Concept
The Foreseeability Approach
Claims for pure economic loss
The Foreseeability Approach
A few courts have replaced the flat bar on purely economic loss with a duty built on foreseeability. The leading formulation holds that a defendant owes a duty of care to take reasonable measures to avoid causing economic damage, aside from physical injury, to particular plaintiffs or to an identifiable class of plaintiffs whom the defendant knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer that damage from its conduct. A defendant who breaches the duty answers for the economic damages it proximately causes.1 The leading case is People Express, a New Jersey decision in which a chemical fire at a rail yard shut down a nearby airline whose property was undamaged. The next subsection takes it up.2
The approach loosens one of the limits damages law places on what a plaintiff may claim, because the law restricts recovery of purely economic loss.3 Defenders of the bar give four reasons. Economic losses can proliferate long after the physical forces in an accident have spent themselves. Recognizing such claims would greatly increase the number, complexity, and expense of lawsuits. The resulting liabilities would be indeterminate and out of proportion to the defendant’s culpability. And victims can often protect themselves through first-party insurance or by contract.4 The foreseeability approach meets the indeterminacy worry by tying the duty to what the defendant knew or had reason to know about the plaintiffs and their loss.
Whether that tie does the work the bar does is the question for the rest of this section. The first subsection presents the argument for flexibility through its leading case. The second explains why most courts decline to follow it. The California Supreme Court called People Express “a lonely outpost,” and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm treats it as a contrary position taken only occasionally.5 The identifiable-class test asks a court to draw, claim by claim, the same boundary a bright-line rule draws once. On a stranger-rule fact pattern, treat the bar as the default, and apply the identifiable-class test only when the jurisdiction follows People Express or the problem says so.
People Express: A Duty to an Identifiable Class
People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp. began with a puncture. Rail workers were trying to attach a tank car carrying a hazardous substance to another freight car when the tank car was punctured, and the fire that followed forced the airline to evacuate its business.6 The substance was ethylene oxide, a volatile chemical.7 Municipal authorities evacuated the area within a one-mile radius of the fire to lessen the risk to people if the burning tank car exploded. That area included the adjacent North Terminal of Newark International Airport, where the airline’s business operations were based.8 The feared explosion never occurred, but airline employees were barred from the terminal for twelve hours.9 The airline’s property was undamaged, and it lost only the business it would have done while it was shut down.10
Those facts fit the stranger rule closely. The airline owned nothing that was harmed, and its loss reached it only through an evacuation. Over the century a virtually per se rule had evolved barring recovery of economic loss unless the negligent conduct also caused physical harm, based in part on Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint and on the English decision in Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co.11 Under that rule the airline’s claim would have failed at the duty stage.
The court attacked the rule’s premise first. The one characteristic that separates plaintiffs whose economic-loss claims courts have regularly denied from those who have recovered, it observed, is the fortuitous occurrence of physical harm or property damage, however slight. A defendant who negligently injures a plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property already answers for all proximately caused harm, economic losses included.12 Put concretely, a business whose premises suffer a little damage recovers its lost profits, and a business that loses the same profits with no damage recovers nothing.
The court then looked at the exceptions courts had already carved out of the bar. The rationalizations differ from case to case, but two threads run through them. Foreseeability is a more appropriate standard of liability than a per se prohibition. And the extent to which the defendant knew or should have known the particular consequences of its negligence, including the economic loss of a particularly foreseeable plaintiff, is dispositive of duty and fault.13 Those threads produced the holding stated at the start of this section: a duty to particular plaintiffs or an identifiable class whom the defendant knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer the loss, with liability for the economic damages the breach proximately causes.14 The standard turns on particular foreseeability. The question is whether the defendant could foresee this plaintiff or this class and the kind of loss it would suffer, which is narrower than asking whether someone somewhere might lose money.
The phrase “identifiable class” carries most of the weight. The court required a class that is particularly foreseeable in four respects.15
- The type of persons or entities that make up the class.
- The certainty or predictability of their presence.
- The approximate numbers of those in the class.
- The type of economic expectations disrupted.
Each factor does separate work. The first two tell the defendant who stands inside the risk: a fixed business at a known address answers that question, and a car passing on the highway does not. The third limits the size of the exposure. The fourth ties the duty to a kind of loss the defendant could anticipate. Merely foreseeable plaintiffs do not qualify. In reading People Express, Chief Judge Kaye of New York observed that the presence of members of the public, of invitees at a particular plaintiff’s business, or of persons traveling nearby, while foreseeable, is nevertheless fortuitous.16 A group whose presence is that uncertain is not a sufficiently ascertainable class.17
The airline cleared the test on the facts the court recited. Its terminal sat close to the freight yard, the nature of its operations was obvious, and economic losses from an accident and evacuation were particularly foreseeable. The defendants also had actual or constructive knowledge of the volatile properties of ethylene oxide. Some of them had prepared an emergency response plan, mentioned at oral argument, that apparently called for evacuating the nearby area to avoid harm in case of an explosion.18 Actual knowledge of the eventual economic losses was not required, because particular foreseeability suffices.19 A fixed business at a known location, whose evacuation an emergency plan anticipated, stands at the opposite pole from the driver who happens to be on the highway when the accident occurs.
