Concept
Avoidable Consequences
Plaintiff's fault outside ordinary negligence: strict liability and avoidable consequences
Avoidable Consequences
A tort ends when the injury happens, but the damage often does not. Whether a wound heals or festers, a cellar dries or molds, or a lost day of work is made up or grows into a lost week depends on what the injured person does next. The doctrine of avoidable consequences assigns responsibility for that choice. Under § 918(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, one injured by another's tort cannot recover damages for harm that reasonable effort or expenditure after the tort would have avoided.1
The phrase “after the commission of the tort” fixes the rule's place on the timeline. The earlier subsections asked how a plaintiff's conduct before or during the events that produced the injury affects the claim, whether that conduct was ordinary carelessness, a knowing encounter with a danger, or recklessness. Section 918 begins later: the wrong is complete, the plaintiff is hurt, and the question is what the plaintiff must do about the loss that remains.
The law gives that task to the plaintiff because the plaintiff lives with the injury and can often act on it at a cost far below the loss it prevents. The rule reaches only the avoidable increment, so the harm the tort itself inflicted stays recoverable. It also measures avoidability by reasonableness: a plaintiff must take sensible steps but need not do everything that might shrink the defendant's bill.
The subsections below state the rule and its mechanics, mark the limits reasonableness imposes, take up § 918(2)'s exception for intentional and reckless wrongdoers, separate the doctrine from comparative fault, and end with seatbelt nonuse, where the two doctrines meet. One sorting question runs through all of them: did the plaintiff's careless conduct come before or during the tort and help bring it about, or did it come afterward and let the loss grow? The first sends a problem to the fault doctrines taught earlier. The second sends it here.
The Reasonable Effort Rule
The rule operates only once harm has occurred. A plaintiff need not anticipate an injury, but after tortious conduct causes harm the law expects reasonable conduct to avoid additional losses.2 That timing separates avoidable consequences from the fault doctrines. Carelessness that comes after the defendant's wrong falls under this rule, while carelessness that comes before the wrong or concurrently with it is contributory or comparative negligence.3
Courts often call the plaintiff's obligation a duty to mitigate, but the label misleads. A plaintiff who fails to take reasonable steps breaches nothing; the failure instead excludes from recovery the damages the plaintiff could reasonably have avoided.4 The doctrine works by subtraction. In Kimbrough v. Anderson, a landowner's home suffered seepage from a neighbor's excessive irrigation drainage. The owner was told that a sump pump would remove the moisture and that waterproofing would prevent further damage, took no step, and watched mold ruin an extensive art collection. The Indiana court held that the failure to act reasonably after the initial injury precluded recovery for the collection.5 The drainage started the problem, but the loss of the art traces to the inaction that followed the warning.
Three reasons support subtracting that increment. The first is fairness: a tortfeasor answers for the damages that flow from the tortfeasor's own wrong and should not pay for losses the plaintiff could have prevented by reasonable care. The second is protection of the plaintiff, because the rule invites reasonable avoidance measures, such as seeking substitute employment or obtaining replacement goods, that secure what the plaintiff was entitled to expect. The third is public: the rule discourages the economic waste of awards for avoidable loss.6 The measure of damages follows from those goals. Courts compute damages as if the plaintiff had minimized the loss, even when the plaintiff actually, but unreasonably, suffered more.7
The rule works through credits against the defendant's liability for consequential damages, which are the losses that follow from the injury, such as lost earnings or aggravated harm. Three propositions are generally accepted, and a fourth follows from them but is less firmly settled.8
- The defendant is credited with any consequential loss the plaintiff actually avoided or minimized.
- The defendant is also credited with any consequential loss the plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable effort or expense, whether or not the plaintiff made the effort.
- The plaintiff recovers the reasonable cost of trying to avoid loss, whether or not the effort succeeded.9
- When recovery is reduced for failure to avoid, the reduction is the net benefit proper avoidance would have produced, after crediting the plaintiff with the cost of that avoidance.
