Concept
Possessor Liability to Outsiders
Harm to persons outside the land and related special rules
Harm Outside the Land
Possessor Liability to Outsiders
Trespasser, licensee, and invitee classify the people a possessor of land (the person who occupies it and controls what happens there) lets onto the land. This section asks what the possessor owes to people who never enter: a pedestrian on a public sidewalk, a driver on an adjoining highway, a neighbor on the next parcel.
For these outsiders the entrant categories drop out. A possessor can screen entrants and match precautions to each one's status, but cannot admit or exclude a person on a public way. The outsider has accepted no risk from the land, cannot inspect it, and cannot bargain over its dangers. With no status to sort outsiders, the analysis asks what produced the danger, because each source carries its own rule. The possessor's activities are measured by ordinary reasonable care. Artificial conditions call for reasonable care too, with limits at the public way. Natural conditions traditionally create no duty, subject to exceptions. Travelers who foreseeably stray from the road onto the land form a fourth group, treated last.
The subject throughout is physical harm to persons and property outside the land. Interference with a neighbor's use and enjoyment is nuisance, which has its own tests and is set aside here.1
Activities on the Land
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 371 governs harm that leaves the land because of something the possessor is doing there. A possessor is subject to liability for physical harm to others outside the land caused by an activity he carries on there, if he realizes or should realize that the activity involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to them, under the same conditions as though the activity were carried on at a neutral place.2 The rule has four parts. The harm must be physical, the victim must be outside the land, and the source must be an activity the possessor carries on, as opposed to a condition that merely sits there. The possessor must also realize, or have reason to realize, that the activity creates an unreasonable risk. The neutral-place clause supplies the yardstick: ask what care the same activity would demand where the actor had no landowner's status, and hold the possessor to that.
Control explains the rule. A possessor who starts an activity decides how the work is done, what equipment to use, and what barriers to put up, so the possessor alone can cut the danger off at its source. Outsiders cannot see behind the property line or bargain over what happens there. The neutral-place comparison then keeps title from distorting the result in either direction: ownership does not excuse carelessness toward neighbors, and it does not make the possessor an insurer of everything that leaves the parcel.
What the possessor realizes or should realize is foreseeability stated two ways: what he actually knows, and what a reasonable person in his position would recognize. The risk must also be unreasonable, so a remote or trivial chance of harm does not qualify. Evidence of how often an activity sends something across the property line is often the best proof. In Salevan v. Wilmington Park, Inc., a pedestrian passing along Thirtieth Street was injured by a foul ball from the defendant's ball park. In an average game sixteen to eighteen foul balls reached the street, and two or three of them cleared the ten-foot fence into the stretch where the plaintiff was walking. The defendant had run the park for over eight years and averaged 68 games a season.3 An operator with that history has watched the activity reach the street again and again, and those numbers are the facts a court weighs in deciding what he should have realized.
