Concept
Express Assumption of Risk
General rule and express assumption of risk
Express Assumption of Risk
A plaintiff who agrees in advance to bear a risk cannot sue when that risk comes to pass. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B states the rule: a plaintiff who “by contract or otherwise expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy.”1
The word express separates this form from the implied forms studied above. In those cases a court infers consent from what the plaintiff knew and did, and the inference is the weak point, because courts tend to equate confronting a known risk with consenting to it.2 Express assumption needs no inference. The plaintiff said yes beforehand, usually in a release, waiver, disclaimer, or covenant not to sue. When valid, the agreement is a contractual surrender, in advance, of the right to sue. The plaintiff really does assume a risk, in the sense of being tortiously injured and left uncompensated, and nothing turns on how carefully or carelessly the plaintiff then behaved.3 That feature sets express assumption apart from contributory negligence, the defense of Butterfield v. Forrester. Contributory negligence asks about the plaintiff's own conduct, while express assumption asks only whether the plaintiff agreed.4
Parties may allocate risk by contract. In a sale between two large corporations, the Fifth Circuit, applying California law, enforced an express assumption clause in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. because parties with equal bargaining power can allocate the risk of loss as they choose.5 Courts stay wary when the clause excuses a party from its own negligence, however, because the law does not favor such provisions.6
Three questions organize the analysis. Did the plaintiff actually agree? Does the agreement reach the risk that caused the injury? And will a court enforce the agreement even if the answer to both is yes? This section takes the first two, the next section takes the third, and the last section of the chapter shows how express assumption fits with comparative fault.
Forming the Agreement
Section 496B asks for an agreement, not for a particular document. The phrase “by contract or otherwise” shows that a formal bargain is unnecessary, and a signed release is simply the clearest evidence that the plaintiff agreed.7 Releases usually originate with the provider of the risky activity, such as a skydiving school, a quarry owner who lets climbers in for a fee, or a horseback-riding ranch.8
An agreement can be far less formal than a signed release. Farmer, hurt while harvesting wheat, flags down Hillary, who warns that her brakes are acting up but offers to drive him to the hospital if he will take the chance. Farmer agrees. The brakes lock at a traffic light, and a car behind them collides with them. Hillary was negligent in driving with defective brakes, yet Farmer cannot recover, because he agreed in advance to bear that risk, with nothing signed and nothing paid.9
Change one fact and the analysis changes. Hillary says nothing about the brakes, Farmer feels them grab, and he stays aboard because his injury needs care. He has signaled no agreement to Hillary. He accepts the risk for his own sufficient reasons, so at most his conduct is reasonable implied secondary assumption of the risk, governed by the doctrines studied above.10 The label therefore matters. Farmer's agreement is an express assumption, while his unspoken acceptance of the same danger is a different kind of assumption.
The medical setting shows the same point. Boyle v. Revici held that a patient's assumption of the risk of unconventional cancer treatment did not need to be in writing. An oral agreement is harder to prove than a signed release, which is one reason providers insist on paper.
Even a signed release binds only a plaintiff who actually accepted its terms. Comment c to § 496B says so directly: “it must appear that the terms were in fact brought home to him and understood by him, before it can be found that he has accepted them.”11 The reason follows from the defense itself. The defense is justified because the plaintiff made a choice, and a term the plaintiff never saw or understood was never chosen. The size of the print is one factor in that judgment.12
Both the bungee customer's release and Sam's ticket reach the operator's negligence. What separates the customer who is barred from the skier who is not is whether the terms actually reached the plaintiff, and breadth of wording alone does not answer that question.
A valid agreement does more than supply a defense, because it removes the defendant's duty as to the covered risk. One court describes the express form as one in which “the plaintiff expressly consents to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct to him and to take the chance of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone.”13 California reached the same place in Knight v. Jewett. So long as an express assumption agreement does not violate public policy, it “operates to relieve the defendant of a legal duty to the plaintiff with respect to the risks encompassed by the agreement and, where applicable, to bar completely the plaintiff's cause of action.”14
The consequence follows in three short steps. Negligence requires a duty. The agreement removes the duty for the covered risk. A defendant who owes no duty cannot have breached one. For that reason, the better-reasoned opinions treat express assumption of risk as no affirmative defense at all: when the parties agree by contract that the defendant owes the plaintiff no duty of care, the plaintiff cannot prove the first element of negligence.15 Take Amelia, whose parachute-school contract says she will not hold the school liable for any injury, including one caused by its negligence. If the school's negligence injures her on her first jump, she loses at the duty element. Nothing remains to weigh against her fault, because the doctrine does not depend on how she behaved.16
Clarity and Scope of the Release
Because § 496B makes the plaintiff's agreement the whole basis of the defense, a court deciding whether a release bars a claim is deciding what the parties actually agreed to.18 The agreement must be knowingly and voluntarily made, and the law does not favor provisions that relieve a party of responsibility for its own negligence, so an unclear or ambiguous release is strictly construed against the defendant.19 The defendant is usually the drafter, since providers of risky activities write the clauses. Courts construe such releases against the drafter and require them to state clearly the risks allocated to the participant.20 The logic is straightforward. The provider chose the words, so the cost of an unclear clause falls on the provider. The defense also rests on full consent to a risk the plaintiff fully comprehends,21 and a signer cannot knowingly accept a burden the words do not plainly describe. Mere exposure to a risk is no substitute for actual consent.22
The sharpest dispute over clarity is whether the release must use the word negligence, and courts divide. In Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a release reaches negligence only if its express language says so.23 Other courts require no magic words and ask whether the language is clear and unequivocal. The Florida Supreme Court found “hold harmless and release … all claims” language adequate in Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., and the Third Restatement likewise treats the word negligence as unnecessary when the language is otherwise clear and unequivocal.24 In Boyce v. West, a release was held to encompass negligence even though it never referred to negligence.25 In Seigneur v. National Fitness Institute, Inc., a fitness-club member had signed an agreement that put all exercise at her risk and released the club from claims arising from active or passive negligence. The Maryland court asked whether the language clearly and specifically showed an intent to release the club from liability for negligently caused injury. A clause that names negligence satisfies both camps, as Amelia's contract does by stating that it covers injuries caused by the school's negligence.26
The form that tests the split is the release that speaks only in general terms.