A published illustration runs the propositions together. Repairs to a plaintiff's car take four days. She earns $100 a day, works half a day by telephone on the first day, and earns nothing for the remaining three and a half days. For $20 a day she could have taken cabs to work and back without undue risk. The first proposition credits the defendant with the $50 she actually earned. The second credits the defendant with the $350 she could reasonably have earned, which taken alone would leave her nothing for lost earnings. The fourth corrects that result, because earning the $350 would have cost $80 in fares: the credit shrinks to $270, and she recovers $80.10 Courts state the netting step less uniformly than the first two, so an answer should present it as the logical consequence of those propositions and not as settled doctrine everywhere.
The rule trims consequential damages and generally leaves general or market damages alone.11 The market value of damaged property is fixed by what it was worth when the harm occurred, so nothing the plaintiff does afterward changes it, while lost earnings and lost use accumulate day by day and depend on the plaintiff's response.
The plaintiff must prove damages in the first place, but the defendant ordinarily bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff did or should have minimized them.12 Courts treat failure to mitigate as an affirmative defense13 and require the defendant to segregate the avoidable harm from the rest.14 The allocation fits the defendant's position as the party seeking the credit; otherwise the plaintiff would have to prove a negative, that no reasonable alternative would have worked. In Morgan v. Scott, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's smoking and obesity had complicated the healing of a fracture, but offered no adequate evidence that either habit caused the difficulty. An avoidance argument without proof that the avoiding step would have reduced the harm gives the jury nothing to subtract. Habits that predate treatment are not weighed as fault under this doctrine, though they may bear on causation.15
Medical treatment supplies the most familiar applications. In Young v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., the plaintiff refused surgery that a doctor testified would have repaired his cartilage and allowed him to return to work, and a refusal of surgery that a reasonable person would undergo can limit damages for both lost wages and pain and suffering.16 The standard is what a reasonable person would do, so the rule bites on the refusal of an operation any sensible patient would accept and spares the plaintiff who declines one a sensible patient would also decline.
A simple example shows what the rule subtracts. A car accident victim unreasonably fails to seek treatment for a broken leg, the leg becomes gangrenous, and it must be amputated. He recovers damages for the broken leg but not for the results of the amputation.17 The tort caused the fracture, and the defendant remains answerable for it; only the discrete increment that the avoidable conduct added drops out. The doctrine is therefore a causal apportionment rule: damages are divided by what caused them, with the original injury charged to the defendant and the avoidable increment charged to the plaintiff.18 Reasonableness is judged from the plaintiff's position when the choice had to be made, so a reasonable effort that fails costs the plaintiff nothing.19
The first step keeps this rule apart from comparative fault, which also reduces recovery for plaintiff conduct and which a later subsection compares with it.
Limits of Reasonableness
The word “reasonable” carries the whole limit on § 918(1), which denies recovery only for harm that reasonable effort or expenditure after the tort would have avoided.21 The jury asks what a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have done to keep the loss from growing. Contract law states the same standard in terms that carry over: the injured party must act reasonably, judged from the perspective of the time, and need not take unduly burdensome or risky action, explore every conceivable way of avoiding loss, or try methods that reasonably appear futile.22 A rule demanding every step that could shrink the damages would make the injured person an instrument of the defendant's liability, spending health, money, and conviction to reduce a bill the defendant ran up by committing the wrong. Three settings show where the limit bites: physical risk, the plaintiff's convictions, and decisions too intimate for a defendant to dictate.
