Concept
Choices Forced by the Defendant
Voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice
Choices Forced by the Defendant
Knowing about a danger is not the same as choosing it. Assumption of risk arises only when the plaintiff’s encounter with a risk is both informed and voluntary, because a person cannot “consent” to what he does not know or to what is forced upon him.1 The plaintiff must therefore understand the risk and must also be free to decline it.2 The passenger who rides with a driver she knows to be intoxicated meets both requirements: she understands the danger, and she could have stayed out of the car.3 This section concerns the plaintiff who meets the first requirement and fails the second.
Section 496E(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines that failure. A plaintiff’s acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant’s tortious conduct has left him no reasonable alternative course of conduct in order to take either of two protective steps.4 One step is to avert harm to himself or another.5 The other is to exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him.6
The rule follows from what a forced choice does to consent. Even where the plaintiff does not protest, a risk is not assumed if the defendant’s conduct has left no reasonable alternative; a defendant who puts the plaintiff to a choice of evils creates a species of duress that destroys the idea of freedom of election.7 A defense built on consent cannot rest on a consent the defendant’s own conduct extracted. Otherwise a defendant could create a danger, leave no way around it, and then treat the plaintiff’s decision to face it as a surrender of the right to protection.
Two elements carry the rule through both branches. The defendant’s tortious conduct must have produced the dilemma, and the plaintiff must have had no reasonable way out. The causal element sets a boundary: hardship the defendant did not create does not excuse the plaintiff, and one who rents a house in obviously dangerous condition because he cannot find or afford another dwelling assumes the risk despite the compulsion he acts under.8 The next section develops that limit. This one begins with the requirement both branches share, a reasonable alternative, and then applies it to harm avoidance, to rights and privileges, and to the workplace, where the worker told to use a dangerous machine or lose the job tests the rule hardest.
Assumption of risk may also rest on an express agreement, and parties can assume even the risk of another’s negligence by contract.9 Disputes over such an agreement ask first whether the risk that injured the plaintiff fell within the unambiguous scope of its terms,10 and they raise further questions, such as whether the agreement must be in writing and whether one spouse’s express assumption bars the other’s loss of consortium claim.11 This section sets those questions aside and concerns the plaintiff whose conduct, not a signed agreement, is said to show acceptance.
The stakes of the voluntariness question have also shifted. After the advent of comparative negligence, courts found it logically or morally difficult to maintain a dual system in which the plaintiff’s fault only reduced damages if it was called contributory negligence but barred the plaintiff entirely if it was called assumption of risk, and most comparative negligence states have moved away from that system by statute or judicial decision.12 Where a jurisdiction still treats assumption of risk as a complete bar, the forced-choice rule keeps the bar from reaching the plaintiff who had nowhere else to turn.
Reasonable Alternatives
Both branches of § 496E(2) depend on one limiting phrase: the defendant’s conduct must have left the plaintiff no “reasonable alternative course of conduct.”13 The weight falls on reasonable. An alternative that exists only in the abstract, such as a long trek on foot through a storm, does not count, because the law asks whether the plaintiff truly had something to choose between. A plaintiff who passes up a convenient, safe route has shown a preference for the danger. A plaintiff with no such route was compelled to run the danger, and a defense built on consent cannot rest on consent the plaintiff had no way to withhold.
Consider a driver who knows of a negligently maintained mudhole and drives through it. Whether she assumed the risk turns on a fact unrelated to what she knew. Pomeroy v. Westfield rejected the defense for a traveler who was away from home and had no other way back, so the encounter was not voluntary. Give the driver a short, convenient, well-kept detour and the result reverses: one who passes the detour to push through the mud has chosen the danger, and Campion v. Rochester puts on the defendant the burden of showing that such an alternative existed. The driver’s knowledge is the same in both settings. The detour decides whether she had a choice at all.
That allocation follows the general rule for the defense. Assumption of risk requires actual knowledge of the particular risk, appreciation of its magnitude, and voluntary encountering of the risk, and it is an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the burden of pleading, production, and proof.14 A defendant who says the plaintiff could have gone another way must therefore identify the way and show that it was open and usable from where the plaintiff stood. Because the answer depends on practical facts, a court takes the question from the jury only when the evidence leaves no room for dispute.
