Concept
Exceptions to the Bar
Claims for pure economic loss
Exceptions to the Bar
Negligence law turns away a stranger whose only injury is financial, but the rule has edges, and most disputes in this area turn on which side of an edge the plaintiff stands.
A plaintiff hurt in person or property recovers the money that follows from the hurt. The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists harm to property, harm to earning capacity, and the creation of liabilities among the compensatory damages that depend on proof of pecuniary loss, and it recognizes harm to property or business caused by an invasion.1 Economic loss that is “parasitic” on the plaintiff’s own bodily injury or property damage is recoverable in the ordinary way: out-of-pocket medical expenses, lost wages, and profits lost because of damage to the plaintiff’s property are all economic losses that negligence plaintiffs recover.2 The economic loss rule also leaves tort recovery open when the plaintiff suffers physical injury as well, or when property other than the object of a contract is damaged.3 The stranger rule governs a different plaintiff, one whose financial loss grows out of physical harm to someone else’s person or property, as when a negligent collision closes a bridge for half a day and burdens everyone who needed to cross.4
This section collects two kinds of situations. Some are true exceptions: the plaintiff has pure economic loss, and the law grants a remedy anyway. Others fall outside the bar’s definition, because the plaintiff’s loss rests on an interest in property that the defendant physically damaged. A true exception calls for naming the reason the bar yields. A definitional escape calls for showing that the facts take the claim outside the bar’s description in the first place. Intentional torts such as fraud and interference with contract or prospective advantage were never within the bar, so they stay outside this discussion.5
Each exception works because it removes a reason for the bar. Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm gives four reasons: economic losses can proliferate long after the physical forces in an accident have spent themselves; recognizing such claims would greatly increase the number, complexity, and expense of lawsuits; liability would be indeterminate and out of proportion to the defendant’s culpability; and victims of economic injury often can protect themselves through first-party insurance or by contract.6 A court that recognizes an exception is finding that, on its facts, one or more of those reasons is missing. The class of claimants may be small and identifiable, the defendant may have undertaken to protect the plaintiff’s economic interests, a legislature may have fixed the limits of recovery in advance, or the plaintiff may hold a property interest that the physical harm invaded.
Foreseeability cannot carry a plaintiff through any of these doors. In the time-charter case of Robins Dry Dock, the dry dock did not know of the charter when it damaged the propeller, and the Fifth Circuit majority in Testbank observed that delay losses were certainly foreseeable. The Supreme Court nevertheless denied recovery, a result the Testbank majority called a pragmatic limitation upon the tort doctrine of foreseeability.7 A plaintiff reaches an exception only by fitting the facts to the exception’s own reason. The first exception comes closest to the ordinary tack-on rule, because it asks what the plaintiff held in the property the defendant damaged.
Proprietary Interest in Damaged Property
A defendant who invades a plaintiff’s proprietary interest owes the economic loss that follows, and the same is true of damages incurred to avoid a physical invasion of that interest.8 In Catalyst Old River Hydroelectric Ltd. Partnership v. Ingram Barge Co., the Fifth Circuit held that blocking an intake channel that was part of a hydroelectric facility invaded a proprietary interest, so the facility’s economic loss was recoverable.9
This exception is more a limit on the bar’s definition than a true exception to it. The bar reaches economic loss “unaccompanied by physical damage to a proprietary interest,” so a plaintiff who has such an interest never meets it.10 Lost use and lost profits that follow from damage to property the plaintiff owns or controls are tacked-on damages, and the stranger rule does not touch them.
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint shows the other side. A dry dock negligently damaged a steamship’s propeller, and the time charterer lost the ship’s use while repairs went forward. The Court framed the question as whether the charterers had “an interest protected by the law against unintended injuries inflicted upon the vessel by third persons who know nothing of the charter.” If they did, the Court said, the interest “must be worked out through their contract relations with the owners, not on the postulate that they have a right in rem against the ship.”11 It held that “a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other unknown to the doer of the wrong.”12 The charterer’s claim ran against the owner, in contract, and not against the dry dock in tort.
