Concept
The Unitary Standard Today
Duty owed to invitees
The Unitary Standard Today
Every rule in this chapter has assumed that a plaintiff's status as an invitee decides the duty owed. Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that duty: a possessor is liable for physical harm to invitees caused by a condition on the land if, but only if, the possessor knows or would discover the condition through reasonable care and should realize it poses an unreasonable risk, should expect that invitees will not discover the danger or will fail to protect themselves against it, and fails to use reasonable care to protect them.1 That assumption holds only where the traditional scheme survives. Within the past generation, almost exactly half of American jurisdictions have discarded the trichotomy of invitee, licensee, and trespasser and now apply a standard of reasonable care to claims by invitees and licensees alike.2 In those states the line between invitee and licensee no longer changes the duty, so the first question on any premises problem is which approach the jurisdiction follows.
The categories had a rationale. According to one account, jurors would empathize with the injured visitor and not with the possessor, and so would unfairly favor the plaintiff under an open-ended reasonable-care standard. The more restrictive rules let judges rule for possessors as a matter of law and kept cases from juries.3 A Minnesota court put the objection to the social-guest line bluntly. Peterson v. Balach cautioned that sweeping away every distinction between trespassers and invited guests is a drastic step, because there is often good reason to distinguish a trespasser from a social guest, but it found little or no reason to distinguish a social guest from a business invitee.4 Many courts have adopted the approach of Rowland v. Christian, and there is considerable agreement that a general negligence standard should govern everyone invited or permitted on the premises.5
A nest of yellow jackets shows how much the classification can decide. Samantha does not know the nest is buried in her yard, although she would have found it had she inspected the yard with reasonable care. Her friend Jeremy is attacked by a swarm, stung repeatedly, and hospitalized. Where the traditional distinction survives, Jeremy cannot recover from Samantha. Had the swarm attacked Jack, the young man who routinely mows her lawn, Jack would recover, because he is an invitee and the invitee duty reaches conditions the possessor would discover by reasonable care.6 The nest, Samantha's ignorance, and the injury are identical in both versions, and only the victim's category differs. In a state that applies reasonable care to licensees as well, Jeremy's status stops mattering. His claim goes forward on the question whether Samantha used reasonable care to inspect her yard.
The label unitary covers less uniformity than it suggests. Most courts still begin by classifying the entrant under the traditional categories, though a substantial number have held that the duty of ordinary care extends to licensees or even trespassers, as well as to invitees.7 Some courts have reaffirmed the categories, among them Moore v. Denune & Pipic, Inc. and Younce v. Ferguson. The New Jersey court in Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors surveyed a field in which a number of jurisdictions had abandoned the categories and many others had eliminated the distinction between licensees and business invitees.8 Rosters of states change as courts revisit the question. The reliable habit is to recognize that the question exists and to say in your answer which approach you apply.
Abolishing the invitee-licensee line leaves the trespasser on separate terms in most places. A substantial majority of the courts that apply the unitary standard of reasonable care to invitees and licensees still require a trespasser to prove intentional or willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct, and only a few states apply reasonable care to trespassers as well.9 Peterson explains why: burglars and vandals are trespassers, criminal statutes already govern trespassers, and there may be good reason to treat a trespasser differently from a social guest.10 The older rule rested on similar logic. In Sheehan v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry. Co., the court described the doctrine supported by the great preponderance of authority. A railroad has the right to a free track and owes no act or service in anticipation of trespassers, and a trespasser who enters the track for his own purposes assumes the risk of what he finds there, including the operation of engines and cars.11
Some courts have gone further. Some cases have deliberately applied the general negligence standard to a trespasser, as Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. did. Many of the cases adopting Rowland have not involved trespass, and in some that raised the issue the courts have declined to extend the duty to trespassers.12 Even the traditional scheme recognized exceptions. The first is the trespasser whose presence has been discovered, as in a case where a plaintiff fell from a subway platform onto the track, the train stopped automatically, and the crew drove on without an adequate inspection. The earliest decisions finding liability to a trespasser involved spring guns or traps set deliberately for him.13
Where a unitary standard governs, the analysis reduces to ordinary negligence. The possessor owes reasonable care under all the circumstances, so the questions are how foreseeable the visitor's presence was, how foreseeable the danger to that visitor was, and what a reasonable possessor would have done about it.14 The questions that section 343 asks remain a useful way to organize that inquiry: what the possessor knew or would have discovered, what the possessor should have expected of visitors, and whether the possessor responded reasonably.15 What disappears is the plaintiff's burden of fitting into one category rather than the other.