Concept
The Section 520 Factors
Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
The Section 520 Factors
Franklin Pest Control sprays an apartment building with Vikane, a toxic chemical that kills bugs and also harms people, and its employee Ciccone first checks carefully that the fumes cannot spread through the party wall into the building next door.1 If the gas reaches a neighbor anyway, Franklin's care does not decide whether it is strictly liable, because strict liability can attach to an activity carried on with all reasonable care.2 The test comes from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, which directs a court deciding whether an activity is abnormally dangerous to consider six factors:3
- (a) a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land, or chattels of others;
- (b) the likelihood that the harm that results will be great;
- (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
- (d) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
- (e) the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
- (f) the extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
The judge, not the jury, weighs these factors. Whether to impose strict liability is a policy decision about the duty owed in carrying on the activity, so a jury that decided it would be making law and not applying it. The court must still look closely at the facts of the operation, such as how toxic Vikane is, how quickly it spreads, whether it is easily detected, and what other means of fumigation exist.4
The factors work as a group, and no single one is a gate. As Langan v. Valicopters, Inc. put it, the interplay among the factors makes it impossible to reduce abnormally dangerous activities to an exact definition, and the court added that not every factor must weigh equally in favor of strict liability.5 Arlington Forest Assoc. v. Exxon Corp. drew the working rule: because the factors are interrelated, a court considers them as a whole and gives each the weight the evidence warrants.6 Beneath all six lies one question, whether the risk is so unusual, because of its magnitude or the circumstances surrounding it, that liability should follow even though the defendant used all reasonable care.7
A list fits the doctrine because negligence already does most of the work. When an activity can be performed safely with ordinary care, a negligence action both remedies the injury and deters carelessness, and strict liability would add cost without adding safety, since the actor already has every reason to take the precautions that work.8 Strict liability is reserved for selected uncommon and extraordinarily dangerous activities for which negligence is an inadequate deterrent or remedy.9
This chapter sorts the six factors into three groups. Factors (a) through (c) measure how dangerous the activity is. Factors (d) and (e) measure how unusual it is. Factor (f) is the counterweight, setting the activity's value against its dangers. The groups carry unequal weight in decided cases: courts have found the possibility of eliminating danger through reasonable care most significant, have seldom treated commonness as influential, and have given the value of the activity least weight, with some ruling it irrelevant.10 Whichever Restatement a court follows, it will probably decide cases almost entirely on the two factors the Third Restatement emphasizes, the risk that reasonable care cannot eliminate and common usage.11
The label has consequences beyond the operator's own liability. The Restatement keeps vicarious liability for those who hire independent contractors in eight situations, and work involving abnormally dangerous activities is one of them.12 The contours of these exceptions vary among jurisdictions,13 and the Third Restatement hinges direct liability for work entrusted to an independent contractor on retained control.14 The six subsections that follow take the factors in the Restatement's order.
High Degree of Risk
Factor (a) asks whether the activity creates a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land, or chattels of others.15 “High degree of risk” makes this a question of probability: how likely is it that the activity will injure someone? “Some harm” leaves the type of injury open, since harm to people, land, or goods will do. How serious the harm would be belongs to factor (b), and keeping the two questions apart stops a frightening description of disaster from standing in for evidence that disaster is likely.
Probability comes first because strict liability is reserved for activities where negligence cannot do the job, and negligence does the job when ordinary care keeps the chance of harm low.16 The factor therefore asks whether the activity, as the defendant actually carried it on, generates an unusual chance of harm to others.
Crop dusting in Langan shows the factor met. The court relied on a study of the industry reporting that the drift of sprayed chemicals is virtually unpredictable, because it depends on three uncertain and uncontrollable factors: the size of the dust or spray particles, the air disturbances the aircraft creates, and natural atmospheric forces.17 A careful pilot still cannot control where the chemical lands, so the chance of harm to neighbors comes with the activity itself. Volatile agents such as nitroglycerine or gasoline show the same feature in another form, since they have an unusual tendency to cause an accident.18
Yommer v. McKenzie shows that the factor follows how the defendant ran the operation and not the label on the business. The court conceded that operating a gasoline station does not of itself involve a high degree of risk of harm to others, but it held that placing a large underground gasoline tank close to a family's residence and well did involve such a risk.19 An answer under this factor should therefore describe the tank's size, its distance from people and water, and the other facts that raise or lower the chance of harm, and should not evaluate the generic business.
Because factor (a) measures probability and factor (b) measures magnitude, an answer should address them separately.