The Testbank litigation shows the rule at work. Forty-one suits came from shipping interests, marina and boat rental operators, seafood wholesalers and retailers not engaged in fishing, seafood restaurants, tackle and bait shops, and recreational fishermen. The defendants moved for summary judgment on every claim for pure economic loss. The district court granted the motion on every claim except those of commercial fishermen, a panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the court sitting en banc retained the rule that physical damage to a proprietary interest is required to recover economic loss in unintentional tort actions.13
What counts as a proprietary interest depends on a functional analysis and not on formal state-law property doctrines. The question is whether the claimant had possession and sufficient control of the damaged property, and a demonstrable exclusive interest is necessary for recovery of loss of use.14 A non-exclusive right to use a damaged pier or railroad bridge does not justify recovery. A building contractor constructing a pipeline that the defendant negligently damaged, and the owner of a leased barge unloading facility that suffered damage, held sufficient interests and recovered for loss of use.15 The Robins charterer held its right through a contract with the owner, and no right in the ship itself.16
The property-damage trigger has boundary questions of its own. In products cases, courts ask whether the product is an integrated whole. If it is, damage to the whole product by a defective component is not damage to “other property”: the product is deemed to have damaged itself, which leaves the plaintiff to whatever contract rights he had.17 That analysis returns in the later material on products.
The demand for possession and control keeps the exception from swallowing the rule. Charterers, suppliers, customers, and employees all hold contracts that depend on some damaged thing, so if dependence counted as an interest, the class of claimants would again have no edge. A party with only a contract can allocate the risk through that contract, and one reason courts give for the bar is that it preserves a contract’s limits on liability and other allocations of loss.18 California recognizes disclaimers of warranty as to economic loss in Seely v. White Motor Co., and Wisconsin found the rule particularly appropriate in Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., where the contract excluded liability for economic harm.19 The fortuitous plaintiff is also screened out. In 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., the New York Court of Appeals declined to hold that a landowner owes a duty to protect an entire urban neighborhood against purely economic losses. It limited the duty to those who suffered personal injury or property damage, a limit it said gave a principled basis for apportioning liability and prevented crushing liability to an indeterminate group.20
Public Nuisance With Special Harm
Public nuisance reaches plaintiffs who hold nothing in the damaged resource. A highway, a river, or a public waterway belongs to the public, so a business that loses money when the resource is obstructed would ordinarily be a stranger with pure economic loss. Section 8 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm makes an actor whose wrongful conduct harms or obstructs a public resource or public property liable for resulting economic loss if the claimant’s losses are distinct in kind from those suffered by members of the affected community in general.23
A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public, and an action may lie even though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant acts in the exercise of private property rights.24 The category is broad. It covers anything from blocking a highway to a gaming house or indecent exposure, and it resembles a catch-all, low-grade criminal offense.25 Because the wrong is public, the normal remedy lies with the state, and in most states the district attorney or another official may sue for abatement.26 A public nuisance can also be a private one when it interferes with private land.27
A private plaintiff therefore needs more than a public wrong. Section 821C(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts requires that “one must have suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of interference.”28 The requirement leaves the general harm, which every user of the resource shares, with public officials, and it reserves a private action for the plaintiff whose injury differs in kind. It also answers the worry about multiplying lawsuits that the Restatement gives as a reason for the stranger rule.29
A closed highway shows how the comparison sorts plaintiffs.30 A commuter who must travel the long way around twice a day bears the delay every traveler bears, only more often. A driver who runs into an unguarded, unlighted obstruction and is injured has suffered a bodily harm that other travelers have not. An owner whose land is cut off from the road has lost access to private land, the situation in which a public nuisance also becomes a private one.31 The commuter differs from the public in amount, and the other two differ in kind.
The words “different in kind” do the work, and a larger amount of the same harm does not satisfy them. A shop whose lost sales are twice its neighbor’s has still lost sales for the same reason every neighbor did.
