193 Md. 489, 69 A.2d 456 (1949)
The Rev. William F. Hopkins, a resident of Elkton, Maryland, was charged by the State with maintaining signs intended to aid in the solicitation and performance of marriages in violation of the 1943 statute.1 On September 1, 1947, Hopkins maintained one sign at the entrance to his home at 148 East Main Street in Elkton and another sign along a highway leading into the town.2
At trial, four photographs were admitted into evidence to show the signs.3 One photograph, taken on an afternoon in September 1947, depicted the sign in Elkton containing the name 'Rev. W. F. Hopkins.'4 Another photograph, taken at night, showed the same sign illuminated by electricity.5 A third photograph showed the highway sign containing the words 'W. F. Hopkins, Notary Public, Information,' while the fourth showed that sign illuminated at night.6
During the month of August 1947, thirty ministers performed 1,267 marriages in Cecil County, and Hopkins performed 286 of those ceremonies, only three of which involved residents of Cecil County.7 Hopkins did not testify at trial.8 Several witnesses testified that, although he resided in Elkton, Hopkins served as the pastor of the First Home Missionary Church, a congregation of about forty members located in Middletown, Delaware.9
The jury in the Circuit Court for Cecil County returned a verdict of guilty against Hopkins. The court entered judgment of conviction upon the verdict. Hopkins then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.10
Whether the defendant's conviction for maintaining signs deprives him of the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment?11
The First Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act.12 Freedom to believe is absolute, but freedom to act is subject to regulation for the protection of society.13 While regulation must not infringe protected freedom, the State by general and nondiscriminatory legislation may safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community without unconstitutionally invading liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.14 Marriage, though a sacred obligation to many, is nevertheless a civil contract and is regulated by law.15 The unethical practice adopted by some ministers of erecting large signs near the courthouse and along the highways to aid in the solicitation of marriages was not compatible with the ministerial calling.16 It was not practiced by respectable ministers.17 The Act is constitutional.18
No. The rule distinguishes absolute freedom of belief from regulable freedom of action.19 Hopkins maintained illuminated signs at 148 East Main Street and along the highway that read 'Rev. W. F. Hopkins' and 'W. F. Hopkins, Notary Public, Information.'20 During August 1947 he performed 286 of the 1,267 marriages in Cecil County, only three of which involved local residents, demonstrating commercial solicitation rather than protected religious exercise.21 The 1943 statute, enacted after prior measures against inducements and waiting periods, applies nondiscriminatorily to all ministers and targets only the solicitation practice while leaving Hopkins free to serve his forty-member Delaware congregation and perform marriages without signs.22
The jury's verdict therefore rests on the civil contract aspect of marriage and the State's interest in curbing highway advertising rather than any interference with belief.23
The defendant's conviction for maintaining the signs does not deprive him of the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.24
Whether the trial judge erred in excluding testimony offered to show that the State's Attorney advised the defendant in 1944 that the signs would not violate the law?25
It is generally held that the advice of counsel, even if followed in good faith, furnishes no excuse for violating the law and cannot be relied upon as a defense in a criminal action.26 Moreover, advice given by a public official, even a State's Attorney, that a contemplated act is not criminal will not excuse an offender if, as a matter of law, the act did amount to a violation.27 These rules are founded upon the maxim that ignorance of the law will not excuse its violation.28 If an accused could be exempted from punishment by reason of the advice of counsel, such advice would become paramount to the law.29 While ignorance of fact may sometimes be admitted as evidence of lack of criminal intent, ignorance of the law ordinarily does not give immunity from punishment.30 Every man is presumed to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does.31
No. Hopkins did not claim that the State's Attorney misled him regarding any facts but only that the State's Attorney advised him as to the law based upon the facts.32 Hopkins erected the signs at 148 East Main Street and along the highway after receiving that advice.33 He still performed 286 marriages in August 1947.34 The trial court therefore properly excluded the testimony.35 The maxim that ignorance of the law furnishes no defense applies directly when the defendant knew what he wanted to do and did the thing he intended to do.36
Exclusion caused no prejudice because the legal advice could not have altered the statutory violation shown by the four photographs of the illuminated signs and the marriage statistics.37
The trial judge did not err in excluding testimony offered to show that the State's Attorney advised the defendant in 1944 that the signs would not violate the law.38
Whether the admission of testimony that the defendant was not a member of the Cecil County Ministerial Association constituted reversible error?39
Evidence must be relevant to the issues and tend either to establish or disprove them.40 Collateral facts that do not afford a reasonable presumption or inference as to the principal matter in dispute should be excluded.41 They may draw jurors' minds away from the point in issue and arouse prejudices.42 The admission of irrelevant evidence will not require reversal if it appears that the evidence was not prejudicial.43
No. The testimony that thirty-two Protestant ministers belonged to the Cecil County Ministerial Association but that Hopkins was not a member was irrelevant because it did not bear on whether the signs at his home and along the highway aided solicitation of marriages.44 The four photographs, the August 1947 marriage totals of 1,267 ceremonies with Hopkins performing 286, and the witnesses confirming his Delaware pastorate already supplied the jury with direct proof of the statutory violation.45 No objection was made to the final question and no motion to strike was filed.46 The evidence did not prejudice the outcome, so the admission did not rise to reversible error under the established standard.47
The admission of testimony that the defendant was not a member of the Cecil County Ministerial Association did not constitute reversible error.48