Concept
Special Verdicts and Instructions
Comparative negligence (modern apportionment)
Special Verdicts and Instructions
Comparative negligence asks a jury to do far more than the contributory negligence bar did. The jury must decide the percentage of negligence of each party, including the plaintiff and perhaps absent tortfeasors. It must then value the plaintiff's damages, apply the comparative negligence statute to reduce them, and render a verdict for the reduced amount against the appropriate defendants.1 Jurors presumably know little about the doctrine, so the judge must instruct them fully on how to compare the parties' negligence, what the plaintiff's own negligence does to the claim, and how the damages are reduced. Those instructions are complicated.
A general verdict leaves no way to tell whether the jury understood them. “Verdict for plaintiff for $50,000” and “verdict for the defendant” announce an outcome and say nothing about the percentages or the arithmetic behind it.2 The opacity matters most at the margins. A $60,000 award to a plaintiff who suffered $150,000 in damages could be attacked as inadequate where contributory negligence bars recovery entirely, because the jury would have no valid reason to award only partial compensation. Under pure comparative negligence the same verdict is consistent with a finding that the plaintiff was 60 percent negligent. General verdicts conceal the jury's thought processes from the trial judge and the appellate court alike, while special verdicts promise greater judicial oversight.3
A special verdict splits the work. The jury answers factual questions about each party's negligence and about damages, and the court applies the comparative negligence statute to fashion the judgment.4 Many states authorize or require this procedure, and some statutes are blunt about it. One provides that where comparative negligence is an issue, “the jury shall return special verdicts” (or, without a jury, the court shall make special findings) fixing “the percentage of negligence attributable to each of the parties” and “the total amount of damages sustained by each of the claimants,” that “the entry of judgment shall be made by the court,” and that “[n]o general verdict shall be returned by the jury.”5 Idaho's statute lets any party ask the court to “direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to each party,” after which the court makes the reduction for a successful plaintiff.6 Courts have encouraged the practice as well. Quoting Li v. Yellow Cab Co., one opinion observed that the inherent difficulties of apportionment are not insurmountable, and that “the utilization of special verdicts or jury interrogatories can be of invaluable assistance in assuring that the jury has approached its sensitive and often complex task with proper standards and appropriate reverence.”7 Another decision authorizes the trial court to require special verdicts and to enter judgment that “may truly reflect the intent of the jury.”8
One court illustrated the division of labor with a form drawn from a federal jury-practice treatise. Once the jury's answers establish a finding of contributory negligence, the jury is told to “state in percentage the extent to which the plaintiff's own negligence contributed to his injuries.” It is then told to state the plaintiff's damages without reference to his own negligence, and the court reduces the award by the percentage the jury supplied. The court offered the form only as one illustrative technique for apportionment.9 A form of this kind keeps the subtraction with the judge. Where the question is open, a special verdict asking only for the fault percentages and total damages, with the court making the computations, is preferable because it reduces confusion and error. It also simplifies the charge, since the judge need not explain to the jury how to compare the negligence of the various parties in fashioning a final judgment.10
See how one set of findings turns into different judgments. Rousseau sues Locke and the city. The jury returns a special verdict finding Locke negligent, the city not negligent, Rousseau's damages $40,000, and Rousseau himself 55 percent at fault. The jury has answered fixed questions and applied no statute, so the judge does that work. In a pure comparative negligence state, Rousseau recovers the remaining 45 percent of $40,000. The judge therefore enters judgment against Locke for $18,000 and dismisses the claim against the city, since the jury did not find it negligent. In a modified state with a 50 percent bar, the judge enters judgment for both defendants, because Rousseau was more than 50 percent negligent.11 The difference in outcome comes entirely from the statute the judge applies, not from anything the jury decided.
A special verdict can also expose a mistake that a general verdict would bury. Suppose that in another version of the case Rousseau's damages are $100,000, he is 10 percent negligent, and the city was negligent but its negligence did not cause his injuries. A jury asked only for a general verdict might mistakenly count the city's negligence anyway, and would probably return a verdict against each defendant for $90,000, Rousseau's damages reduced by his own 10 percent. That verdict looks perfectly permissible on its surface even though it rests on a misunderstanding of the law. The general verdict often hides such mistakes.12 A special verdict puts the jury's reasoning on the record, where the judge can see it.
The states do not agree on any of this. Some require special verdicts, others permit them, and one or two bar them entirely despite their obvious utility; Vermont, for example, requires a general verdict.13 Where a special verdict is used, the court, not the jury, decides what the percentages reduce, and courts can err. In one maritime case the district court applied the Jones Act comparative negligence percentage to reduce the damages on the plaintiff's unseaworthiness claim. The court of appeals disagreed and held that the plaintiff could recover the full $545,000 the jury found on that claim, and that the defendants' Jones Act liability was joint and several rather than several only.14 Labels matter too. Once comparative fault replaced the bar, the same plaintiff conduct became an absolute bar if viewed as assumption of risk but only a partial bar if considered contributory fault, a difficulty taken up under assumption of risk below.15
A separate question is whether the jury should be told what its percentages will do. With a special verdict, the jury need only find the percentages, so the knowledge is logically unnecessary and may even impede objective decision making. Even so, a good many states require the judge to inform the jury of the effect of finding the plaintiff more negligent than the defendant; Iowa is one.16 In a state with a 50 percent bar, the instruction warns jurors that a plaintiff found as much at fault as the defendant, or more, will lose entirely. The plaintiff naturally seeks it, because the warning is likely to push a jury in a close case to find the plaintiff 49 percent negligent instead of 50, 55, or 60. Statutes that require the instruction accept that juries often structure their findings to divide the damages in close cases, and that in practical terms there is nothing particularly shocking about that.17
A few states keep the jury blindfolded. The jury simply returns a special verdict stating the plaintiff's total damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party, and the court then calculates whether the plaintiff recovers and how much. In those states the difference between a 50/50 and a 51/49 finding can have an enormous impact.18 The instruction question matters only where the jurisdiction bars a plaintiff at some level of fault, and thresholds are not always numerical. South Dakota is the only remaining jurisdiction that apportions damages so long as the plaintiff's negligence “was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant,” and otherwise bars recovery. What counts as “slight” is a “relative and variable term” that resists an arbitrary mathematical ratio, so a court there cannot reduce the threshold to a fixed percentage line.19
On a stem that hands you a special verdict, work as the judge does. Take the jury's findings as given, test the plaintiff's percentage against the jurisdiction's threshold, and only then reduce the damages.