Courts differ on how much work nuisance should do for economic-loss plaintiffs. The Testbank dissent would have applied the usual doctrines of foreseeability and proximate cause “as refined in the law of public nuisance.” It reasoned that the limit imposed by “particular” damages, together with refined notions of proximate cause and foreseeability, “provides a workable scheme of liability that is in step with the rest of tort law, compensates innocent plaintiffs, and imposes the costs of harm on those who caused it.”32 The majority kept the physical-damage rule.33 A careful statement of the special-harm requirement reads it strictly and acknowledges the competing view.
Commercial fishermen are the plaintiffs who most reliably satisfy both conditions. Commercial fishermen and clam diggers operating in public waters can recover on a public nuisance theory for harm to the waters and marine life caused by oil discharged from a tanker in transit.34 Where a plaintiff’s business rests in part on the exercise of a public right, the plaintiff has been able to recover purely economic loss caused by the defendant’s negligence, a “very solid exception” that the cases connect to private actions for public nuisance and support by citing Union Oil Co. v. Oppen.35 A longstanding line of cases grants commercial fishermen lost profits when pollution or another casualty disrupts their work, because of their “particular and special nature” and because their losses are especially foreseeable and a direct consequence of a casualty such as an oil spill.36 The better and widely accepted view in admiralty is that the economic harm rule does not bar commercial fishermen’s lost earnings from a maritime tort.37 Even in Testbank, the district court excepted the commercial fishermen’s claims from summary judgment.38
The exception stops with the most direct users of the resource. Courts limit liability to the most direct plaintiffs, the fishers, and deny it to those affected one step away: the people who buy the fish, process them, sell them to restaurants, serve them, or park cars at seafood restaurants, and the people who sell to the fishers, such as marinas, bait and tackle shops, and, for sport fishers, hotels and guides.39 Those businesses did not exercise the public right themselves, and their losses reach them through the fishermen’s lost catch. The Testbank claimants were of this kind, and paying them would rebuild the open-ended class that the special-harm requirement keeps out.40
The comparison also looks at where the plaintiff’s loss came from. A plaintiff must have suffered its different harm in exercising the public right that was interfered with, so a large and genuine financial loss still fails if it comes from some other source.41
Steps 2 and 3 sort the failing claims. A plaintiff who passes step 1 only because its business sits near the harm has shown the geography of the loss and nothing more, and a plaintiff who answers step 3 with a larger loss has answered with magnitude.
Special Relationships and Professionals
The first two exceptions looked at what the plaintiff held or suffered. This one looks at what the defendant undertook. When a defendant negligently performs a professional or business service, liability has been extended to clients, and sometimes to others who foreseeably relied on the service or were its intended beneficiaries.44 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm covers these cases in sections 4 and 6, and the group includes accountants and auditors, surveyors, termite inspectors, engineers, attorneys, notaries public, architects, and weighers.45 Fiduciaries belong to the same family. Liability for merely negligent misrepresentation is reserved mainly for professional and fiduciary relationships, where the parties expect that reasonable care will be taken to ensure that statements are accurate.46
That reservation shrinks the bar’s reach. Many jurisdictions, and the Third Restatement, let professional malpractice and negligent misrepresentation proceed even when the plaintiff has incurred only economic harm, so the Testbank rule tends to preclude only general negligence and strict liability actions for pure economic loss.47 It is still accurate to treat the absence of negligence liability for pure economic loss as the norm outside professional-client cases, with some extension to business services performed for the plaintiff’s benefit and to negligent misrepresentation. Liability will not exist unless a court is persuaded that it should for a particular type of case.48
The reasons for the bar lose force in these cases. Courts have found liability fair and just where the defendant, by virtue of special activities or professional training, had particular knowledge or reason to know that others would be economically harmed by negligent work. Their examples include the intended beneficiaries of wills and the purchasers of stock who were expected to rely on a financial statement in a prospectus. Even when the particular plaintiff was not always foreseeable, the class of plaintiffs and the type of injury were.49 A class that is foreseeable in advance answers the indeterminacy worry. The self-protection argument also weakens. Clients hire professionals to supply reasonable care, so the protection they bought was the duty itself, and whether first-party insurance will protect other plaintiffs is an empirical question that the Testbank majority and dissent answered differently without evidence.50
