Concept
The Complete Bar
Common-law contributory negligence (complete bar)
The Complete Bar
At common law, a plaintiff's own carelessness can defeat a claim that would otherwise succeed. Except where the defendant has the last clear chance, the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars recovery against a defendant whose negligent conduct would otherwise make that defendant liable for the plaintiff's harm.1 The defendant's breach may be clear, its causal role established, and the damages real; if the plaintiff's own negligence helped cause the harm, the plaintiff still recovers nothing.
Two questions follow. First, what does an all-or-nothing rule do in a decided case, and why did courts accept so severe a result when both parties were at fault? Second, does it matter whose carelessness came first? The Restatement says it does not: the bar reaches antecedent, subsequent, and simultaneous negligence alike.2 Last clear chance is the one exception in both formulations, and a later section treats it in full. Until then, read the bar as complete subject to that single qualification.
The All-or-Nothing Rule
A plaintiff can prove duty, breach, causation, and damages and still lose everything. The Restatement's wording shows how. Contributory negligence bars recovery against a defendant whose conduct would “otherwise” make that defendant liable, so the bar acts on a claim that would succeed and extinguishes it.3 A plaintiff who was slightly careless recovers what a grossly careless plaintiff recovers, which is nothing, and neither the size of the injury nor the gravity of the defendant's fault enters the calculation.
Consider Victoria and Mickey. A jury finds that Victoria's damages are $100,000, that Mickey is 90 percent at fault, and that Victoria is 10 percent at fault. Under the traditional rule, Victoria recovers nothing. In a comparative fault state, she recovers $90,000.4 That $90,000 gap, produced by a ten percent share of the fault, previews the criticism of the common-law rule taken up below.
The bar is traditionally traced to Lord Ellenborough's 1809 opinion in Butterfield v. Forrester.5 The plaintiff, “riding as fast as his horse would go,” ran into an obstruction the defendant had placed in the road. Lord Ellenborough stated the rule that “one person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care,” and the plaintiff was denied recovery because he had not used ordinary care to avoid the obstruction.6 Justice Bayley had told the jury to find for the defendant if a rider using reasonable and ordinary care could have seen and avoided the obstruction and the plaintiff was riding extremely hard and without ordinary care, and the jury did so.7 His own account was blunt: the plaintiff was proved to be riding as fast as his horse could go through the streets of Derby, ordinary care would have shown him the obstruction, and the accident therefore appeared to happen entirely from his own fault.8 The rule soon crossed to America as part of the common law and spread through the states.9
Bayley's account describes a plaintiff who alone caused the harm. The rule grew to reach far more. In the countless later cases applying the defense, nothing suggests that the plaintiff was the sole cause in fact or the sole proximate cause of the injury; the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's negligence were both causes in fact and both proximate causes.10 Any justification for the bar must therefore explain why a plaintiff who was one cause among two loses everything.
The harshness of the result suited its era. The late nineteenth century, when the common law of negligence took shape, prized rugged individualism, personal initiative, and self-determination, and judges steeped in those ideas readily accepted that the individual is master of his own fate and must bear the consequences of a careless choice.11 Courts and commentators also offered more specific explanations. Each is weak, which explains the heavy criticism the rule drew.
Two explanations rest on moral fault. The penal theory holds that the plaintiff is denied recovery as punishment for misconduct.12 The clean-hands theory holds that courts should not aid a plaintiff who does not come with clean hands. Neither explains why the plaintiff should bear the entire punishment when the defendant was also at fault, and in other contexts courts often grant relief to plaintiffs who were to some extent at fault.13
The deterrence explanation holds that the bar makes plaintiffs careful. A plaintiff, however, already has incentive enough in the prospect of serious personal injury.14 Meanwhile the bar weakens the incentives of defendants, who can anticipate being relieved of liability in some cases even when they are negligent.15 Many defendants, such as corporations, manufacturers, and landowners, risk no personal injury to themselves when they act negligently, so a rule that reduces their liability exposure reduces the total incentive toward safety that negligence law creates.16 Whatever small deterrence the defense achieves among plaintiffs, it fails to deter potential defendants at least as much.
The causal explanation treats the plaintiff's negligence as a superseding cause that breaks the chain between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's harm. That notion conflicts with the usual rule on intervening and superseding causes, under which another party's negligence is foreseeable and therefore does not supersede.17 It also treats the plaintiff's conduct as the single cause of the harm, which is simply untrue: the negligence of several persons may combine to produce one indivisible injury,18 and in the cases applying the defense both parties' negligence are causes in fact and proximate causes of the harm.19 Causal reasoning cannot explain the defense.
