Concept
Strict Liability and Plaintiff Fault
Plaintiff's fault outside ordinary negligence: strict liability and avoidable consequences
Plaintiff Fault Beyond Negligence
Strict Liability and Plaintiff Fault
Strict liability removes the question that normally organizes a tort case, whether the defendant behaved carelessly, and that removal unsettles the usual treatment of the plaintiff's own carelessness. In a negligence suit both parties answer to the same standard of reasonable care, so the plaintiff's lapse is a natural counterweight to the defendant's. A defendant who answers for keeping a dangerous animal, conducting an abnormally dangerous activity, or selling a defective product is judged by no such standard, and the yardstick is gone. The question becomes which kinds of plaintiff conduct can still reduce or defeat the claim.
Three answers have emerged, one for each subsection below. The traditional rule gives no effect to ordinary contributory negligence, a careless failure to notice or guard against the danger. It gives complete effect to a plaintiff who knows the danger and unreasonably chooses to meet it. Many courts and legislatures have since replaced that all-or-nothing treatment with comparative fault, which reduces recovery in proportion to each party's share of responsibility.
On an exam, first confirm that the defendant's liability is strict. Then classify the plaintiff's conduct, and last decide whether the jurisdiction applies the traditional categories or comparative fault.
Ordinary Contributory Negligence
Under the Second Restatement, a plaintiff's ordinary contributory negligence is no defense to strict liability for harm done by animals or by abnormally dangerous activities.1 The comment to § 402A carries the rule into strict products liability: contributory negligence that consists merely of a failure to discover a defect, or to guard against the possibility that one exists, is no defense.2 California took the same position in Luque v. McLean, holding that most forms of contributory negligence are no defense to a strict products claim, although negligence amounting to assumption of risk is a complete one.3 The rule reverses an instinct that negligence law trains, because there the plaintiff's carelessness is the first defense a defendant reaches for.
Sandy v. Bushey, a Maine case about a vicious colt, shows the logic. The plaintiff had turned his mare and colt out in a neighbor's pasture, where the defendant's three-year-old colt also grazed, and he was kicked and seriously injured while graining his mare. The evidence supported a finding that the defendant's colt had a vicious disposition and that the defendant knew it, so the keeper answered without regard to care.4 The defendant argued contributory negligence, and the court refused to treat it as a defense: once negligence is excluded as the basis of liability, contributory negligence has no place as a defense. The court left room for some plaintiff conduct to matter, but only conduct of a different order from slight negligence. Its opinion marks the boundary with this passage: a person who, “with full knowledge of the evil propensities of an animal wantonly excites him, or voluntarily and unnecessarily puts himself in the way of such an animal, he would be adjudged to have brought the injury upon himself, and ought not to be entitled to recover.”5
Exam writers usually test the edge of this rule by varying what the plaintiff knew. A contractor blasting beside a highway posts a warning sign or a flagman, and a driver passing through is hurt by a blast. Whether the driver missed the warning through inattention or saw it and drove on decides the case. In the blasting cases, for which Worth v. Dunn is the usual citation, a driver who negligently fails to observe the sign may recover, while a driver who sees the sign or flagman warning against proceeding and insists on going ahead cannot.6 The first driver committed the ordinary carelessness the rule forgives. The second made a knowing choice to encounter the danger, which the next subsection takes up. Sandy v. Bushey draws the same line with animals: the slight want of care it excused sits on one side, and the voluntary encounter with a known danger it described sits on the other.
The reason for the rule lies in what strict liability is. It rests on the willful creation of an abnormal risk by unusual conduct, and inherent in creating such a risk is the possibility that others will fail to anticipate or guard against it.7 A defense for mere inattention would therefore reach nearly every plaintiff and hollow out the claim, because inattention is the lapse the danger exploits. Products add a further reason. Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept them on faith in the manufacturer's reputation, and strict liability exists to put the costs of defective-product injuries on manufacturers rather than on injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.8
The rule can look incongruous at first glance.9 A plaintiff whose carelessness helped cause the harm shared control over the risk, and critics point out that the rule leaves an innocent defendant fully liable to that plaintiff even though fault would have defeated a claim against a negligent one. The Third Restatement responds by treating the plaintiff's negligence in strict-liability cases as a reason to reduce damages rather than to bar recovery.10 Whether that response persuades depends on why the defense was denied in the first place. If the reason was that the defendant is the best bearer of the risk of the accidents in question, adopting comparative negligence changes nothing. If the reason was that an all-or-nothing bar seemed too harsh, a proportional reduction answers the objection, and the answer may differ by context, so that comparative negligence might be wrong for abnormally dangerous activities yet right for products.11 A jurisdiction that still follows the Second Restatement applies the rule as taught here, and the comparative-fault subsection shows what changes where it does not.