Falling materials supply the plainest application. An occupier who negligently lets building materials fall on people outside the land is liable, and so is a building contractor working on the land in the occupier's right.4 Bradford v. Universal Construction Co. involved a sheet of plywood blown loose by heavy wind, the kind of loose-material risk this rule addresses.5 Livestock follow the same logic. Except under open-range rules, an owner must use care to keep horses and cattle from escaping onto the highway, where they can cause collisions, and Roberts v. Weber & Sons, Co. applied res ipsa loquitur (the doctrine that lets a jury infer negligence from an accident that ordinarily happens only through carelessness) to such an escape.6 Open-range rules may still fail to protect an owner whose own negligence let cattle stray onto a public highway and remain there, as Larson-Murphy v. Steiner illustrates.7
The rule also reaches harm that workers carry off the land. An occupier may be liable for negligently allowing workers to carry dangerous substances such as asbestos dust off the land to the injury of others. Some courts have found liability on that theory, as in Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. and Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., but most states have rejected liability on those facts, so an answer should flag the split.8 A possessor who is present on the land must also use reasonable care to control others there so that they do not harm outsiders, a duty drawn from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 318.9 In Volpe v. Gallagher, a mother let her dangerous adult son live with her, and a jury could find she also let him store weapons, which he used to shoot a neighbor.10
The rule stops at physical harm. What if a lawful activity injures no one itself but draws drivers' eyes from the road? When legitimate activity on the land merely distracts motorists on a nearby highway, and collisions follow, courts may assign the entire responsibility to the motorists and none to the landowner.11 In Largosa v. Ford Motor Co., a commercial bungee-jumping business beside a highway was held not responsible for accidents that occurred when motorists gaped at the jumpers.12 Compare the plywood sheet: it leaves the land and strikes someone, so the possessor's activity is the physical cause of the injury. The jumper never crosses the property line and endangers no one unless a driver chooses to look away from the road, and the driver controls that choice. If mere visual interest were enough, any spectacle near a road would put its owner in court for every rear-end collision. The footnoted decision in Haymon v. Pettit stands on similar ground. It denied any duty to warn or protect a non-patron who was hit by a car while chasing a foul ball hit out of a stadium onto a public street.13 In Salevan the ball itself injured the pedestrian; in Haymon no ball struck anyone, and the injury came from a car after the plaintiff went into the road.
Artificial Conditions
The occupier must also use care about artificial conditions on the land that risk injury to people outside it, and a possessor is generally answerable to third parties for physical harm outside the land caused by structures and similar man-made conditions.15 A condition is artificial when human choice put it there or changed it. Once a landowner alters a condition of his land, it becomes artificial for tort purposes, and he must use reasonable care for the protection of those outside the premises. Damming a stream to form a malarial pond (Towaliga Falls Power Co. v. Sims) and piling sand where the wind may blow it (Ettl v. Land & Loan Co.) are the standard illustrations.16 The line matters because it decides which rule governs, and the natural side of it is the subject of the next section.
A possessor who builds, plants, or maintains a condition knows it is there and can change it. A person on the public way cannot inspect the land, weigh what is on it, or bargain over the danger. The duty therefore puts the cost of precaution where it is cheapest to bear, since redirecting a downspout or trimming a limb costs far less than a fractured hip. An activity under § 371 ends when the work stops, while a condition keeps generating risk after the possessor's attention has moved elsewhere, so the duty lasts as long as the condition does.
Two applications show the rule at work. If structures on the land cause water to collect on the public walk, the possessor must use reasonable care to protect pedestrians who may slip on the ice that forms, a duty recognized in Pritchard v. Mabrey.17 Trees raise a subtler question, because trees look like part of nature. Trees the owner planted in front of the property may nonetheless be treated as an artificial condition. The owner then owes a duty of reasonable care to keep their branches, roots, or trunks from harming pedestrians on the sidewalk, as in Rosengren v. City of Seattle.18 A person chose to put that tree in that spot, and the choice makes the condition the possessor's to manage. A tree that sprang up unaided involves no such choice, which is why the natural-conditions rule that follows takes a far less demanding view of it.
Both owners in that scene owed a duty, and breach is what separates them. The artificial-conditions rule settles only that reasonable care is owed to people outside the land. Whether the possessor was careless remains a question of fact for the jury, which weighs how foreseeable the injury was and how easily it could have been prevented. Whitt v. Silverman reflects this approach: general foreseeability of the risk establishes the duty, and breach and proximate cause stay fact-specific.19 An answer that moves from the existence of a duty straight to liability skips breach and causation.