California gives the idea a testable form. Southern California Gas Co. v. Superior Court arose from a massive, months-long leak at a natural gas storage facility outside Los Angeles that severely harmed the economy of a nearby suburb. The question was whether local businesses with no personal injury or property damage could recover in negligence for income lost because of the leak.51 The court called a “special relationship” the primary exception to the rule against recovery for negligently inflicted pure economic loss. It defined the term as a situation in which the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of a particular transaction but was harmed by the defendant’s negligence in carrying it out.52 The businesses conceded that their only relevant tie to the defendant was operating near the facility, and they proposed a class defined by geographic proximity alone. The court found that no special relationship existed.53
Two earlier California cases show what an intended beneficiary looks like. In J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, a contractor hired by a property owner to renovate space rented by a restaurant operator negligently failed to finish on time, and the operator recovered its purely economic losses.54 In Biakanja v. Irving and in J’Aire, the duty rested on the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff and on further factors: the foreseeability of harm, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the conduct and the injury, the moral blame attached to the defendant, and the policy of preventing future harm.55 The same idea explains the will cases. The person a will names to receive property is the one whom the work of the lawyer or notary preparing it was meant to benefit.56
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. confines the exception. The California court limited auditor liability for negligent misrepresentation to plaintiffs who, like those in Biakanja and J’Aire, were “specifically intended beneficiaries” of the audit.57 It explained that foreseeability “may set tolerable limits for most types of physical harm” but “provides virtually no limit on liability for nonphysical harm,” because on “clear judicial days” courts “can foresee forever.” It worried about letting the countless people who rely on public audit reports recover the “pure economic loss suffered” because of a shoddy audit.58
The Restatement draws the same line for people who supply information. Under section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and prevailing case law, a person who negligently furnishes false information is liable only to the person, or one of a limited, specific, and identifiable group, for whose benefit and guidance the supplier intends to supply it, or where the supplier knows the recipient intends to rely on it.59 A defendant with a public duty to furnish information, such as a notary public or a food inspector, answers for pecuniary loss to any member of the class for whose benefit the duty exists.60
The work product in these cases is usually a document that others read. In one Wisconsin case, for example, an accounting firm prepared a client’s financial statements for several years and accompanied them with an opinion letter stating that they fairly presented the client’s financial condition and followed generally accepted accounting principles.61 The older New York cases show how much turns on what the defendant knew. A public weigher who knew his certification was meant for the buyer’s use was liable to the buyer in Glanzer v. Shepard, but he would not have been liable had he been unaware that the buyer would rely, even though he could reasonably anticipate that some third person would. Accountants who certified a corporate financial statement escaped liability for the same reason in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.62 The courts feared that a negligent misrepresentation, once released into the world, could be relied on by unknown numbers of third persons, or for a purpose the defendant never contemplated, causing a loss out of all proportion to the defendant’s fault. Most courts now allow recovery by the members of a sufficiently limited group if the defendant knew that one or more of them would receive and rely on the information, even without knowing who they were.63
Lawyers follow the same logic. A duty to a nonclient who was the intended beneficiary of the lawyer’s work is a limited one with a special utility. Courts apply it most often to drafting errors in wills and other documents and to erroneous title reports, errors that by their nature take effect late and probably affect people other than the lawyer’s immediate client, though it has been applied in other contexts as well, as in Donald v. Garry.64 One court refused to extend it to bidders at a foreclosure sale where the lawyers represented the mortgagee, because the mortgagee wanted the highest price and the bidders the lowest, and a lawyer could not lawfully represent both.65
Negligent misrepresentation is the related path, because most professional carelessness reaches the plaintiff as advice, information, or an opinion that turns out wrong. There is liability for fraud almost without regard to the business setting in which a lie causes economic harm, but liability for merely negligent misrepresentation is not imposed in ordinary commercial settings.66 Tort liability for innocent misrepresentation generally attaches only when the defendant has warranted the truth of its statement.67 For claims other than personal injury and property damage, courts often require the claimant to show that the defendant owed a duty to impart accurate information, and a relationship that is too remote supports none. A union that paid its members’ medical expenses for smoking-related lung disease could not build such a duty against the cigarette manufacturer whose safety claims it said were false.68
Two errors recur in this area. One treats foreseeable harm, or a plaintiff’s closeness to the defendant’s activity, as the relationship itself, when proximity only identifies who happened to be near. The other treats a professional defendant as the end of the analysis, when the plaintiff must still be the client, an intended beneficiary, or a member of a limited group the defendant knew would rely.