Knowing Assumption of Risk
The one kind of plaintiff conduct that still defeats a strict products claim under comment n is the form of contributory negligence that consists of voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, commonly called assumption of risk. A user who discovers the defect, is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to use the product is barred.13 The same defense runs through the rest of strict liability. A keeper of animals or an operator of an abnormally dangerous activity may defend by showing that the plaintiff knowingly and unreasonably encountered the danger, and § 524(2) says so expressly for abnormally dangerous activities.14
The previous subsection explained why inattention is forgiven: the abnormal risk the defendant creates is one that others may fail to anticipate. A plaintiff who knows exactly how the danger works stands differently, because that plaintiff now decides whether the risk will be encountered at all. The defense rests on consent. A person who fully comprehends a risk and chooses to run it is treated as accepting responsibility for the consequences and relieving the person who created the risk, as the maxim volenti non fit injuria expresses.15 Courts traditionally found that tacit consent when the plaintiff, knowing of the risk and appreciating its quality, voluntarily chose to confront it.16 Nobody can consent to a danger unknown to them or forced upon them, so the defense requires an encounter that is informed and voluntary, and Second Restatement jurisdictions add that it be unreasonable.17
Knowledge, the first element, is measured inside the plaintiff's head. The question is what this plaintiff actually knew and understood, and arguing or instructing that the plaintiff should have known of the risk substitutes the vocabulary of contributory negligence, which the previous subsection showed is no defense.18 A subjective test still allows proof by circumstance. A plaintiff who denies awareness of a danger that was plainly visible will have trouble being believed, and matters of common knowledge, such as the slipperiness of ice, are charged to the plaintiff.19 The knowledge required is of the specific danger that caused the injury. A person may accept a general risk when taking a job or starting a project and still encounter no particular risk voluntarily at the moment of an accident.20
Heil Co. v. Grant shows how specific that knowledge must be, and how specific it need not be. A worker repairing a dump truck from underneath was warned by his brother that the raised bed would crash down if he hit the pullout cable on the hydraulic valve; the cable was bumped, and the bed crushed him.21 His family argued that he knew only the general danger of working beneath a truck and nothing of the hoist's design defect. The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, reasoning that the specific danger was that hitting the cable would drop the bed, which he knew, and that the defense turns on knowledge of a product's dangerous condition rather than on recognizing that the product is legally defective.22 In another case, a plaintiff who knew that small wood particles might be thrown toward his face believed that his glasses would protect his eyes, and the court upheld the trial instruction and affirmed his judgment.23 A general awareness of a hazard, joined to a belief that one is protected against it, is not knowledge of the danger that actually materialized.
Bowling v. Heil Co. shows that the outcome turns on the jury's finding about the plaintiff's own awareness. The bed of a dump truck did not return to the down position, and a worker put his head under the raised bed and manipulated a lever, whereupon the bed fell and killed him. The jury found him chargeable with contributory fault but found that he had not assumed the risk, and the court refused to reduce recovery for the defective hoist mechanism.24 Carelessness, even serious carelessness, counted for nothing under that approach. What counted was a finding about what the plaintiff knew and chose.