Courts weigh those practical facts: how far the plaintiff was from home, the weather, whether another route was open, and what the alternative would have cost in inconvenience. Ordinary inconvenience does not make an alternative unreasonable; only one that is unduly burdensome or risky falls short. Contract law’s doctrine of duress draws a similar line. An alternative is reasonable only if it is a feasible and practical means of evading the consequences of the threat, and one that would be unduly burdensome or risky, or would not likely avoid those consequences, leaves the victim without a reasonable alternative.15
When the plaintiff has no reasonable alternative to encountering the known danger, the plaintiff does not assume the risk. If an apartment building has only one reasonable exit, for example, a tenant does not assume the risk of the landlord’s negligent maintenance of the hallway leading out; Thomas v. Panco Management of Maryland, LLC is a cited illustration.16 A plaintiff’s claim that nothing else was possible also needs evidence behind it. The delivery worker discussed under Employment and Economic Pressure, below, said she had no choice but to cross a visibly icy walkway, and the court found nothing in the record to support her.
Averting Harm to Self or Another
The first branch of § 496E(2) protects a plaintiff who confronts a known risk in order to “avert harm to himself or another.”18 Read with the lead-in to subsection (2), it makes the plaintiff’s acceptance involuntary when the defendant’s tortious conduct left no reasonable alternative for that purpose.19 The rescuer is the paradigm. A bystander who runs toward someone endangered by the defendant’s negligence understands the danger, yet the only alternative to running in is to let the harm happen, and standing aside is not a choice the law treats as free.
Blackburn v. Dorta illustrates the point with two examples built on one fire. A landlord negligently causes a fire in a tenant’s apartment.20 The tenant returns, learns that his young child is still inside, rushes in, and is severely burned. A literal application of assumption of risk might bar him from recovering against the landlord,21 but few courts today would apply the doctrine so harshly. In the second example, a different tenant finds the same fire, remembers his favorite fedora inside, and runs in after it. He has voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known risk, so the defense is available, and his conduct would satisfy contributory negligence as well. The flames and the knowledge are identical. The difference lies in the alternative: letting a hat burn is a reasonable course, so the landlord’s negligence left the second tenant a choice, while letting a child burn is a course no one would call reasonable.
A defense that inferred consent from knowledge would fall hardest on rescuers, who know of the danger, proceed anyway, and act reasonably. The objection is general: why should the plaintiff who does not know of a negligently created risk be better off than the plaintiff who knows of it and reasonably decides to take it? In most cases it makes sense to treat the two alike.22 Eckert v. Long Island R.R. applied that logic to a man killed while pulling a child out of the path of a train; the court held that a jury could find the rescue was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
The branch is not limited to a peril that the defendant is inflicting on someone else at that moment. A pregnant woman deep in the country is told by her doctor, on the telephone, to start for a distant hospital at once. Her husband, a tire salesman, finds a bubble in the sidewall of a newly purchased tire and knows it may fail at any moment. With no neighbors and no time to call an ambulance, he drives slowly and carefully, the tire bursts, and he is injured. A jury would likely find his decision reasonable and informed but not voluntary.23 It was reasonable for the very reason that it was involuntary: he had no reasonable alternative to making the trip on a tire he knew to be dangerously defective.
Two limits keep the branch from swallowing the defense. The harm the plaintiff seeks to avert must be real, and the alternative of accepting it must be unreasonable, so a convenience or an item of trivial value does not become a rescue. And the defendant’s tortious conduct must have produced the predicament, a requirement the next section takes up.
Protecting a Right or Privilege
The second branch of § 496E(2) protects a plaintiff who confronts a known danger in order to “exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him.”25 Two parts of the text carry the weight. The plaintiff must be exercising a right or privilege that the plaintiff truly holds, such as a tenant’s entitlement under a lease to reach and use the home. And the defendant must have no right to deprive the plaintiff of it, which keeps the branch away from entitlements the defendant could lawfully withhold or condition.
The branch exists because the defense would otherwise grow stronger as the facility grew more essential. A landlord rents an upper-floor apartment reachable only by one common stairway and then lets the stairway decay. If the tenant’s daily use of the stairway counted as acceptance of its condition, the landlord’s failure to repair would become a defense, and the defense would be strongest against the tenant with nowhere else to go. The tenant obtained the right to enter and live in the home through the lease. Treating its exercise as consent would let the landlord take back through the defense what he could not take back directly.
Rush v. Commercial Realty Co. shows the branch at work. A tenant went to use the detached privy her landlord supplied for two houses and fell through a defective trap door in its floor. The court observed that she had no choice, when impelled by the calls of nature, but to use the facilities the landlord had placed at her disposal, and it did not treat her use as an assumption of risk, because she was not required to leave the premises and go elsewhere. The right to use the facility came from her tenancy, and the only alternative to exercising it was to abandon the premises. The court sent contributory negligence to the jury, which was to ask whether it was careless to step on a floor she knew was in bad order. That division matters: the right-or-privilege branch answers only the voluntariness question and leaves open whether the plaintiff handled the danger with reasonable care.