An answer to a problem like the gym's should identify the split, say which side the facts favor, and avoid announcing one rule as though every court followed it.
Clear words must also reach the signer. The brought-home requirement and the size-of-print factor from the previous subsection apply to a release drafted in perfectly clear language.27
Even a clear, conspicuous release protects only against the risks it covers, so the risk that caused the injury must fall within it.28 Clarity and scope overlap, because a court may find that a release does not cover an injury precisely because it does not clearly do so. Disputes over scope turn on how the release frames the risk. In Grabill v. Adams County Fair and Racing Ass'n, participants who signed releases to enter a county racetrack's pit area were hurt when rockets from a fireworks display went astray. They argued that fireworks fell outside the release, but the Iowa Supreme Court held that fireworks are within the broad range of events that might cause injury on a racetrack.29 In Thompson v. Hi Tech Motor Sports, Inc., by contrast, a customer who signed a release about the inherent dangers of motorcycle riding lost control during a test drive. The Vermont court held that the dealer's alleged negligence in urging her onto a motorcycle too big for her lay outside the release. Where it is truly unclear whether the release reaches the injury, the question may go to the jury, as in Wright v. Loon Mountain Recreation Corp., a New Hampshire decision. A release tied to the inherent dangers of an activity invites the question whether the injury came from the activity or from someone's separate carelessness, as the dealer's sales advice did in Thompson. A release tied to a setting, as in Grabill, is read against what might happen in that setting.
The same reasoning governs a second ski-lift problem. Killey signs a form that lists the natural hazards of skiing, such as ice, stumps, and trees, and a chair then fails because the operator negligently maintained it. The form says nothing about equipment or operator negligence. Killey has assumed many of the risks of skiing itself, but a purchaser would not contemplate negligent maintenance as one of skiing's inherent hazards, and by listing natural risks the form tends to confirm that other risks were outside the clause. Because the language does not clearly include this risk, Killey has not assumed it.30
A release can nonetheless reach a hazard the signer never anticipated. Gavin signs a release assuming responsibility for the risks of skydiving, whether or not he is aware of them, and he later suffers ear damage he did not know a jump could cause. Language stating that the participant assumes risks even if unaware of them strengthens the argument that he chose to accept all the risks, not just the ones he expected, so the release will likely be enforced even though he never knew what the risk was. A release that named ear damage would show even more clearly that the risk was within the parties' contemplation. That is why a provider's lawyer drafts a release to reveal as many risks as possible and to state that the participant assumes them even if unaware of them, although a release that spells out every danger may depress business.31
Finally, a release protects only the party that bargained for it. In Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., a skier whose bindings failed to release had signed a rental agreement accepting the equipment as is and releasing the rental agency from liability, including liability for negligence. The court held that a waiver signed at the rental agency's request could not benefit the distributor of the bindings, because express assumption concerns a defendant who owes no duty as a result of an agreement with the plaintiff, and the distributor was a stranger to that agreement.32 In Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., whose facts were virtually identical, only the rental agency was sued, and the suit was dismissed on the strength of a waiver held fully enforceable.33 Whether a rental agency may enforce such a waiver at all is a public-policy question for the next section.
Steps two and four often merge in practice, since a court can find that a release does not reach an injury precisely because it does not say so clearly.
A release that passes all five steps can still fail on public-policy grounds, the separate gate the next section develops. Courts do not honor a consent extracted from a party with little bargaining power, and they have struck down contractual consents to unsanitary living conditions in public housing and to negligent treatment in local hospitals, on the theory that the plaintiff had no meaningful alternative.34 Most courts also refuse to enforce a release as to willful and wanton misconduct or intentional torts.35