The same line separates assumption of risk from contributory negligence on everyday facts. Suppose an owner lends a car and warns the borrower that the brakes do not work, and the borrower shrugs, says the emergency brake will do, and drives off. The borrower assumed the risk, and the choice may well have been negligent too. If the owner says nothing and the borrower merely notices that the pedal feels loose and drives on without checking, the borrower was probably contributorily negligent but assumed nothing, because assumption of risk requires a showing that the plaintiff actually knew of the danger and chose to proceed.25 A plaintiff may unreasonably risk harm in two ways, by carelessly failing to recognize a risk or by consciously taking an unreasonable one, and each is contributory negligence, though only the second is usually called assumption of risk.26
Animal cases show how often knowledge becomes a jury question. A customer at a service station put a hand into an unlocked box of snakes kept for public display and was bitten by a rattlesnake. In Keyser v. Phillips Petroleum Co. the appellate court reversed a dismissal on the pleadings because the customer was entitled to try to prove that he did not know the dangers.27 A person cannot assume a danger never recognized. In Irvine v. Rare Feline Breeding Center, a visitor who had been to the farm about thirty times went into the backyard and petted a Siberian tiger through the fence. The court held that strict liability applied to the wild animal but that whether the keeper had proved assumption of risk was a question of fact for the jury.28 Thirty visits make knowledge likely, yet likelihood falls short of the finding the defense requires.
The second element asks whether the plaintiff met the danger by free choice. A plaintiff whose only reasonable option is to meet the known danger acts under a species of duress that destroys the idea of consent. Timing matters as well. A worker may accept a general risk when taking a job or starting a project, but the physical contact at the moment of an accident is usually an inadvertent slip, and an inadvertent act is not a deliberate choice, so the choice that counts is the decision to encounter the specific danger.29 The defense exists to hold people to their own choices about risk, and where no real choice existed it has nothing to rest on.
Courts are most receptive to challenges to voluntariness in two settings. A rescuer who enters a danger the defendant created has not freely chosen it, because the alternative is to let the threatened harm happen, and many courts do not bar a rescuer with the defense.30 Employment is the other setting. Does an employee assume the risk of using dangerous equipment where the alternative is to be fired? Many courts once said yes, but the trend and better view lets that economic compulsion defeat the defense.31
The third element reflects comment n's requirement of an unreasonable encounter. Conventional assumption of risk does not require unreasonableness, so a plaintiff who accepts a risk for good reasons can still be barred in a negligence case, and jurisdictions that follow comment n add the requirement for strict liability, which narrows the defense considerably.32 The limit fits the nature of strict liability. A defendant who creates a patently dangerous condition may not unreasonably limit the plaintiff's freedom of action or restrict the use of neighboring land, and in some settings, a circus for example, a plaintiff may reasonably assume the defendant will guard against the obvious risks.33 The defense is also distinct from product misuse. Courts limit a seller's responsibility to foreseeable uses because the ways a product might be misused are endless,34 but assumption of risk does not require use outside the product's intended and foreseeable limits.35
Not every jurisdiction follows this framework. A few states still treat assumption of risk as a complete bar in the traditional way, though most do not.36 Many others have merged conscious risk-taking into comparative fault, so that it reduces recovery without defeating it.37 Where the defense is a complete bar and ordinary carelessness is ignored, the label the jury chooses decides everything. A plaintiff who climbed on a tank he knew was sometimes “real slick” recovers nothing if the jury finds he fully appreciated and chose to encounter the danger, but recovers in full if the jury finds only that he carelessly disregarded a risk he did not fully appreciate.38 The next subsection turns to the jurisdictions that have replaced that all-or-nothing treatment and explains why they did so.