Establishing a duty did not win the case. The court held that the airline had stated a cause of action and was entitled to a plenary trial. It warned that the airline still faced a difficult task in proving damages, particularly lost profits, to the degree of certainty required in other negligence cases. It also expected the cause of action to evolve case by case in actual adjudications.20 Courts that have allowed negligence actions for economic loss have usually weighed four things: the foreseeability that a person in the plaintiff’s position would suffer the loss, the closeness of the connection between the negligence and the loss, the ability to identify a limited category of parties to whom the duty would be owed, and policy factors such as deterrence and placing the loss on the party better able to bear it.21
A stem about an evacuation or business closure invites two analyses. Under the bar, the claim fails at the duty stage however foreseeable the loss. Under People Express, the question is whether the plaintiff belongs to an identifiable class, and the stem usually answers it with details. A fixed business near the hazard, facing a defendant that knew what the hazard could do and had planned for an evacuation, points toward a duty. Delayed travelers, visiting customers, and businesses whose presence and losses no one could have predicted point away from one.
Why Courts Reject It
The fullest modern rejection comes from Southern California Gas Co. v. Superior Court, a California Supreme Court decision about a massive, months-long leak from a natural gas storage facility just outside Los Angeles.24 Porter Ranch area businesses sued on behalf of a class of every business within five miles of the facility. They alleged that SoCalGas’s negligence caused the leak and that the relocation of many residents devastated the local economy by depriving businesses of customers.25 None alleged personal injury or property damage.26 The trial court overruled SoCalGas’s demurrer on the reasoning that companies must face the full cost of accidents they create or they will underinvest in precautions, and the Court of Appeal reversed.27 The Supreme Court held that SoCalGas had no tort duty to guard against purely economic losses.28
The court reached that result through the duty element, and its starting point shows why the claim was uphill. For traditionally compensable injury, such as physical harm to person or property, California presumes that the defendant owed a duty of care and asks whether the circumstances justify a departure from that presumption under Rowland.29 Purely economic loss starts from the opposite position, because the general rule is no recovery for negligently inflicted purely economic loss.30 The primary exception is the special relationship, in which the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of a particular transaction but was harmed by the defendant’s negligence in carrying it out.31 The gas-leak plaintiffs conceded that their only relevant tie to SoCalGas was the misfortune of operating near the facility.32 Proximity is not a transaction meant to benefit them.
Courts elsewhere have reached the same place. In 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. 2001), the New York Court of Appeals declined to hold “that a landowner owes a duty to protect an entire urban neighborhood against purely economic losses” after a collapse. It limited the duty to those who suffered personal injury or property damage, a limit it said gave a principled basis for apportioning liability and avoided crushing liability to an indeterminate group in the affected areas.33 Concerned about line-drawing problems and potentially overwhelming liability, courts across the country have rejected recovery for purely economic losses stemming from man-made calamity.34 Chief Judge Kaye’s opinion in 532 Madison both rejects and distinguishes People Express, reasoning that the plaintiffs could not meet its particular-foreseeability standard because the presence of the public, invitees, and nearby travelers is fortuitous.35 The two decisions put the boundary in different places. New York fixes it at personal injury or property damage, and New Jersey fixes it at the identifiability of a class.
The California court’s central objection is line drawing. It held that claims for purely economic losses suffered through mere proximity to an industrial accident create intractable line-drawing problems for courts, so they are best not treated as compensable in negligence.36 The plaintiffs’ own proposal shows why. Having conceded that geography was their only link to SoCalGas, they defined the class by proximity alone: businesses within five miles, which they described as the precise area from which residents were evacuated.37 An evacuation boundary marks where officials judged people to be at risk, and it says nothing about which businesses lost customers. The court saw no workable way to limit geographically who may recover, and it saw no viable temporal limit either. Without a limit, the dangers of indeterminate liability, over-deterrence, and endless litigation are at their apex.38
The two courts also framed deterrence differently. The trial court worried that companies would underinvest in precautions if they escaped the full cost of their accidents.39 The Supreme Court listed over-deterrence beside indeterminate liability and endless litigation as dangers that a duty without workable limits would push to their apex.40
The court did not minimize the harm. Risks from industrial accidents raise grave concerns for society, and the court had no doubt the accident caused significant hardships. Tort law plays a pivotal role in compensating those harmed and deterring those who do the harming, but society’s interests are not best served by extending its scope indefinitely. Meaningful limits on tort liability, and the incentives they set, are crucial to the functioning of the economy and the courts. Where such limits leave gaps, tort does not stand alone: insurance also compensates, regulation also deters, and where gaps persist the Legislature can act.41
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm §7 embraces the holding and rationale of 532 Madison and rejects People Express as a “[c]ontrary position . . . taken only occasionally in the case law.”42 That places the Restatement, New York, and California on one side of the divide, with People Express on the other.
Step 3 does the work in the usual fact pattern. A business inside the evacuation zone that loses a predictable amount and points to the defendant’s knowledge of the danger has described proximity and foreseeability, the very facts the California court held insufficient to create a duty.