Physical risk is the first limit, and it works as a factor to weigh and not as an automatic excuse. Nearly every medical step carries some risk, and so does leaving an injury untreated, so an excuse that applied whenever any danger existed would erase the rule in the cases where it matters most. Courts such as the one in Bowers v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. accordingly treat the presence of risk as one consideration in judging reasonableness.23 The jury sets the size and likelihood of the risk against the size and likelihood of the benefit, so the larger the danger and the smaller the gain, the likelier a refusal is reasonable. Jurisdictions differ on how much room they give the plaintiff's own preference, and in some a plaintiff need not submit to major surgery if he prefers not to.24 Where the operation is one a reasonable person would undergo, refusal costs the plaintiff, as the refusal in Young shows. The rule never compels treatment: the plaintiff remains free to refuse, and the only consequence is that the avoidable increment drops out of the recovery.
The statute's reference to expenditure also asks plaintiffs to spend money, and the same weighing bounds that demand. Spending is the mildest burden the rule imposes, because an injured person who reasonably spends to avert further harm may recover the expenditure from the defendant.25 A plaintiff asked to advance a modest sum that will head off a large loss is therefore in a very different position from one asked to risk his body or abandon a conviction. Continuing nuisances show why a ceiling matters. The neighbors in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. endured dirt, smoke, and vibration from a cement plant,26 and a rule requiring them to spend whatever might blunt those effects would turn their claim into a subsidy for the plant. Reasonableness fixes the middle position: the plaintiff must spend what a sensible person would, and no more.
Personal conviction raises the question in sharper form, because the step may be medically sensible while the plaintiff objects on religious grounds. In Williams v. Bright, a New York appellate court directed that the pattern jury charge be supplemented so that the jury could consider the plaintiff's testimony that she was a believer in the Jehovah's Witness faith, and that her faith barred her from accepting the treatment, in deciding whether she acted as a reasonably prudent person.27 The charge fits the standard because reasonableness is judged by the circumstances the plaintiff actually faced, and a sincere conviction is one of them. It also makes belief one input and leaves reasonableness as the test, so the jury still weighs the belief against the avoidable harm; a plaintiff who declines the same treatment for no reason beyond inconvenience puts nothing on the other side of the scale. Constitutional objections have not succeeded: in Munn v. Algee, the Fifth Circuit found neither the Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause violated.28
The strongest limit appears where the avoiding step would override an intimate decision about the plaintiff's body or family. In wrongful pregnancy cases, where an unwanted pregnancy follows negligence such as a failed sterilization, the defendant may argue that the plaintiff should have ended the pregnancy to minimize damages.29 Courts have sometimes entertained the argument as a reason to limit the claim, but almost none has applied it, partly because requiring an abortion might infringe constitutional privacy rights and partly because it would fail the reasonableness test built into the rule.30 The second ground matters most here, because it shows that the exclusion follows from the rule's own standard: the question is what a reasonable person would do, and ending a pregnancy is not a cost-cutting measure.
Adoption raises the same issue where abortion is no longer available. If the negligence has foreclosed any chance to end the pregnancy, the defendant may argue instead that damages should shrink because the parent could relinquish the child. Relinquishment might produce a sound economic result, but the tort injures more than the plaintiff's finances, and a defendant who has deprived the mother of one choice has no right to force on her another she does not want to make.31 Courts are therefore unlikely to make a mother choose between her claim and her child. These cases mark the far end of a spectrum. Routine treatment and modest spending fall within the rule, a step that would override the plaintiff's most personal choices falls outside it, and the cases in between turn on weighing the burden against the benefit for a person in the plaintiff's position.
Intentional and Reckless Wrongdoers
Section 918(2) of the Restatement (Second) qualifies the duty to avoid further loss in two stages: it removes the duty for one class of defendants and restores it against one class of plaintiffs. A plaintiff is not prevented from recovering for a particular harm if the tortfeasor intended the harm or was aware of it and recklessly disregarded it, unless the plaintiff, with knowledge of the danger of the harm, intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interests.33 The provision thus has three layers, and an answer that stops at the first or second misses the rule. The general rule denies recovery for harm that reasonable effort after the tort would have avoided.34 The exception lifts that deduction when the defendant intended the harm or knowingly disregarded the risk of it. The counter-exception restores the deduction when the plaintiff, aware of the danger, intentionally or heedlessly let the harm happen.