Two further explanations come from the machinery of the common law. Courts refused to apportion damages arising from negligence, reasoning that human tribunals cannot mete out exact justice by assigning effects to their causes, and the same refusal explains why one tortfeasor could not recover contribution from another.20 Issue pleading may also have played a part, because it posed questions answerable yes or no and so left courts, on this theory, no choice but to award all or nothing.21 These explanations show how the rule could be administered. They do not show that it was fair, and in most cases the refusal to apportion was simply arbitrary and unjust.22
Most legal historians believe the most important reason was practical: the total bar reduced the liability exposure of emerging industries and railroads in the nineteenth century, so that liability would not thwart the Industrial Revolution.23 Whatever the motives, the notion at the core of the defense, that it is unfair to impose liability on a defendant when the plaintiff has negligently contributed to the injury, has a mirror image that is equally true. It is unfair to relieve the defendant of liability completely merely because the plaintiff's negligence was also a cause of the injury.24
The weakness of the rationale led courts and legislatures to find ways around the total bar, among them the last clear chance doctrine and the rule that a defendant whose conduct was willful and wanton cannot invoke it.25 Tennessee's courts, for example, long recognized that contributory negligence does not absolutely bar recovery where the defendant's conduct was intentional or grossly negligent, where the defendant had the last clear chance, or where the plaintiff's negligence was “remote.”26 Absent such an exception, the analysis stays short. If the plaintiff's own negligence was a legal cause of the harm, the defendant's greater fault does not change the result.
Timing of the Plaintiff's Fault
The order of the two lapses does not affect the bar. Except where the defendant has the last clear chance, the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars recovery whether it is antecedent to the defendant's negligence, subsequent to it, or simultaneous with it.28 Antecedent means the plaintiff's lapse came first, subsequent means it followed the defendant's, and simultaneous means the two occurred together. In all three patterns the claim fails.
Timing drops out because the bar asks whether the plaintiff's negligence helped cause the harm, and it does not ask who was careless last. Where the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's negligence are both causes in fact and proximate causes of the harm,29 the order in which they occurred changes neither fact. Sequence would matter only to a theory that treats the plaintiff's lapse as a superseding cause, because an intervening cause comes after what it displaces, and that theory conflicts with the usual rule that another party's negligence is foreseeable and does not supersede.30
A plaintiff cannot escape the bar by arguing that the defendant created the danger first, or that the plaintiff's own lapse was over before the defendant acted. Each argument takes sequence as the test, and the rule uses none. The plaintiff must still contend with causation: a lapse that played no part in how the harm happened is not a contributing cause, and it does not bar the claim whenever it occurred.
Sequence matters in one place, the exception itself, because the defendant's chance must be the last one. A defendant has the last clear chance when the defendant, through the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided the plaintiff's injury.31 When the defendant had that chance, the bar yields.32 Courts have also limited the exception. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, on a certified question in 1999, held that last clear chance does not apply to the intentional act of a woman who committed suicide by jumping into the path of an oncoming subway train, in her estate's suit against the transit authority for the operator's negligent failure to stop in time.33
Conduct after the injury falls under a different rule. Contributory negligence concerns the plaintiff's lapse as one of the causes of the accident; mitigation concerns what the plaintiff does once injured. An injured plaintiff must use reasonable care to seek treatment and must follow reasonable directions from a health care provider, and a plaintiff who loses earnings must make a reasonable effort to find gainful employment of which the plaintiff is now capable. If the plaintiff unreasonably fails to take prescribed medicine and the injury becomes more serious than it would have been, the enhanced injury is caused by the failure to mitigate.34
The two doctrines also differ in what they take away. A lapse that helps cause the accident defeats the whole claim at common law. A lapse that only enlarges the harm afterward reaches only the enlargement. The better approach divides the plaintiff's damages, where possible, between those caused by the original injury and those caused by the failure to mitigate, and applies the failure to mitigate only to the second group; contributory negligence in causing the original injury then operates on the first.35
One boundary case sits between the two doctrines. A plaintiff who failed to wear an available seat belt did not contribute to the collision itself; the omission merely aggravates the damages, and courts distinguish it from contributory negligence for that reason. If the defendant proves that some separable part of the injuries came from the omission, some courts refuse damages for that part or treat the omission as comparative fault, but where no statute requires the protective gear, the omission is typically no defense at all.36 The test in each case is whether the plaintiff's lapse helped bring about the accident, which triggers the bar, or only enlarged the harm afterward, which reaches the added damages alone.