Comparative Fault in Strict Liability
Daly v. General Motors Corp. is the leading statement of how comparative fault reaches strict liability. A driver was thrown from his Opel in an accident allegedly caused by a defective door latch, and the evidence showed that he had not used the shoulder harness, had not locked the door, and was intoxicated.40 Under the older rules that carelessness would have counted for nothing, because only a knowing and unreasonable encounter with a known danger could defeat a strict products claim. The California Supreme Court held instead that a system of comparative fault extends to strict products liability and that the separate defense of assumption of risk is abolished to the extent it is a form of contributory negligence.41 Two changes follow. Plaintiff fault reduces recovery in proportion to the plaintiff's share of responsibility, and negligent assumption of risk stops operating as a complete bar and becomes one more input to the same apportionment, since most courts now conceive of unreasonable assumption of risk as a species of contributory negligence.42 Most jurisdictions have followed this lead, though a few have refused to recognize comparative fault in product liability cases or have limited it to plaintiffs who assumed the risk.43
Daly began from the point that strict liability has never been absolute liability, and that the manufacturer does not become the insurer of the safety of the product's user.44 The doctrine already carries limits, so asking how much of the harm the plaintiff's own lack of care produced does not turn it into something it never was. The court then asked a functional question instead of matching labels: would comparative principles defeat the purposes of strict liability? Those purposes were to insure that the costs of injuries from defective products are borne by manufacturers rather than by injured persons powerless to protect themselves.45 The answer was no. Plaintiffs remain relieved of proving negligence, the defendant's liability stays strict, and the cost of compensating the victim, though proportionately reduced, remains on the manufacturer. Only the share of damages that flows from the plaintiff's own fault shifts to the plaintiff.46 The court summed up the trade by saying that what may be lost in symmetry is “more than gained in fundamental fairness.”47
Three objections had been pressed against the merger, and the answers explain why most courts followed. The first was conceptual: critics said that apples and oranges cannot be compared. Daly replied that the objection insists on fixed definitions in an area where the law had repeatedly blended concepts to reach substantial justice, and that contributory negligence is conduct risking harm to the actor himself, involving no duty owed to the defendant, so it was never negligence in the sense the objection assumes.48
The same discussion answers what a jury actually compares. When a consumer sues the manufacturer alone, neither party's fault is literally weighed against the other. The conduct of one party combined with the product of another produced the injury, and the court preferred the phrase equitable apportionment or allocation of loss to comparative fault.49 The Third Restatement supplies a method. Each party's conduct is a proximate cause of the harm, so the factfinder compares relative causal contribution, looking to the nature of each party's risk-creating conduct, including awareness of or indifference to the risk, and to the strength of the causal connection between that conduct and the harm.50 Causal contribution is the measure. In one negligence case a speeding plaintiff was hit by a car crossing the median, the proof showed that his speed did not contribute to the collision though it increased his damages, and after extensive discussion of causation the court awarded the full amount.51 In Andrade v. Shiers, a lifelong cattleman tried to move a newborn calf off a muddy river bank while its mother stood unsecured a few feet away, and the cow attacked as he put the calf down. The court compared his unreasonable conduct with the owners' strict liability and allocated 80 percent of the fault to him.52
The second objection concerned deterrence: if the plaintiff's fault can reduce what the manufacturer pays, its incentive to make safe products shrinks. Daly called the worry “more shadow than substance.” The manufacturer cannot avoid its continuing liability for a defective product even when the plaintiff's conduct contributed to the injury, so its incentive to avoid and correct defects remains, and its exposure is lessened only to the extent the trier finds that the victim's conduct contributed.53
The third objection was that jurors cannot measure a plaintiff's negligence against a defendant's strict liability. Daly was unpersuaded, pointing to the maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness, a form of strict liability to which comparative principles have been applied with no serious practical difficulty even in jury trials.54 The court also found an affirmative reason to merge the doctrines. Without the merger, conduct amounting to negligent assumption of risk merely reduces damages in a negligence action but acts as a complete bar in a strict-liability action, which puts the strict-liability plaintiff in a worse position and rewards adroit pleading.55 The same gap can appear inside a single verdict. If a jury found a consumer 20 percent negligent in a comparative-negligence jurisdiction, she would recover 80 percent of her damages on a negligence claim over defective brakes,56 while under the traditional rule the same conduct would be no defense on the strict-liability count. Comparative fault closes the gap by treating the plaintiff's fault alike on both counts.
The question remained contested even as the court resolved it. The dissent asked how a trier of fact can rationally weigh the conduct of a human being against a defective product, and said it knew of no other instance in American law pitting a person's conduct against an inanimate object.57 A response in the same case is that the difficulty is not peculiar to strict liability, because it persists in almost every case in which parties' negligence is compared.58 On that view the problem calls for better methods of apportionment, not for a return to an all-or-nothing rule.