The defendant's state of mind triggers the exception, and the text recognizes two states. A tortfeasor who intended the harm acted with the purpose of causing it. A tortfeasor who was aware of the harm and recklessly disregardful of it saw the harm coming and went ahead anyway, the same conscious disregard of a known danger that defines recklessness elsewhere in this chapter.35 Both states involve awareness, so a defendant who was merely inattentive, however badly, does not qualify, and the ordinary deduction continues to apply. The phrase “a particular harm” also frames the inquiry loss by loss: the question is whether the defendant intended or knew of the specific harm claimed, so a wrongdoer's deliberate attack on one interest does not automatically strip the deduction from an unrelated loss the wrongdoer never foresaw.
The exception follows from what the deduction does. The deduction attributes the growth of a loss to the plaintiff's choice not to stop it, and that attribution persuades against a defendant whose wrong was an accident that neither side planned. It loses its force against a defendant who intended the harm or knowingly ran the risk of it, because the growing loss is then the very thing the defendant set in motion, and the victim's ordinary slowness does not make the defendant less responsible for what the defendant chose. A deliberate wrongdoer has no equitable claim to a discount for the victim's ordinary failure to protect himself.
The same reasoning governs plaintiff conduct before and during the tort. Under the Restatement, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery for harm caused by the defendant's reckless disregard for the plaintiff's safety.36 Courts explain that recklessness differs from negligence in kind and not merely in degree: negligence is inattention or inadvertence, while recklessness is a danger realized and consciously disregarded.37 Prosser described the resulting rule as one of comparative fault in which the court refuses to set the lesser fault against the greater.38 Section 918(2) carries that logic forward in time. Ordinary carelessness in dealing with an injury, a failure to exercise reasonable care to protect oneself from loss,39 is not set against a defendant who intended the harm or consciously disregarded it.
The counter-exception parallels the Restatement's rule that a plaintiff whose own conduct is in reckless disregard of his own safety is barred from recovery against a defendant whose reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety is a legal cause of the harm.40 The premise of the exception is that the defendant's conscious wrongdoing so exceeds the plaintiff's lapse that the two cannot be balanced, and that premise fails when the plaintiff's own conduct was conscious too. Two phrases in § 918(2) carry the weight. “With knowledge of the danger of the harm” requires that the plaintiff actually knew the danger, because one who simply failed to notice it was merely careless, and carelessness is what the exception forgives. “Intentionally or heedlessly” covers both the plaintiff who chose to let the harm happen and the plaintiff who went ahead despite a danger already known.41
Because the rule has three layers, it is best run in a sequence that settles one layer before the next begins.
The usual error is to treat the exception as a complete answer, so that an intentional wrongdoer is assumed to owe everything regardless of what the plaintiff knew and did. The counter-exception belongs to the same sentence of § 918(2). The harm inflicted at the outset remains recoverable throughout, and only the increment the plaintiff knowingly or heedlessly let grow is at stake. The next subsection separates this post-tort deduction from comparative fault, which reduces the whole recovery by a percentage instead of removing a particular avoidable harm.
Avoidable Consequences Versus Comparative Fault
Section 918(1) denies recovery for harm that reasonable effort after the tort could have avoided,43 and because it also trims what a less-than-perfect plaintiff collects, it is easily confused with the contributory and comparative fault doctrines taught earlier. The two work as different instruments. Comparative fault asks how much of the blame for the whole event belongs to the plaintiff and cuts the entire recovery by that percentage. Avoidable consequences asks whether a particular, identifiable item of loss traces to the plaintiff's own later choice and, if so, removes that item and leaves the rest. Which instrument a problem calls for decides whether the plaintiff gives up a slice of everything, a single item, or, in some systems, the whole claim.