Likelihood of Great Harm
Factor (b) asks about the likelihood that the harm that results from the activity will be great.22 Where factor (a) asks whether harm is likely, factor (b) asks how bad the harm is likely to be: how many people it can reach, how seriously, and how much property it can destroy. The inquiry looks at what the activity can do when it goes wrong, and the injury this plaintiff suffered is only one piece of evidence on that question.
Large potential harm does not carry a claim by itself. Pseudomonomethane has the potential for very widespread harm if it gets into the water supply, yet it has no unusual tendency to cause an accident, so the likelihood of an accident from storing it is no higher than from storing molasses, water, or anything else, which argues against strict liability.23 The factors are interrelated, and a court weighs them together.24 The size of the threat therefore matters in combination with how likely the activity is to produce an accident.
The tank-car case, Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., shows how courts take the measure of scale. Acrylonitrile is flammable at 30 degrees Fahrenheit or above, highly toxic, and possibly carcinogenic, and when fluid was seen gushing from a broken lid on the bottom outlet of a car, the authorities feared that all 20,000 gallons had leaked and ordered nearby homes evacuated; only about a quarter had.25 Judge Posner asked what would have happened had all 20,000 gallons spilled, and whether the chance of such a spill, even if everyone were careful, justified giving the shipper an incentive to explore alternative routes. He answered that the argument overlooks the fact that the railroad network is a hub-and-spoke system.26 The scale of the threat raised the question without settling it.
Ordinary construction work shows the other side. A falling object can cause serious harm, but construction does not pose the extreme risk of an explosion or a dam collapse, which may injure many people or wipe out an entire community, and most of its risks can be reduced to a minimum by precautions during the work.27
On an exam, treat factor (b) as its own step. Describe how severe and widespread the harm would be if the risk materialized, then tie that description to the probability analysis under factor (a).
Risk Reasonable Care Cannot Eliminate
Factor (c) asks about the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care.29 Read literally, the phrase seems to cover any activity that keeps some risk after precautions, and no activity is free of risk. Arlington Forest rejected that reading. The factor does not require that due care eliminate all risk, since absolute safety is not required; it asks whether due care can reduce the risk to a point where the likelihood of harm is no longer high.30
Courts have found this question more significant than any other factor on the list,31 and the reason lies in what strict liability adds to negligence. When due care can hold the risk down, the accidents that still happen trace to lapses in care, and the threat of negligence liability adequately deters those lapses when they can be shown in court.32 Strict liability would then raise the defendant's costs without making anyone safer, because the defendant already has every reason to take precautions that cost less than liability.33 The picture changes when a serious risk survives all reasonable care. Negligence then gives the actor no reason to consider relocating the activity, substituting a less hazardous method, or reducing its scale, and strict liability supplies that reason.34
Arlington Forest drew support from Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, which refused strict liability for disposing of the highly toxic chemical pentaborane, chiefly because the disposal could have been conducted safely had reasonable precautions been taken.35 The tank-car case reaches the same result for shipping a hazardous chemical. It was easy to see how the leak could have been prevented at reasonable cost by greater care on the part of those who handled the car, and hard to see how it could have been prevented at reasonable cost by a change in the activity of transporting the chemical, so the court, speaking through Judge Posner, found the case not apt for strict liability.36 A manufacturer, moreover, does not engage in an abnormally dangerous activity merely because its product becomes dangerous when handled or used after it leaves the premises, even if the danger is foreseeable.37
Blasting sits on the other side of the line. Explosives are dangerous even when handled carefully, so strict liability gives blasters a reason to choose the site with care and to consider safer substitutes such as a wrecking ball.38 Fumigation with poisonous gas, the activity in Luthringer v. Moore, transporting gasoline, the activity in Siegler v. Kuhlman, and storing explosive chemicals share the feature that an unusual risk of accident remains despite due care.39 Guille v. Swan is the older illustration: a balloonist who could not steer to a chosen landing place came down in a New York City vegetable garden, and the crowd that rushed to help him trampled the crops.40 However careful the balloonist, he could not choose where he came down. Explosions also raise a proof problem, because the more dangerous and violent an activity, the more likely it is to destroy the evidence a plaintiff would need to show negligence, and strict liability reduces information and error costs where fault is hardest to prove.41
Step two does the real work. An answer that observes only that an accident occurred has not asked what care would have done, and that question separates the leaking tank car from the exploding gasoline truck. Even so, factor (c) is one factor among six. When reasonable care cannot eliminate a substantial risk of grave physical injury, strict liability will probably apply even though the activity is socially valuable and conducted conscientiously, and the defendant's best argument at that point is that the activity is one of common usage.42
Not a Matter of Common Usage
Factor (d) asks the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage.44 The word “extent” makes this a matter of degree: the rarer the activity, the more the factor favors strict liability, and a dangerous activity that is also commonplace loses much of its claim. The factor traces to Lord Cairns's requirement in Rylands v. Fletcher that the injury result from a “non-natural” use, and many strict liability cases have concluded that the doctrine applies only when the activity is unusual or extraordinary as well as dangerous.45
The cases sort activities along this line. Driving a car is a commonplace activity, and blasting is not.46 Courts have generally declined to apply strict liability to the distribution of water, electricity, or natural gas,47 and a California appellate court rejected strict liability for driving under the influence of alcohol in Goodwin v. Reilley.48 Ordinary construction is common too: many members of the community engage in it, and many are exposed to hazards such as falling objects.49 Crane work in built-up areas is very common and can generally be done without serious risk, so a claim of strict liability for it should fail.50 Courts have also treated keeping firearms in the home, as in Jupin v. Kask, and secondhand smoke, as in DeNardo v. Corneloup, as outside strict liability. Wild animals and dogs draw the contrast within a single family of activity. Keeping a wild animal involves an unusual danger seldom matched by the activities of one's neighbors, while large dogs are a common risk; many more people are bitten by dogs than by tigers, yet dog-bite victims have usually had to prove negligence.51
The common thread is reciprocity. Where an activity is characteristic of an area, such as maintaining mill dams in certain New England counties or oil wells in certain Texas counties, many potential victims are also potential injurers because they engage in the activity too, and a person considering moving in is on notice of the common risks and can watch existing owners for guidance on protecting against them.52 Driving fits the pattern, since those exposed to its risks largely drive themselves. A neighbor of a rare activity is differently placed. To the extent that an activity is uncommon, those exposed to it know little about it and can do little to protect themselves; land uses involve investments that are costly to alter; and the people exposed are usually already engaged in common uses when the potential injurer chooses an uncommon one, so the potential injurer is better placed to set the activity's level at the outset, when the cost is lowest.53 The more uncommon an activity is in a given area, the more likely it is that the incentives created by strict liability work best on potential injurers and not on potential victims.54 Strict liability for uncommon dangerous uses thus works like common-law zoning, encouraging similar land uses in an area and putting the cost of a dangerous, uncommon use on the party that departs from the pattern.55
Because commonness is measured against a community, the same activity can be common in one place and unusual in another, a point the next factor develops.
Under the Second Restatement, common usage is one factor of six, and commonness has seldom been influential in decided cases.56 A common activity can therefore still be held strictly liable when the risk factors are strong. Gasoline hauling shows how much rides on the label: the defendant's best argument against strict liability, when reasonable care cannot eliminate a grave risk, is that the activity is one of common usage,57 yet Siegler v. Kuhlman applied strict liability to the transportation of gasoline.58 The Third Restatement changes the role of this factor entirely. It treats an activity as abnormally dangerous only if the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors and is not one of common usage,59 which elevates “not in common usage” from a factor to a necessary element.60 A finding of common usage ends the inquiry there. A plaintiff who meets a common-usage argument should contest how the activity is characterized and should also build the case on factors (a) through (c).
Step two does the most work. An answer that stops at whether the activity is familiar has not asked whether the people exposed to its risk carry on the same activity themselves.
Inappropriate to the Place
Factor (e) asks about the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on.62 The factor measures how well an activity fits its surroundings, so the same activity can pass unnoticed in one setting and count as abnormally dangerous in another. Comments (i) and (j) to § 520 make population density and common usage, judged on a local basis, relevant to the inquiry, as Northglenn v. Chevron USA, Inc. observed.63
Oil wells supply the clearest pair of contrasting outcomes. One court refused strict liability for drilling an oil well in rural Oklahoma in Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Stell, while another held a defendant strictly liable for drilling one in downtown Los Angeles in Green v. General Petroleum Corp.64 Older decisions explain results like the Oklahoma one by a community view that makes water reservoirs or irrigation ditches in dry country, and properly conducted oil wells in Texas or Oklahoma, “natural” to the locality.65 The neighborhood separates the two oil-well cases. Where wells are the local pattern, one more well adds a risk the community already lives with and runs in return; in a dense city, residents did not invite the well and impose no matching risk. The wild animal case marks the extreme: keeping a wild animal in a community is an uncommon, unnecessary, and highly dangerous activity, and given its low utility, inappropriate location, and high risk, a community might ban it entirely, with strict liability making good sense where it is tolerated.66
Yommer applied the factor to a gasoline tank, and the court called the appropriateness of the place the fifth and perhaps most crucial factor on the facts before it.67 The court conceded that gasoline stations as a rule present no particular danger to the community. The owners had nonetheless placed a large underground tank next to a well from which a family had to draw its water for drinking, bathing, and laundry, and the court held that at least that aspect of the activity was inappropriate to the locale, even when set against the value of the activity.68 There was no evidence of negligence, and the court treated such a showing as unnecessary.69 The factor applies to the activity as the defendant actually sited it, so an exam answer should name the feature of the location that makes the activity misplaced, such as a tank's closeness to a household water supply, and should not condemn the generic business.
The limit on the factor matters as much as the factor itself. A defendant does not escape strict liability by showing that it chose an appropriate or even the only available place. It is “appropriate” to store mining wastes in retaining pools near the mine, or to blast rock for a road where the rock is found, yet most courts would impose strict liability on these activities anyway.70 In cases brought by neighbors of the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Reservation, the Ninth Circuit determined that Washington law would treat plutonium production as abnormally dangerous under the § 520 factors even though there is no other appropriate place for the activity.71 The reason is that a better location reduces harm only when the danger depends on where the activity occurs, as with a tank beside a well or a drilling rig beside homes. When the danger travels with the activity, as with stored mining waste or the shock of a blast, moving to the best available site leaves the risk in place. Factor (e) therefore adds weight for the plaintiff when an activity is misplaced, and it does not operate as a defense when the place is suitable.
The Third Restatement eliminates factor (e) as a separate item. Place is partly reflected in the common-usage requirement, which receives increased emphasis there.72 Under that formulation, the location at which the activity is conducted does not independently determine whether it is abnormally dangerous, but it could be relevant under either of the two criteria.73 An answer under the Second Restatement should give place its own analysis, and an answer under the Third should fold the same facts into common usage.
Value Versus Danger
Factor (f) asks the extent to which the activity's value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.75 It is the only factor that looks at what an activity contributes to the community. Factors (a) through (c) measure how dangerous the activity is, and factors (d) and (e) measure how unusual it is, so factor (f) serves as the counterweight: the more the community gains from the activity, the weaker the case for strict liability. The idea sounds sensible, but it is the least influential factor on the list and the most often criticized.76
The factor entered the Second Restatement as a concession to particular industries. In the discussion quoted in Koos v. Roth, the Reporter, Dean Prosser, said he would like to “play this down” and “would be happy to throw it out, if I thought I could,” but explained that Pennsylvania coal mines, western irrigation ditches, and Texas oil wells were protected from strict liability “simply because of their importance to the community.”77 The factor was apparently included to spare locally important, economically fragile industries the added expense of strict liability. Many critics, Prosser's own treatise among them, charged that it reintroduces a Hand-formula negligence analysis into strict liability doctrine, and Koos refused to consider the factor in determining the standard of liability.78
The criticism has force because strict liability presupposes valuable activities. Comment b says the rule applies to an activity carried on with all reasonable care and of such utility that its risk cannot be regarded as so great or so unreasonable as to make it negligence merely to carry it on, and comment d says the enterprise must pay its way by compensating for the harm it causes because of its special, abnormal, and dangerous character.79 A showing of value therefore cannot excuse a defendant from the price, and weighing value against danger asks a question close to the one negligence law already asks.
The cases have followed that logic. Courts sometimes mention the value of the activity to the community, but it has been the least influential factor, and some courts have ruled expressly that it is irrelevant to strict liability in their state.80 The factor's practical effect shows at the extremes. Keeping a tiger in a community is uncommon, unnecessary, and highly dangerous, and with so little value on the other side of the scale, factor (f) joins the other factors in pointing toward strict liability.81 For a valuable activity the result is different only at the margin: if reasonable care cannot eliminate a substantial risk of grave physical injury, strict liability will probably apply even though the activity is socially valuable and conducted conscientiously.82 Value therefore decides little when the risk is severe and matters mostly in borderline cases where the danger is moderate and the benefit large.
The Third Restatement drops the factor altogether. Its test asks only whether the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when all actors use reasonable care, and whether the activity is not one of common usage.83 Social utility is no longer a separate item and is said to be reflected in the common-usage requirement.84 The drafters did not explain the omission at length, but they argued that “the point that the activity provides substantial value or utility is of little direct relevance to the question whether the activity should properly bear strict liability.”85 The next sections compare the two Restatements in full.
In an answer under the Second Restatement, mention factor (f), state the value and the danger it is weighed against, and say that the factor carries the least weight, that some courts, Oregon among them, refuse to consider it, and that the Third Restatement omits it. A defendant who points to the usefulness of its activity should expect little from the argument if a serious risk survives all reasonable care, because the enterprise must pay its way for the harm it causes.