Step 2 does the sorting. A plaintiff with real losses and a careless professional in the facts invites a finding of duty, and the question that settles it is whether the work was meant for that plaintiff.
Transferred or Single Loss
The stranger bar leans on the fear of a domino effect, in which one economic loss produces another and a careless defendant answers to an indeterminate class for an indeterminate time.71 The fear has nothing to attach to when the negligence causes a harm that lands on one person and creates no new losses downstream, and a court may then find that principle and policy support a duty.72 A transferred loss is an economic harm that the defendant’s negligence first inflicts on A and that then passes to someone else, by contract or otherwise, without creating further harms or liabilities. A single loss is the broader category. It includes every transferred loss and also the case where only one loss can be suffered whether or not it ever moves.73
The vocabulary is borrowed. Canadian and European law use the name transferred loss, and American courts have not announced a doctrine by that name, so no American decision announces a transferred-loss rule. What exists is a pattern of results that point the same way, and a sound answer names the route the court actually took, which is often negligent misrepresentation or a duty owed to an intended beneficiary.74
The surveyor cases show the pattern most clearly. A surveyor retained by A negligently marks the boundaries of a parcel. A builds structures that do not sit entirely on the land, or pays too much for a parcel smaller than the survey showed, and then sells to B before the error comes to light. B ends up with the loss, either by moving or destroying the structures or by discovering the true size of the parcel. B was not the surveyor’s client, suffered no physical harm, and holds only a financial claim, so B looks like the stranger the bar was built to exclude. Courts nevertheless tend to find some ground for liability.75
The reason lies in how the loss behaves as the property changes hands. However many times the parcel is sold, only one sale will ultimately produce an economic loss. If A discovers the error and sues, the surveyor is liable to A; if B discovers it, the surveyor is liable to B but not to A. The surveyor answers for the same figure either way, so B’s suit adds no exposure.76 Some courts explain the result by analogy to subrogation or assignment: because the surveyor breached a duty to A, recognizing B’s loss prejudices the surveyor no more than an assignment of A’s claim to B would.77
The law of negligent misrepresentation draws a related line between two kinds of information suppliers. An accountant’s report may be used and relied on by a number of third persons, each of whom might lose money, so most courts require that the group be sufficiently limited before liability reaches its members. Surveyors and title abstractors supply information that a succession of unknown users will rely on, but in all probability only one of them will suffer a loss, and courts lean toward extending liability to the users who foreseeably rely.78 The number of people who could lose separately is what separates the two lines, and it is the same question the single-loss idea asks.
Notaries and termite inspectors fit the surveyor pattern. A notary’s error leaves someone to bear the loss of ownership, although it cannot be known in advance which party that will be, and a termite inspector’s negligent report lets a seller collect full price for a house infested with termites while the later buyer bears the loss. Courts have found grounds to impose liability in such cases, often borrowing from negligent misrepresentation.79 The same link appears when the claim is pleaded as fraud. In Ensminger v. Terminix International Co., home buyers sued in fraudulent misrepresentation the termite company that had inspected the house for the seller before the sale, and the court stressed the unequal access to information held by a specialist on whom reliance is placed.80 Fraud is an intentional tort that falls outside the stranger rule anyway, so the case shows who ends up holding the loss and carries no negligence holding.
