Concept
The Stranger Rule
Claims for pure economic loss
The Stranger Rule
A stranger to the wrong is a plaintiff who loses money because the defendant physically harmed someone else, and who has no injury, no damaged property, and no contract with the defendant. The California Supreme Court met such plaintiffs in the Southern California Gas Leak Cases. A massive, months-long leak from a natural gas storage facility just outside Los Angeles severely harmed the economy of a nearby suburb, and local businesses, none alleging personal injury or property damage, sued in negligence for the income they lost.1 Whether they could recover turned on whether the entity that allegedly caused the leak had a tort duty to guard against what courts call “purely economic losses.”2 The court concluded that it had none.3
Courts draw this limit through the doctrine of duty. In certain categories of cases, the defendant owes less than a reasonable standard of care, or no duty at all.4 The Restatement (Third) of Torts permits that move in exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability for a particular class of cases.5 Pure economic loss suffered by strangers is such a class. Unlike the law of pure emotional loss, this field has seen only very modest evolution away from a bright-line rule denying recovery; a few exceptions exist, and the rule as it now stands is very similar to the rule of a century ago.6
Three limits mark the edges of this section. First, it concerns strangers. When the parties have a contract, a different strand of the economic loss rule applies, one that preserves the contract’s limits on liability and its allocation of loss.7 Most often a contracting party is not liable in tort for inflicting economic loss on the other, and contract law deals with the loss.8 A product damaged by one of its own component parts is likewise deemed to have damaged itself, which leaves the buyer to whatever contract rights he had.9 Those rules come later in the chapter. Second, a plaintiff whose own person or property is physically harmed recovers the accompanying economic loss as part of that claim, so only losses unaccompanied by such harm are in play here.10 Third, the rule reaches only unintentional wrongs, as the last subsection shows.
The subsections below follow the rule from its source in Robins Dry Dock, through the two reasons courts give for it, to the fact patterns it governs and the intentional torts it leaves alone.
The Robins Dry Dock Rule
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm states the rule in two steps. Section 1 says that, subject to exceptions, an actor has no general duty to avoid the unintended infliction of economic loss on another.11 Section 7 applies that principle to strangers: a claimant cannot recover for economic loss caused by (a) unintentional injury to another person or (b) unintentional injury to property in which the claimant has no proprietary interest.12 “Economic loss” means pecuniary damage that does not arise from injury to the plaintiff’s person or physical harm to the plaintiff’s property.13 Both clauses describe one three-party structure. The defendant physically harms a third person, or a third person’s property, and the plaintiff’s money loss follows from that harm. The word unintentional confines the rule to negligence and similar fault.
The rule takes its common name from Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).14 A dry dock company negligently damaged a steamship’s propeller. Replacing the propeller kept the ship out of operation for another two weeks, and the ship’s time charterer sued the dry dock for loss of the ship’s use during that period.15 Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Second Circuit and dismissed the charterer’s claim.16
Holmes asked whether the charterer held an interest the law protects against unintended injury to the vessel by third persons who know nothing of the charter. If it did, he said, the interest “must be worked out through their contract relations with the owners,” and not on the theory that the charterer had a right in rem against the ship. The injury to the propeller was no wrong to the charterer but only to those to whom it belonged, and the charterer’s loss arose only through its contract with the owner. Intentionally bringing about a breach of contract may give rise to a cause of action, Holmes noted, but as a general rule a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong. “The law does not spread its protection so far.”17
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank carried the principle from one damaged ship to a regional disaster. Two vessels collided in the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, and about twelve tons of pentachlorophenol spilled overboard. The Coast Guard closed the outlet to navigation for roughly three weeks, and all fishing, shrimping, and related activity stopped in the outlet and four hundred square miles of surrounding marsh and waterways. Forty-one suits followed, brought by shipping interests, marina and boat rental operators, seafood wholesalers and retailers not engaged in fishing, seafood restaurants, tackle and bait shops, and recreational fishermen. The defendants moved for summary judgment on every claim for pure economic loss, meaning loss “unaccompanied by physical damage to a proprietary interest,” and the district court granted the motion as to every claim except those of commercial fishermen.18 The en banc Fifth Circuit retained the rule that physical damage to a proprietary interest is required to recover economic loss in an unintentional tort action, and its majority read Robins to apply even to plaintiffs with no contractual connection to the injured party.19
Testbank states the general rule: in actions for unintentional torts, a plaintiff cannot recover for economic loss without personal injury to the plaintiff or damage to the plaintiff’s property. That is the clear majority rule, and many courts call it the “economic loss rule.” Between noncontracting parties it bars negligence and strict liability claims for pure economic loss, and it has no application to unintentional tort claims for personal injury or property damage, with or without accompanying economic harm.20
The two decisions press the rule from different sides. The Robins charterer at least had a contract with the owner of the damaged propeller. The Testbank plaintiffs had no tie to the vessels beyond the customers they lost during the cleanup.21 Neither owned the thing that was physically harmed, which is why one rule governs a two-week repair delay on a single ship and a three-week closure of a waterway.