The duty reaches into the public way itself when the possessor makes special use of it. An owner who uses the public way beside the lot as a driveway to the property may be liable in negligence for creating the dangerous condition there, as in Breger v. City of New York, where the claim rested on creating or causing the defect through use of the public way as a driveway to the defendant's property.20 Whether the duty also covers failure to keep the special-use area reasonably safe is less settled. Rose v. Provo City imposed a duty on that basis, because the owner used the dangerous public property as the driveway to the owner's parking lot, even though the owner had not created the danger.21
Special use explains why a possessor can owe care about ground the possessor does not own. An owner who folds a strip of public ground into the working of his own property takes the benefit of it, sees it daily, and is the one party able to repair or guard it. A pedestrian on the walk has no way to learn that the strip serves as a private driveway. The duty follows the owner's own use of the way, which is also why it stays narrower than a general duty to police every public way that borders the land.
The general rule stops short of making a possessor answer for every defect beside the land. A possessor who did not create a condition on an adjoining public way, and who made no special use of it, generally owes no duty about it. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 54 and its comment c add an exception when the land is commercial.22 The possessor has no control over a public way and draws no special benefit from it, so the knowledge-and-cost logic behind the duty has nothing to attach to.
Two decisions involving parking show where the line falls. In Rose v. Provo City the owner used dangerous public property as the driveway to the owner's parking lot, and that use justified a duty even though the owner had not created the danger.23 In Davis v. Westwood Group a business placed its customer parking lot across a dangerous highway, and the court declined to treat that placement as actionable.24 The difference is special use. The Rose owner made the public ground part of its own access, while the Davis business merely located itself near a road that the public travels for its own purposes.
Natural Conditions and Trees
The artificial-conditions rule applies when human choice put the hazard on the land. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363 governs hazards that arose without it: if a dangerous condition arises from purely natural causes, courts generally refuse to hold the owner or possessor liable for personal injury or property damage the condition causes outside the land.26 Two explanations are offered. One is that some activity by the possessor is essential to liability, and the other is that a person has no general obligation to take affirmative action to protect others.27 Both follow from how the neighboring rules work. Section 371 and the artificial-conditions rule each find a human choice behind the risk, because the possessor chose to carry on an activity or to build or plant something. A swamp, a rockslide, or a rut that formed on its own has no such choice behind it, so there is no act of the possessor to call careless. Requiring a possessor to survey and repair every natural feature of a large parcel for the benefit of passersby would also demand affirmative effort that the law does not ordinarily impose on anyone toward strangers.
Courts have applied the rule to a foul swamp in Roberts v. Harrison and to rabbits in Brady v. Warren. In Skinner v. South Carolina Department of Transportation the owner of land beside a road owed a motorist no duty for naturally occurring ruts on the shoulder that caused a car accident.28 Human involvement draws the line between natural and artificial, so a single fact can move a tree case from one rule to the other. Trees that an owner planted may be governed by the rule for artificial conditions instead, as Carver v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n and Rosengren v. City of Seattle reflect.29 The first question for any tree on an exam is therefore whether someone put it there.
The natural-conditions rule also gives way when a person has contributed significantly to creating the danger.30 Take a hillside where large rocks sit naturally but precariously. A former tenant terraces the slope for farming and loosens the soil around them. After the land is leased to a new tenant, the rocks break loose, roll onto an abutting public road, and injure several motorists. The owner is liable for failing to correct the condition while it was in his possession and control, and the current tenant is liable as well because of present possession and control.31 The loosened soil was a human act, so what remained was no longer a purely natural condition, and the premise that nobody's conduct lies behind the danger had disappeared. Why a landlord and a tenant can both answer for one condition is taken up in the later material on lessors.