Attorneys supply a third set of examples. A flawed will costs the person who was meant to take under it and no one else, so the loss is single even though the testator hired the lawyer. That is why the duty to nonclients appears most often in will drafting and title work.81 Single-loss reasoning answers the indeterminacy objection, but the plaintiff must still fit a recognized route, so the foreclosure bidders could not sue the mortgagee’s lawyer.82
A disaster that spreads losses through a community fails the count, and fact patterns built around one usually show why.
Step 3 does the real work. A chain of buyers, any of whom could be left holding the loss, calls for asking which buyer ends up bearing it, while customers and suppliers spread across a neighborhood call for the stranger bar.
Statutory Claims
A legislature can create the claim that the common law withholds. When an accident causes no personal injury or property damage other than damage to a natural resource, the economic loss rule may not deter negligent conduct, and legislative action may be necessary to give defendants a reason to take precautions.85 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, passed after the Exxon Valdez spill, fills that gap with “[d]amages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.”86
Statutory provisions of this kind expand liability beyond the physical injury requirement. The Oil Pollution Act primarily allows recovery by landowners and lessees, but it also reaches those who use the resource for subsistence and states that lose revenue as a result of a spill.87 Its “any claimant” language seems to allow recovery by someone who depends on property or a natural resource even without a legal claim to it, so an employee on a fishing boat that lost business after the Deepwater Horizon spill might claim lost earning potential from the destruction of a natural resource.88
The common-law posture is different when no statute applies. After the Southern California gas leak, local businesses with no personal injury or property damage asked a court to recognize a tort duty to guard against purely economic losses, so the whole dispute turned on duty.89 A statute removes that inquiry for the cases it covers by naming who may sue and what they may recover.
The two hotels differ in only one respect, and it decides the case, because a statute displaces the bar only as far as its wording reaches. Extending the oil statute to a toxic release because the facts are sympathetic would credit the legislature with a rule it did not write.
Wrongful death acts supply the classic statutory claim for plaintiffs with no physical injury. Lord Campbell’s Act was meant to compensate immediate family members who lost economic support or vital household services because of a death, and it limited the family members who could recover to the wife, husband, parent, and child of the deceased, with a proviso extending the meaning of parent and child to grandparents, grandchildren, stepparents, and stepchildren.90 Those survivors fit the pattern the stranger bar addresses, because their financial loss grows out of physical harm to someone else’s person.91 The statute names the class that may sue, which is why the indeterminacy concern has little room to operate. In maritime law, The Harrisburg held in 1886 that no cause of action for wrongful death existed, and the Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. took up whether that holding should any longer be regarded as acceptable law.92
Because the claim exists only by statute, the statute’s wording sets the measure of recovery. The measure of damages for causing death depends on the wording of the statute creating the right of action and on its interpretation.93 A court construing a statute limited to “pecuniary loss” in the strict sense will therefore refuse a survivor’s end run. A spouse whose partner died instantly cannot add a loss-of-consortium count for the companionship lost after death, because that is a claim for damages resulting from the death, and since the right to recover for wrongful death is defined by the statute, the court confines recovery to what the statute allows.94
Survival statutes work differently and fall outside the stranger problem. All states have statutes that preserve the decedent’s own claim for losses suffered before death, such as medical expenses and pain and suffering caused by the defendant’s tort, and damages for those losses are recovered by the estate and pass to those entitled to inherit it.95 Those losses ride on the decedent’s own injury, so they are the tacked-on loss taught earlier, whereas a wrongful death action compensates survivors for losses of their own that result from the death. On a death fact pattern, applying the Robins Dry Dock bar to the survivors overlooks the statute, and letting the survivors recover everything the death cost them overlooks that the statute names who may sue and defines the loss.