The contrast is often taught as one of timing: fault doctrines govern what the plaintiff did before or during the accident, and avoidable consequences governs what the plaintiff did afterward. The shortcut is often right, and the earlier subsections used it as a first sorting question, but it does not touch the essence of the difference.44 The doctrines are functionally different because they divide responsibility by different schemes and measure the division differently. Comparative negligence reduces damages in proportion to the plaintiff's fault, while avoidable consequences reduces damages for discrete, identifiable items of loss caused by the plaintiff's fault or unreasonableness.45 Fault figures in both, yet the response differs. One doctrine converts blame into a percentage of the whole. The other assigns a particular piece of harm to the plaintiff as though the plaintiff alone had caused it.
A decedent who has resolved never to accept a blood transfusion shows the two responses side by side. He is negligently injured, refuses a transfusion afterward, and dies; had he accepted blood, he would have lived. Comparative fault would assign the refusal some percentage of the total fault and reduce the wrongful death damages by that percentage without barring them. Avoidable consequences, if it applies, bars the entire wrongful death recovery.46 The difference follows from the question each doctrine asks. Death is a discrete item of harm, and if reasonable acceptance of the transfusion would have prevented it, the doctrine treats the refusal as the cause of that item. Comparative fault never asks that causal question; it asks only how blameworthy the refusal was when set against the defendant's negligence. Avoidable consequences is therefore not always the gentler doctrine: when the avoidable item is the largest part of the claim, it takes the largest part.
The law keeps both systems because each needs something different to run. Causal apportionment divides responsibility by deciding which party caused which element of harm, so it can operate only when the injury comes in separable pieces. A speeding driver who strikes an inattentive pedestrian produces one broken leg, and no one can say which part of it belongs to whom, yet a jury can still say which party was more at fault and divide the damages on that basis. That versatility explains why causal apportionment is usually reserved for special cases: strict liability cases in which fault plays no part, cases in which a defendant enhances a pre-existing injury, avoidable consequences cases in which the plaintiff's post-accident conduct worsens the harm, and sometimes seatbelt cases.47 The consequence for an essay is a limit on the avoidable consequences argument. A choice between the two systems exists only when discrete harms can be traced to the plaintiff's conduct, and if the plaintiff suffers one harm, or several that cannot be separated, any apportionment must rest on fault rather than causation, even where the plaintiff's fault came after the defendant's negligence.48 The defendant, as the party seeking the reduction, bears the burden of separating the avoidable harm.49
Two scenes mark the poles. Soto v. NYC Transit Authority shows the fault pole. A teenager who had been drinking walked along a subway catwalk between stations, ran toward the next station when he heard a train behind him, and was struck as he moved around a signal box that jutted onto the catwalk. His conduct came before and during the accident, so the jury compared fault and placed most of the responsibility on him.50 In a pure comparative negligence jurisdiction such as New York, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by his percentage of fault, and he keeps the remainder.51
The doctrines part ways most sharply where a comparative fault system bars the plaintiff outright. In a modified system, a seriously faulty plaintiff may lose everything under the fault label, yet lose only the damages her later conduct aggravated under the avoidable consequences label.52 Ostrowski v. Azzara, as Cipollone v. Liggett Group describes it, turns on that gap. A patient sued her podiatrist over toe surgery; her later conduct, including continued smoking against advice, worsened her circulation and led to bypass surgery. The trial court's treatment of that conduct as fault against which the podiatrist's fault could be compared led to a bar, and on remand the jury was told to make two findings. The first compared the degree to which her conduct after treatment began was responsible for the toe surgery with the physician's fault for it. The second measured the degree to which her conduct, before and after the toe surgery, was responsible for the ultimate injury, the bypass. If the first percentage was less than the physician's fault, she recovered, and her recovery was offset by the second percentage times her damages; if it was greater, the comparative fault statute barred her.53
The Third Circuit applied the same structure to a smoker's claim in Cipollone. Federal law had ended the conduct for which the cigarette maker could be held liable as of January 1, 1966, so the smoker's later conduct bore only on avoidable consequences, possibly reducing her damages but not foreclosing liability.54 On retrial the fault comparison would cover only the earlier period, and only a plaintiff found 50 percent or less at fault would go on to the avoidable consequences inquiry, which considered her conduct both before and after that date.55 The label therefore decides whether a plaintiff with a heavy share of blame loses the claim or loses only the aggravated harm.
