Concept
Distress From Third-Person Peril
Negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical harm: threshold rule
Distress From Third-Person Peril
The bodily-harm exception compensates a plaintiff who falls ill because the actor's negligence frightened or shocked her. Section 313(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts withdraws that compensation from a large class of plaintiffs. The rule of subsection (1), it says, “has no application to illness or bodily harm of another which is caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.”1 The sentence holds a bar and an exception that lifts it, and each gets its own subsection below.
Subsection (1) is built around the risk the actor creates for the plaintiff. An act is negligent for this purpose when the actor intends to subject the other to an emotional disturbance, or realizes or should realize that the act involves an unreasonable risk of doing so, and the disturbance is likely to result in illness or other bodily harm.2 One condition of subsection (1) then requires that the risk the actor should have realized be a risk of distress arising “otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person.”3 Claims built on that knowledge therefore fall to subsection (2).
Nearly every fact favors the mother. The driver was careless, a parent's collapse at a child's injury is foreseeable, and a heart attack is a definite, medically recognizable illness of the kind the exception demands. She loses on a different point: what produced her distress. The answer is an injury to someone else, and § 313(2) puts that source outside the exception unless something more is present.
The exception clause names that something more. A mother who was herself in the vehicle's path was endangered by the driver's negligence, and her claim no longer rests on derivative distress alone. The subsection below develops the bar, and the one after it develops the clause that lifts it. The next section of the chapter maps the broader bystander rules. Within the Second Restatement framework taught here, § 313(2) is the controlling limit.
The Derivative-Distress Bar
The bar limits the exception itself. Under § 313(2), the rule of subsection (1) has no application to illness or bodily harm caused by distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, so a plaintiff inside the bar receives none of the liability for resulting illness or bodily harm that subsection (1) otherwise supplies.4 The word solely does the sorting. If everything that distressed the plaintiff concerned someone else's injury or danger, the bar applies. If any part of the distress came from her own exposure to danger, it did not arise solely from a third person's peril, and the bar does not reach her claim on its terms. The intensity of the distress, her closeness to the victim, and the seriousness of her illness do not enter the inquiry. Nor does the text confine the third person to a child or a relative: a spouse, a friend, and a stranger who watches an accident all fall on the same side of the line.
The Restatement's own illustration shows how firm the bar is. The comment to subsection (2) imagines an actor who negligently runs down and kills a child in the street, and a mother who, in the immediate vicinity, witnesses the event and suffers severe emotional distress resulting in a heart attack or other bodily harm. She cannot recover for that harm unless she was herself in the path of the vehicle or was otherwise threatened with bodily harm, apart from her distress at her child's peril.5 Arrange the facts as a plaintiff's lawyer would: a careless defendant, the plaintiff's own child, a nearby parent who saw it happen, severe distress, a heart attack. She still loses. The bar is a categorical rule about the source of distress, and it does not screen weak claims one at a time.
A problem built on this rule will usually make the victim's injury as terrible and the plaintiff's illness as well documented as it can, and then ask whether the plaintiff recovers. The answer turns on one fact, which is what the plaintiff was frightened about. A parent frightened only for the child is barred. A parent whose own body was also in the truck's path is not, and the next subsection takes up what she must still show.
Because the bar is written in terms of illness or bodily harm, it operates only after the plaintiff clears the bodily-harm threshold taught earlier. A bystander whose distress produces no bodily harm or other compensable damage has no claim, because the baseline rule withholds liability for emotional disturbance alone, and § 313(2) is not needed to reach that result.6 A bystander whose distress produces a definite illness has cleared that threshold, and § 313(2) then withdraws the exception because the distress arose solely from another person's peril. The mother in the comment belongs to the second group. Her heart attack satisfies the bodily-harm requirement, and the bar stops her anyway.
The common law offered several reasons for refusing recovery for distress and its physical consequences: fear of false claims, difficulty measuring damages, lack of precedent, fear of a flood of litigation, and the view that the harm is too remote. Apart from perhaps the first, the weakness of these reasons is apparent. The first retains some force in the bystander setting. Distress at someone else's injury is a private reaction, easy to claim and hard to disprove, and the defendant may never have directed conduct toward the plaintiff or even known she was nearby.7
A second consideration is the place of fault. Compensation is a real aim of tort law, and the mother in the illustration goes uncompensated for a real harm. Courts have not generally let that aim displace fault as the usual basis of tort liability,8 and § 313(2) keeps the actor's liability for resulting illness tied to a person the actor's conduct otherwise endangered. Courts take a similar view of relationships in other settings. In the duty-to-warn cases against psychiatrists, for example, other courts have agreed that the psychiatrist-patient relationship alone does not ground a duty to warn.9 The mother's bond with her child likewise gives the driver no duty to her unless his conduct threatened her as well.