Foreseeability does not rescue the plaintiff. The Testbank majority observed that, although the dry dock did not know of the charter, “delay losses by users of the ship were certainly foreseeable,” and the Supreme Court denied recovery anyway. The majority called the result a “pragmatic limitation imposed by the Court upon the tort doctrine of foreseeability.”22 In maritime law the rule is a bright-line test, a broadening of the Robins principle, that applies even to damages that pass the test of foreseeability.23
The California Supreme Court explains why foreseeability cannot do the work. It “may set tolerable limits for most types of physical harm,” but it “provides virtually no limit on liability for nonphysical harm,” because on “clear judicial days” courts “can foresee forever.”24 A flat rule also spares courts the multiplication of claims, since recognizing these claims would greatly increase the number, complexity, and expense of lawsuits.25 The price is hardship. Purely economic losses inflict real pain, and the court conceded that the prevailing rule of no recovery is, like society itself, imperfect, yet nearly everyone follows a rule that few, if any, entirely like.26
Metro’s claim falls within the rule although nothing about the crash resembles a disaster. Section 7 is stated generally, and several of the Restatement’s illustrations apply it to facts that involve no large-scale accident.27 Goalie recovers because lost wages that accompany the plaintiff’s own physical injury are recoverable economic loss.28
Courts and commentators attach several labels to the rule. Many call the Testbank principle the “economic loss rule,” and it is also called the Robins rule.29 The first label also names the rule that confines contracting parties to their contract remedies, so an answer should state the triggering facts and reach its conclusion without leaning on a name.30 In that contract strand, a product damaged by its own component part is deemed to have damaged itself.31
When a fact pattern pairs a damaged object with a plaintiff who lost money, the deciding question is whether the plaintiff held a proprietary interest in the damaged thing.
The bonus is an item of damages tacked onto injury to the contractor’s own property.32 The developer’s lost rent is pure economic loss flowing from harm to property in which the developer has no proprietary interest.33 The dollar amounts could be identical, and only the identity of the owner of the damaged drill separates a routine recovery from a barred claim.
Indeterminate Liability
Economic loss does not stay put, and that is the first reason courts give for the stranger rule. The Restatement’s justifications begin there: economic losses can proliferate long after the physical forces at work in an accident have spent themselves, and recognizing such claims would produce liabilities that are indeterminate and out of proportion to the defendant’s culpability.36 The Testbank majority put the contrast with physical harm in a quotation from Professor James: “the physical consequences of negligence usually have been limited, but the indirect economic repercussions of negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually open-ended.” The majority described “wave upon wave of successive economic consequences.” A vessel delayed in St. Louis may be unable to fulfill its obligation to haul from Memphis, “to the injury of the shipper, to the injury of the buyers, to the injury of their customers.”37
Those consequences are often foreseeable to the negligent defendant, which is why ordinary negligence analysis cannot stop the chain. Under proximate cause principles the defendant answers for foreseeable harm.38 Courts that deny recovery for such secondary economic losses therefore cannot credibly rest on lack of proximate cause, although opinions often say the defendant’s conduct was “not the proximate cause.” The real reason is that the burden of liability for secondary losses is too great. Imagine the same carelessness burning down a bridge and interrupting the business of an entire town.39
Then-Judge Cardozo gave the worry its classic form. Permitting negligence recovery for purely economic loss, he warned, can threaten “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”40
The New York Court of Appeals confronted all three indeterminacies in a city setting in 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc. Part of a 39-story office tower collapsed and shut down more than a dozen blocks of midtown Manhattan for several weeks. Local businesses alleging that would-be customers “were unable to gain access to their stores” sued on behalf of themselves and “all other business entities” operating within the affected blocks. The court declined to hold “that a landowner owes a duty to protect an entire urban neighborhood against purely economic losses.” It limited the duty to those who suffered personal injury or property damage, a limit that supplied “a principled basis for reasonably apportioning liability” and prevented crushing liability to “an indeterminate group in the affected areas.” Adopting that rule, the court added, was what “historically courts ha[d] done” with similar negligence claims.41 Injury to a person and damage to a building are finite events. A court can identify who falls inside the duty and apportion liability among them, while the commercial ripple through a neighborhood has no comparable edge.