The two systems can also be combined. A court might put the plaintiff's fault in failing to fasten a seatbelt at 5 percent and find that a bruised chest was the only harm the failure caused. Fault apportionment alone would reduce total damages by 5 percent, avoidable consequences alone would deduct the value of the bruised chest, and a combined system would deduct 5 percent of the value of the bruised chest.56 On a $100,000 verdict with a $10,000 chest injury, those results are $95,000, $90,000, and $99,500. The Third Restatement moves toward fault: a plaintiff's failure to mitigate no longer bars recovery of the avoidable damages but is a factor in assigning percentages of responsibility.57 Even so, the better approach is to divide the damages between those caused by the original injury and those caused by the failure to mitigate, applying the plaintiff's fault in failing to mitigate only to the second group and any contributory negligence in causing the original injury only to the first.58 That is the combined system again, and it shows that the causal idea survives inside fault systems wherever harms can be separated.
Seatbelt Nonuse
Seatbelt nonuse strains the timing line that sorts the other cases. An unbelted passenger did nothing careless that produced the collision, and the unbuckled condition existed before the defendant's negligence occurred, yet it may have turned a survivable crash into a serious injury. The conduct sits between the doctrines the earlier subsections kept apart: it precedes the tort, as contributory fault does, and it affects only the size of the harm, as a failure to mitigate does. The same analysis applies to any precaution a plaintiff could have taken to soften an injury, such as a motorcycle helmet.60
Courts needed years to settle on an answer because each familiar doctrine fits only part of the facts. The Washington Supreme Court's reasoning is representative. Failure to buckle up occurs before the defendant's negligence, while contributory negligence customarily concerns conduct contributing to the accident itself. In many states, Washington among them, contributory negligence was a complete bar, an obviously unjust result for a plaintiff who merely failed to buckle up. Assumption of risk, which would treat the unbuckled driver as voluntarily accepting more serious injuries from another's negligence, would produce the same result.61 Mahoney v. Beatman shows the traditional response to a close cousin of these facts. The plaintiff drove at excessive speed, and the defendant negligently crossed the median and struck him. The proof showed that the speed had not contributed to the collision but had enlarged the plaintiff's damages, and the court, after extended discussion of causation, awarded the full amount.62
Courts and commentators now group the answers into three methods. Each description below assumes the plaintiff was not at all at fault in causing the collision and could have avoided some identifiable injury by buckling up.63
- Causal apportionment under the avoidable consequences rule excludes all damages traceable to nonuse. A plaintiff with $40,000 in damages that would have occurred anyway and $20,000 in additional damages from nonuse recovers $40,000.64
- Ordinary comparative fault treats nonuse as fault to be compared with the defendant's fault, so the plaintiff's total damages, including those a belt would not have prevented, are reduced by the percentage assigned.65
- The dual approach, articulated in New Jersey in Waterson v. General Motors Corp., treats nonuse as comparative fault but applies the plaintiff's percentage only to the injuries nonuse enlarged.66
The methods ask different questions, so none is better for every plaintiff. Exclusion asks which injuries nonuse produced and charges them entirely to the plaintiff. That can erase a large enhanced injury, yet it spares a plaintiff whose nonuse injuries cannot be identified. Ordinary comparative fault asks how blameworthy nonuse was in the whole event. That favors a plaintiff with heavy enhanced injuries and a small percentage, but it reduces damages even when no separate injury can be identified, and in a modified system it can bar recovery altogether.67 The dual approach sorts by causation first and fault second, so the injuries a belt would not have prevented are never reduced.