The bar replaced an open question. The original 1934 version of § 313 carried a caveat in which the Institute expressed no opinion on whether an actor negligent toward a child or spouse is liable for illness suffered by a parent or spouse who witnesses the peril or harm. In drafting the Second Restatement, the Reporter proposed striking the caveat and stating the rule of nonliability in its place, and his note to the Institute rested the change on the overwhelming weight of the decided cases. The advisers had been unanimous in wishing to keep the caveat for its possible effect on the courts. The Reporter himself sympathized and felt that a mother who suffers a heart attack on seeing her child killed should recover, but he was compelled to recognize that the decisions were otherwise. The Council agreed that the caveat should go out and that the definite rule of nonliability should be stated.10 The rule therefore records where the cases stood when the drafters wrote, even though the Reporter sympathized with the mother's claim.
The line did not stay where the drafters drew it. California's Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. reflects the older, stricter limit that denied recovery to a person outside the zone of danger. The bystander rules that later displaced it, and the broader liability they brought, are mapped in the next section.
The Own-Peril Exception
The bar closes with an unless clause, and that clause admits the plaintiff who was endangered as well as distressed. The bar does not apply where “the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.”12 The word otherwise carries the meaning. It points to a threat to the plaintiff's body that comes by some route other than her own distress at a third person's peril, which is how the comment describes a plaintiff “threatened with bodily harm in another manner” who also suffers distress at harm to someone else.13 The question from the last subsection, what produced the plaintiff's distress, therefore gets a companion: did the actor's carelessness also put the plaintiff's own body at risk?
Bovsun v. Sanperi supplies the rationale. The court quoted the comment to § 436(3), which explains that the exception rests on the fact that the defendant “has endangered the plaintiff's own safety and threatened him with bodily harm so that the defendant is in breach of an original duty to the plaintiff to exercise care for his protection.”14 A plaintiff in that position claims as a direct victim of the carelessness, owed care in her own right, so her claim does not borrow a duty owed to someone else. The same comment shows why the bystander outside the danger is treated differently, since no original duty of protection ran to her.
Section 436 supplies the working text for the family-peril case.15 Subsection (2) covers an actor whose negligence creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to another “otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance.” It provides that harm resulting solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.16 A car bearing down on a pedestrian endangers her body apart from any fright, so the driver cannot answer an illness claim by pointing out that the fright, not the car, made her ill. Subsection (3) then applies the rule of subsection (2) “where the bodily harm to the other results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his immediate family occurring in his presence.”17 A plaintiff the actor's negligence endangered therefore recovers for bodily harm that flows from fright for an immediate family member as well as from fright for herself.
Courts call the resulting test the zone-of-danger rule. It allows recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the plaintiff was both located in the dangerous area created by the defendant's negligence and frightened by the risk of harm.18 The rule is now the majority view. Courts once denied recovery for the physical consequences of fear even to a plaintiff within the zone, such as one a negligent driver narrowly missed, if there was no impact. Most jurisdictions have abolished the impact requirement and allow such plaintiffs to recover on satisfactory proof.19
Bovsun treats the zone-of-danger rule as the one the Restatement adopts. It held that where a defendant negligently exposes a plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of bodily injury or death, the plaintiff may recover, as a proper element of her damages, for injuries suffered in consequence of observing the serious injury or death of an immediate family member, assuming the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about that injury or death.20 The court favored the rule because it asks an objective question within ordinary negligence principles, namely whether the defendant's conduct unreasonably threatened the plaintiff with bodily harm. It saw the rule as a circumscribed alternative to the apparently sweeping liability recognized in Dillon v. Legg, and as a standard that serves the purpose of holding strict rein on liability.21 An objective test has a practical edge. A court can ask where the plaintiff stood relative to the danger without probing anyone's private state of mind. The holding's phrase “a proper element of his or her damages” also shows that distress for the family member is part of the claim the plaintiff already has because of her own endangerment, and it is not a second claim.
Section 436(3) and Bovsun add limits that keep the exception within its justification. The Restatement confines the family-peril extension to harm or peril to an immediate family member occurring in the plaintiff's presence, which ties her fright to an event she perceived and caps the class of claimants. Bovsun adds that the distress must be tied, as a matter of proximate causation, to observing the family member's serious injury or death, and that the injury or death must have been caused by the defendant's conduct.22 The Restatement's own text still speaks of bodily harm that results from the shock or fright, so a court applying the Second Restatement continues to look for the bodily-harm threshold taught earlier.
Steps one and two do the sorting between plaintiffs. A plaintiff whose fear was entirely for another person stops at the bar, and a plaintiff whose own body was in the path goes on to the added limits. An exam stem may give a plaintiff every sympathetic fact except the one that matters, which is her own exposure to the danger.
The mother in the crosswalk and this father suffer the same loss and the same illness. The one fact that moves the answer is whether the actor's negligence also threatened the parent's own body. The rule turns on the plaintiff's location and exposure, and the depth of her grief carries no weight.
The exception also has a boundary. The Restatement comment denies recovery to the mother who was not in the vehicle's path, and the zone-of-danger test asks whether the plaintiff was in the danger, so a parent who watches from safety as a vehicle kills her child has no claim under it.23 The next section maps the bystander rules that grew up around that gap. Within the Second Restatement framework taught here, § 313(2) together with § 436(2) and (3) remains the route for the plaintiff whom the actor also endangered.