The three words in Cardozo’s formula name three separate ways a defendant’s exposure can escape any limit set by its own conduct:
- The amount stays open because the bill depends on how many people lost money and how much each lost, and the defendant’s act fixes neither figure. The three-week closure in Testbank produced forty-one suits.42
- The time stays open because economic losses can proliferate long after the physical forces at work in an accident have spent themselves.43
- The class stays open because nothing marks off who may sue. In the Gas Leak Cases the plaintiffs were the local businesses of an entire suburb, and in 532 Madison they were “all other business entities” in a dozen blocks.44
Indeterminate liability would also be out of proportion to fault. Negligent conduct is by definition unintentional, and that lesser culpability does not warrant such significant liability. Liabilities of that size “may in turn create an exaggerated pressure to avoid an activity altogether.”45 The bar leaves the careless defendant answerable for any bodily injury or property damage its conduct causes.46
The rationale carries weight in proportion to the risk it answers. Comment e to section 1 of the Restatement recognizes cases in which the scope of a defendant’s liability for economic loss is no more troubling than in cases of physical harm, because the set of potential plaintiffs is compact and the size of the potential liability is clear and proportionate to the defendant’s culpability.47
A fact pattern in which customers across a whole neighborhood are cut off calls for naming the three indeterminacies and tying each to a fact in the stem. A pattern with one identifiable plaintiff and no chain of claims shows a rationale with little left to explain.
Self-Protection Through Insurance
The second rationale looks to the plaintiff’s own means of protection. Victims of economic injury often can protect themselves effectively by means other than a tort suit, including first-party insurance against their own losses and recovery in contract.50 First-party insurance is coverage a person buys against that person’s own loss, as distinct from the liability insurance a defendant buys against what it may owe others. A person who relies on another in a transaction has a full chance to manage the risk by inspecting the item or investment, insuring against disappointment, or contracting to assign the loss to someone else.51 Contract terms matter too: one reason frequently given for the economic loss rule is that it preserves a contract’s limits on liability and its other allocations of loss.52
This rationale stands beside indeterminate liability and does not depend on it. The Restatement names two main policy rationales, an aversion to indeterminate and disproportionate liability and a preference for deferring to contractual protection, and if either is implicated a plaintiff’s recovery is typically denied.53 A plaintiff who defeats one rationale has done only half the work. A stranger never bargained with the defendant, so in the stranger setting the practical question is whether first-party insurance could have covered the loss.
Testbank supplies the classic comparison. The majority argued that the tortfeasor may be unable to buy third-party liability insurance for open-ended economic losses. An insurer needs some idea of the size of the risk to set a premium that funds expected claims and still earns a profit, and the indeterminate nature of economic harm makes that difficult, if not impossible. Without insurance, the argument runs, many ventures would be driven out of business. Victims, by contrast, are better placed to buy first-party insurance. An insurer can price a business-interruption policy from the operating data of any particular insured, and each victim’s potential losses are “finite and readily discernible.”54
The premise is contested. The Testbank majority believed first-party insurance would be readily available; the dissent disagreed. Neither side offered empirical or other evidence, and each argued from what it thought would follow from the decision. That is common in judicial policy disputes, where the arguments are driven more by differing views of how the world works than by hard evidence.55 An answer should therefore present the insurance rationale as a reasoned judgment about who can best absorb the risk, and should not claim that anyone has proved it.
The argument from insurance is older than the modern economic loss cases. In Ryan v. New York Central Railroad Co., an 1866 decision, the New York court restricted liability for fire damage to the first adjacent property burned and called the burning of further properties “not the immediate but the remote result of the negligence of the defendants.” Anyone could foresee that a fire would burn beyond the next lot. The true rationale was the crushing burden such liability would impose, together with the general availability of fire insurance as an alternative source of protection.56 Ryan involved physical damage to neighboring buildings, so it is a precedent for the reasoning and not a holding on pure economic loss.
The Restatement builds the doubt into its analysis. Comment e recognizes that in some cases the potential plaintiffs form a compact group and the liability would be proportionate to the defendant’s culpability, and that in some cases the plaintiff is in a poor position to allocate the risk of economic loss by contract, whether directly or indirectly. Where those conditions hold, a duty of care may reasonably be found.57
Moreno’s claim shows why the Restatement asks two questions. The comment cautions that a court “should not labor under a presumption against liability when the rationales for restricting it are absent.”58 The caution qualifies the bar, which section 7 still states in broad terms, and it answers only the facts in front of the court.59 If hundreds of businesses along a closed highway shared Moreno’s inability to insure, the indeterminacy concern would return in full. An answer that applies the bar to a seafood dealer on a closed waterway should name business-interruption coverage priced to the dealer’s own finite losses as the realistic protection.
Recurring Fact Patterns
The facts of 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc. give the rule its typical shape. A building collapse shut down a dozen blocks, and businesses whose customers could not reach their stores sued for lost income.62 Something physical happened to someone else’s property, the plaintiffs’ own bodies and premises were untouched, and the loss reached them through customers who were cut off. Four variations on that shape recur.