Since Daly, the Third Restatement has generalized the approach. Its products provisions treat assumption of risk as a form of plaintiff responsibility that reduces rather than bars recovery, on the view that all forms of a plaintiff's failure to conform to applicable standards of care are considered in apportioning responsibility.59 Its provisions on physical harm would apply comparative negligence principles to compare a plaintiff's negligence with strict liability for animals and abnormally dangerous activities.60 Courts outside products cases have followed. Kentucky, which had earlier rejected contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability, adopted comparative negligence for a dog-bite claim in Maupin v. Tankersley, and Missouri read its comparative-fault statute to cover strict liability for damage done by an escaped bull in Coble v. Taylor.61 Most jurisdictions renamed contributory negligence “comparative negligence” or “comparative fault” in the latter part of the twentieth century, and those principles now define the role of assumption of risk in many of them.62
Statutory text is the first counter-current. Most comparative-fault regimes were enacted by legislatures, and a court applying a statute that speaks of negligence must decide whether it reaches a claim that does not depend on negligence. Nebraska's court in Shipler v. General Motors Corp. read its statute to preclude a comparative negligence defense in strict products claims.63 Idaho went the other way in Boswell v. Steele, holding that comparative negligence principles apply to a dog-bite case even though the statute by its terms mentions only negligence.64 New Jersey's statute is also framed in negligence terms, and the Third Circuit in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. explained that it reaches strict liability when the plaintiff's conduct amounts to contributory negligence, so that a plaintiff found more than 50 percent responsible would be barred on a failure-to-warn claim.65 Legislatures can remove the doubt. New York's statute reduces damages in proportion to culpable conduct, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk,66 and the Arkansas and Maine statutes define fault broadly enough to include strict products liability.67 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act of 1977 settled the question by including strict tort liability in its definition of fault, but only two states adopted it.68
The survival of older rules is the second counter-current. In states that continue to reject comparative fault, the traditional user-conduct defenses still govern products claims, and much traditional doctrine on contributory negligence and assumption of risk has survived even in states that converted.69 In those jurisdictions the label the jury attaches to the plaintiff's conduct decides the outcome, as the previous subsection showed.
The third counter-current is the one nearly every court accepts. Even where comparative fault reaches strict liability, almost every court to consider the question exempts the plaintiff's careless failure to discover a defect, or to guard against its possible existence, from apportionment. Courts have chosen to shield consumers from all responsibility for failing to watch for product defects.70 One might have expected courts to throw such simple negligence back into the pot once the all-or-nothing rule fell, and the exemption survives because consumers rely on products being free of defects.
The exemption is narrow, and the usual exam error is to stretch it. In General Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, a defective parking-gear design let a truck pop out of gear and roll, crushing its owner. The Texas court held that merely failing to discover the defect would neither bar nor reduce recovery, but that the owner could be chargeable with fault for parking unsafely, independent of the defect, in which case damages would be reduced accordingly.71 A car whose defectively designed tires explode when driven five miles per hour over the speed limit shows the same logic from the other side. Speeding is negligent, so treating it as a bar would let the manufacturer escape liability for the very risk the tire design should have guarded against, and comparative fault lets the speeding reduce the recovery without defeating it.72
Once plaintiff fault counts, the factfinder calculates total damages and reduces them by the plaintiff's percentage of fault. If the trier decides that the defendant contributed 75 percent and the plaintiff 25 percent, a plaintiff with $10,000 in damages recovers $7,500.73 Systems differ on what happens when the plaintiff's share is large, but each changes the effect of fault from barring the claim outright to reducing damages in proportion to the plaintiff's fault.74 A pure system reduces at any percentage, so a plaintiff mostly at fault still recovers the defendant's share. California's Li decision adopted that form because a 50 percent system only moves the lottery of the all-or-nothing rule to a different line: a plaintiff 49 percent at fault recovers 51 percent of damages, while one at 50 percent recovers nothing.75 Modified systems keep a bar. Under a not-greater-than rule, such as New Jersey's statute, the plaintiff recovers if his negligence was not greater than the defendant's and is barred only above 50 percent.76 Under a not-as-great-as rule, the plaintiff is barred at 50 percent.
These threads combine into a sequence of questions, and settling them in order keeps a strict-liability problem from collapsing into arithmetic before the doctrine is sorted out.