The same logic protects a tenant who must use the only exit. With one reasonable way out of the building, the tenant does not assume the risk of the landlord’s negligent maintenance of the hallway.26 Ownership of land gives similar protection. In Marshall v. Ranne the plaintiff was attacked by a neighbor’s vicious boar on his own property, and his choice was held not voluntary because his only options were to remain a prisoner in his own house or to try to get past the boar to his pickup truck.
A visitor’s errand falls on the other side of the line, and the contrast is easiest to see on a single set of icy facts. A university left its dormitory parking lot crunchy with ice and snow, and a mother who had come to visit her daughter and bring her some money crossed the lot and fell. In Morgan State University v. Walker the court upheld judgment against the mother on assumption of risk, while noting that a student who lived in the dormitory and had no other way out would have created a jury question on voluntariness. Both women knew of the ice, and both crossed the same lot. The resident was using the way to her own car and out of her own home, an entitlement the college had no power to condition on her accepting its neglect. The mother was making a visit she could have made another day, and a trip taken for convenience is not a right the defendant is powerless to take away.
Establishing a right does not end the inquiry, because the lead-in to subsection (2) still asks whether the defendant’s negligence left the plaintiff no reasonable alternative. In Lamy, a shopper injured outside an A & P store argued that, as a business invitee with a right of egress, she had no alternative safe route. Maryland’s highest court declined to address voluntariness directly but held that the tenant case she relied on did not apply, because, unlike the tenant in Rountree, she had a safe alternative: she had entered the store one way and left by another.27 The tenant with no other exit is protected; the customer with a safe route is not.
The third step usually decides these cases, since the right is rarely in dispute when the plaintiff is a tenant going home. The contest is over whether a sound stairway, an unobstructed door, or another route was open, and the defendant who relies on such a route must be ready to show that it was real.
Employment and Economic Pressure
A worker who knows that a machine is dangerous must either keep using it or give up the job, and the cases that accept her argument treat quitting as no reasonable alternative. In deciding to use the defective machine, the worker presumably weighed the burden of quitting against the risk of harm from the design. Because the cost of changing jobs is usually substantial, the decision to continue working is typically reasonable, and on this reasoning the decision to use a defective product instead of quitting is not voluntary.29 The reasoning applies the no-reasonable-alternative requirement of subsection (2), which protects a plaintiff who must confront a danger in order to exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him.30
Rhoads v. Service Machine Co. shows the argument at work. A punch-press operator lost her balance while activating the press, and her arm and hand slipped into it. She knew the press was unguarded, yet the court upheld the jury’s rejection of assumption of risk and called the voluntariness of a worker assigned to such a machine “illusory.” The Ohio Supreme Court stated the rule in categorical terms in Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co.: “[C]ommon sense dictates, and we so hold, that an employee does not voluntarily or unreasonably assume the risk of injury which occurs in the course of his or her employment when he or she must encounter that risk in the normal performance of his or her required job duties and responsibilities.”31
The same policy appears outside products cases. The doctrine developed in the employment context, yet it is now generally held that the inequality of bargaining power inherent in employment bars an employee from expressly assuming a risk.32 In California, a worker who continues to work in the face of safety violations to avoid losing a livelihood does not thereby assume the risk of injury from them, because the implied agreement on which the defense rests would be contrary to public policy and unenforceable.33 Knight v. Jewett recites the principle.
Other courts decline to treat the workplace as special. They reason that any compulsion to keep working comes from the employer, a third party, and not from the defendant whose product created the danger, and that some workers make deliberate, even foolish, decisions to run risks they fully understand to be unreasonable.34 In strict products liability, the Restatement treats the form of contributory negligence that consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, commonly called assumption of risk, as a defense, and these courts apply it to workers as to anyone else.35 In Karim v. Tanabe Mach., Ltd., a machine operator grabbed a control box near a moving chain and sprocket that caught his hand, and the court held that assumption of risk barred recovery even though the injury occurred at work.
Where a court will hear the economic-pressure argument at all, the evidence decides the case, and two questions carry most of the weight: did the employer actually require the use of the dangerous equipment, and did a real alternative exist? ADM P'ship v. Martin marks the failing side of the line. A delivery worker slipped on a visibly icy walkway and claimed she had no reasonable alternative because she believed her employer would fire her if the package went undelivered. The court agreed with the trial court that she had several alternatives, including refusing to deliver, and noted that neither her employer nor the defendant ever demanded that she cross the ice against her will. The record held “not a shred of evidence” from which her concern for her job could be inferred.36 A fear of discharge that rests only on the plaintiff’s say-so does not turn a free choice into a forced one, and employment alone does not defeat voluntariness.
The first two steps do the evidentiary work, and a plaintiff who can answer both with facts from the record is positioned to win the voluntariness question in a jurisdiction on the favorable side of the split. The third step explains why the same worker can lose in one state and win in another on identical facts.