Trees in urban areas form the main exception to the no-liability rule. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363(2) and its comment e place the possessor of urban land under a duty to use reasonable care, including inspection, to prevent injury from dangerous trees on the land.32 The reasoning is that where people are concentrated, the harm a defective tree can do justifies a duty of due care. A decayed tree beside a city sidewalk threatens a steady stream of pedestrians, and the owner can often spot the warning signs at little cost by looking. Courts agree that an owner is liable in negligence if the owner knows or should have known that a tree is defective and fails to take reasonable precautions, as in Turner v. Ridley and Plesko v. Allied Investment Co.33 The knowledge requirement does real work, because foreseeability alone does not show actual or constructive knowledge when the tree is healthy, a point Lewis v. Krussel makes.34
The rural side of the line was once equally clear. An owner of land abutting a rural highway had no duty to inspect for defects in trees, as in Chambers v. Whelen and O'Brien v. United States.35 The logic mirrors the urban rationale: where few people pass, the risk from any one tree is small, and inspecting long stretches of roadside frontage costs a great deal. Classification fights show how unstable such a line is, since Hensley v. Montgomery County treated suburban forest land as more like rural land.36
Because the rural-urban line invites that kind of dispute, the trend is toward balancing factors. In Miles v. Estate of Christensen, an Indiana court called for weighing considerations such as traffic patterns and land use in the area. It concluded that an owner of land, whether classified as urban or rural, may owe a duty of reasonable care about natural conditions that threaten outsiders.37 California went further in Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., abolishing the landowner's general immunity for natural conditions and holding that an uphill landowner owed a downhill landowner a duty of care to control a landslide condition.38 The test in that line of authority is negligence: whether the possessor acted as a reasonable person under the circumstances in managing the property.39 Moeller v. Fleming followed Sprecher in allowing a pedestrian who slipped on a sidewalk break caused by tree roots from the landowner's adjacent property to sue.40 Authority for that approach remains limited, so the answer depends on the jurisdiction.41
The Restatements trace the same movement. The first excepted only trees growing near a highway from the no-liability rule. The second imposed liability on urban landowners for failing to prevent an unreasonable risk to highway users while leaving the rural landowner's position open. The third rejects the rural-urban distinction altogether.42 Under Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 54(b), a possessor owes a duty of reasonable care about a natural condition that endangers people outside the land if the land is commercial, and otherwise only if the possessor knows of the risk or the risk is obvious to him.43 The more people a parcel puts at risk, and the better placed its owner is to bear the cost of precautions, the stronger the case for a duty, and commercial land is both a draw for traffic and a source of income. A knowledge-or-obviousness condition keeps a residential owner from becoming a surveyor of every hidden hazard. Florida's foliage decisions show the fork at work. In Williams v. Davis, a residential owner had no duty to cut back foliage on his own property that blocked drivers' view unless it extended into the public right of way and created a foreseeable hazard to traffic. In Whitt v. Silverman, the commercial owners of a service station owed pedestrians a duty to trim foliage so that vehicles could leave the premises safely.44
Governmental landowners present a separate complication. A state or the federal government may keep an immunity for failure to inspect and remove dead trees, as when a Kentucky decision, Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways v. Sexton, treated inspection and removal of dead trees as a discretionary act that left the state immune.45 Those immunities belong to a different body of law and fall outside this chapter.
Travelers Straying From the Road
The duty to outsiders has one more branch, and its facts blur the line between outsider and entrant. A possessor owes reasonable care not only to people on the public way but also to travelers who foreseeably stray from the road onto the land itself and are hurt by a condition such as an excavation put there after the road was built.48 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 368 supplies the test: should the possessor foresee that a highway user would inadvertently enter the land even while exercising due care?49 At the moment of injury the traveler stands on the possessor's land, so the entrant categories might seem to apply. The rule instead treats the traveler as an extension of the outsider cases. The traveler began on the public way, reached the land without meaning to visit it, and was hurt by a hazard close enough to the road to threaten the same traveling public that the activity and artificial-condition rules already protect. Foreseeability of the deviation, not the traveler's status, sets the duty.
The reason for the duty lies in how highway travel works. Drivers leave the pavement for reasons that involve no fault: swerving around an obstacle, skidding on a wet surface, losing control after a tire failure. A possessor who creates a hazard near a road can therefore foresee that careful drivers will sometimes reach it. The qualification that the condition was put there after the road was built matters for the same reason, because a possessor who digs beside an existing road knows where the traffic runs and chooses to place the danger next to it.