When an accident forces authorities to close an area, every nearby business that loses customers during the closure or cleanup stands in the same position. Testbank rejected the claims of marinas, bait shops, and seafood restaurants for that reason, and the same doctrine rejects the claim of every business in the vicinity that lost customers while a toxic spill was cleaned up.63 Each business’s loss is a by-product of harm to something it does not own, and the class of such businesses has no edge.
A plaintiff who loses supplies or power because the defendant damaged a supplier’s property stands where the Robins charterer stood, depending on the owner of the damaged thing for something its business needed.
Courts do not always reach such results through a no-duty rule. In Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. C.F. Bean Corp., dredgers severed a natural gas line. The lost gas shut down electric turbines, which cut the electric power vital to the producer’s aluminum reduction process and left it with damaged equipment and product in process. The Fifth Circuit held that this chain of harm “goes beyond the pale of general harm which reasonably might have been anticipated by negligent dredgers.”64 In Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co., the Second Circuit likewise used proximate cause to deny recovery for losses that followed a negligently caused blockage of the Buffalo harbor.65 Reasoning from anticipation or proximate cause is less candid than reasoning from burden, because a court that denies secondary economic losses cannot credibly do so for want of proximate cause.66 An answer should state the conclusion in duty terms even when an opinion speaks of foreseeability.
An employee’s injury produces a matched pair of results. When a negligent driver injures an employee, the employee may sue in tort and recovers the lost wages with the injury, but the employer, whose output falls during the absence, has no tort claim against the driver.67 The employer’s loss arises from physical injury to someone else’s person. Property damage works the same way.
The workers’ wage loss was plainly foreseeable, so a court that denies it cannot credibly say the fire was not the proximate cause. The ground is that the burden of liability for such secondary economic losses is too great.68 Alder recovers its own losses because they ride on physical damage to its property.69
The pattern now reaches digital events. In Community Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., criminals hacked a grocery chain’s computer network and stole card account information from its customers. The banks that had issued the cards sued the chain for their losses, and the Seventh Circuit held that the economic loss doctrine precluded the claims.70 A breach with no collapse or spill in sight produces the same result for plaintiffs who suffered no physical injury or property damage of their own.
Courts treat these variations as one rule because each shares the two features the rationales address. The class of claimants has no edge, since every business along a closed route, every customer on a severed line, and every worker at a burned plant could assert the same claim. And each claimant holds a loss confined to its own operations that first-party insurance or a contract term could address in advance.71 Because both features recur, a court need not weigh foreseeability fact by fact, and a showing that one plaintiff’s loss was sympathetic or foreseeable leaves the structure of the claim unchanged. The exceptions taught later in this chapter address the cases in which that structure is absent.
Steps 2 and 3 do the sorting work. A stem that describes a damaged factory and an idle worker invites a duty finding because the factory was harmed, and step 3 asks whose factory it was.
Intentional Torts Fall Outside
Holmes drew the boundary in Robins itself. Intentionally bringing about a breach of contract, he noted, may give rise to a cause of action, but as a general rule a tort to one man’s person or property does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other.73 Testbank states the rule in terms that carry the same limit: in actions for unintentional torts a plaintiff cannot recover economic loss without personal injury or damage to its own property, so between noncontracting parties the rule bars negligence and strict liability claims for pure economic loss.74
Business torts usually avoid the rule for that reason. Fraud, and certain forms of intentional infliction of economic loss known as interference with contract rights or prospective advantage, are torts in their own right.75 The California Supreme Court has reexamined the elements of interference with prospective economic advantage and the allocation of the burdens of proof between the parties, treating it as an established tort with rules of its own.76 Many jurisdictions, and the Third Restatement, also let professional malpractice and negligent misrepresentation proceed on proof of economic harm alone.77 The Testbank rule therefore precludes only general negligence and strict liability actions for pure economic loss, which exposes as inaccurate any judicial statement that there is generally no liability in tort for causing pure economic loss to another.78
Intent matters for reasons the rule’s own rationales supply. One objection to liability for negligently caused economic loss is that negligent conduct is by definition unintentional, and that lesser culpability does not warrant such significant liability.79 An intentional wrongdoer has no comparable claim to protection from the consequences. A structural reason points the same way: deception, attorney malpractice, defamation, invasion of privacy, and interference with contract rarely produce injury to person or property, and they would virtually disappear if the doctrine applied to them.80
An exam stem that cuts a plaintiff off from a supplier can call for either answer, depending on what the defendant meant to do.
Professional malpractice and negligent misrepresentation sit outside the rule for a different reason than fraud does. When a defendant has undertaken to provide a service or supply information and does so negligently, a separate body of rules governs the duty to avoid causing economic loss, and much of the law of professional malpractice by lawyers and accountants, and of negligent misrepresentation, falls there.81 Those duties return under special relationships later in the chapter. Contracting parties face a related but different limit: a product deemed to have damaged itself leaves the plaintiff to whatever contract rights he had and excludes the tort claims.82