeper answers for the harm only if he intentionally causes it or is negligent in failing to prevent it,42 and a highway collision ordinarily falls under the second ground.43
The difference follows from what made the trespass rule strict. Strict liability for wandering cattle came with the writ of trespass, and the modern rule keeps the economic burden of fencing animals in on the keeper for the benefit of the landowners whose property they enter.44 A motorist on a public road is not a landowner whose property was invaded, and once the invasion is gone nothing remains to justify departing from the fault baseline. The same herd that breaks through a fence into a neighbor’s cornfield and then drifts onto the county road therefore produces strict liability for the crop damage and only a negligence claim for the car it meets on the pavement. The highway rule also sits beside the exception for livestock lawfully driven along a road: that exception shields the keeper from strict liability for strays onto the land adjoining the road, and the collision rule shields him from strict liability to the people on the road itself.45
How much negligence liability survives depends on the jurisdiction’s attitude toward open range. Some courts impose negligence liability for loose animals even when the owner is entitled to graze them on open range.46 Others hold that open-range rules, perhaps combined with a scheme of statutory regulation, relieve the owner of any duty of reasonable care to keep livestock off the roads, as in Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc.47 The logic follows from local custom. Where a community lets cattle graze at large, a duty to keep them off every road would amount to a duty to fence the range, which is the burden open-range law avoids. A smaller group of courts holds that the owner owes those on the highway no duty at all, and so is not liable even for negligence, as in Douglass v. Dolan.48 In most fence-in jurisdictions, the animal’s owner must be shown to have been negligent.49
Where negligence governs, the motorist must prove it, and the useful facts are those that show the owner failed to keep the animal in. Evidence of negligence includes a gate left open, a fence improperly constructed or maintained, knowledge that the animals were in heat and needed a stronger enclosure or a closer watch, and knowledge that the animals were outside their enclosure followed by no attempt to return them.50 Hastings v. Sauve illustrates the point: a motorist who collided with a cow on a public road could recover if the owner had negligently maintained the fence.
A plaintiff who lacks that kind of evidence loses. In Fisel v. Wynns, a pickup truck hit a black cow in a dark road at midnight, and Florida’s fencing-in statute required the plaintiff to show the owner’s intent or negligence. The owner had secured his gate the day before, and he did not know how it came open, so the court approved summary judgment for him. The plaintiff had proved that the cow escaped, which is a different showing from proving that the owner failed to use care. The Montana court in Larson-Murphy treated comparable facts differently, reversing summary judgment for the owners and sending the case to a jury.
Underneath those results is a practical problem: the motorist usually cannot learn how the animal got out, and the owner is the one person who can. Res ipsa loquitur is a procedural technique that can shift the burden of proof in a tort case, and some fence-in jurisdictions apply it in livestock and automobile collisions.51 Where it applies, the owner’s control of the animal and the motorist’s ignorance of how it escaped let the motorist require the owner to prove that he was not negligent. Washington applied the doctrine in Curtis v. Lein and Nebraska in Roberts v. Weber & Sons, Co., while Florida refused in Fisel. A court that refuses is in effect doubting the doctrine’s premise, since an animal can leave an enclosure by a route that involves no carelessness by the owner, such as a gate opened by someone else.
An exam stem about a cow on a highway invites strict liability, because the animal is livestock and the trespass rule has just been taught. The first screen is whether any land was invaded. If the harm occurred on the road, the claim is negligence, and the analysis moves to the evidence of how the animal escaped, then to whether the jurisdiction narrows the owner’s duty for open range, and finally to whether it lets the plaintiff use res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden.