Concept
The Negligence Baseline
Related effects of the plaintiff's conduct and consent
Plaintiff Conduct Beyond Negligence
The Negligence Baseline
Every rule in this chapter is measured against the ordinary negligence case, so that case comes first. Suppose Tanaka knowingly accepts a ride from Quentin, who is visibly drunk, and Tanaka is hurt when Quentin drives carelessly. Quentin's negligence created the danger, and Tanaka chose to face it. In theory that choice is assumption of risk, which is voluntary consent to encounter a known danger created by the defendant's negligence. Contributory negligence is something else: unreasonable conduct. The distinction is between consent and conduct, and the same facts may raise one defense or both.1
Comparative negligence changes what follows from those facts. Many states with comparative negligence regimes treat a plaintiff's conscious choice to encounter a risk as negligent conduct, so the jury assigns the plaintiff a percentage of fault for it, as it does for any other carelessness. Assumption of risk then becomes a partial defense instead of a complete bar. If the jury puts 30 percent of the fault on Tanaka, he recovers 70 percent of his damages.2 The trend is strong but not universal, because a minority of states still keep assumption of risk as a separate defense.3
Merging the two makes sense because one set of facts can wear either label. What was once termed assumption of the risk may now be used to show that the plaintiff is at fault.4 A separate instruction also invites error. If the judge tells the jury that it is a defense when the plaintiff was contributorily negligent or assumed the risk, the instruction implies that assumption of risk is something different from contributory negligence. Jurors may then conclude that even non-negligent assumption of risk defeats a negligence claim.5
The harder case is the plaintiff who knew of the danger and went ahead for a good reason. Arguably a knowing choice that was reasonable should not affect recovery at all, since recovery is reduced only for negligence, and some cases take that position.6 Eckert v. Long Island R.R. shows the logic. The plaintiff's decedent was killed while rescuing a child from being struck by a train, and the court held that a jury could find this was not contributory negligence, which in that setting meant not assumption of risk, because his conduct was not unreasonable under the circumstances.7 Now suppose a farmer with a badly injured leg accepts a ride to the hospital from a neighbor who warns that the brakes are failing. The brakes give out and the farmer is hurt further. He understood the risk, yet most states conclude that a reasonable choice of that kind should neither reduce nor bar his claim.8 In a few states, secondary assumption of risk, whether reasonable or unreasonable, remains a complete defense.9 There the farmer's lawyer faces an odd choice. Unreasonable assumption only reduces damages under the comparative statute, so a lawyer who shows the farmer was slightly negligent wins most of the recovery, while one who persuades the jury that the farmer acted entirely reasonably wins nothing.10
Knowing that a danger exists is different from agreeing to bear the loss if the defendant is careless. A pedestrian who crosses in mid-block does not consent to a driver's negligence, but she may still have liability apportioned to her under comparative fault.11 Assumption of risk requires actual knowledge of the particular risk, appreciation of its magnitude, and voluntary encounter with it.12 Contributory negligence asks only whether the plaintiff acted unreasonably. Compare two borrowers of the same car. One is told that the brakes do not work, shrugs, and drives off. That borrower consented to the risk and probably acted unreasonably as well. The other is told nothing but notices that the pedal feels loose, skips any check, and drives away. A careful person would have investigated, so this borrower was contributorily negligent, but without actual knowledge of the defect there was no deliberate choice to face it and no assumption of risk.
An agreement to bear the risk stands on firmer ground, because the plaintiff has said in advance what conduct alone only suggests. Persons entering a relationship may agree that one will assume the risk of the other's negligence, and ordinary contract principles govern these exculpatory agreements, which often take the form of releases or disclaimers.13 Courts usually honor such waivers, though they may construe them narrowly and refuse to enforce them in some contexts involving essential services.14 The agreement also has outer limits. The parties cannot disclaim liability for intentional torts or willful, wanton, and reckless conduct, where there is a gross disparity of bargaining power, or when the transaction involves a matter of public interest, which is why common carriers, for example, cannot disclaim liability for negligence.15 The label can therefore decide a case. If the neighbor agrees to drive the farmer only if the farmer accepts the risk of the failing brakes, and the farmer says yes, the express assumption is a waiver that courts will usually honor. A farmer who simply climbs aboard in the emergency has agreed to nothing and, in most states, recovers in full.16
What courts call primary assumption of risk is a different matter again, because it is a conclusion that the defendant was not negligent. A spectator struck by a foul ball or a skier hit by another skier will likely lose, since it was not negligent to offer the activity even though such injuries occasionally happen. Courts may still say the plaintiff assumed the risk, but the real basis for rejecting the claim is that the operator breached no duty.17 A true defense works only after the plaintiff has proved a negligent defendant. It is an affirmative defense, so the defendant must plead and prove it.18
Everything above assumes a negligent defendant. The rest of the chapter asks what changes when liability rests on something else: recklessness, intentional wrongdoing, strict liability for animals and activities, strict products liability, or a statutory duty. Strict products liability shows the shift clearly. An injured party may recover against a seller for harm caused by a defective product, and a plaintiff who alleges a manufacturing defect need not prove that the manufacturer was negligent.19 Once the defendant's negligence is no longer the starting point, each plaintiff-conduct label has to be tested again for what it does.