Concept
Classifying the Animal
Strict liability for harm done by animals
Strict Liability for Animals
Classifying the Animal
Every claim for harm done by an animal begins with a sort, because the category the animal falls into fixes what the plaintiff must prove. The possessor of a wild animal is liable for harm the animal does even though he used the utmost care to confine it or otherwise prevent the harm.1 The possessor of a domestic animal is liable on the same no-fault terms only if he knows or has reason to know that the animal has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class.2 Without that knowledge, and except for animal trespass, he is liable only if he intentionally causes the animal to do the harm3 or is negligent in failing to prevent it.4 Three working categories result: wild animals, domestic animals known to be abnormally dangerous, and ordinary domestic animals. Classification as wild or domestic is the first sort, and what the possessor knows then divides the domestic group, as later sections show.
The first line follows custom because the risks differ in kind. Keeping a wild animal involves an unusual danger seldom matched by similar activity of one's neighbors, while large dogs are a common risk.5 The Restatement (Second) of Torts tracks that difference through community practice, and its words at the time and in the place in which the animal is kept make the measure local and current.
Wild Animals
The Restatement defines a wild animal as one that is not by custom devoted to the service of mankind at the time and in the place in which it is kept.6 Each phrase narrows the inquiry. Custom makes the settled practice of the community the measure, so the court asks what people there do with that class of animal and not how one animal behaves. Service of mankind names the practice that counts, which is the ordinary working relationship between people and the animals they keep. At the time and in the place fixes when and where custom is measured, so one species can be wild in one setting and domestic in another. An animal outside the community's ordinary service is wild, and its possessor faces strict liability.
Tigers are the paradigm of a wild animal. In Irvine v. Rare Feline Breeding Center, Inc. a breeding facility kept tigers, and the court treated them as wild animals. A tiger is not by custom devoted to service where it is kept, and keeping one brings an unusual danger seldom matched by similar activity of one's neighbors.7 That unshared quality explains why the definition looks to custom: the keeper of an animal outside the community's ordinary service is the person who created the unusual risk.
Because the test asks about the class of animal, training and affection cannot move an animal across the line. A circus elephant that has performed on command for twenty years still belongs to a class that custom does not devote to service in the community where it is kept, so it remains wild. Gentleness is a fact about one animal, and the test looks at the class.
How dangerous an animal is does not decide the category either. In Smith v. Jalbert a zebra kept in Massachusetts was classed as wild, and its keeper was held strictly liable for the harm it did.8 An animal is not wild merely because it is excessively dangerous, and it is not domestic merely because it is generally safe; the classification follows whether the community customarily devotes the animal's class to service.
Place and time can change the answer for a single species, and elephants are the standard illustration. In Maung Kyaw Dun v. Ma Kyin the court recognized that an elephant may be domestic where local custom devotes elephants to service, as in Upper Burma. In Filburn v. People's Palace & Aquarium Co. an elephant kept in England was classed as wild, because English custom does not devote elephants to service.9 The animal is the same in both places, and only the custom where it is kept differs. The words at the time work the same way: if community practice brings a class into ordinary service, the label follows the practice.
Bar-exam stems usually describe the animal in terms that invite the wrong question. The animal is gentle, trained, long at home with the family, or beloved by its keeper, and the instinct is to call it domestic. Ask instead whether the community where the animal is kept customarily devotes animals of that class to service. If it does not, the animal is wild.
Domestic Animals
The Restatement defines a domestic animal as one that is by custom devoted to the service of mankind at the time and in the place in which it is kept.11 The definition mirrors the wild-animal definition and turns on the same variable, so the court again asks what the community customarily does with animals of that class. Dogs, horses, and cattle are the familiar examples. The phrases at the time and in the place keep the inquiry local and current.
Because the definition looks at the class, aggression does not push an animal out of the domestic category. A bull that charges and a stallion that kicks are dangerous animals, yet cattle and horses are by custom devoted to the service of mankind, so each is domestic.
Keeping a creature as a household pet does not make it domestic. In Whitefield v. Stewart the animal was a pet woolly monkey, and the court described it as a tamed wild animal. Monkeys are not by custom devoted to the service of mankind, so the household setting left the classification where it was. Being a pet is a fact about one keeper and one animal, while being domestic is a fact about what the community customarily does with a whole class of animals. Taming cannot make a wild animal domestic, and aggressiveness cannot make a domestic animal wild.
The label sorts risks by how common they are. A great many more people are bitten by dogs than by tigers, yet dog-bite victims have usually had to prove negligence to recover, because a large dog is a common risk and a tiger is an unusual one.12 Cattle follow the same pattern. A motorist injured in colliding with a cow has no trespass-to-land claim and so no strict liability claim, and in most instances the person responsible for an animal that strays onto the highway is liable for negligence and only for negligence.13 Later sections take up trespassing livestock and highway cases in detail.
A domestic animal reaches strict liability only through the keeper's knowledge. The possessor who knows or has reason to know of dangerous propensities abnormal to the animal's class is liable even though he exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.14 A wild animal reaches strict liability through classification alone.