Concept
Consent Versus Carelessness
General rule and express assumption of risk
Consent Versus Carelessness
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A bars recovery by a plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct.1 Because the bar rests on the plaintiff's own choice, it is easily confused with contributory negligence, which also examines what the plaintiff did before the injury. The two defenses ask different questions. Assumption of risk asks what the plaintiff actually knew and accepted; contributory negligence asks how a reasonable person would have acted in the plaintiff's place. One is a question of consent, the other of conduct.2 Older opinions compressed the contrast into a phrase: the essence of contributory negligence is carelessness, and of assumption of risk, venturousness. A plaintiff may have used the utmost care and still have voluntarily assumed a known hazard.3
The difference follows from what consent requires. A plaintiff cannot consent to a danger the plaintiff does not know about, so assumption of risk is a subjective inquiry into the risk this plaintiff actually knew and chose to encounter.4 Contributory negligence can reach a plaintiff who was subjectively unaware of a danger that would have been apparent with due care.5 Keeping the tests apart blocks a tempting shortcut. A defendant who negligently created a hazard could otherwise escape by showing only that the plaintiff should have looked harder, a charge of carelessness that says nothing about consent.
The knowledge must also be specific. Because assumption turns on appreciating the particular risk that caused the injury, the defense applies only if that risk was fully understood, and courts have often rescued plaintiffs by finding that they did not appreciate the exact risk behind the harm.6 If general awareness of danger were enough, a window washer who leans out too far would have assumed whatever risk then materialized, and nearly every conscious lapse in care would count as assumption of risk.
One set of facts can raise both defenses. A host offers a guest a chair with a broken leg, the guest sits, and the chair collapses. If the guest knew the leg was broken, the guest assumed that risk, and because a prudent person would not have used the chair, the same conduct is contributory negligence as well.7 If the guest had no idea the leg was broken, nothing was consented to. Whether the guest was careless then depends on whether a prudent person would have noticed the defect or inspected the chair first, but the guest did not assume the risk either way.8
A borrowed car supplies a second pairing. Newman lends Knieval a car and says the brakes do not work, and Knieval shrugs and plans to use the emergency brake. Knieval has assumed the risk and has probably also been negligent. Suppose instead that Newman says nothing and Knieval merely feels a loose pedal and drives off without checking. Knieval is negligent for ignoring a warning sign but has not assumed the risk, because he never chose to drive without brakes with full knowledge of the danger.9
The remaining combination is the unusual one: a plaintiff who knows the specific danger, decides to face it, and decides reasonably.
Traditionally the hiker's informed choice would bar recovery under the voluntary-assumption rule, however sensible the choice.10 The decided modern trend, though not uniform, holds that consciously but non-negligently taking a risk is no defense. A plaintiff who reasonably chooses to run a known risk should fare no worse than one who never knew of it, although courts may preserve room for exceptions.11
The hiker's case shows why the line between consent and carelessness matters. In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the California Supreme Court quoted Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co. on this point. A plaintiff who unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk imposed by the defendant's negligence engages in conduct that is "in reality a form of contributory negligence," even if the plaintiff goes about it prudently. Other situations involve no contributory negligence at all. A plaintiff held to agree to relieve the defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct does not reduce the plaintiff's own care so much as reduce the defendant's duty of care.12 The last section of this chapter returns to what comparative fault does to each kind.
That second kind of assumption is the one a plaintiff can sign, and consent is easiest to prove when it is written down. A release that names a specific risk, such as ear damage, shows the risk was within the parties' contemplation at the time of contracting. A release that adds that the plaintiff assumes the risks even if unaware of them strengthens the argument that the plaintiff chose to accept all the risks, not just the ones the plaintiff expected to meet.13 The next section takes up such express agreements.