Those numbers show a pattern worth carrying onto an exam. A plaintiff with heavy enhanced injuries and a low percentage, like Reyes, does far better when nonuse is compared as fault than when the enhanced injury is excluded. A plaintiff with a high percentage and modest enhanced injuries, like Whitfield, does better under exclusion, and a modified system would bar her outright under the comparative method.68 The dual approach gives both passengers the most because it never touches the injuries nonuse did not enlarge. A jurisdiction's choice of method can matter as much as the jury's percentage.
The strict-liability setting adds a reason that nonuse should not operate as a complete defense. In Daly v. General Motors Corp., a driver died after being thrown from his car, and the manufacturer offered evidence that he had not used the belts and locks and that he was intoxicated. The court placed no limit on the conclusions the jury could draw from a finding of nonuse, and the California Supreme Court thought the jury could well have concluded that the decedent's negligent, intoxication-induced failure to use the belts and locks completely barred recovery; the court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs waived the objection by not requesting limiting instructions.69 Under the extension of comparative fault to strict liability taught earlier, that evidence now goes to apportionment and not to a complete bar. Warranty and strict liability claims rest in part on the buyer's reliance on the seller and inability to inspect for latent defects, premises that sit poorly with letting a plaintiff's lapse defeat the claim outright.70
Statutes decide many nonuse cases before any of the three methods comes into play. Every state except New Hampshire, which does not require adult use, eventually enacted some form of belt legislation, and the provisions fall into four groups: those that prohibit evidence of nonuse to reduce damages, those that permit it, those that permit it but cap the reduction, and those that leave the matter to the courts.71 Caps vary. Nebraska's is 5 percent and still requires some evidence that injuries would have been less with a belt, and Missouri's may not exceed 1 percent.72 A statute that bars or caps the evidence replaces the jury's open-ended weighing with a fixed legislative answer, so the first question in a nonuse problem is what the local statute says. Where the legislature has left the matter to the courts, courts have admitted nonuse evidence as part of the comparative analysis, as the Texas court did in Nabors Well Services, Ltd. v. Romero in a suit against the driver of the other vehicle.73
Whether a belt statute reaches a crashworthiness suit against the manufacturer divides the courts.74 In Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., the Michigan Supreme Court held that the legislature's cap on mitigated damages does not apply to products liability claims, because the statute by its terms covers only cases arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle.75 Other courts hold that the plain language of statutes barring nonuse evidence as proof of contributory negligence or as evidence in any civil action applies to crashworthiness actions like any others. In Gaudio v. Ford Motor Co., a Pennsylvania court excluded nonuse evidence in an airbag-defect case because the statutory language required exclusion.76
Where nonuse evidence comes in, a crashworthiness claim concerns how the product worsened injuries in a crash, so the comparison is confined to plaintiff conduct that bears on the enhanced harm. In Green v. Ford Motor Co., the Indiana court held that a jury could apportion fault to a motorist for failing to wear a seatbelt if his actions were a proximate cause of his enhanced injuries.77 The South Carolina court in Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co. likewise let the jury consider a driver's out-of-position posture in an airbag case, while requiring proof that the defendant's conduct proximately caused a specific share of the enhanced injuries.78
Helmets follow the same logic with an added limit. Where no statute requires protective gear such as a motorcycle helmet, failure to use it is typically unavailable as a defense.79 Courts have so held in Rogers v. Frush, which treated nonuse as inadmissible to show contributory negligence or failure to mitigate, and in McKinley v. Casson, which held nonuse irrelevant to comparative negligence because neither statute nor common law required a helmet. Comparative fault compares fault, and a precaution nobody was obliged to take leaves nothing to compare.
The fourth step reflects the burden. A defendant who can prove that some separable part of the plaintiff's injuries was caused by the nonuse may obtain a reduction for that part, and some jurisdictions require evidence that the belt would actually have lessened the injuries.80