The test has two parts. The first asks whether the deviation from the roadway is a normal incident of travel, which many courts use as the measure of foreseeability.50 In Military Highway Water Supply Corp. v. Morin, a motorist hit a horse on the road, then traveled 500 feet off it and was injured by an artificial condition on the defendant's land. The Texas court found no duty, because the motorist must be “traveling with reasonable care” and “foreseeably deviating from the highway in the ordinary course of travel.”51 A possessor can plan for the ordinary departures that attend driving, but not for a vehicle that crosses hundreds of feet of open ground. The second part asks whether the risk is one to travelers who are reasonably careful.52 That standard ties the duty to the real reach of the hazard, so the possessor must guard against what a careful driver might meet and need not guard against the most reckless driver imaginable.
An exam stem will often add that the injured driver was speeding or inattentive, and then ask whether the possessor owed a duty at all. The answer comes from looking at the class of travelers the hazard threatens rather than at the particular plaintiff. The rule does not require the actual plaintiff to be free of fault, so long as the risk would also be one to careful travelers. The plaintiff's own fault becomes a matter of contributory negligence rather than a limit on the possessor's duty.53 Keller v. City of Spokane reasoned the same way about a city's duty to provide a reasonably safe intersection: the duty was not limited to fault-free plaintiffs, and comparative negligence, rather than a no-duty rule, accounted for the highway user's own negligence.54 The duty exists to protect faultless travelers from the hazard. If one careless plaintiff could erase it, the possessor would escape liability for a hazard that threatened careful drivers as well, and the factfinder would never get to apportion responsibility between the two. Some authority does hold that no duty is owed to a plaintiff who was actually at fault, as in City of McAllen v. De La Garza, so the framing depends on the jurisdiction.55
Distance from the road moves most of these cases, because the farther a hazard lies from the pavement, the less likely even a straying driver is to reach it. A pile of construction materials at the road's edge is a great danger even when it is obvious, while a hidden excavation 100 yards from the road is not.56 Obviousness therefore does not decide the matter, and neither does concealment. What decides it is whether a reasonably careful traveler would foreseeably arrive at the spot, and comment h to § 368 addresses the point in related terms.57 The 500-foot journey in Military Highway sits far along the same scale as the hidden excavation, and the materials at the edge sit at the other end.
The utility-pole cases test the same idea against a hazard that is plainly visible. Poles near a road are obvious, yet it is often reasonably foreseeable that a motorist might hit one.58 In Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Goss, a pole stood nine inches from the road with guy wires less than a foot from it, and the court treated whether the pole was an unreasonably dangerous obstruction as a question of fact.59 Gouge v. Central Illinois Public Service Co. went the other way where the pole stood 15 feet off the road, finding it not reasonably foreseeable that an automobile would leave the roadway and strike it.60 Many courts hesitate even when the distance is very small. Coates v. Southern Maryland Co-op., Inc. found no liability for a pole three feet from the road and treated distance as only one factor. Board of County Commissioners of Cecil County v. Dorman reached the same result for a pole two and one-half feet from a county road, relying on evidence that no one had struck that pole in 40 years.61 Goss sent the question to the factfinder because the pole and its wires nearly touched the pavement, while Coates and Dorman resolved foreseeability against the plaintiff on their records, so the results turn on the evidence in each case and not on a fixed number of feet.
Two features set the pole cases apart from most excavation cases. Government regulation can shape the outcome, as in Turner v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., where a utility that had obtained permits to install a pole in the highway right of way was not liable because the pole did not interfere with the usual course of travel.62 Courts also voice a policy concern about exposing utilities to a claim whenever a car leaves the road. Coates said the court did not “wish, or intend, to establish a law that provides an absolute immunity for utility companies,” but was also unwilling to “create the prospect of a damage award against a utility every time someone runs off the road and strikes a pole.”63 That concern counsels caution about how readily a court finds foreseeability for poles. It does not create an immunity, and the ordinary stray-traveler analysis still governs.